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Abstract	
  	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Constructing	
  Arctic	
  Sovereignty:	
  Rules,	
  Policy	
  and	
  Governance	
  
1494-­‐2013	
  is	
  a	
  meta-­‐narrative	
  of	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  state	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  It	
  investigates	
  the	
  evolution	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  over	
  the	
  longue	
  durée,	
  in	
  so	
  far	
  as	
  they	
  frame	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  It	
  examines	
  in	
  particular	
  the	
  increasing	
  importance	
  of	
  the	
  legal	
  dimension	
  of	
  territory	
  and	
  the	
  transitions	
  that	
  have	
  occurred	
  with	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  new	
  rules	
  used	
  by	
  states	
  to	
  establish	
  sovereignty.	
  The	
  thesis	
  analyses	
  the	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  as	
  they	
  pursue	
  their	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  with	
  reference	
  to	
  (and	
  at	
  times	
  in	
  contravention	
  of)	
  international	
  rules	
  and	
  codes,	
  and	
  it	
  situates	
  governance	
  within	
  the	
  framework	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  as	
  a	
  mechanism	
  for	
  states	
  to	
  pursue	
  their	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  beyond	
  their	
  sovereign	
  borders.	
  This	
  thesis	
  makes	
  an	
  original	
  contribution	
  to	
  knowledge	
  through	
  its	
  distinctive	
  methodology	
  and	
  theoretical	
  approach,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  through	
  its	
  analysis	
  of	
  primary	
  materials.	
  Using	
  the	
  pillars	
  of	
  a	
  constructivist	
  research	
  framework	
  -­‐-­‐	
  including	
  rules	
  and	
  interests	
  over	
  the	
  longue	
  durée	
  -­‐-­‐	
  to	
  develop	
  a	
  meta-­‐narrative	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty,	
  it	
  situates	
  contemporary	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policy	
  and	
  governance	
  within	
  the	
  evolving	
  framework	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  identifying	
  imperialism	
  as	
  a	
  common	
  thread	
  in	
  the	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  and	
  Arctic	
  territory.	
  It	
  concludes	
  that	
  the	
  expansion	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  this	
  new	
  territory	
  represents	
  the	
  continuation	
  of	
  imperialism	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  by	
  states,	
  perpetuating	
  an	
  asymmetric	
  relationship	
  that	
  allows	
  states	
  to	
  absorb	
  this	
  territory	
  for	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  resource	
  exploitation	
  in	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  national	
  interests,	
  with	
  international	
  cooperation	
  maintaining	
  the	
  primacy	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  within	
  the	
  region.	
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Introduction	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  On	
  2	
  August	
  2007,	
  a	
  Russian	
  mini-­‐submarine	
  commanded	
  by	
  Arctic	
  hero	
  Artur	
  Chilingarov	
  descended	
  into	
  the	
  depths	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  when	
  “for	
  the	
  first	
  time	
  in	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  human	
  civilization	
  man	
  visited	
  the	
  real	
  pole	
  of	
  the	
  North.”1	
  As	
  a	
  mark	
  of	
  this	
  expedition,	
  a	
  titanium	
  flag	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation	
  was	
  planted	
  on	
  the	
  seabed	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  repeating	
  the	
  ceremonies	
  of	
  possession	
  initiated	
  by	
  explorers	
  in	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  acting	
  on	
  behalf	
  of	
  European	
  empires,	
  an	
  action	
  long	
  considered	
  to	
  be	
  an	
  initial	
  step	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition.	
  The	
  symbolic	
  nature	
  of	
  this	
  undertaking	
  was	
  not	
  lost	
  on	
  the	
  rest	
  of	
  the	
  world,	
  eliciting	
  the	
  immediate	
  response	
  from	
  Canadian	
  Foreign	
  Minister	
  Peter	
  McKay,	
  “This	
  isn’t	
  the	
  15th	
  century.	
  You	
  can’t	
  go	
  around	
  the	
  world	
  and	
  just	
  plant	
  flags	
  and	
  say	
  ‘We’re	
  claiming	
  this	
  territory’,”2	
  a	
  statement	
  denying	
  the	
  international	
  acknowledgement	
  necessary	
  for	
  legitimacy	
  to	
  any	
  claims	
  Russia	
  might	
  have	
  been	
  entertaining.	
  	
  The	
  Arctic	
  is	
  considered	
  the	
  globe’s	
  final	
  frontier	
  in	
  both	
  physical	
  and	
  geopolitical	
  imaginings.	
  It	
  has	
  resisted	
  conquest,	
  armed	
  with	
  perpetual	
  ice	
  and	
  climatic	
  and	
  weather	
  conditions	
  so	
  harsh	
  that	
  many	
  explorers	
  lured	
  by	
  the	
  siren	
  song	
  of	
  Arctic	
  enchantment	
  have	
  been	
  thwarted	
  at	
  the	
  gates	
  or	
  never	
  returned	
  from	
  their	
  expeditions.	
  Through	
  accepted	
  norms	
  of	
  state	
  behaviour	
  during	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  the	
  terra	
  firma	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  been	
  delineated	
  into	
  the	
  political	
  boundaries	
  of	
  the	
  littoral	
  states.	
  However,	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  and	
  its	
  resources	
  remaining	
  locked	
  in	
  an	
  icy	
  safe,	
  sovereign	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  was	
  of	
  little	
  import	
  in	
  this	
  period	
  and	
  failed	
  to	
  be	
  resolved.	
  The	
  Arctic	
  is	
  melting	
  with	
  global	
  warming	
  removing	
  its	
  conditional	
  barriers	
  and,	
  combined	
  with	
  the	
  technology	
  of	
  modern	
  world,	
  the	
  treasures	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  1	
  (Plutenko,	
  2008)	
  2	
  (Parfitt,	
  2007)	
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of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  are	
  now	
  within	
  reach	
  of	
  extraction.	
  The	
  Arctic	
  states	
  are	
  keen	
  to	
  absorb	
  these	
  resources	
  into	
  their	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction,	
  but	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  have	
  changed:	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  maritime	
  is	
  governed	
  by	
  rules	
  different	
  from	
  terrestrial	
  territory	
  and	
  flag	
  planting	
  is	
  no	
  longer	
  an	
  acceptable	
  method	
  for	
  annexation.	
  	
  In	
  the	
  matter	
  of	
  establishing	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  states	
  of	
  Canada,	
  Russia	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  are	
  playing	
  by	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  have	
  always	
  played	
  by	
  the	
  rules,	
  but	
  the	
  rules	
  organising	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  have	
  changed	
  over	
  four	
  discernible	
  periods.	
  These	
  rules	
  include	
  both	
  tacit	
  norms	
  and	
  those	
  codified	
  within	
  international	
  law	
  and	
  they	
  serve	
  as	
  guidelines	
  instructing	
  on	
  the	
  expected	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.3	
  Conceived	
  in	
  Europe,	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  has	
  been	
  moulded	
  into	
  its	
  current	
  form	
  through	
  the	
  forces	
  and	
  methods	
  of	
  imperialism,	
  developed	
  through	
  the	
  expansion	
  of	
  the	
  community	
  of	
  states	
  worldwide	
  and	
  through	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  rules	
  by	
  states	
  with	
  the	
  greatest	
  influence.	
  These	
  new	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  Arctic	
  territory-­‐-­‐and	
  the	
  methods	
  used	
  to	
  acquire	
  it-­‐-­‐are	
  framed	
  within	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  this	
  system	
  and	
  its	
  rules.	
  	
  The	
  history	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  the	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  reflect	
  these	
  transitions	
  within	
  the	
  structure	
  and	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  as	
  their	
  methods	
  for	
  pursuing	
  national	
  interests	
  adjusted	
  to	
  the	
  new	
  expectations	
  in	
  each	
  period.	
  The	
  current	
  foreign	
  policy	
  of	
  these	
  three	
  states	
  is	
  formulated	
  to	
  address	
  their	
  national	
  interests	
  within	
  the	
  contemporary	
  system,	
  and	
  beyond	
  domestic	
  policy,	
  international	
  governance	
  structures	
  are	
  setting	
  precedence	
  for	
  the	
  manner	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  desire	
  the	
  region	
  to	
  be	
  situated	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  going	
  forward.	
  For	
  affairs	
  that	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  3	
  The	
  use	
  concept	
  of	
  ‘rules’	
  is	
  developed	
  in	
  Chapter	
  1.	
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extend	
  beyond	
  their	
  areas	
  of	
  legal	
  jurisdiction,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  are	
  establishing	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  governance	
  to	
  pursue	
  their	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  areas	
  that	
  lie	
  beyond	
  their	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  and	
  to	
  mitigate	
  competition	
  from	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states.	
  	
  
Background	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  establishment	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  amongst	
  the	
  littoral	
  states	
  is	
  a	
  matter	
  of	
  present	
  interest	
  in	
  contemporary	
  international	
  relations.	
  The	
  world	
  has	
  anxiously	
  watched	
  while	
  states	
  make	
  statements	
  on	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  issue	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policy	
  documents,	
  implement	
  existing	
  rules	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  and	
  seek	
  to	
  establish	
  new	
  cooperative	
  arrangements	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.	
  However,	
  within	
  the	
  bustle	
  of	
  Arctic	
  politics	
  there	
  is	
  confusion	
  about	
  the	
  conflicting	
  messages	
  between	
  the	
  activities	
  of	
  states	
  that	
  seemingly	
  do	
  not	
  align	
  with	
  their	
  official	
  policy	
  statements,	
  especially	
  as	
  states	
  make	
  claims	
  of	
  adhering	
  to	
  existing	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  yet	
  meanwhile	
  engaging	
  in	
  publicity	
  stunts	
  that	
  indicate	
  adherence	
  to	
  practices	
  of	
  a	
  bygone	
  age.	
  Why	
  is	
  there	
  so	
  much	
  confusion	
  over	
  what	
  rules	
  apply	
  to	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  how	
  have	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  been	
  applied	
  to	
  date	
  and	
  what	
  implications	
  do	
  this	
  combination	
  of	
  the	
  implementation	
  of	
  these	
  rules	
  with	
  the	
  interest	
  of	
  states	
  have	
  for	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations?	
  	
  It	
  is	
  more	
  than	
  five	
  hundred	
  years	
  since	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  first	
  divided	
  between	
  states	
  and	
  today	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  still	
  undergoing	
  sovereignty	
  transformations.	
  Since	
  this	
  time,	
  the	
  colours	
  of	
  the	
  political	
  map	
  have	
  changed	
  and	
  the	
  boundary	
  lines	
  on	
  maps	
  delimiting	
  the	
  Arctic	
  have	
  moved	
  not	
  only	
  between	
  states	
  but	
  also	
  in	
  their	
  distance	
  from	
  the	
  land	
  to	
  the	
  pole	
  as	
  the	
  region	
  continues	
  to	
  be	
  restructured	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  new	
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codes	
  and	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  The	
  topic	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  seen	
  a	
  succession	
  of	
  waves	
  of	
  historical	
  debates	
  and	
  analysis	
  in	
  the	
  areas	
  of	
  political,	
  legal	
  and	
  security	
  studies	
  throughout	
  these	
  transformations,	
  each	
  wave	
  of	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  appearing	
  to	
  focus	
  only	
  on	
  the	
  national	
  interests	
  and	
  character	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  during	
  the	
  period	
  in	
  which	
  it	
  was	
  generated.	
  Yet	
  between	
  waves,	
  the	
  character	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  has	
  shifted,	
  as	
  have	
  the	
  national	
  interests	
  and	
  identities	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  	
  The	
  first	
  wave	
  of	
  Arctic	
  literature,	
  produced	
  in	
  the	
  nineteenth	
  century,	
  focused	
  on	
  the	
  travels	
  of	
  individual	
  explorers,	
  many	
  titled	
  along	
  the	
  lines	
  of	
  'Tales	
  of	
  Arctic	
  Exploration	
  and	
  Discovery'.	
  It	
  included	
  the	
  diaries	
  and	
  accounts	
  of	
  men	
  such	
  as	
  Franklin,	
  Frobisher	
  and	
  Bering,	
  among	
  many	
  others,	
  as	
  they	
  battled	
  the	
  elements	
  of	
  the	
  hostile	
  Arctic	
  in	
  search	
  of	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Passage	
  and	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route—with	
  a	
  shorter	
  passage	
  from	
  Europe	
  to	
  Asia	
  being	
  the	
  holy	
  grail	
  of	
  Arctic	
  encounter.	
  Tangent	
  to	
  this	
  primary	
  interest	
  were	
  the	
  benefits	
  that	
  came	
  through	
  the	
  discovery	
  of	
  virgin	
  territory	
  and	
  previously	
  untapped	
  economic	
  resources:	
  furs,	
  whale	
  oil,	
  fish	
  and	
  minerals,	
  which	
  were	
  grossly	
  exploited	
  to	
  the	
  detriment	
  of	
  these	
  resources.	
  In	
  order	
  to	
  secure	
  these	
  resources,	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  new	
  territory	
  became	
  an	
  important	
  by-­‐product	
  of	
  exploration.	
  Encounter	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  by	
  the	
  states	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  clearly	
  aligned	
  with	
  other	
  similar	
  objectives	
  of	
  exploration	
  throughout	
  the	
  world:	
  gold,	
  glory	
  and	
  the	
  national	
  interest.	
  	
  As	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  ended	
  and	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  began,	
  the	
  focus	
  of	
  the	
  second	
  wave	
  of	
  Arctic	
  literature	
  shifted	
  accordingly	
  to	
  accommodate	
  the	
  new	
  concerns	
  of	
  the	
  new	
  period	
  when	
  the	
  state	
  system	
  in	
  Europe	
  was	
  consolidating	
  formerly	
  fragmented	
  political	
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units	
  into	
  larger	
  political	
  entities.	
  Corresponding	
  to	
  this	
  shift	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  states	
  sought	
  ways	
  in	
  which	
  to	
  codify	
  existing	
  principles	
  of	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  nations.	
  As	
  new	
  states	
  entered	
  into	
  the	
  state	
  system,	
  they	
  were	
  expected	
  to	
  adhere	
  to	
  these	
  norms.	
  These	
  guidelines	
  on	
  the	
  expected	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  is	
  the	
  focus	
  of	
  Arctic	
  literature	
  in	
  this	
  period,	
  concentrating	
  on	
  the	
  theoretical	
  and	
  legal	
  specifics	
  of	
  state	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  included	
  the	
  debates	
  on	
  the	
  validity	
  of	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  as	
  a	
  mechanism	
  for	
  establishing	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  while	
  superseding	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition,	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  and	
  the	
  rights	
  or	
  limits	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  to	
  exploit	
  and	
  protect	
  resources	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Finally,	
  this	
  period	
  saw	
  a	
  focus	
  on	
  the	
  legal	
  designation	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  areas	
  not	
  adequately	
  claimed	
  under	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  earlier	
  period,	
  such	
  as	
  East	
  Greenland	
  and	
  Svalbard.	
  	
  The	
  third	
  wave	
  of	
  Arctic	
  literature	
  came	
  with	
  the	
  transition	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  to	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period	
  with	
  retrospective	
  studies	
  on	
  the	
  policies	
  of	
  the	
  interwar	
  period,	
  and	
  of	
  special	
  interest	
  including	
  the	
  Stalin	
  era	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  However,	
  the	
  literature	
  of	
  this	
  era	
  focused	
  predominantly	
  on	
  the	
  issues	
  created	
  by	
  Cold	
  War	
  insecurities	
  and	
  the	
  possibility	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  becoming	
  a	
  theatre	
  of	
  war	
  or	
  a	
  route	
  of	
  attack,	
  and	
  many	
  reports	
  were	
  of	
  material	
  capabilities	
  coupled	
  with	
  analyses	
  of	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  by	
  states	
  for	
  both	
  security	
  and	
  sovereignty	
  objectives.	
  Near	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  this	
  period,	
  environmental	
  issues	
  were	
  introduced	
  to	
  the	
  discourse,	
  reflecting	
  the	
  move	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  cooperate	
  towards	
  environmental	
  concerns,	
  not	
  only	
  because	
  the	
  Arctic	
  environment	
  was	
  under	
  threat,	
  but	
  also	
  as	
  a	
  non-­‐security	
  concern	
  over	
  which	
  these	
  states	
  could	
  agree.	
  	
  With	
  the	
  dissolution	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
  a	
  turn	
  toward	
  cooperation	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  began,	
  and	
  most	
  importantly,	
  with	
  the	
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discovery	
  of	
  vast	
  energy	
  reserves	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  a	
  new	
  wave	
  of	
  interest	
  surged	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  literature	
  can	
  be	
  divided	
  into	
  academic	
  analyses	
  of	
  specific	
  issues	
  and	
  'pop'	
  or	
  sensational	
  accounts	
  of	
  the	
  'race	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic'.	
  There	
  has	
  been	
  a	
  mushrooming	
  of	
  literature	
  in	
  this	
  period,	
  especially	
  in	
  the	
  last	
  few	
  years	
  as	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  become	
  an	
  in	
  vogue	
  international	
  affairs	
  topic	
  due	
  to	
  climate	
  change	
  and	
  the	
  discovery	
  of	
  fossil	
  fuels.	
  It	
  includes	
  topics	
  such	
  as	
  analyses	
  of	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  implications	
  of	
  scientific	
  programmes	
  initiated	
  by	
  states	
  to	
  support	
  development	
  policies	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  legal	
  commentary	
  on	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  a	
  body	
  of	
  polar	
  law	
  and	
  analyses	
  of	
  individual	
  components	
  from	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  to	
  environmental	
  cooperation.	
  They	
  have	
  also	
  included	
  narratives	
  detailing	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  disputes	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  informing	
  on	
  how	
  they	
  will	
  be	
  determined	
  given	
  present	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Yet	
  this	
  final	
  wave	
  of	
  literature	
  fails	
  to	
  analyse	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  as	
  part	
  of	
  a	
  larger	
  process.	
  	
  This	
  research	
  bridges	
  these	
  individual	
  waves	
  of	
  literature	
  by	
  engaging	
  with	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  by	
  marking	
  the	
  transitions	
  within	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  layering	
  of	
  its	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  as	
  they	
  channelled	
  state	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  this	
  meta-­‐narrative	
  of	
  sovereignty,	
  a	
  comparative	
  analysis	
  is	
  conducted	
  on	
  the	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  as	
  they	
  have	
  acquired	
  territory,	
  established	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  deployed	
  effective	
  occupation	
  and	
  administration	
  in	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  national	
  interests.	
  Finally,	
  this	
  research	
  demonstrates	
  how	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  are	
  using	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  to	
  develop	
  a	
  governance	
  framework	
  that	
  allows	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  realm.	
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The	
  Problem	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Currently,	
  in	
  2014,	
  claims	
  to	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  are	
  being	
  established	
  over	
  maritime	
  areas,	
  despite	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  a	
  long	
  upheld	
  principle	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  that	
  the	
  seas	
  are	
  free	
  and	
  not	
  subject	
  to	
  the	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  states.	
  Thus,	
  for	
  these	
  sovereign	
  claims	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  to	
  be	
  an	
  acceptable	
  policy	
  within	
  international	
  relations,	
  the	
  rules	
  will	
  have	
  to	
  change	
  in	
  order	
  for	
  these	
  claims	
  to	
  legitimately	
  progress.	
  Although	
  the	
  rules	
  defining	
  territorial	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  ultimately	
  began	
  with	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Tordesillas	
  1494,	
  this	
  specific	
  change	
  to	
  generate	
  the	
  new	
  conceptions	
  of	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  involved	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  events	
  initiated	
  by	
  the	
  Truman	
  Proclamation	
  1945	
  and	
  culminated	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982,	
  all	
  socially	
  constructed	
  rules.	
  States	
  have	
  introduced	
  these	
  latest	
  rules	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  acquire	
  sovereign	
  rights	
  to	
  pursue	
  their	
  national	
  interests	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  territories.	
  	
  	
  These	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  claims	
  are	
  being	
  determined	
  based	
  on	
  their	
  contiguity	
  to	
  sovereign	
  terra	
  firma	
  that	
  surrounds	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean.	
  This	
  vast	
  territory,	
  historically	
  without	
  political	
  organisation	
  and	
  still	
  sparsely	
  populated,	
  has	
  been	
  absorbed	
  into	
  the	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  states	
  by	
  imperialist	
  policies	
  of	
  an	
  earlier	
  period,	
  legitimised	
  according	
  to	
  rules	
  that	
  regulated	
  the	
  acquisition	
  of	
  territory.	
  Sovereignty	
  over	
  these	
  regions	
  has	
  been	
  primarily	
  maintained	
  through	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  effective	
  occupation	
  through	
  security	
  pursuits.	
  However,	
  with	
  the	
  addition	
  of	
  new	
  rules	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  self-­‐determination	
  for	
  indigenous	
  people,	
  the	
  sole	
  use	
  of	
  effective	
  occupation	
  results	
  in	
  an	
  uncertain	
  legitimacy	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  some	
  Arctic	
  territories	
  given	
  the	
  weak	
  political	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  core	
  and	
  the	
  outer	
  extremities	
  of	
  these	
  Arctic	
  territories	
  once	
  predominantly	
  used	
  only	
  for	
  defence	
  and	
  economic	
  exploitation.	
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To	
  diminish	
  the	
  effects	
  of	
  these	
  uncertainties,	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  have	
  implemented	
  Arctic	
  policies	
  that	
  maintain	
  international	
  recognition	
  of	
  their	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  while	
  continuing	
  to	
  pursue	
  their	
  resource	
  and	
  security	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  in	
  an	
  asymmetric	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  inhabitants	
  and	
  with	
  the	
  territory	
  providing	
  the	
  resources.	
  	
  Although	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  creates	
  stability	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  it	
  also	
  constrains	
  the	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  defined	
  territorial	
  boundaries.	
  Sovereignty	
  is	
  ultimately	
  in	
  the	
  interests	
  of,	
  and	
  indeed	
  defining	
  of,	
  states.	
  It	
  allows	
  them	
  to	
  maintain	
  jurisdictional	
  integrity,	
  but	
  it	
  also	
  restricts	
  their	
  ability	
  to	
  project	
  policy-­‐-­‐and	
  thus	
  national	
  interests	
  -­‐-­‐beyond	
  those	
  boundaries.	
  With	
  issues	
  germane	
  to	
  national	
  interests,	
  such	
  as	
  environmental	
  security,	
  climate	
  change	
  and	
  control	
  of	
  shipping	
  lanes,	
  lying	
  outside	
  the	
  sovereign	
  boundaries	
  of	
  states,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  are	
  unable	
  to	
  unilaterally	
  establish	
  policy	
  to	
  pursue	
  these	
  interests.	
  Since	
  the	
  early	
  phase	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  states	
  have	
  negotiated	
  with	
  other	
  states	
  to	
  create	
  new	
  rules	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  overcome	
  this	
  constraint,	
  resulting	
  in	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  being	
  structured	
  through	
  the	
  layering	
  of	
  socially	
  constructed	
  rules.	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  is	
  both	
  developed	
  and	
  limited	
  through	
  this	
  layering	
  of	
  rules,	
  and	
  to	
  circumvent	
  the	
  constraints	
  of	
  sovereignty,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  have	
  developed	
  rules	
  of	
  governance	
  to	
  pursue	
  policy	
  and	
  interests	
  beyond	
  their	
  jurisdictional	
  boundaries,	
  an	
  act	
  which	
  ultimately	
  alters	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  	
  In	
  this	
  light,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  presents	
  a	
  problem	
  for	
  policy	
  analysis	
  within	
  international	
  relations.	
  The	
  present	
  claims	
  to	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  cannot	
  be	
  adequately	
  understood	
  when	
  framed	
  only	
  within	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  contemporary	
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international	
  relations,	
  for	
  the	
  current	
  policy	
  is	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  long-­‐term	
  engagements	
  with	
  the	
  region	
  and	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  that	
  frames	
  it.	
  The	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  through	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  Arctic	
  governance,	
  have	
  long	
  demonstrated	
  an	
  imperialist	
  relationship	
  towards	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  their	
  policy	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  their	
  national	
  interests,	
  a	
  relationship	
  that	
  is	
  typical	
  of	
  state	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  since	
  the	
  discovery	
  of	
  the	
  ‘New	
  World.’	
  If	
  one	
  analyses	
  and	
  frames	
  contemporary	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  and	
  governance	
  through	
  the	
  long	
  term	
  development	
  of	
  rules	
  in	
  the	
  socially	
  constructed	
  international	
  system,	
  it	
  enables	
  a	
  comprehensive	
  understanding	
  of	
  how	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  came	
  to	
  be	
  developed	
  through	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  states	
  engaging	
  with	
  the	
  region	
  and	
  how	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  is	
  being	
  configured	
  as	
  the	
  these	
  states	
  continue	
  to	
  pursue	
  their	
  national	
  interests.	
  	
  	
  
Main	
  arguments	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  issue	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  an	
  important	
  topic,	
  not	
  only	
  of	
  interest	
  to	
  the	
  policy	
  makers	
  of	
  today,	
  but	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  also	
  serves	
  as	
  a	
  case	
  study	
  for	
  demonstrating	
  the	
  way	
  in	
  which	
  states	
  pursue	
  national	
  interests,	
  especially	
  territorial	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  resource	
  sovereignty	
  within	
  the	
  confines	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  how	
  foreign	
  policy	
  is	
  shaped	
  by	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  these	
  national	
  interests	
  constrained	
  by	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  finally	
  how	
  states	
  circumvent	
  constraints	
  to	
  pursue	
  their	
  interests	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  traditional	
  bounds	
  of	
  sovereignty.	
  In	
  the	
  Ilulissat	
  Declaration	
  of	
  2008,	
  the	
  five	
  coastal	
  states	
  declared	
  that	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  would	
  be	
  determined	
  by	
  existing	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law,	
  both	
  rejecting	
  the	
  potential	
  of	
  creating	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Treaty	
  but	
  also	
  affirming	
  dedication	
  to	
  cooperating	
  with	
  one	
  another	
  to	
  pursue	
  issues	
  unique	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Region.	
  This	
  introduces	
  the	
  query:	
  Why	
  is	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  still	
  being	
  established	
  and	
  why	
  are	
  the	
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current	
  structures	
  insufficient	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  contemporary	
  opening	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic?	
  	
  Underlying	
  this	
  process	
  of	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  is	
  the	
  demonstration	
  of	
  imperialism	
  as	
  the	
  modus	
  operandi	
  in	
  the	
  way	
  in	
  which	
  states	
  relate	
  to	
  the	
  land,	
  its	
  people	
  and	
  its	
  resources	
  outside	
  of	
  a	
  ‘social	
  contract’.	
  In	
  pursuing	
  sovereignty,	
  states	
  are	
  seeking	
  recognition	
  by	
  the	
  international	
  community	
  that	
  they	
  hold	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  administrate	
  a	
  given	
  territory.	
  As	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  duties	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  to	
  its	
  population,	
  this	
  administration	
  traditionally	
  includes	
  pursuing	
  national	
  interests	
  of	
  security.	
  Today,	
  security	
  is	
  not	
  measured	
  only	
  in	
  physical	
  and	
  material	
  capabilities,	
  but	
  security	
  is	
  also	
  measured	
  in	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  ensure	
  control	
  over	
  a	
  great	
  variety	
  of	
  issues.	
  In	
  a	
  globalised	
  world	
  this	
  security	
  can	
  include	
  a	
  range	
  of	
  measures	
  from	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  mitigate	
  terrorist	
  attacks,	
  health	
  pandemics,	
  marine	
  pollution	
  or	
  the	
  effects	
  of	
  climate	
  change	
  where	
  often	
  the	
  security	
  of	
  one	
  state	
  in	
  these	
  matters	
  relies	
  on	
  the	
  cooperation	
  of	
  many	
  states,	
  restricting	
  the	
  utility	
  of	
  territorial	
  sovereignty.	
  However,	
  most	
  importantly	
  and	
  often	
  the	
  largest	
  measure	
  of	
  security	
  with	
  which	
  policy	
  makers	
  can	
  seek	
  results,	
  is	
  found	
  in	
  economic	
  terms,	
  which	
  relies	
  on	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  access	
  raw	
  material	
  resources,	
  develop	
  industry,	
  and	
  engage	
  in	
  international	
  trade	
  because	
  economic	
  security	
  ultimately	
  permits	
  the	
  maintenance	
  of	
  physical	
  security.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  This	
  thesis	
  argues	
  that	
  throughout	
  the	
  entire	
  process	
  of	
  establishing	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  from	
  1494	
  to	
  2013,	
  states	
  have	
  been	
  playing	
  by	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  abiding	
  by	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  in	
  their	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  However,	
  during	
  this	
  long	
  drawn	
  out	
  process	
  of	
  establishing	
  sovereignty	
  the	
  rules	
  have	
  changed	
  so	
  that	
  new	
  layers	
  of	
  territory	
  over	
  which	
  to	
  establish	
  sovereignty	
  have	
  been	
  created,	
  which	
  is	
  why	
  states	
  still	
  make	
  reference	
  to	
  establishing	
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sovereignty.	
  These	
  transitions	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  can	
  be	
  followed	
  throughout	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  policies	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia.	
  Meanwhile,	
  as	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  become	
  more	
  embedded	
  in	
  state	
  practice,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  are	
  compelled	
  to	
  turn	
  to	
  international	
  governance	
  as	
  a	
  method	
  to	
  pursue	
  national	
  interests	
  outside	
  of	
  their	
  sovereign	
  boundaries,	
  allowing	
  for	
  regulatory	
  frameworks	
  addressing	
  contemporary	
  issues	
  in	
  the	
  terra	
  nullius	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  This	
  thesis	
  makes	
  its	
  original	
  contribution	
  to	
  knowledge	
  through	
  collating	
  established	
  facts	
  of	
  recorded	
  Arctic	
  history,	
  combining	
  this	
  knowledge	
  together	
  with	
  new	
  facts	
  of	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  and	
  analysing	
  them	
  through	
  methods	
  and	
  a	
  framework	
  not	
  previously	
  employed	
  in	
  studies	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations.	
  It	
  analyses	
  issues	
  within	
  international	
  relations	
  at	
  three	
  different	
  levels:	
  the	
  meta-­‐narrative	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  structure,	
  the	
  national	
  interests	
  within	
  the	
  state	
  that	
  are	
  manifest	
  in	
  their	
  Arctic	
  policies	
  and	
  the	
  practices	
  of	
  these	
  states	
  with	
  the	
  structure	
  as	
  they	
  pursue	
  policy	
  and	
  interests	
  outside	
  of	
  territorial	
  boundaries.	
  Policy	
  has	
  memory,	
  and	
  as	
  foreign	
  policy	
  decision-­‐making	
  does	
  not	
  occur	
  within	
  a	
  political	
  vacuum,	
  this	
  model	
  permits	
  the	
  analysis	
  of	
  the	
  processes	
  underlying	
  these	
  decisions.	
  The	
  impact	
  of	
  this	
  research	
  is	
  that	
  this	
  models	
  approach	
  can	
  be	
  applied	
  to	
  future	
  studies	
  of	
  both	
  historical	
  foreign	
  policy	
  decisions	
  and	
  contemporary	
  international	
  relations.	
  Additionally,	
  the	
  findings	
  of	
  this	
  research	
  will	
  be	
  useful	
  to	
  policymakers	
  in	
  both	
  Arctic	
  and	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states	
  alike	
  giving	
  insight	
  to	
  the	
  broader	
  issues	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  to	
  inform	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  future	
  policy.	
  Finally,	
  it	
  provides	
  similar	
  insight	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  identifying	
  issues	
  relevant	
  to	
  the	
  work	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  and	
  making	
  policy	
  recommendations	
  for	
  these	
  issues.	
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Methodology	
  and	
  Theoretical	
  Approach	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Methodologically,	
  this	
  thesis	
  employs	
  several	
  tools	
  available	
  to	
  the	
  social	
  scientist.	
  The	
  first	
  is	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  a	
  meta-­‐narrative	
  of	
  the	
  longue	
  durée	
  history	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  policy.	
  The	
  use	
  of	
  this	
  approach	
  allows	
  this	
  research	
  to	
  avoid	
  the	
  limitations	
  of	
  an	
  episodic	
  analysis	
  of	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  through	
  only	
  the	
  lens	
  of	
  the	
  present,	
  and	
  permits	
  a	
  reconstruction	
  of	
  the	
  long-­‐term	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  Through	
  this,	
  a	
  discursive	
  historical	
  analytical	
  approach	
  is	
  employed	
  to	
  determine	
  meaning	
  in	
  the	
  sequence	
  of	
  events	
  that	
  shape	
  the	
  interplay	
  between	
  actors	
  and	
  structures	
  in	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  the	
  fulfilment	
  of	
  interests.	
  It	
  focuses	
  on	
  the	
  structures	
  and	
  the	
  rules	
  that	
  form	
  the	
  structures	
  that	
  are	
  generated	
  as	
  the	
  outcome	
  of	
  these	
  interactions,	
  in	
  turn,	
  shaping	
  future	
  events	
  with	
  its	
  own	
  new	
  set	
  of	
  identities,	
  interests	
  and	
  structure.	
  	
  To	
  develop	
  this	
  meta-­‐narrative,	
  this	
  research	
  has	
  employed	
  both	
  primary	
  and	
  secondary	
  sources,	
  drawing	
  from	
  a	
  range	
  of	
  empirical	
  materials,	
  using	
  process-­‐tracing	
  to	
  identify	
  a	
  lineage	
  of	
  the	
  key	
  events	
  pertinent	
  to	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  Primary	
  resources	
  have	
  included	
  treaties,	
  policy	
  documents,	
  official	
  government	
  diplomatic	
  reports	
  and	
  releases,	
  maps,	
  congressional	
  and	
  parliamentary	
  archival	
  records,	
  and	
  newspaper	
  archives	
  dating	
  back	
  to	
  the	
  mid-­‐nineteenth	
  century.	
  When	
  the	
  historical	
  narrative	
  lies	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  primary	
  materials,	
  secondary	
  sources	
  of	
  historical	
  accounts	
  have	
  been	
  consulted.	
  Throughout,	
  a	
  critical	
  relationship	
  has	
  been	
  maintained	
  with	
  the	
  secondary	
  sources	
  to	
  avoid	
  adopting	
  biases	
  present	
  within	
  this	
  literature.	
  	
  The	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  case	
  study	
  has	
  been	
  employed	
  to	
  test	
  the	
  macro	
  observations	
  of	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  codes	
  and	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
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international	
  system	
  which	
  frame	
  the	
  Arctic	
  on	
  a	
  micro	
  level	
  in	
  the	
  individual	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  analyses	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia.	
  This	
  method	
  has	
  provided	
  the	
  opportunity	
  to	
  make	
  epistemological	
  evaluations	
  of	
  the	
  transitions	
  described	
  to	
  develop	
  a	
  valid	
  and	
  reliable	
  understanding	
  of	
  the	
  reality	
  of	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  The	
  existence	
  of	
  these	
  three	
  case	
  studies	
  has	
  then	
  provided	
  an	
  opportunity	
  to	
  exercise	
  a	
  third	
  method,	
  a	
  comparative	
  analysis	
  of	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  of	
  these	
  three	
  states	
  in	
  corresponding	
  period	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  Although	
  not	
  actively	
  employed	
  as	
  a	
  research	
  method,	
  this	
  thesis	
  has	
  been	
  informed	
  by	
  the	
  models	
  analysis	
  approach	
  of	
  Graham	
  Allison,	
  introduced	
  in	
  'The	
  Essence	
  of	
  Decision:	
  The	
  Cuban	
  Missile	
  Crisis.'	
  In	
  this	
  work,	
  Allison	
  proposes	
  a	
  framework	
  for	
  analysing	
  the	
  domestic	
  foreign	
  policy	
  decision-­‐making	
  process.	
  In	
  brief,	
  he	
  asks:	
  Is	
  this	
  decision	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  a	
  state	
  behaving	
  as	
  a	
  rational	
  actor,	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  bureaucratic	
  departmental	
  processes	
  or	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  personality	
  politics?	
  In	
  analysing	
  the	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia,	
  it	
  can	
  be	
  seen	
  that	
  at	
  different	
  times	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  analytical	
  approaches	
  can	
  be	
  applied	
  to	
  various	
  points	
  in	
  history.	
  The	
  U.S.	
  decision	
  to	
  decline	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  and	
  the	
  sectoral	
  proclamations	
  of	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  could	
  be	
  deemed	
  as	
  examples	
  of	
  these	
  states	
  acting	
  as	
  rational	
  actors.	
  The	
  decision	
  by	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Canada	
  to	
  form	
  NORAD	
  and	
  the	
  DEW	
  line	
  and	
  the	
  decision	
  of	
  Russia	
  to	
  dedicate	
  research	
  and	
  funding	
  to	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  icebreakers	
  as	
  early	
  as	
  the	
  late	
  twentieth	
  century	
  can	
  be	
  attributed	
  to	
  bureaucratic	
  politics.	
  Finally,	
  Canada	
  giving	
  a	
  passport	
  to	
  Santa	
  Claus	
  and	
  Putin	
  photographed	
  assisting	
  a	
  research	
  team	
  to	
  tag	
  polar	
  bears	
  for	
  environmental	
  studies	
  are	
  likely	
  to	
  be	
  attributed	
  to	
  personality	
  politics.	
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However,	
  these	
  examples	
  provide	
  a	
  mere	
  snapshot	
  of	
  the	
  story	
  of	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  and	
  the	
  ways	
  in	
  which	
  these	
  states	
  approach	
  the	
  issue.	
  Although	
  responding	
  to	
  a	
  USGS	
  announcement	
  that	
  a	
  significant	
  quantity	
  of	
  the	
  world's	
  fossil	
  fuel	
  resources	
  are	
  found	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  contemporary	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policy	
  documents	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  do	
  not	
  stand	
  in	
  a	
  vacuum	
  of	
  time	
  and	
  Arctic	
  politics	
  cannot	
  be	
  analysed	
  only	
  against	
  present	
  conditions,	
  as	
  so	
  many	
  recent	
  commentaries	
  have	
  done.	
  Rather,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  of	
  these	
  three	
  states	
  must	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  the	
  long	
  term	
  cumulative	
  result	
  of	
  political	
  development,	
  and	
  also	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  their	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  within	
  their	
  interaction	
  with	
  each	
  other	
  in	
  the	
  realm	
  of	
  international	
  relations	
  as	
  they	
  act	
  to	
  secure	
  their	
  best	
  interests.	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  singular	
  event-­‐-­‐	
  as	
  was	
  the	
  Cuban	
  Missile	
  Crisis-­‐-­‐	
  but	
  also	
  a	
  response	
  to	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  new	
  rules	
  for	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  The	
  study	
  of	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  is	
  thus	
  a	
  long	
  term	
  and	
  broad	
  subject	
  of	
  engagement	
  with	
  an	
  entire	
  region,	
  and	
  Allison’s	
  models,	
  although	
  informative	
  and	
  helpful	
  as	
  a	
  framework	
  for	
  analysis,	
  are	
  insufficient	
  to	
  analyse	
  and	
  comprehend	
  what	
  is	
  the	
  breadth	
  and	
  depth	
  of	
  the	
  past	
  and	
  future	
  of	
  Arctic	
  policy.	
  	
  Finally,	
  while	
  not	
  subscribing	
  to	
  a	
  specific	
  school	
  of	
  thought,	
  this	
  research	
  has	
  been	
  informed	
  by	
  International	
  Relations	
  Social	
  Constructivist	
  theory.	
  In	
  varying	
  degrees,	
  it	
  has	
  used	
  the	
  four	
  pillars	
  of	
  Constructivist	
  thought-­‐-­‐	
  structure,	
  agents,	
  interests	
  and	
  identity—components	
  on	
  which	
  to	
  focus	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  meta-­‐narrative	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  To	
  facilitate	
  this	
  development	
  the	
  research	
  design	
  of	
  this	
  thesis	
  asks	
  questions	
  such	
  as:	
  what	
  are	
  the	
  structures,	
  who	
  are	
  the	
  agents	
  and	
  what	
  are	
  their	
  interests	
  and	
  identities?	
  It	
  adopts	
  a	
  Constructivist	
  position	
  on	
  the	
  mutual	
  construction	
  of	
  stable	
  meanings	
  to	
  form	
  new	
  structures,	
  and	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  objectives	
  of	
  this	
  research	
  has	
  been	
  to	
  pinpoint	
  the	
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'turning	
  points'	
  in	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  which	
  has	
  led	
  to	
  the	
  identification	
  of	
  four	
  distinctive	
  periods	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system:	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years,	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  and	
  the	
  Post-­‐Cold	
  War	
  Periods.	
  
	
  
Limitations	
  	
  The	
  first	
  limitation	
  in	
  considering	
  the	
  long-­‐term	
  development	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  is	
  that	
  this	
  research	
  focuses	
  on	
  what	
  is	
  quite	
  a	
  large	
  period	
  of	
  time.	
  In	
  the	
  chapter	
  on	
  the	
  genealogy	
  of	
  international	
  law,	
  time	
  begins	
  in	
  the	
  events	
  of	
  1492	
  that	
  were	
  catalyst	
  for	
  the	
  Columbian	
  exchange	
  and	
  the	
  rapid	
  expansion	
  of	
  known	
  lands	
  and	
  resources,	
  and	
  at	
  a	
  varying	
  intervals	
  for	
  the	
  studies	
  of	
  the	
  foreign	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  depending	
  on	
  when	
  they	
  first	
  encountered	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  long-­‐term	
  approach	
  has	
  both	
  strengths	
  and	
  weaknesses.	
  Its	
  strength	
  lies	
  in	
  that	
  considering	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  expansion	
  of	
  territorial	
  sovereignty	
  into	
  the	
  Arctic	
  of	
  the	
  selected	
  states,	
  one	
  is	
  able	
  to	
  develop	
  a	
  complete	
  and	
  'big	
  picture'	
  by	
  describing	
  the	
  broad	
  overarching	
  patterns	
  of	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  dominant	
  trends	
  that	
  survived	
  or	
  faded	
  with	
  the	
  transitions	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Its	
  weakness	
  lies	
  in	
  that	
  the	
  timeframe	
  coupled	
  with	
  the	
  limitations	
  of	
  a	
  thesis	
  have	
  restricted	
  the	
  amount	
  of	
  detail	
  that	
  has	
  been	
  included	
  and	
  has	
  thus	
  restricted	
  opportunity	
  for	
  the	
  depth	
  of	
  analysis	
  in	
  some	
  chapters.	
  	
  Another	
  important	
  limitation	
  is	
  that	
  this	
  thesis	
  only	
  considers	
  the	
  foreign	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  three	
  largest	
  of	
  Arctic	
  littoral	
  states,	
  which	
  again	
  restricts	
  the	
  broader	
  opportunities	
  for	
  analysis.	
  This	
  has	
  occurred	
  in	
  part	
  because	
  the	
  size	
  of	
  the	
  thesis	
  did	
  not	
  permit	
  for	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  littoral	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  be	
  included	
  with	
  the	
  same	
  level	
  of	
  detail	
  as	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia.	
  However,	
  Norway	
  and	
  Denmark	
  were	
  also	
  excluded	
  as	
  not	
  only	
  are	
  they	
  the	
  smallest	
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of	
  the	
  littoral	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  but	
  also	
  because	
  their	
  formal	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  a	
  much	
  shorter	
  timespan,	
  eliminating	
  them	
  as	
  party	
  to	
  the	
  solidification	
  of	
  codes	
  and	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery.	
  Norway	
  became	
  an	
  Arctic	
  state,	
  largely	
  by	
  coincidence	
  when	
  it	
  gained	
  independence	
  from	
  Sweden	
  in	
  1905	
  and	
  Denmark	
  was	
  awarded	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  Greenland	
  by	
  the	
  International	
  Court	
  of	
  Justice	
  in	
  1933.	
  Today,	
  home	
  government	
  rules	
  Greenland	
  with	
  only	
  economic	
  ties	
  keeping	
  them	
  bound	
  to	
  Denmark.	
  (How	
  convenient	
  it	
  would	
  have	
  been	
  for	
  this	
  thesis	
  had	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  successfully	
  purchased	
  Greenland!)	
  Finally,	
  these	
  states	
  were	
  excluded	
  due	
  to	
  language	
  barriers,	
  as	
  I	
  neither	
  understand	
  their	
  language	
  nor	
  had	
  resources	
  to	
  finance	
  translation.	
  As	
  many	
  resources	
  detailing	
  Russia	
  in	
  all	
  four	
  of	
  the	
  phases	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  that	
  this	
  thesis	
  approaches	
  are	
  available	
  in	
  English,	
  this	
  was	
  deemed	
  only	
  a	
  minor	
  limitation	
  for	
  the	
  chapter	
  on	
  Russia.	
  	
  
Chapter	
  Summaries	
  	
  Part	
  One:	
  Rules	
  	
  Chapter	
  One:	
  The	
  Case	
  of	
  the	
  Melting	
  Arctic:	
  Sovereignty,	
  Imperialism	
  and	
  the	
  International	
  System	
  	
  In	
  the	
  formation	
  of	
  a	
  meta-­‐narrative	
  of	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  it	
  is	
  evident	
  that	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  been	
  developed	
  on	
  a	
  foundation	
  of	
  imperialism.	
  Although	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  'discovered'	
  long	
  ago,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  first	
  encountered	
  imperialism	
  in	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  when	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  of	
  states	
  were	
  being	
  developed	
  for	
  the	
  intents	
  and	
  purposes	
  of	
  imperial	
  expansion.	
  Transitioning	
  through	
  subsequent	
  eras	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system:	
  the	
  Interwar,	
  Cold	
  War	
  and	
  Post-­‐Cold	
  War	
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Periods,	
  it	
  is	
  possible	
  to	
  see	
  the	
  addition	
  of	
  new	
  rules	
  which	
  have	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  expanding	
  definitions	
  of	
  territory,	
  which	
  allows	
  for	
  states	
  to	
  continue	
  claiming	
  new	
  layers	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  includes	
  rules	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  sector	
  principle,	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  and	
  Arctic	
  governance.	
  	
  To	
  answer	
  the	
  question	
  ‘Who	
  owns	
  the	
  Arctic?’	
  this	
  chapter	
  clarifies	
  the	
  function	
  of	
  ownership,	
  or	
  sovereignty,	
  as	
  a	
  rule	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Elaborating	
  on	
  the	
  mechanics	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  this	
  chapter	
  introduced	
  a	
  function	
  mechanism,	
  or	
  a	
  rules	
  engine,	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  how	
  new	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  cause	
  transition	
  within	
  this	
  system.	
  After	
  presenting	
  a	
  discussion	
  on	
  the	
  methods	
  of	
  imperialism	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  this	
  chapter	
  argues	
  that	
  the	
  characteristics	
  of	
  imperialism	
  are	
  evident	
  throughout	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  and	
  the	
  application	
  of	
  this	
  concept	
  is	
  useful	
  in	
  determining	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations.	
  	
  Chapter	
  Two:	
  A	
  Genealogy	
  of	
  the	
  Rules	
  and	
  Codes	
  of	
  Arctic	
  Sovereignty	
  	
  In	
  their	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  and	
  their	
  practices	
  in	
  Arctic	
  diplomacy	
  and	
  engagement,	
  Canada,	
  Russia	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  have	
  declared	
  that	
  in	
  the	
  matter	
  of	
  establishing	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  that	
  they	
  are	
  all	
  abiding	
  by	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law.	
  International	
  laws	
  are	
  socially	
  constructed	
  rules	
  that	
  have	
  resulted	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  over	
  the	
  space	
  of	
  centuries,	
  and	
  the	
  international	
  law	
  that	
  frames	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  this	
  evolving	
  structure.	
  As	
  this	
  structure	
  has	
  evolved,	
  the	
  laws,	
  or	
  rules,	
  which	
  frame	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  provide	
  guidelines	
  for	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  in	
  their	
  engagement	
  with	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  have	
  also	
  changed.	
  The	
  rules	
  that	
  applied	
  in	
  the	
  fifteenth	
  century	
  are	
  not	
  the	
  rules	
  that	
  apply	
  in	
  the	
  twenty-­‐first,	
  although	
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the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  still	
  refer	
  to	
  these	
  older	
  rules	
  as	
  a	
  method	
  of	
  measuring	
  the	
  condition	
  of	
  their	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  as	
  a	
  way	
  to	
  inform	
  their	
  policy	
  objectives	
  in	
  contemporary	
  Arctic	
  politics.	
  	
  The	
  chapter	
  investigates	
  the	
  layering	
  of	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  that	
  have	
  developed	
  in	
  four	
  different	
  phases	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  to	
  culminate	
  in	
  the	
  shared	
  system	
  of	
  understanding	
  that	
  guides	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  in	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  their	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  Arctic	
  territory.	
  It	
  does	
  this	
  by	
  establishing	
  a	
  lineage,	
  or	
  genealogy	
  of	
  codes	
  and	
  laws	
  which	
  have	
  developed	
  in	
  international	
  relations	
  from	
  the	
  'discovery'	
  of	
  the	
  Americas	
  in	
  1492,	
  to	
  end	
  in	
  2013,	
  an	
  era	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  are	
  claiming	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean.	
  The	
  chapter	
  leads	
  to	
  the	
  point	
  where	
  law	
  over	
  territory	
  ends	
  and	
  where	
  governance	
  begins.	
  	
  The	
  chapter	
  focuses	
  on	
  the	
  agreement,	
  development	
  and	
  implementation	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  that	
  have	
  informed	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  (or	
  their	
  political	
  predecessors)	
  as	
  they	
  engage	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  It	
  then	
  leads	
  to	
  the	
  division	
  of	
  both	
  terrestrial	
  and	
  maritime	
  territory,	
  including:	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law,	
  treaties,	
  customary	
  and	
  codified	
  law	
  as	
  it	
  has	
  developed	
  across	
  the	
  four	
  different	
  phases	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  that	
  this	
  thesis	
  identifies	
  for	
  its	
  organisational	
  approach.	
  It	
  begins	
  with	
  the	
  'Age	
  of	
  Discovery'	
  in	
  the	
  ‘discovery’	
  of	
  the	
  Americas	
  by	
  Columbus	
  in	
  1492	
  and	
  the	
  resulting	
  rules	
  that	
  developed	
  as	
  a	
  consequence	
  of	
  that	
  encounter	
  in	
  an	
  international	
  system	
  dominated	
  by	
  the	
  authority	
  of	
  the	
  Pope.	
  After	
  following	
  territorial	
  transfers	
  that	
  shaped	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  territory	
  that	
  would	
  finally	
  become	
  the	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia,	
  the	
  chapter	
  moves	
  through	
  the	
  Interwar	
  and	
  Cold	
  War	
  phases	
  which	
  included	
  new	
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transformations	
  in	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  way	
  that	
  these	
  states	
  engaged	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  It	
  ends	
  with	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  rule	
  of	
  governance	
  in	
  the	
  Post-­‐Cold	
  War	
  phase	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  Part	
  Two:	
  Policy	
  	
  Chapter	
  Three:	
  United	
  States	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  1867-­‐2013	
  	
  Having	
  acquired	
  their	
  Arctic	
  territory	
  by	
  purchase	
  and	
  treaty,	
  under	
  a	
  policy	
  of	
  imperial	
  expansion,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  maintains	
  a	
  strong	
  position	
  in	
  their	
  claims	
  to	
  Arctic	
  territorial	
  sovereignty.	
  However,	
  despite	
  being	
  an	
  active	
  participant	
  in	
  Arctic	
  international	
  affairs,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  occupies	
  a	
  tenuous	
  position	
  in	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  their	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  maritime.	
  This	
  position	
  is	
  created	
  through	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  ratification	
  by	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  
Sea	
  1982,	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  most	
  recent	
  layers	
  of	
  rules	
  added	
  to	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  framing	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  This	
  chapter	
  investigates	
  the	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  since	
  the	
  purchase	
  of	
  Alaska	
  in	
  1867.	
  It	
  analyses	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  through	
  four	
  eras	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  evaluating	
  the	
  way	
  in	
  which	
  policy	
  has	
  evolved	
  in	
  response	
  to	
  transitions	
  in	
  this	
  structure.	
  Finally,	
  it	
  identifies	
  U.S.	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  their	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  and	
  practice	
  as	
  they	
  engage	
  with	
  the	
  system	
  and	
  with	
  other	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  	
  Chapter	
  Four:	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  1870-­‐2013	
  	
  Having	
  acquired	
  their	
  Arctic	
  lands	
  and	
  islands	
  through	
  a	
  transfer	
  of	
  authority	
  from	
  Imperial	
  Great	
  Britain	
  who	
  themselves	
  held	
  'incomplete	
  sovereignty'	
  over	
  some	
  of	
  these	
  territories,	
  Canada's	
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Arctic	
  policy	
  continues	
  to	
  reflect	
  the	
  uncertainty	
  inherited	
  in	
  this	
  transfer.	
  Although	
  there	
  is	
  very	
  little	
  challenge	
  to	
  Canada's	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  land,	
  and	
  only	
  minor	
  dissent	
  in	
  their	
  claims	
  to	
  maritime	
  sovereignty,	
  Canada	
  appears	
  to	
  be	
  continuously	
  seeking	
  international	
  approval	
  for	
  their	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  their	
  Arctic	
  islands.	
  To	
  demonstrate	
  their	
  sovereignty,	
  Canada	
  uses	
  a	
  variety	
  of	
  methods	
  available	
  to	
  them	
  from	
  the	
  toolkit	
  of	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  including	
  imperial	
  transfer,	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  and	
  different	
  from	
  the	
  other	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  the	
  residency	
  of	
  their	
  native	
  Inuit.	
  	
  This	
  chapter	
  investigates	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  combined	
  with	
  the	
  transition	
  in	
  Canadian	
  identity	
  to	
  becoming	
  an	
  Arctic,	
  or	
  a	
  Northern	
  State	
  through	
  four	
  phases	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  As	
  a	
  nation	
  germinated	
  in	
  the	
  roots	
  of	
  imperialism,	
  this	
  chapter	
  follows	
  the	
  implementation	
  of	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  in	
  their	
  pursuit	
  of	
  national	
  interests	
  and	
  their	
  pursuit	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  from	
  the	
  1870	
  transfer,	
  its	
  continuous	
  clinging	
  to	
  the	
  defunct	
  sector	
  theory	
  and	
  finally,	
  application	
  of	
  the	
  
United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982.	
  Finally,	
  this	
  chapter	
  notes	
  the	
  ways	
  in	
  which	
  Canadian	
  elevation	
  of	
  the	
  importance	
  of	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants	
  has	
  ebbed	
  into	
  their	
  involvement	
  of	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  mechanisms.	
  	
  Chapter	
  Five:	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  1619-­‐2013	
  	
  Acquiring	
  their	
  Arctic	
  lands	
  through	
  eastward	
  imperial	
  expansion	
  during	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  and	
  their	
  Arctic	
  islands	
  through	
  exploration	
  and	
  application	
  of	
  the	
  sectoral	
  principle,	
  Russia	
  claims	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  largest	
  percentage	
  of	
  Arctic	
  coastline.	
  Accordingly,	
  Russia	
  is	
  also	
  the	
  greatest	
  beneficiary	
  in	
  the	
  new	
  areas	
  of	
  maritime	
  territory	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  created	
  in	
  the	
  twentieth	
  century	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  developments.	
  As	
  the	
  largest	
  landowner	
  in	
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the	
  Arctic,	
  but	
  also	
  the	
  state	
  with	
  most	
  radical	
  and	
  opaque	
  domestic	
  political	
  history,	
  Russia	
  is	
  the	
  greatest	
  source	
  of	
  uncertainty	
  in	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations.	
  	
  When	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  ended	
  Russia	
  embarked	
  on	
  a	
  campaign	
  of	
  good	
  relations	
  with	
  its	
  Arctic	
  neighbours,	
  yet	
  there	
  exists	
  reservations	
  over	
  the	
  future	
  direction	
  of	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy,	
  despite	
  their	
  declaration	
  of	
  intent	
  to	
  abide	
  by	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  in	
  the	
  determination	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  A	
  long-­‐term	
  analysis	
  of	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  demonstrate	
  that	
  there	
  are	
  particular	
  trends	
  in	
  their	
  political	
  identity	
  that	
  have	
  transferred	
  from	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  to	
  Soviet	
  Russia	
  and	
  then	
  on	
  to	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation.	
  This	
  chapter	
  argues	
  that	
  although	
  Russia	
  has	
  redefined	
  its	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  each	
  political	
  transition,	
  there	
  are	
  particular	
  elements	
  of	
  Russian	
  policy	
  and	
  behaviour	
  which	
  demonstrate	
  that	
  Russian	
  national	
  interests	
  supersede	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  	
  Part	
  3:	
  Governance	
  	
  Chapter	
  Six:	
  Arctic	
  Governance:	
  Transformation,	
  Rules	
  and	
  Doctrine	
  	
  When	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  ended,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  seized	
  upon	
  the	
  opportunity	
  to	
  cooperate	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  on	
  issues	
  not	
  related	
  to	
  military	
  security.	
  As	
  a	
  result,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Environmental	
  Protection	
  Strategy	
  in	
  1991	
  was	
  developed,	
  initiating	
  a	
  genesis	
  of	
  governance	
  specific	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  The	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  was	
  informally	
  created	
  in	
  1996	
  in	
  the	
  Ottawa	
  Declaration	
  to	
  cooperate	
  and	
  coordinate	
  on	
  matters	
  of	
  mutual	
  interest,	
  especially	
  environmental	
  protection	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  but	
  specifically	
  excluding	
  matters	
  of	
  security.	
  Membership	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  is	
  restricted	
  to	
  the	
  eight	
  Arctic	
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states,	
  with	
  permanent	
  membership	
  of	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  and	
  observer	
  status	
  for	
  choice	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states.	
  The	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  became	
  a	
  formal	
  body	
  in	
  2012	
  with	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  a	
  permanent	
  secretariat.	
  	
  In	
  both	
  historical	
  policy	
  positions	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  Ilulissat	
  Declaration	
  of	
  2008,	
  the	
  littoral	
  Arctic	
  states	
  have	
  determined	
  that	
  an	
  overarching	
  Arctic	
  Treaty	
  is	
  unnecessary	
  to	
  manage	
  the	
  contemporary	
  issues	
  of	
  the	
  circumpolar	
  region.	
  This	
  chapter	
  discusses	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  as	
  a	
  method	
  for	
  states	
  to	
  achieve	
  national	
  interests	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  traditional	
  areas	
  of	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction.	
  It	
  argues	
  that	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  with	
  both	
  insiders	
  and	
  outsiders	
  has	
  had	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  restricting	
  the	
  activities	
  of	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states	
  as	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  develop	
  policy	
  and	
  law	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  And	
  although	
  Canada	
  uses	
  their	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  to	
  claim	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  their	
  Arctic	
  islands,	
  this	
  has	
  not	
  had	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  elevating	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  to	
  the	
  same	
  status	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Finally,	
  it	
  determines	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  and	
  the	
  agreements	
  and	
  policies	
  made	
  under	
  its	
  auspices	
  in	
  effect	
  form	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Doctrine.	
  	
  Chapter	
  Seven:	
  The	
  Arctic	
  Search	
  and	
  Rescue	
  Agreement:	
  Text,	
  Framing	
  and	
  Logics	
  	
  The	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  which	
  has	
  been	
  formed	
  to	
  address	
  issues	
  of	
  governance	
  which	
  lie	
  outside	
  the	
  traditional	
  areas	
  of	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  states,	
  has	
  produced	
  its	
  first	
  act	
  of	
  hard	
  law	
  in	
  the	
  Agreement	
  on	
  
Aeronautical	
  and	
  Maritime	
  Search	
  and	
  Rescue	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  2011.	
  Although	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  are	
  already	
  individually	
  party	
  to	
  existing	
  international	
  treaties	
  establishing	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  obligations,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  SAR	
  was	
  deemed	
  necessary	
  to	
  address	
  gaps	
  in	
  the	
  coordination	
  and	
  responsibility	
  for	
  SAR	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.	
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The	
  issue	
  of	
  SAR	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  been	
  made	
  exigent	
  by	
  the	
  increasing	
  activity	
  in	
  resource	
  extraction,	
  tourism	
  and	
  commercial	
  shipping	
  as	
  climatic	
  barriers	
  decrease	
  and	
  technological	
  capability	
  increases.	
  	
  This	
  chapter	
  investigates	
  the	
  legal,	
  political	
  and	
  cultural	
  contexts	
  in	
  which	
  this	
  agreement	
  can	
  be	
  framed.	
  As	
  a	
  legal	
  document,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  SAR	
  is	
  indicative	
  of	
  evolving	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations,	
  demonstrating	
  the	
  advancement	
  of	
  an	
  identity	
  of	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  complete	
  with	
  its	
  own	
  set	
  of	
  geopolitical	
  logics.	
  Although	
  the	
  Arctic	
  SAR	
  was	
  presented	
  as	
  an	
  easy	
  opportunity	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  cooperate	
  with	
  one	
  another	
  outside	
  of	
  security	
  concerns	
  and	
  sovereignty	
  disputes,	
  it	
  is	
  also	
  a	
  method	
  for	
  states	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  their	
  obligations	
  within	
  their	
  Arctic	
  territory.	
  The	
  agreement	
  is	
  not	
  entirely	
  free	
  of	
  political	
  intrigue	
  that	
  the	
  discourse	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  appears	
  to	
  deliver.	
  	
  	
  Chapter	
  Eight:	
  A	
  Pending	
  Governance	
  Issue:	
  The	
  Legal	
  Status	
  of	
  Ice	
  	
  When	
  Peary	
  acquired	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  on	
  the	
  surface	
  of	
  sea	
  ice	
  in	
  1909,	
  U.S.	
  President	
  Taft	
  made	
  a	
  decision	
  affecting	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic:	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  would	
  not	
  claim	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  sea	
  ice,	
  as	
  it	
  was	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  and	
  thus	
  not	
  subject	
  to	
  claims	
  of	
  state	
  acquisition.	
  However,	
  since	
  this	
  time,	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  have	
  changed	
  so	
  that	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  some	
  water	
  can	
  be	
  established,	
  but	
  which	
  water?	
  In	
  an	
  era	
  faced	
  by	
  the	
  acceleration	
  of	
  climate	
  change,	
  not	
  only	
  is	
  water	
  an	
  increasingly	
  scarce	
  resource	
  and	
  one	
  necessary	
  for	
  human	
  survival,	
  but	
  the	
  laws	
  over	
  freshwater	
  have	
  remained	
  ambiguous,	
  including	
  the	
  rules	
  for	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  freshwater	
  ice.	
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This	
  lack	
  of	
  a	
  legal	
  status	
  for	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  poses	
  problems	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  water	
  security	
  and	
  the	
  avoidance	
  of	
  conflict	
  and	
  environmental	
  degradation	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  awareness,	
  need	
  and	
  economic	
  potentials	
  of	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  attract	
  the	
  focus	
  of	
  would	
  be	
  harvesters	
  of	
  this	
  resource.	
  Regarding	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  ice,	
  a	
  longstanding	
  academic	
  debate	
  occurred	
  during	
  the	
  last	
  century	
  over	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  sea	
  ice	
  but	
  through	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  action	
  by	
  states,	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  sea	
  ice	
  has	
  remained	
  ambiguous	
  and	
  has	
  been	
  eliminated	
  as	
  a	
  necessary	
  rule	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  advancement	
  in	
  maritime	
  territory	
  definitions	
  created	
  by	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea.	
  However,	
  due	
  to	
  its	
  origination	
  from	
  land	
  and	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  permanent	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  resources,	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  introduces	
  a	
  new	
  problem	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  	
  This	
  chapter	
  provides	
  an	
  overview	
  of	
  this	
  long-­‐term	
  debate	
  over	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice,	
  including	
  arguments	
  for	
  the	
  different	
  types	
  of	
  sea	
  ice	
  that	
  exist,	
  the	
  different	
  ways	
  in	
  which	
  they	
  have	
  been	
  used	
  by	
  states	
  and	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  that	
  could	
  apply	
  in	
  determining	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  this	
  mineral.	
  Although	
  lacking	
  the	
  same	
  dedicated	
  academic	
  debate,	
  this	
  chapter	
  then	
  discusses	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  that	
  could	
  be	
  applied	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  as	
  a	
  sovereign	
  resource	
  and	
  the	
  problems	
  that	
  these	
  principles	
  present	
  given	
  the	
  fugacious	
  nature	
  of	
  freshwater	
  ice,	
  giving	
  examples	
  in	
  the	
  current	
  uses	
  of	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  as	
  it	
  is	
  being	
  requisitioned	
  for	
  water	
  security	
  and	
  economic	
  gain.	
  It	
  then	
  discusses	
  the	
  overlapping	
  legal	
  regimes	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  identifying	
  the	
  ways	
  in	
  which	
  these	
  regimes	
  fail	
  to	
  provide	
  a	
  mechanism	
  for	
  designating	
  a	
  legal	
  status	
  for	
  freshwater	
  ice.	
  Finally,	
  this	
  chapter	
  provides	
  a	
  solution	
  for	
  determining	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  through	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  a	
  specialised	
  regime	
  managed	
  under	
  the	
  auspices	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  a	
  governance	
  mechanism	
  created	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  address	
  Arctic	
  issues	
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that	
  lay	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  normal	
  jurisdictional	
  boundaries	
  of	
  sovereign	
  states.	
  	
  
Conclusions	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  research	
  and	
  presentation	
  of	
  the	
  findings	
  for	
  Constructing	
  
Arctic	
  Sovereignty:	
  Rules,	
  Policy	
  and	
  Governance	
  1494-­‐2013	
  has	
  been	
  a	
  project	
  that	
  has	
  attempted	
  to	
  combine	
  empirical	
  data,	
  political	
  intrigue	
  and	
  rules	
  with	
  conceptual	
  abstractions	
  to	
  identify	
  processes	
  and	
  patterns	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  issue	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  As	
  a	
  result,	
  although	
  this	
  research	
  acknowledges	
  that	
  states	
  do	
  pursue	
  physical	
  and	
  economic	
  security	
  in	
  their	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  that	
  institutions	
  have	
  been	
  created	
  to	
  peacefully	
  develop	
  the	
  region,	
  the	
  findings	
  are	
  atypical	
  in	
  that	
  they	
  identify	
  different	
  underlying	
  processes	
  at	
  work,	
  rather	
  than	
  face-­‐value	
  realpolitik	
  or	
  the	
  emphasis	
  on	
  liberal	
  institutionalism	
  that	
  is	
  prevalent	
  in	
  the	
  surge	
  of	
  Arctic	
  commentaries	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  produced	
  since	
  2008.	
  It	
  is	
  hoped	
  that	
  this	
  big-­‐picture	
  analysis	
  has	
  developed	
  a	
  logical	
  explanation	
  for	
  the	
  on-­‐going	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty,	
  providing	
  policymakers	
  with	
  an	
  understanding	
  of	
  how	
  to	
  engage	
  with	
  this	
  region,	
  and	
  has	
  advanced	
  an	
  approach	
  suitable	
  for	
  analysis	
  of	
  other	
  regions	
  in	
  a	
  state	
  of	
  political	
  flux.	
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Chapter	
  I	
  
	
  
The	
  Case	
  of	
  the	
  Melting	
  Arctic:	
  Sovereignty,	
  
Imperialism	
  and	
  the	
  International	
  System	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  ‘Who	
  Owns	
  the	
  Arctic?’	
  is	
  a	
  query	
  that	
  this	
  researcher	
  has	
  been	
  continuously	
  asked	
  throughout	
  the	
  duration	
  of	
  this	
  research	
  project.	
  The	
  answer	
  is	
  of	
  interest	
  not	
  only	
  to	
  the	
  general	
  public	
  who	
  are	
  presented	
  with	
  information	
  on	
  climate	
  change,	
  resources	
  conflicts	
  and	
  territorial	
  scrambles	
  on	
  a	
  regular	
  basis	
  by	
  the	
  media,	
  but	
  in	
  growing	
  numbers-­‐-­‐	
  as	
  demonstrated	
  by	
  the	
  sudden	
  worldwide	
  surfeit	
  of	
  Arctic	
  forums-­‐-­‐	
  of	
  policy	
  makers,	
  commercial	
  entities	
  and	
  academics.	
  The	
  response	
  to	
  this	
  query	
  does	
  not	
  have	
  a	
  straight	
  answer,	
  because	
  who	
  ‘owns’	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  simple	
  question;	
  the	
  answer	
  ultimately	
  requires	
  a	
  detailed	
  response	
  on	
  the	
  layers	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  found	
  within	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea,	
  imperialism	
  and	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  that	
  frames	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  
Following	
  a	
  basic	
  answer	
  to	
  the	
  query	
  of	
  ‘Who	
  owns	
  the	
  Arctic	
  [Ocean]?’	
  referencing	
  the	
  Arctic	
  littoral	
  states,	
  the	
  following	
  logical	
  progression	
  is	
  to	
  question	
  why	
  and/or	
  how	
  do	
  they	
  own	
  the	
  Arctic?	
  In	
  short,	
  they	
  own	
  it	
  because	
  the	
  international	
  law	
  that	
  frames	
  the	
  Arctic	
  says	
  that	
  they	
  do.	
  To	
  the	
  layman,	
  this	
  is	
  a	
  sufficient	
  conclusion:	
  The	
  states	
  littoral	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  own	
  it	
  because	
  this	
  has	
  been	
  determined	
  by	
  international	
  law,	
  but	
  to	
  the	
  curious,	
  questions	
  of	
  who	
  made	
  the	
  law	
  and	
  how	
  is	
  it	
  enforced	
  arise.	
  As	
  one	
  learns	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  law	
  that	
  determines	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty,	
  one	
  wonders	
  further	
  at	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  differentiation	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  terrestrial	
  and	
  maritime	
  territory.	
  	
  
Like	
  any	
  good	
  mystery,	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  the	
  melting	
  Arctic	
  requires	
  a	
  methodical	
  process	
  to	
  review	
  the	
  facts	
  and	
  evidence	
  of	
  the	
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situation.	
  The	
  method	
  used	
  to	
  understand	
  how	
  the	
  Arctic	
  came	
  to	
  be	
  thus	
  situated	
  within	
  contemporary	
  international	
  relations	
  is	
  to	
  employ	
  process-­‐tracing.	
  Through	
  this,	
  one	
  can	
  “trace	
  backward	
  the	
  causal	
  process	
  that	
  produces	
  the	
  case	
  outcome,	
  at	
  each	
  stage	
  inferring	
  from	
  the	
  context	
  what	
  caused	
  each	
  cause…lead[ing]	
  the	
  investigator	
  back	
  to	
  a	
  prime	
  cause.”4	
  Beginning	
  with	
  the	
  question	
  of	
  who	
  owns	
  the	
  Arctic	
  today,	
  one	
  can	
  trace	
  back	
  through	
  history’s	
  
longue	
  durée	
  to	
  establish	
  who,	
  when,	
  where,	
  why	
  and	
  how	
  the	
  Arctic	
  came	
  to	
  be	
  owned	
  by	
  the	
  littoral	
  states.	
  Although	
  presented	
  in	
  a	
  standard	
  forward	
  progressing	
  linear	
  chronology,	
  the	
  events	
  identified	
  in	
  this	
  research	
  have	
  been	
  determined	
  by	
  tracing	
  backwards	
  through	
  time.	
  
In	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  tracing	
  back	
  through	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  the	
  melting	
  Arctic,	
  this	
  chapter	
  asks	
  the	
  following	
  questions:	
  
• What	
  does	
  it	
  mean	
  to	
  own	
  the	
  Arctic?	
  
• How	
  is	
  the	
  structure	
  that	
  frames	
  the	
  Arctic	
  developed?	
  
• What	
  are	
  the	
  different	
  phases	
  of	
  development	
  of	
  this	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  structure?	
  
Defining	
  Ownership:	
  Sovereignty	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  When	
  ‘Who	
  owns	
  the	
  Arctic?’	
  is	
  asked,	
  what	
  is	
  really	
  meant	
  is	
  ‘Who	
  holds	
  the	
  legitimate	
  authority	
  over	
  decision-­‐making	
  for	
  this	
  territory?’	
  or,	
  sovereignty.	
  What	
  is	
  additionally	
  being	
  asked	
  is	
  who	
  holds	
  the	
  property	
  rights	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  thus	
  the	
  benefits	
  of	
  the	
  resources	
  that	
  lay	
  within	
  this	
  territory.	
  Although	
  within	
  international	
  relations,	
  sovereignty	
  is	
  ordinarily	
  conceived	
  of	
  as	
  authority	
  rather	
  than	
  as	
  property	
  rights,	
  it	
  is	
  yet	
  true	
  that	
  governments	
  of	
  states	
  also	
  own	
  the	
  property	
  rights	
  to	
  land	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  being	
  states	
  that	
  hold	
  sovereignty.	
  Within	
  Alaska,	
  the	
  U.S.	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  4	
  (Van	
  Evera,	
  1997,	
  p.	
  70)	
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Government	
  is	
  the	
  largest	
  landowner5,	
  and	
  although	
  Canada	
  has	
  recently	
  settled	
  many	
  land	
  claims	
  agreements	
  along	
  its	
  northern	
  borders	
  with	
  indigenous	
  groups,	
  the	
  borders	
  for	
  those	
  land	
  claims	
  extend	
  only	
  to	
  the	
  territorial	
  seas	
  and	
  do	
  not	
  include	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf.6	
  Under	
  Soviet	
  administration,	
  land	
  in	
  Russia	
  was	
  amalgamated	
  through	
  the	
  policy	
  of	
  collectivisation	
  and	
  placed	
  under	
  state	
  control,	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  post-­‐Cold	
  War	
  Period	
  private	
  land	
  ownership	
  continues	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  murky	
  area	
  under	
  Russian	
  law.	
  Here,	
  then,	
  are	
  three	
  states	
  with	
  vested	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  implications	
  for	
  their	
  national	
  interests,	
  each	
  as	
  landowners	
  and	
  each	
  being	
  sovereign	
  and	
  holding	
  sovereignty.	
  	
  
Sovereignty,	
  although	
  with	
  a	
  basic	
  definition	
  of	
  “supreme	
  power	
  or	
  authority,”7	
  is	
  a	
  multi-­‐faceted	
  term	
  and	
  has	
  a	
  much	
  deliberated	
  meaning	
  and	
  usage	
  within	
  International	
  Relations	
  with	
  varying	
  theoretical	
  and	
  conceptual	
  dimensions,	
  including	
  contradictions	
  within	
  its	
  usage.8	
  It	
  is	
  a	
  word	
  that	
  often	
  appears	
  in	
  the	
  discourse	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations,	
  referring	
  to	
  both	
  domestic	
  and	
  international	
  aspects	
  of	
  the	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  inducing	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  differentiate	
  what	
  these	
  states	
  mean	
  when	
  they	
  refer	
  to	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  There	
  are	
  two	
  dimensions	
  to	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  being	
  sovereign,	
  where	
  a	
  state	
  holds	
  both	
  internal	
  and	
  external	
  sovereignty9,	
  although	
  some	
  diminutive	
  political	
  units	
  have	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  hold	
  the	
  former	
  without	
  the	
  latter	
  as	
  will	
  be	
  noted	
  below	
  in	
  the	
  discussion	
  on	
  tribal	
  sovereignty.	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  5	
  The	
  Federal	
  Government	
  owns	
  62%	
  of	
  land	
  in	
  Alaska.	
  	
  6	
  For	
  example,	
  see	
  the	
  Nunavut	
  Land	
  Claims	
  Agreement	
  1993.	
  	
  7	
  (Oxford	
  University	
  Press,	
  2014)	
  8	
  Krasner	
  lists	
  some	
  of	
  these	
  contradictions	
  such	
  as	
  non-­‐intervention	
  while	
  simultaneously	
  promoting	
  democracy.	
  	
  See	
  (Krasner,	
  1999,	
  p.	
  3).	
  It	
  is	
  beyond	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  this	
  research	
  to	
  address	
  these	
  anomalies	
  and	
  contradictions.	
  	
  9	
  Stephen	
  Krasner	
  has	
  identified	
  four	
  types	
  of	
  sovereignty:	
  international	
  legal	
  sovereignty,	
  Westphalian	
  sovereignty,	
  domestic	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  interdependence	
  sovereignty.	
  See	
  (Krasner,	
  1999,	
  p.	
  3).	
  This	
  research	
  divides	
  sovereignty	
  into	
  two	
  broader	
  types,	
  encompassing	
  the	
  divisions	
  listed	
  by	
  Krasner	
  into	
  external	
  and	
  internal	
  sovereignty.	
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Internal	
  sovereignty,	
  according	
  to	
  Machiavelli	
  is	
  when	
  within	
  a	
  state	
  “there	
  are	
  none	
  who	
  acknowledge	
  any	
  other	
  sovereign”10	
  and	
  is	
  acquired	
  by	
  either	
  “the	
  good	
  will	
  of	
  the	
  people	
  or	
  of	
  the	
  nobles.”11	
  Writing	
  in	
  medieval	
  Europe,	
  Machiavelli’s	
  conception	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  becomes	
  raison	
  d’État,	
  where	
  the	
  “acquisition,	
  maintenance	
  and	
  expansion	
  of	
  sovereign	
  power”12	
  is	
  closely	
  linked	
  with,	
  not	
  only	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  wage	
  war,	
  but	
  also	
  to	
  the	
  morality	
  of	
  the	
  sovereign.	
  For	
  Machiavelli,	
  sovereignty	
  arises	
  from	
  the	
  ability	
  of	
  the	
  prince	
  to	
  maintain	
  his	
  own	
  power	
  through	
  various	
  means,	
  but	
  writing	
  before	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  the	
  modern	
  state,	
  this	
  sovereignty	
  is	
  attributed	
  only	
  to	
  the	
  individual	
  and	
  not	
  to	
  the	
  political	
  unit	
  of	
  the	
  state.	
  Machiavelli	
  produced	
  his	
  treatise	
  in	
  an	
  age	
  when	
  the	
  Pope	
  wielded	
  significant	
  political	
  and	
  religious	
  authority,	
  and	
  as	
  the	
  messenger	
  of	
  God,	
  served	
  as	
  arbitrator	
  between	
  monarchs.	
  Machiavelli	
  said	
  of	
  Alexander	
  VI	
  who	
  issued	
  the	
  Papal	
  Bull	
  of	
  1493	
  that	
  would	
  be	
  later	
  redrafted	
  into	
  the	
  Treaty	
  
of	
  Tordesillas	
  1494	
  that	
  “none	
  of	
  those	
  who	
  preceded	
  or	
  followed	
  him,	
  have	
  shewn	
  like	
  him	
  what	
  a	
  pontiff	
  can	
  do	
  with	
  men	
  and	
  money.”13	
  The	
  decline	
  of	
  the	
  individual	
  as	
  sovereign,	
  the	
  power	
  of	
  the	
  Pope	
  and	
  the	
  consolidation	
  of	
  principalities	
  occurring	
  in	
  this	
  period	
  signalled	
  a	
  change	
  for	
  the	
  fledgling	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  	
  
About	
  a	
  century	
  later,	
  Bodin	
  further	
  developed	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  sovereignty,	
  defining	
  it	
  as	
  the	
  “absolute	
  and	
  perpetual	
  power	
  of	
  a	
  commonwealth”14	
  which	
  “is	
  not	
  limited	
  in	
  power,	
  or	
  in	
  function,	
  or	
  in	
  length	
  of	
  time.”15	
  Like	
  Machiavelli,	
  for	
  Bodin	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  sovereign	
  ruler	
  who	
  is	
  absolute	
  and	
  a	
  ruler	
  who	
  is	
  sovereign	
  cannot	
  be	
  subject	
  to	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  those	
  who	
  have	
  preceded	
  them.	
  While	
  this	
  approach	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  was	
  compatible	
  with	
  monarchical	
  systems	
  of	
  the	
  period,	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  so	
  conducive	
  to	
  the	
  transfer	
  of	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  10	
  (Machiavelli,	
  1810,	
  p.	
  23)	
  11	
  (Machiavelli,	
  1810,	
  p.	
  55)	
  12	
  (Maiolo,	
  2007,	
  p.	
  109)	
  13	
  (Machiavelli,	
  1810,	
  p.	
  67)	
  14	
  (Bodin,	
  1992,	
  p.	
  1)	
  15	
  (Bodin,	
  1992,	
  p.	
  3)	
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power	
  in	
  government	
  within	
  the	
  modern	
  state.	
  Writing	
  in	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  when	
  European	
  empires	
  were	
  annexing	
  territories	
  abroad	
  and	
  the	
  Iberian	
  empires	
  were	
  being	
  challenged	
  for	
  the	
  territory	
  designated	
  through	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Tordesillas	
  1494,	
  for	
  Bodin,	
  the	
  realm	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  did	
  not	
  end	
  with	
  populations	
  and	
  land.	
  Like	
  the	
  Romans,	
  he	
  included	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  sea.	
  “Rights	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  belong	
  solely	
  to	
  the	
  sovereign	
  prince”	
  up	
  to	
  ninety	
  nautical	
  miles	
  from	
  his	
  coast	
  “unless	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  sovereign	
  prince	
  nearer	
  by	
  to	
  prevent	
  him.”16	
  This	
  approach	
  to	
  the	
  limitations	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  territory	
  would	
  soon	
  become	
  relevant	
  in	
  the	
  debates	
  over	
  mare	
  liberum	
  and	
  mare	
  clausum.	
  	
  
The	
  consolidation	
  of	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  monarch	
  with	
  the	
  internal	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  emerges	
  in	
  the	
  social	
  contract	
  theories	
  of	
  Hobbes,	
  Locke	
  and	
  Rousseau,	
  who	
  for	
  varying	
  reasons,	
  including	
  fear	
  and	
  security	
  of	
  property,	
  determine	
  that	
  individuals	
  choose	
  to	
  surrender	
  the	
  freedoms	
  accorded	
  them	
  by	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  nature	
  in	
  the	
  hypothetical	
  state	
  of	
  nature	
  to	
  an	
  authority	
  figure-­‐-­‐a	
  sovereign.	
  In	
  exchange	
  for	
  this	
  surrender	
  of	
  freedoms,	
  individuals	
  are	
  accorded	
  rights	
  and	
  duties	
  upon	
  becoming	
  members	
  of	
  civil	
  society	
  overseen	
  by	
  the	
  state;	
  collectively	
  giving	
  up	
  their	
  individual	
  sovereignty	
  to	
  created	
  a	
  consolidated	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  monarch,	
  or	
  government.	
  Whereas	
  Hobbes	
  and	
  Rousseau	
  both	
  believe	
  this	
  transaction	
  to	
  be	
  absolute-­‐-­‐for	
  Hobbes	
  sovereignty	
  remains	
  perpetually	
  with	
  the	
  monarch	
  but	
  for	
  Rousseau	
  it	
  rests	
  in	
  the	
  people.	
  For	
  Locke,	
  duty	
  of	
  the	
  government	
  to	
  the	
  citizens	
  is	
  created	
  in	
  this	
  transfer	
  and	
  can	
  be	
  dissolved	
  if	
  found	
  ineffectual.	
  This	
  theoretical	
  rationalisation	
  of	
  the	
  sources	
  of	
  internal	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  the	
  emerging	
  conceptualisation	
  of	
  ‘the	
  state’	
  is	
  set	
  against	
  the	
  backdrop	
  of	
  revolution	
  in	
  Europe,	
  while	
  intra-­‐state	
  conflict	
  was	
  developing	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  external	
  sovereignty	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  16	
  (Bodin,	
  1992,	
  p.	
  83)	
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The	
  sovereignty	
  established	
  in	
  the	
  Peace	
  of	
  Westphalia	
  1648,	
  often	
  considered	
  to	
  be	
  the	
  starting	
  point	
  of	
  the	
  modern	
  international	
  system,	
  represents	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  external	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  international	
  relations.	
  Westphalia	
  is	
  “seen	
  as	
  marking	
  the	
  symbolic	
  origin	
  of	
  the	
  modern	
  European	
  international	
  society	
  in	
  the	
  sense	
  that	
  it	
  crystallised	
  and	
  gave	
  legal	
  weight	
  to	
  developments	
  that	
  had	
  been	
  taking	
  place	
  in	
  a	
  random	
  and	
  unfocused	
  way	
  over	
  many	
  years.”17	
  In	
  Westphalia,	
  this	
  process	
  of	
  deference	
  to	
  the	
  notion	
  sovereignty	
  emerged	
  and	
  ultimately	
  culminated	
  when	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Utrecht	
  1713	
  “confirmed	
  that	
  the	
  balance	
  of	
  power	
  and	
  national	
  interests	
  would	
  prevail	
  over	
  dynastic	
  rights	
  in	
  international	
  affairs.”18	
  The	
  form	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  established	
  here	
  eliminates	
  the	
  religious	
  authority	
  of	
  the	
  pope	
  within	
  state	
  borders,	
  establishes	
  the	
  right	
  of	
  monarchs	
  to	
  legislate	
  for	
  all	
  matters	
  within	
  their	
  borders	
  and	
  finally,	
  it	
  introduces	
  the	
  legal	
  equality	
  of	
  states,	
  although	
  it	
  would	
  take	
  some	
  centuries	
  to	
  for	
  this	
  concept	
  to	
  consolidate	
  in	
  the	
  Montevideo	
  Convention	
  
1933.19	
  	
  
This	
  phase	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  system	
  also	
  provided	
  empires	
  with	
  legitimacy	
  to	
  purloin	
  newly	
  discovered	
  lands	
  overseas.	
  An	
  early	
  justification	
  of	
  the	
  Iberian	
  empires,	
  granted	
  their	
  entitlements	
  by	
  the	
  pope,	
  was	
  provided	
  based	
  on	
  ecclesiastical	
  obligation,	
  and	
  they	
  were	
  charged	
  with	
  the	
  duty	
  of	
  bringing	
  Christianity	
  to	
  the	
  heathens	
  of	
  the	
  New	
  World.	
  However,	
  as	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  states	
  and	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  territorial	
  integrity	
  entered	
  into	
  the	
  fledgling	
  international	
  system,	
  new	
  forms	
  of	
  justification	
  were	
  required,	
  especially	
  with	
  the	
  decline	
  of	
  papal	
  authority.	
  These	
  justifications	
  were	
  found	
  in	
  Locke’s	
  labour	
  theory	
  of	
  property,	
  which	
  determined	
  that	
  New	
  World	
  lands	
  were	
  underutilised	
  by	
  the	
  inhabitants	
  and	
  were	
  available	
  for	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  17	
  (David	
  Armstrong,	
  2012,	
  pp.	
  60-­‐1)	
  18	
  (Jackson,	
  2007,	
  p.	
  51)	
  19	
  (Pemberton,	
  2009)	
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requisitioning,	
  by	
  other	
  powers,	
  but	
  more	
  importantly,	
  that	
  any	
  forms	
  of	
  existing	
  political	
  organisation	
  were	
  inferior	
  to	
  the	
  European	
  conception	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  and	
  were	
  thus	
  ineligible	
  for	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereign	
  status.	
  While	
  this	
  is	
  not	
  expressly	
  defined	
  within	
  Kant’s	
  conception	
  of	
  sovereignty,	
  he	
  validates	
  imperial	
  practices	
  of	
  territorial	
  annexation,	
  so	
  long	
  as	
  agreed	
  through	
  treaty	
  arrangements,	
  but	
  held	
  that	
  indigenous	
  tribes	
  “do	
  not	
  constitute	
  states.”20	
  Although	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  engage	
  in	
  treaties	
  should	
  indicate	
  external	
  sovereignty,	
  indigenous	
  peoples	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  were	
  instead	
  absorbed	
  into	
  the	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  European	
  empires	
  due	
  to	
  their	
  lack	
  of	
  acceptable	
  political	
  organisation.	
  
This	
  sovereign	
  inequality	
  between	
  the	
  states	
  that	
  came	
  to	
  own	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  contemporary	
  international	
  relations	
  continues	
  to	
  exist	
  in	
  the	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  and	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants	
  in	
  both	
  the	
  domestic	
  and	
  in	
  international	
  realms.	
  While	
  significant	
  quantities	
  of	
  territories	
  around	
  the	
  world	
  were	
  annexed	
  during	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  many	
  were	
  released	
  and	
  decolonised	
  during	
  the	
  twentieth	
  century	
  to	
  form	
  states	
  and	
  join	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  their	
  own	
  right,	
  whereas	
  the	
  territories	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  which	
  are	
  sparsely	
  populated,	
  have	
  been	
  absorbed	
  by	
  states	
  that	
  are	
  derivations	
  of	
  European	
  empires.	
  In	
  domestic	
  legislation,	
  these	
  states	
  have	
  continued	
  this	
  asymmetric	
  relationship	
  through	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  tribal	
  sovereignty,	
  which	
  permits	
  only	
  internal	
  sovereignty	
  to	
  indigenous	
  peoples	
  living	
  within	
  their	
  ancestral	
  lands,	
  while	
  the	
  states	
  maintain	
  external	
  sovereignty,	
  including	
  acting	
  as	
  arbitrators	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  domain.21	
  This	
  is	
  a	
  relationship	
  that	
  historically	
  has	
  been	
  more	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  20	
  (Kant,	
  1970,	
  p.	
  164)	
  21	
  Following	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Declaration	
  on	
  the	
  Rights	
  of	
  Indigenous	
  Peoples	
  in	
  2007,	
  the	
  Inuit	
  Circumpolar	
  Council	
  made	
  a	
  declaration	
  on	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  elaborating	
  on	
  the	
  point	
  of	
  ‘overlapping	
  sovereignties’,	
  their	
  right	
  to	
  self-­‐determination	
  and	
  the	
  need	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  accept	
  them	
  as	
  partners	
  in	
  international	
  relations,	
  (Inuit	
  Circumpolar	
  Council,	
  2009).	
  While	
  the	
  UNDRIP	
  acknowledges	
  the	
  indigenous	
  right	
  to	
  self-­‐determination,	
  the	
  declaration	
  is	
  not	
  to	
  be	
  “construed	
  as	
  authorizing	
  or	
  encouraging	
  any	
  action	
  which	
  would	
  dismember	
  or	
  impair,	
  totally	
  or	
  in	
  part,	
  the	
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beneficial	
  for	
  the	
  state	
  than	
  for	
  the	
  indigenous	
  peoples,	
  although	
  with	
  land	
  claims	
  agreements,	
  there	
  have	
  been	
  minor	
  rectifications	
  of	
  this	
  historical	
  injustice,	
  however,	
  these	
  land	
  claims	
  do	
  nothing	
  to	
  change	
  the	
  inequality	
  of	
  their	
  internal	
  versus	
  external	
  sovereign	
  status	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  
Within	
  the	
  current	
  international	
  system	
  it	
  would	
  now	
  be	
  difficult,	
  if	
  not	
  impossible,	
  to	
  eliminate	
  inequalities	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  that	
  are	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  states	
  as	
  the	
  primary	
  unit	
  within	
  the	
  system	
  without	
  a	
  radical	
  shakeup	
  of	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  this	
  system.	
  While	
  there	
  are	
  many	
  nations,	
  such	
  as	
  indigenous	
  tribes	
  with	
  internal	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  thus	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  make	
  internal	
  decisions	
  for	
  the	
  benefit	
  of	
  the	
  community,	
  it	
  is	
  only	
  states	
  that	
  hold	
  external	
  sovereignty,	
  in	
  part	
  determining	
  their	
  status	
  as	
  states.	
  There	
  are	
  four	
  characteristics	
  that	
  must	
  be	
  in	
  place	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  hold	
  statehood	
  and,	
  therefore,	
  external	
  sovereignty:	
  territory,	
  a	
  people,	
  a	
  government	
  and	
  international	
  recognition.	
  To	
  hold	
  internal	
  sovereignty,	
  a	
  monarch	
  or	
  a	
  government	
  must	
  exist	
  in	
  a	
  symbiotic	
  relationship	
  with	
  a	
  people	
  group,	
  ideally	
  within	
  a	
  clearly	
  delimited	
  territory.	
  However,	
  to	
  achieve	
  external	
  sovereignty,	
  and	
  the	
  quality	
  of	
  statehood,	
  a	
  political	
  unit	
  must	
  also	
  hold	
  recognition	
  from	
  the	
  community	
  of	
  states	
  that	
  it	
  has	
  achieved	
  equal	
  status	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  This	
  complete	
  package	
  of	
  the	
  features	
  of	
  sovereign	
  states	
  fail	
  to	
  apply	
  to	
  the	
  national	
  groups	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  leaving	
  them	
  without	
  the	
  benefits	
  of	
  external	
  sovereignty.	
  
It	
  was	
  the	
  recognition	
  of	
  external	
  sovereignty	
  that	
  led	
  to	
  the	
  rapid	
  expansion	
  of	
  the	
  modern	
  international	
  system	
  following	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  as	
  empires	
  retreated,	
  surrendering	
  authority	
  and	
  control	
  over	
  territory	
  and	
  people	
  to	
  fledgling	
  governments,	
  using	
  infrastructure	
  which	
  was	
  incubated	
  during	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  imperial	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  territorial	
  integrity	
  or	
  political	
  unity	
  of	
  sovereign	
  and	
  independent	
  States,	
  (United	
  Nations,	
  2007).	
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rule.	
  Yet	
  the	
  motives	
  that	
  compelled	
  empires	
  to	
  expand	
  into	
  new	
  territory,	
  including	
  economic	
  and	
  resource	
  benefits,	
  was	
  a	
  reason	
  for	
  “sovereignty	
  [to	
  be]	
  invoked	
  as	
  a	
  source	
  of	
  authority	
  for	
  the	
  acquisition	
  of	
  territories	
  and	
  as	
  a	
  means	
  of	
  asserting	
  a	
  continuing	
  legal	
  title	
  to	
  peoples	
  and	
  lands	
  as	
  against	
  the	
  aspirations	
  or	
  claims	
  of	
  others.”22	
  These	
  reasons	
  did	
  not	
  disappear	
  with	
  decolonisation	
  and	
  thus	
  these	
  empires,	
  while	
  maintaining	
  de	
  jure	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  internal	
  and	
  external	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  all	
  states,	
  were	
  compelled	
  to	
  find	
  alternative	
  methods	
  to	
  achieve	
  their	
  interests.	
  These	
  methods	
  included	
  using	
  not	
  only	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system23	
  to	
  permit	
  de	
  facto	
  infringements	
  of	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  new	
  states	
  which	
  allowed	
  continued	
  access	
  to	
  trade	
  and	
  resources,	
  but	
  also	
  to	
  change	
  the	
  limitations	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  within	
  international	
  law	
  to	
  enable	
  sovereign	
  expansion	
  over	
  the	
  maritime	
  resources.	
  
Along	
  with	
  the	
  expansion	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  evolution	
  of	
  the	
  elaborate	
  network	
  of	
  infrastructure	
  that	
  exists	
  between	
  developed	
  and	
  developing	
  states,	
  the	
  integrity	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  as	
  a	
  coherent	
  concept	
  begins	
  to	
  fray.	
  Although	
  internal	
  and	
  external	
  sovereignty	
  both	
  continue	
  to	
  exist,	
  they	
  exist	
  with	
  caveat,	
  and	
  the	
  exceptions	
  to	
  the	
  ‘rule	
  of	
  sovereignty’	
  are	
  many.	
  To	
  delve	
  into	
  these	
  discrepancies	
  is	
  beyond	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  this	
  discussion	
  on	
  sovereignty	
  as	
  this	
  research	
  focuses	
  on	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  resource	
  control,	
  holding	
  that	
  despite	
  these	
  anomalies,	
  “the	
  conditions	
  and	
  social	
  practice	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  demarcate	
  national	
  realms	
  of	
  sovereign	
  authority”24	
  and	
  that	
  “political	
  ‘sovereignty’	
  represents	
  claims	
  of	
  rights,	
  specifically	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  rule	
  and	
  the	
  right	
  of	
  authority.	
  As	
  a	
  property	
  right,	
  ‘sovereignty’	
  is	
  the	
  highest,	
  most	
  complete	
  right	
  of	
  ownership.”25	
  This	
  research	
  holds	
  to	
  a	
  combination	
  of	
  Realist	
  and	
  Constructivist	
  conceptualisations	
  of	
  state	
  sovereignty:	
  the	
  state	
  is	
  the	
  dominant	
  unit	
  of	
  analysis	
  within	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  22	
  (Jackson,	
  1999,	
  p.	
  442)	
  in	
  (Pemberton,	
  2009,	
  p.	
  90)	
  23	
  Such	
  as	
  the	
  World	
  Bank,	
  the	
  IMF	
  or	
  the	
  UN.	
  	
  24	
  (Burch,	
  2002,	
  p.	
  76)	
  25	
  (Burch,	
  2002,	
  p.	
  75)	
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international	
  relations,	
  but	
  as	
  socially	
  constructed	
  concepts,	
  both	
  the	
  state	
  and	
  sovereignty	
  are	
  rules	
  that	
  are	
  susceptible	
  to	
  reinterpretation.	
  Therefore,	
  “States’	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  construct	
  a	
  social	
  environment	
  in	
  which	
  they	
  can	
  interact	
  as	
  an	
  international	
  society	
  of	
  states,	
  while	
  at	
  the	
  same	
  time	
  the	
  mutual	
  recognition	
  of	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  is	
  an	
  important	
  element	
  in	
  the	
  construction	
  of	
  states	
  themselves.”26	
  Sovereignty	
  is	
  thus	
  a	
  rule	
  providing	
  order,	
  without	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  force,	
  in	
  the	
  anarchical	
  condition	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  
The	
  Structure	
  of	
  International	
  Relations:	
  The	
  International	
  
System	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  since	
  1494	
  has	
  occurred	
  in	
  a	
  social	
  structure	
  identified	
  as	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  in	
  which	
  states	
  are	
  the	
  dominant	
  agents	
  of	
  action	
  following	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  expected	
  behaviour.	
  This	
  structure	
  framing	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  is	
  a	
  conceptual,	
  rather	
  than	
  a	
  physical	
  formation,	
  constructed	
  through	
  rules	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  introduced	
  by	
  these	
  agents.	
  Rules,	
  both	
  social	
  and	
  legal	
  (codes),	
  are	
  intersubjective	
  understandings	
  and	
  “a	
  rule	
  is	
  a	
  statement	
  that	
  tells	
  people	
  what	
  we	
  should	
  do.”27	
  As	
  is	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  next	
  chapter,	
  by	
  process-­‐tracing	
  the	
  longue	
  durée	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  from	
  contemporary	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  back	
  to	
  the	
  discovery	
  of	
  the	
  Americas,	
  it	
  is	
  demonstrated	
  through	
  the	
  genealogical	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  that	
  frame	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  that	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  this	
  system	
  have	
  been	
  formed	
  by	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  dominant	
  states	
  within	
  several	
  different	
  periods	
  of	
  this	
  system.	
  While	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  merely	
  a	
  single	
  case	
  study	
  of	
  international	
  relations,	
  this	
  research	
  provides	
  opportunity	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  the	
  character	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  how	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  dominant	
  states	
  compels	
  change.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  26	
  (Biersteker	
  &	
  Weber,	
  1996,	
  pp.	
  1-­‐2)	
  27	
  (Onuf,	
  1998,	
  p.	
  59)	
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Because	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  is	
  a	
  social	
  construction	
  it	
  is	
  another	
  one	
  of	
  those	
  terms	
  subject	
  to	
  varied	
  definitions,	
  and	
  like	
  many	
  other	
  terms,	
  there	
  is	
  some	
  difficulty	
  of	
  defining	
  this	
  core	
  term	
  in	
  International	
  Relations.	
  Jay	
  Goodman	
  has	
  identified	
  several	
  conceptions	
  of	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  term	
  ‘international	
  system’,	
  including	
  “an	
  arrangement	
  of	
  the	
  actors	
  of	
  international	
  politics	
  in	
  which	
  interactions	
  are	
  patterned	
  and	
  identifiable”	
  and	
  “a	
  particular	
  arrangement	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  arrangement	
  makes	
  it	
  the	
  major	
  variable	
  to	
  be	
  considered	
  in	
  explaining	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  the	
  actors	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  arena.”28	
  In	
  depicting	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  systems,	
  Stephen	
  Krasner	
  says	
  that	
  all	
  international	
  systems	
  have	
  been	
  “characterized	
  by	
  organized	
  hypocrisy”	
  and	
  that	
  they	
  are	
  “conventions,	
  contracts,	
  coercion,	
  and	
  impositions	
  have	
  all	
  been	
  patterns	
  of	
  behaviour	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system.”29	
  For	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  this	
  research,	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  is	
  defined	
  as	
  a	
  changeable	
  set	
  of	
  rules	
  and	
  institutions	
  determining	
  the	
  normative	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  international	
  relations.	
  
As	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  exists	
  in	
  anarchy	
  without	
  a	
  global	
  sovereign,	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  is	
  an	
  informal	
  structure,	
  a	
  social	
  construction	
  created	
  through	
  the	
  repeated	
  patterns	
  of	
  these	
  shared	
  understandings	
  and	
  the	
  social	
  organisation	
  that	
  follows	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  rules.	
  The	
  system	
  exists	
  only	
  because	
  states,	
  as	
  the	
  primary	
  agents	
  of	
  this	
  system	
  tacitly	
  agree	
  that	
  it	
  does	
  exist	
  and	
  continue	
  to	
  follow	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  system.	
  The	
  repetition	
  of	
  states	
  following	
  these	
  rules	
  results	
  in	
  predictable	
  patterns	
  of	
  state	
  behaviour,	
  thus	
  producing	
  stability	
  in	
  the	
  relationships	
  between	
  states.	
  This	
  stability	
  then	
  culminates	
  in	
  a	
  form	
  of	
  security	
  that	
  allows	
  for	
  states	
  to	
  continue	
  making	
  additional	
  linkages	
  between	
  one	
  another,	
  until	
  the	
  point	
  where	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  of	
  today	
  is	
  a	
  complex	
  network	
  of	
  financial,	
  material	
  and	
  legal	
  relationships.	
  When	
  the	
  rules	
  are	
  ‘broken’,	
  it	
  causes	
  insecurity	
  and	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  28	
  (Goodman,	
  1965,	
  p.	
  258)	
  29	
  (Krasner,	
  2001,	
  p.	
  18)	
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instability	
  in	
  the	
  relations	
  between	
  states.	
  Despite	
  the	
  anarchy	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  international	
  relations	
  are	
  not	
  entirely	
  a	
  Hobbesian	
  free-­‐for-­‐all,	
  and	
  most	
  states	
  operate	
  within	
  the	
  boundaries	
  of	
  an	
  implied	
  social	
  contract	
  created	
  through	
  the	
  rules	
  introduced	
  to	
  the	
  structure.	
  As	
  powers	
  rise	
  and	
  fall,	
  it	
  allows	
  for	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  rules	
  by	
  different	
  actors,	
  again	
  introducing	
  the	
  possibility	
  for	
  change	
  within	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  
The	
  international	
  system	
  has	
  turning	
  points	
  of	
  development	
  where	
  new	
  rules	
  are	
  introduced	
  and	
  when	
  this	
  happens,	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  expected	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  change.	
  Within	
  social	
  relations,	
  rules	
  are	
  malleable	
  and	
  normative	
  ideas	
  have	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  change.	
  As	
  the	
  rules	
  change,	
  so	
  can	
  the	
  structure	
  that	
  is	
  shaped	
  by	
  those	
  rules,	
  and	
  this	
  is	
  how	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  has	
  been	
  created,	
  shaped,	
  formed	
  and	
  reformed	
  to	
  constrain	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  international	
  society.	
  As	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  states	
  change,	
  so	
  also	
  change	
  the	
  rules	
  to	
  allow	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  these	
  interests	
  within	
  a	
  stable	
  environment,	
  however,	
  this	
  a	
  reciprocal	
  process	
  because	
  actors	
  also	
  “define	
  who	
  they	
  are	
  and	
  what	
  they	
  want	
  with	
  reference	
  to	
  the	
  dominant	
  rules	
  and	
  ideologies	
  of	
  the	
  time.”30	
  This	
  process	
  can	
  be	
  seen	
  within	
  the	
  development	
  the	
  rules	
  that	
  states	
  have	
  followed	
  in	
  the	
  long-­‐term	
  establishment	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  
For	
  example,	
  while	
  it	
  was	
  acceptable	
  for	
  Columbus	
  to	
  place	
  a	
  flag	
  in	
  the	
  New	
  World	
  claiming	
  it	
  for	
  Spain	
  because	
  ‘ceremonies	
  of	
  possession’	
  were	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  and	
  were	
  an	
  accepted	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  fifteen	
  century;	
  it	
  was	
  no	
  longer	
  an	
  accepted	
  rule	
  when	
  Russia	
  placed	
  their	
  tricolour	
  on	
  the	
  seabed	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  in	
  2007.	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  the	
  insecurity,	
  albeit	
  minor	
  insecurity,	
  that	
  this	
  caused	
  within	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations—	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  30	
  (Klotz	
  &	
  Lynch,	
  2007	
  p.	
  11)	
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more	
  importantly	
  it	
  demonstrated	
  that	
  the	
  rules	
  for	
  determining	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  have	
  changed	
  with	
  shifts	
  in	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  To	
  illustrate	
  the	
  ability	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  to	
  evolve	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  a	
  new	
  rule,	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  variety	
  of	
  examples	
  from	
  which	
  to	
  draw.	
  Consider	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  the	
  Geneva	
  Conventions	
  and	
  the	
  guidelines	
  agreed	
  upon	
  by	
  actors	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  community	
  on	
  the	
  treatment	
  of	
  civilians	
  and	
  wounded	
  or	
  captured	
  servicemen	
  during	
  war.	
  This	
  has	
  caused	
  war	
  to	
  become	
  more	
  discriminant,	
  lest	
  the	
  violator	
  be	
  railed	
  upon	
  with	
  international	
  scorn.	
  In	
  the	
  twentieth	
  century,	
  military	
  action	
  to	
  prevent	
  the	
  spread	
  of	
  totalitarianism	
  and	
  fascism	
  was	
  considered	
  acceptable,	
  yet	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
  the	
  proxy	
  wars	
  used	
  to	
  prevent	
  the	
  spread	
  of	
  Communism	
  were	
  of	
  dubious	
  credibility	
  and	
  finally,	
  the	
  same	
  technique	
  used	
  to	
  prevent	
  the	
  spread	
  of	
  terrorism	
  receives	
  even	
  less	
  acceptance	
  by	
  members	
  in	
  the	
  contemporary	
  international	
  community.	
  	
  
It	
  is	
  possible	
  to	
  perceive	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  does	
  evolve	
  and	
  change	
  through	
  a	
  simple	
  review	
  of	
  history,	
  the	
  larger	
  the	
  sample	
  cross	
  section	
  of	
  history	
  the	
  easier	
  it	
  is	
  to	
  trace	
  the	
  turning	
  points	
  of	
  the	
  construction	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  The	
  process	
  of	
  change	
  is	
  this:	
  “If	
  the	
  thoughts	
  and	
  ideas	
  that	
  enter	
  into	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  international	
  relations	
  change,	
  then	
  the	
  system	
  itself	
  will	
  change	
  as	
  well,	
  because	
  the	
  system	
  consists	
  in	
  thoughts	
  and	
  ideas.”31	
  If	
  you	
  add	
  a	
  new	
  rule	
  to	
  the	
  existing	
  international	
  system,	
  such	
  as	
  'war	
  is	
  not	
  to	
  be	
  used	
  as	
  an	
  instrument	
  of	
  policy'-­‐-­‐it	
  changes	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  relations	
  between	
  states.	
  This	
  can	
  be	
  illustrated	
  in	
  international	
  relations	
  by	
  borrowing	
  the	
  mathematical	
  concept	
  of	
  functions,	
  where	
  a	
  rule	
  is	
  applied	
  to	
  an	
  input,	
  resulting	
  in	
  a	
  permissible	
  output,	
  (See	
  Figure	
  1).	
  Because	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  “exists	
  only	
  as	
  an	
  intersubjective	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  31	
  (Jackson	
  &	
  Sorenson,	
  p.	
  162)	
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awareness	
  among	
  people”32,	
  it	
  is	
  possible	
  to	
  cause	
  the	
  system	
  to	
  transform	
  by	
  introducing	
  new	
  rules	
  into	
  the	
  structure.	
  As	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  international	
  system	
  is	
  the	
  ideational	
  creation	
  of	
  agents	
  who	
  have	
  introduced	
  rules	
  with	
  self-­‐interested	
  objectives	
  in	
  mind—the	
  international	
  system	
  exemplifies	
  that	
  “Anarchy	
  is	
  what	
  states	
  make	
  of	
  it.”33	
  
	
  Figure	
  1:	
  Addition	
  of	
  Rules	
  in	
  the	
  Function	
  Machine	
  of	
  the	
  International	
  System	
  
The	
  reason	
  that	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  has	
  changed	
  is	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  ideas	
  by	
  states	
  with	
  the	
  power	
  to	
  influence	
  the	
  system	
  to	
  change,	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  achieve	
  a	
  desired	
  beneficial	
  result.	
  Just	
  as	
  when	
  the	
  “sovereignty	
  doctrine	
  expel[ed]	
  the	
  non-­‐European	
  world	
  from	
  its	
  realm,	
  and	
  then	
  proceed[ed]	
  to	
  legitimise	
  the	
  imperialism	
  that	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  incorporation	
  of	
  the	
  non-­‐European	
  world	
  into	
  the	
  system	
  of	
  international	
  law.”34	
  For	
  centuries,	
  the	
  anarchic	
  international	
  system	
  operated	
  in	
  a	
  survival	
  of	
  the	
  fittest	
  mode,	
  as	
  states	
  expanded	
  and	
  contracted	
  with	
  the	
  fortunes	
  of	
  material	
  forces	
  and	
  social	
  alliances35	
  and	
  as	
  markets	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  32	
  (Jackson	
  &	
  Sorenson,	
  p.	
  162)	
  33	
  (Wendt,	
  1999,	
  p.	
  42)	
  34	
  (Anghie,	
  2006,	
  p.	
  741)	
  35	
  See	
  (Wendt	
  1995,	
  p.	
  73)	
  where	
  he	
  notes	
  “Neorealists	
  think	
  it	
  [structure]	
  is	
  made	
  only	
  of	
  a	
  distribution	
  of	
  material	
  capabilities,	
  whereas	
  constructivists	
  think	
  it	
  is	
  also	
  made	
  of	
  social	
  relationships.”	
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grew,	
  new	
  resources	
  were	
  needed	
  for	
  economic	
  expansion.	
  
The	
  European	
  empires	
  acquired	
  land	
  and	
  resources	
  from	
  native	
  populations	
  and	
  then	
  from	
  each	
  other,	
  and	
  sometimes	
  exchanged	
  through	
  treaty	
  or	
  purchase,	
  all	
  considered	
  as	
  acceptable	
  behaviour	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  However,	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  first	
  indication	
  that	
  a	
  shift	
  had	
  occurred	
  in	
  international	
  system	
  was	
  when	
  following	
  race	
  for	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  between	
  Scott	
  and	
  Peary	
  was	
  achieved,	
  U.S.	
  President	
  Taft	
  posited	
  that	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  could	
  not	
  be	
  absorbed	
  into	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  mare	
  liberum.	
  It	
  was	
  this	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  that	
  had	
  changed	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  centuries	
  before.	
  If	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  at	
  this	
  time	
  had	
  declared	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  it	
  is	
  likely	
  that	
  the	
  sector	
  principles	
  and	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  ice	
  would	
  have	
  entered	
  into	
  customary	
  international	
  law.	
  This	
  claim	
  by	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  would	
  have	
  been	
  reinforced	
  through	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  repetition	
  by	
  the	
  actions	
  of	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  who	
  later	
  made	
  sectoral	
  declarations.	
  If	
  this	
  had	
  happened—the	
  sector	
  principle	
  would	
  have	
  included—not	
  only	
  the	
  lands,	
  but	
  also	
  the	
  ice.	
  Instead,	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  reigned	
  supreme—and	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  would	
  not	
  need	
  to	
  see	
  another	
  rule	
  added	
  to	
  maritime	
  territory	
  until	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  could	
  be	
  accessed.	
  If	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  had	
  not	
  failed	
  to	
  become	
  an	
  actual	
  rule	
  for	
  territorial	
  delineation,	
  the	
  codified	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  
the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  would	
  have	
  been	
  unnecessary	
  for	
  the	
  determination	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  
So	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  Arctic	
  situated	
  within	
  it	
  are	
  products	
  of	
  imperialism	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  ability	
  of	
  certain	
  states	
  to	
  achieve	
  desired	
  outcomes	
  in	
  the	
  structures	
  and	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  system.	
  Those	
  with	
  more	
  persuasive	
  clout	
  added	
  the	
  rule	
  'freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas'	
  and	
  when	
  the	
  international	
  community	
  accepted	
  this,	
  it	
  became	
  the	
  modus	
  operandi	
  and	
  the	
  seas	
  could	
  no	
  longer	
  be	
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annexed	
  into	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction.	
  Later,	
  the	
  rule	
  'exclusive	
  economic	
  zone'	
  was	
  added	
  and	
  a	
  certain	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  could	
  be	
  annexed	
  into	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  for	
  exploitation	
  of	
  marine	
  resources.	
  This	
  was	
  followed	
  by	
  the	
  addition	
  of	
  the	
  rule	
  'continental	
  shelf'	
  and	
  from	
  this,	
  the	
  land	
  underneath	
  the	
  seas	
  becomes	
  sovereign	
  territory	
  for	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  exploitation	
  by	
  a	
  handful	
  of	
  actors	
  with	
  the	
  privilege	
  of	
  coastal	
  boundaries.	
  Through	
  this,	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  which	
  would	
  have	
  once	
  fallen	
  under	
  the	
  juridical	
  notion	
  of	
  mare	
  liberum,	
  has	
  undergone	
  a	
  transformation	
  from	
  ‘mare	
  nullius’	
  to	
  again	
  return	
  to	
  a	
  form	
  of	
  mare	
  clausum,	
  a	
  principle	
  so	
  carefully	
  circumvented	
  in	
  an	
  earlier	
  era.	
  	
  Through	
  the	
  cumulative	
  layering	
  of	
  these	
  rules,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  its	
  resources	
  (shipping	
  routes,	
  marine	
  resources,	
  oil	
  and	
  other	
  minerals)	
  are	
  divided	
  up	
  into	
  the	
  sovereign	
  realm	
  of	
  the	
  five	
  littoral	
  states,	
  with	
  the	
  rules	
  carefully	
  constructed	
  to	
  exclude	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states.	
  
The	
  Arctic,	
  Imperialism	
  and	
  the	
  International	
  System	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Although	
  the	
  rules	
  governing	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  have	
  changed	
  since	
  European	
  empires	
  began	
  absorbing	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  New	
  World	
  through	
  imperial	
  practices,	
  the	
  engagement	
  of	
  states	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  historically	
  been	
  and	
  continues	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  relationship	
  of	
  imperialism.	
  The	
  Arctic	
  has	
  been	
  absorbed	
  into	
  the	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  through	
  the	
  processes	
  of	
  imperialism	
  in	
  four	
  phases	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system:	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years,	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  and	
  Post-­‐Cold	
  War	
  Periods.	
  In	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  periods,	
  it	
  is	
  possible	
  to	
  analyse	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  against	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  and	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  that	
  applied	
  to	
  their	
  policy.	
  The	
  turning	
  points	
  for	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  occur	
  when	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  corresponding	
  shift	
  within	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  but	
  through	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  periods,	
  it	
  is	
  possible	
  to	
  see	
  the	
  results	
  of	
  imperialist	
  relationships	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  and	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
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sovereignty	
  over	
  territory	
  framed	
  by	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  
The	
  Arctic	
  and	
  empire	
  are	
  not	
  two	
  terms	
  often	
  seen	
  together	
  outside	
  the	
  histories	
  of	
  British	
  exploration	
  in	
  the	
  nineteenth	
  century,	
  but	
  their	
  connection	
  extends	
  much	
  beyond	
  this	
  early	
  period	
  of	
  European	
  engagement	
  in	
  the	
  high	
  north.	
  Empire	
  and	
  imperialism	
  are	
  connected	
  by	
  their	
  etymological	
  origins	
  in	
  
imperium,	
  the	
  Latin	
  for	
  “an	
  order,	
  a	
  command;	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  order,	
  power,	
  mastery,	
  command,	
  esp[ecially]	
  political	
  power,	
  authority,	
  sovereignty,”36	
  which	
  was	
  commonly	
  incorporated	
  into	
  the	
  English	
  language	
  in	
  the	
  eighteenth	
  century37	
  just	
  before	
  what	
  Hobsbawm	
  called	
  the	
  ‘Age	
  of	
  Empire’.	
  	
  For	
  Hobsbawm,	
  the	
  imperialism	
  of	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Empire	
  was	
  not	
  in	
  the	
  style	
  of	
  ‘traditional’	
  empire,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  classical	
  or	
  European	
  colonial	
  empires,	
  which	
  introduced	
  the	
  enchantment	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  to	
  the	
  wider	
  world.	
  Nor	
  was	
  it	
  in	
  the	
  style	
  which	
  warranted	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  imperium	
  to	
  the	
  common	
  vernacular	
  and	
  filled	
  bookshelves	
  with	
  histories	
  of	
  heroic	
  explorers	
  and	
  grand	
  military	
  exploits.	
  Rather,	
  it	
  was	
  marked	
  by	
  the	
  extension	
  of	
  “political	
  and	
  cultural	
  institution	
  bourgeois	
  liberalism.”38	
  This	
  shows	
  that	
  empire	
  and	
  imperialism	
  have	
  held	
  multiple	
  incarnations,	
  not	
  in	
  form	
  only,	
  but	
  also	
  in	
  juridical	
  and	
  theoretical	
  approaches	
  that	
  have	
  changed	
  along	
  with	
  the	
  transitions	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  
The	
  reality	
  of	
  the	
  variations	
  in	
  conceptions	
  on	
  the	
  definition	
  of	
  empire	
  has	
  led	
  Colas	
  to	
  concluded	
  that	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  empire	
  “carries	
  considerable	
  historical	
  baggage;	
  it	
  is	
  constantly	
  contested	
  and	
  reaffirmed	
  in	
  the	
  present	
  with	
  reference	
  to	
  the	
  past.”39	
  Empire	
  and	
  imperialism	
  are	
  now	
  often	
  considered	
  as	
  dirty	
  words	
  and	
  it	
  is	
  no	
  longer	
  socially	
  acceptable	
  to	
  wear	
  the	
  badge	
  of	
  the	
  proud	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  36	
  (University	
  of	
  Notre	
  Dame,	
  2013)	
  37	
  (Harper,	
  2010)	
  38	
  (Hobsbawm,	
  1987,	
  p.	
  10)	
  39	
  (Colas,	
  2007,	
  p.	
  3)	
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imperialist	
  that	
  was	
  conjured	
  in	
  Land	
  of	
  Hope	
  and	
  Glory’s	
  lyric	
  “wider	
  still	
  and	
  wider	
  shall	
  thy	
  bounds	
  be	
  set.”40	
  Instead,	
  associations	
  with	
  imperialism	
  conjure	
  endless	
  histories	
  of	
  immorality,	
  suppression	
  and	
  oppression.41	
  It	
  is	
  impossible,	
  even	
  within	
  the	
  space	
  of	
  a	
  thesis,	
  to	
  survey	
  the	
  breadth	
  of	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  empire	
  and	
  imperialism.	
  Accordingly,	
  this	
  research,	
  like	
  Colas,	
  adopts	
  the	
  premise	
  that	
  “not	
  only	
  does	
  the	
  meaning	
  of	
  empire	
  vary	
  throughout	
  time	
  and	
  space,	
  but	
  its	
  deployment	
  as	
  an	
  explanatory	
  concept	
  requires	
  being	
  especially	
  sensitive	
  to	
  the	
  historical	
  particularity	
  of	
  different	
  imperial	
  experiences.”42	
  Nor	
  is	
  there	
  space	
  within	
  this	
  work	
  to	
  consider	
  the	
  morality	
  of	
  empire	
  and	
  imperialism.	
  	
  
Empire	
  and	
  imperialism	
  are	
  difficult	
  to	
  define	
  and	
  it	
  has	
  been	
  said	
  that,	
  “Imperialism	
  resembles	
  Darwinism,	
  in	
  that	
  many	
  use	
  the	
  term	
  but	
  few	
  can	
  say	
  what	
  it	
  really	
  means.”43	
  Doyle	
  has	
  described	
  empire	
  as	
  both	
  a	
  “relationship,	
  formal	
  or	
  informal,	
  which	
  one	
  state	
  controls	
  the	
  effective	
  political	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  another	
  political	
  society”	
  and	
  as	
  “system	
  of	
  interaction	
  between	
  two	
  political	
  entities,	
  one	
  of	
  which,	
  the	
  dominant	
  metropole,	
  exerts	
  political	
  control	
  over	
  the	
  internal	
  and	
  external	
  policy—the	
  effective	
  sovereignty—of	
  the	
  other,	
  the	
  subordinate	
  periphery.”44	
  Others,	
  such	
  as	
  Mattingly,	
  have	
  described	
  imperialism	
  as	
  “the	
  geopolitical	
  manifestation	
  of	
  relationships	
  of	
  control	
  imposed	
  by	
  a	
  state	
  on	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  others,”45	
  and	
  Howe	
  concludes	
  that,	
  “a	
  kind	
  of	
  basic,	
  consensus	
  definition	
  would	
  be	
  that	
  an	
  empire	
  is	
  a	
  large	
  political	
  body	
  which	
  rules	
  over	
  territories	
  outside	
  its	
  original	
  borders.”46	
  This	
  relationship,	
  or	
  system	
  of	
  empire,	
  can	
  be	
  achieved	
  through	
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  (Courtauld,	
  2010)	
  41	
  (Howe,	
  2002)	
  42	
  (Colas,	
  2007,	
  p.	
  3)	
  43	
  (Wolfe,	
  1997,	
  p.	
  388)	
  44	
  (Doyle,	
  1986,	
  p.	
  12)	
  45	
  (Mattingly,	
  2010,	
  p.	
  6)	
  46	
  (Howe,	
  2002,	
  p.	
  14)	
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many	
  methods,	
  including	
  “by	
  force,	
  by	
  political	
  collaboration,	
  by	
  economic,	
  social	
  or	
  cultural	
  dependence.”47	
  	
  
In	
  another	
  approach	
  on	
  imperialism,	
  Miéville	
  notes	
  that	
  many	
  textbooks	
  on	
  international	
  law	
  merely	
  “explain	
  how	
  to	
  ‘do’	
  international	
  law	
  [but]	
  these	
  writings	
  cannot	
  get	
  to	
  grips	
  with	
  its	
  categories	
  or	
  processes”48	
  and	
  that	
  they	
  fail	
  to	
  adequately	
  develop	
  a	
  theoretical	
  position	
  on	
  the	
  of	
  origin	
  of	
  international	
  law.	
  He	
  determines	
  that	
  the	
  common	
  definitions	
  of	
  international	
  law-­‐-­‐	
  as	
  laws	
  which	
  “governs	
  the	
  relations	
  between	
  states”49	
  in	
  actuality	
  “tells	
  us	
  almost	
  nothing	
  of	
  the	
  underlying	
  nature	
  of	
  international	
  law.”50	
  Miéville	
  eventually	
  concludes,	
  as	
  does	
  this	
  research	
  though	
  from	
  a	
  different	
  methodology,	
  that	
  imperialism	
  includes	
  the	
  “means	
  by	
  which	
  international	
  law	
  is	
  made	
  actual	
  in	
  the	
  modern	
  international	
  system.”51	
  Meanwhile	
  this	
  research	
  also	
  holds	
  that	
  in	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  anarchy	
  that	
  exists	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  imperialism	
  is	
  also	
  the	
  method	
  used	
  to	
  create	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  structures	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  which	
  frame	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  this	
  system.	
  	
  
From	
  these	
  definitions	
  emerge	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  key	
  features	
  of	
  empire:	
  territory,	
  sovereignty,	
  distinction	
  between	
  a	
  core	
  and	
  periphery	
  and	
  finally,	
  the	
  control	
  of	
  international	
  affairs,	
  including	
  diplomatic	
  and	
  economic	
  affairs.	
  Colas	
  has	
  determined	
  that	
  there	
  are	
  three	
  hallmarks	
  of	
  empire:	
  “imperial	
  organization	
  of	
  political	
  space,	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  markets	
  in	
  sustaining	
  imperial	
  rule,	
  and	
  the	
  contradictory	
  expressions	
  of	
  imperial	
  rule,”52	
  while	
  Howe	
  describes	
  empire	
  as	
  “a	
  central	
  power	
  or	
  core	
  territory—whose	
  inhabitants	
  usually	
  continue	
  to	
  form	
  the	
  dominant	
  ethnic	
  or	
  national	
  group	
  in	
  the	
  entire	
  system—and	
  an	
  extensive	
  periphery	
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  (Doyle,	
  1986,	
  p.	
  12)	
  48	
  (Mieville,	
  2005,	
  p.	
  2)	
  49	
  (Mieville,	
  2005,	
  p.	
  12)	
  50	
  (Mieville,	
  2005,	
  p.	
  11)	
  51	
  (Mieville,	
  2005,	
  p.	
  8)	
  52	
  (Colas,	
  2007,	
  p.	
  5)	
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of	
  dominated	
  areas”53	
  with	
  Mattingly	
  contributing	
  that	
  “Empires	
  generally	
  combine	
  a	
  core,	
  often	
  metropolitan-­‐controlled	
  territory,	
  with	
  peripheral	
  territories	
  and	
  have	
  multi-­‐ethnic	
  or	
  multinational	
  dimensions.”54	
  Imperialism	
  is	
  thus	
  characterised	
  as	
  a	
  relationship	
  of	
  political	
  control	
  by	
  a	
  state	
  over	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  territory	
  of	
  another	
  people,	
  assumed	
  without	
  the	
  benefit	
  of	
  the	
  social	
  contract.	
  
Using	
  these	
  features	
  of	
  empire,	
  and	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  difficult	
  to	
  colour	
  the	
  Arctic	
  map	
  as	
  having	
  historically	
  been	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  empires	
  of	
  Russia,	
  Great	
  Britain,	
  and	
  even	
  as	
  part	
  of	
  a	
  brief	
  imperial	
  project	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  that	
  followed	
  the	
  doctrine	
  of	
  Manifest	
  Destiny.	
  This	
  was	
  also	
  true	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
  although	
  the	
  map	
  would	
  have	
  been	
  coloured	
  along	
  ideological	
  lines	
  of	
  polarity.	
  Still	
  today,	
  the	
  littoral	
  states	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  demonstrate	
  the	
  key	
  features	
  of	
  empire,	
  although	
  some	
  to	
  greater	
  extent	
  than	
  others.	
  This	
  includes	
  that	
  they	
  have	
  demonstrated	
  their	
  territorial	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  terra	
  firma,	
  that	
  there	
  are	
  marked	
  differences	
  maintaining	
  Arctic	
  territory	
  as	
  a	
  periphery,	
  with	
  the	
  core	
  legislating,	
  creating	
  policy—and	
  more	
  importantly,	
  financing	
  their	
  respective	
  territories	
  and	
  finally,	
  the	
  core	
  maintains	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  affairs	
  concerning	
  these	
  territories	
  and	
  their	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants.	
  	
  
How	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  come	
  to	
  symbolise	
  the	
  project	
  of	
  empire	
  can	
  be	
  traced	
  through	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  authority	
  in	
  the	
  region.	
  With	
  imperialism	
  also	
  being	
  defined	
  as	
  “the	
  process	
  or	
  policy	
  of	
  establishing	
  or	
  maintain	
  an	
  empire,”55	
  it	
  requires	
  action	
  by	
  agents,	
  not	
  only	
  with	
  power,	
  but	
  also	
  with	
  interests,	
  with	
  asymmetry	
  as	
  a	
  key	
  feature	
  in	
  the	
  relationship	
  between	
  agents.	
  Agents,	
  or	
  states,	
  act	
  to	
  fulfil	
  these	
  interests,	
  guided	
  by	
  their	
  identities	
  to	
  develop	
  structures	
  and	
  through	
  reinforcement	
  of	
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  (Howe,	
  2002,	
  p.	
  14)	
  54	
  (Mattingly,	
  2010,	
  p.	
  6)	
  55	
  (Doyle,	
  1986,	
  p.	
  45)	
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rules,	
  similar	
  to	
  electronic	
  interaction	
  of	
  neuron	
  dendrite	
  synapses	
  in	
  the	
  brain:	
  a	
  path	
  travelled	
  often	
  reinforces	
  the	
  likelihood	
  that	
  rules	
  will	
  be	
  remembered	
  and	
  establishes	
  expected	
  norms	
  of	
  behaviour.	
  However,	
  imperialism	
  is	
  not	
  just	
  another	
  word	
  for	
  states	
  acting	
  to	
  fulfil	
  their	
  interests,	
  as	
  interest	
  seeking	
  is	
  not	
  only	
  a	
  naturally	
  inherent	
  impulse,	
  but	
  is	
  also	
  an	
  essential	
  duty	
  of	
  the	
  state.	
  Rather,	
  imperialism	
  is	
  acting	
  to	
  achieve	
  these	
  interests	
  by	
  having	
  the	
  persuasive	
  power	
  to	
  manipulate	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  structure,	
  through	
  convincing	
  other	
  actors	
  to	
  reproduced	
  a	
  shared	
  understanding	
  and	
  through	
  an	
  asymmetric	
  relationship	
  with	
  territory.	
  
Thus,	
  imperialism	
  is	
  also	
  responsible	
  for	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  changing	
  the	
  shared	
  understandings	
  that	
  form	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  this	
  is	
  how	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  come	
  to	
  be	
  presently	
  situated	
  in	
  international	
  relations.	
  The	
  Arctic	
  has	
  been	
  absorbed	
  through	
  imperialism	
  into	
  the	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  a	
  small	
  number	
  of	
  states	
  in	
  four	
  stages	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  In	
  these	
  stages,	
  there	
  has	
  been	
  a	
  transformation	
  in	
  the	
  way	
  that	
  ‘territory’	
  is	
  defined	
  within	
  international	
  law,	
  making	
  it	
  possible	
  to	
  absorb	
  increasing	
  quantities	
  of	
  resources	
  into	
  the	
  sovereign	
  control	
  of	
  states.	
  Through	
  these	
  changes	
  it	
  has	
  been	
  made	
  acceptable	
  to	
  bypass	
  a	
  historic	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  the	
  ‘freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas’,	
  while	
  at	
  the	
  same	
  time	
  appearing	
  to	
  respect	
  and	
  even	
  retain	
  this	
  rule	
  in	
  effect,	
  yet	
  still	
  finding	
  a	
  way	
  to	
  create	
  legitimate	
  claims	
  over	
  resources	
  beyond	
  the	
  old	
  limits	
  of	
  territorial	
  sovereignty.	
  The	
  changes	
  within	
  the	
  understood	
  limits	
  of	
  territory	
  have	
  evolved	
  in	
  the	
  different	
  phases	
  of	
  Arctic	
  empire.	
  In	
  phase	
  one,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  an	
  empire	
  of	
  conquest	
  when	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  territory	
  indicated	
  that	
  discovery	
  and	
  annexation	
  were	
  sufficient	
  demonstration	
  of	
  right.	
  In	
  phase	
  two,	
  imperialism	
  was	
  demonstrated	
  in	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  the	
  myth	
  of	
  Arctic	
  heroes	
  demonstrating	
  mastery	
  over	
  the	
  elements	
  and	
  through	
  the	
  use	
  of	
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science	
  to	
  improve	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty.	
  	
  In	
  phase	
  three,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  an	
  empire	
  of	
  ideology	
  and	
  for	
  reasons	
  of	
  security	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  sovereign	
  boundaries	
  of	
  territory	
  were	
  blurred	
  or	
  overlooked.	
  In	
  phase	
  four,	
  imperialism	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  been	
  administered	
  through	
  a	
  legal	
  conquest—the	
  manipulation	
  of	
  the	
  structures	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  that	
  has	
  allowing	
  additional	
  territory	
  and	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  to	
  be	
  absorbed	
  for	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  national	
  interest.	
  
Although	
  having	
  different	
  grammatical	
  functions,	
  empire	
  and	
  imperialism	
  are	
  in	
  essence	
  the	
  same	
  because	
  they	
  represent	
  forms	
  of	
  power,	
  control,	
  suppression,	
  extraction,	
  a	
  gravitational	
  pull	
  to	
  the	
  central	
  core	
  and	
  the	
  financial	
  maintenance	
  of	
  empire.	
  They	
  are	
  different	
  because	
  of	
  the	
  forms	
  of	
  their	
  manifestation.	
  “If	
  an	
  empire	
  is	
  a	
  kind	
  of	
  object,	
  usually	
  a	
  political	
  entity,	
  then	
  imperialism	
  is	
  a	
  process—or	
  in	
  some	
  understandings	
  an	
  attitude,	
  an	
  ideology,	
  even	
  a	
  philosophy	
  of	
  life.”56	
  Empire	
  is	
  visible,	
  tangible.	
  Empire	
  can	
  be	
  seen	
  in	
  maps,	
  territory,	
  products	
  and	
  commerce.	
  Imperialism	
  can	
  only	
  be	
  perceived	
  and	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  exert	
  hegemony	
  mental/philosophical/ideological	
  hegemony	
  over	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Imperialism	
  is	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  create	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  game	
  during	
  a	
  state	
  of	
  play	
  to	
  secure	
  a	
  win,	
  permitting	
  the	
  continuation	
  of	
  asymmetric	
  relationships	
  between	
  people	
  and	
  territory.	
  	
  
Even	
  though	
  they	
  feature	
  heavily	
  within	
  the	
  annals	
  of	
  history,	
  empire	
  and	
  imperialism	
  are	
  often	
  ignored	
  within	
  International	
  Relations.57	
  Perhaps	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  relative	
  youth	
  of	
  International	
  Relations	
  that	
  there	
  has	
  not	
  been	
  opportunity	
  to	
  return	
  to	
  the	
  analysis	
  of	
  an	
  era	
  that	
  predates	
  its	
  own	
  existence	
  when	
  there	
  is	
  so	
  much	
  analysis	
  of	
  current	
  affairs	
  to	
  undertake.	
  	
  Yet	
  one	
  does	
  not	
  have	
  to	
  look	
  very	
  hard	
  to	
  find	
  relations	
  between	
  states	
  are	
  far	
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  (Howe,	
  2002,	
  p.	
  22)	
  57	
  (Zielonka,	
  2012,)	
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from	
  the	
  condition	
  of	
  equality	
  emphasised	
  in	
  the	
  Montevideo	
  
Convention	
  193358	
  or	
  to	
  find	
  examples	
  of	
  the	
  violations	
  of	
  the	
  supposed	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  Westphalian	
  System.	
  Rather,	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  national	
  interests	
  without	
  respect	
  for	
  human	
  dignity	
  or	
  the	
  concern	
  for	
  the	
  well	
  being	
  of	
  the	
  environment	
  introduces	
  questions	
  regarding	
  concepts	
  that	
  are	
  currently	
  used	
  to	
  evaluate	
  the	
  appropriateness	
  of	
  policy	
  within	
  contemporary	
  international	
  relations	
  and	
  although	
  not	
  a	
  popular	
  concept,	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  imperialism	
  may	
  present	
  a	
  more	
  pragmatic	
  analysis	
  of	
  international	
  relations.	
  	
  
The	
  Arctic	
  is	
  a	
  suitable	
  topic	
  for	
  analysis	
  under	
  the	
  lens	
  of	
  imperialism	
  for	
  a	
  variety	
  of	
  reasons,	
  including:	
  expansion	
  of	
  territory,	
  extraction	
  of	
  resources,	
  control	
  by	
  a	
  distant	
  core	
  over	
  the	
  administrative	
  features	
  of	
  government,	
  i.e.	
  domestic	
  policy,	
  treaties,	
  foreign	
  policy	
  and	
  finally,	
  influence/control	
  of	
  international	
  legal	
  mechanisms	
  to	
  the	
  sometimes	
  exclusion	
  of	
  indigenous	
  populations.	
  This	
  research	
  follows	
  the	
  idea	
  that	
  “the	
  study	
  of	
  empire	
  demands	
  a	
  focus	
  on	
  the	
  scope	
  and	
  structure	
  of	
  governance,	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  borders,	
  centre-­‐periphery	
  relations	
  and	
  respective	
  civilising	
  missions…studies	
  of	
  empires,	
  on	
  the	
  other	
  hand,	
  show	
  that	
  interdependence	
  between	
  periphery	
  and	
  centre	
  often	
  works	
  to	
  the	
  former’s	
  advantage…Besides,	
  empires	
  often	
  try	
  to	
  “civilise”	
  and	
  “institutionalise”	
  their	
  peripheries,	
  rather	
  than	
  simply	
  attempting	
  to	
  conquer	
  or	
  exploit	
  them,	
  as	
  is	
  sometimes	
  assumed	
  by	
  scholars	
  of	
  hegemony.”59	
  These	
  features	
  are	
  evident	
  in	
  the	
  relationship	
  of	
  the	
  dominant	
  core	
  to	
  the	
  outlying	
  territories	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  empire,	
  with	
  the	
  people	
  who	
  live	
  there	
  and	
  with	
  the	
  resources	
  that	
  this	
  territory	
  holds.	
  This	
  research	
  will	
  show	
  that	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  “imperial	
  control	
  involves	
  not	
  only	
  a	
  process	
  but	
  also	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  58	
  Article	
  4	
  states:	
  “States	
  are	
  juridically	
  equal,	
  enjoy	
  the	
  same	
  rights,	
  and	
  have	
  equal	
  capacity	
  in	
  their	
  exercise.	
  The	
  rights	
  of	
  each	
  one	
  do	
  not	
  depend	
  upon	
  the	
  power	
  which	
  it	
  possesses	
  to	
  assure	
  its	
  exercise,	
  but	
  upon	
  the	
  simple	
  fact	
  of	
  its	
  existence	
  as	
  a	
  person	
  under	
  international	
  law,”	
  (Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Rights	
  and	
  Duties	
  of	
  States,	
  1933).	
  59	
  (Zielonka,	
  2012,	
  p.	
  506)	
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outputs	
  or	
  outcomes…empire	
  is	
  as	
  imperialism	
  does.”60	
  For	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  empire	
  and	
  imperialism	
  are	
  not	
  only	
  the	
  story	
  of	
  its	
  past,	
  but	
  they	
  are	
  also	
  the	
  story	
  of	
  its	
  future.	
  	
  
The	
  Phases	
  of	
  Arctic	
  Imperialism	
  
The	
  recorded	
  history	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  a	
  history	
  of	
  empire.61	
  Phase	
  one	
  of	
  empire,	
  or	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  begins	
  in	
  the	
  epoch	
  of	
  European	
  expansion,	
  with	
  explorers	
  crossing	
  the	
  seas	
  as	
  representatives	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  to	
  claim	
  territory	
  to	
  add	
  to	
  their	
  spheres	
  of	
  influence,	
  (See	
  Figure	
  2).	
  During	
  this	
  period,	
  Alaska	
  became	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  Imperial	
  Russia,	
  Rupert’s	
  Land	
  was	
  chartered	
  to	
  the	
  commercial	
  entity	
  of	
  the	
  Hudson	
  Bay	
  Company	
  and	
  various	
  other	
  lands	
  and	
  islands	
  were	
  claimed	
  for	
  Russia,	
  France,	
  Great	
  Britain	
  and	
  eventually	
  Norway,	
  Denmark	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  States.	
  Explorers	
  came	
  for	
  gold,	
  glory	
  and	
  the	
  national	
  interests,	
  or	
  for	
  the	
  vast	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  personal	
  acclaim	
  and	
  especially,	
  in	
  pursuit	
  of	
  the	
  illusive	
  Northwest	
  Passage,	
  the	
  route	
  that	
  would	
  give	
  Europe	
  access	
  to	
  the	
  lucrative	
  markets	
  of	
  East	
  Asia.	
  The	
  early	
  focus	
  of	
  this	
  period	
  was	
  the	
  acquisition	
  of	
  new	
  territories	
  for	
  European	
  empires	
  for	
  both	
  prestige	
  and	
  resources,	
  and	
  the	
  hope	
  of	
  shipping	
  routes	
  through	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Toward	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  this	
  period,	
  states	
  focused	
  on	
  the	
  solidification	
  of	
  land	
  borders	
  and	
  the	
  implications	
  of	
  the	
  borders	
  for	
  their	
  overall	
  national	
  interests.	
  	
  
	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  60	
  (Doyle,	
  1986,	
  p.	
  39)	
  61	
  As	
  this	
  paper	
  focuses	
  on	
  ‘Western’	
  history	
  of	
  empire	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  due	
  to	
  constraints	
  of	
  space,	
  it	
  excludes	
  the	
  traditional/oral	
  history	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  indigenous	
  peoples.	
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  Figure	
  2:	
  Exploration	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic62	
  
This	
  earliest	
  phase	
  is	
  the	
  era	
  in	
  which	
  European	
  powers	
  ‘discovered’	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  what	
  Orwell	
  described	
  as	
  “imperialism	
  in	
  its	
  expansionist	
  phase”63	
  and	
  created	
  the	
  legal	
  mechanisms	
  whereby	
  it	
  was	
  acceptable	
  for	
  this	
  already	
  inhabited	
  land	
  to	
  be	
  absorbed	
  within	
  the	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  its	
  new	
  owners.	
  These	
  legal	
  mechanisms	
  were	
  not	
  codified,	
  but	
  were	
  rather	
  tacitly	
  accepted	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  community	
  as	
  the	
  status	
  quo	
  and	
  included	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  discovery,	
  annexation,	
  proclamation,	
  and	
  effective	
  administration64,	
  rules	
  introduced	
  through	
  repeated	
  practice	
  and	
  accepted	
  as	
  normative	
  guidelines	
  for	
  imperialist	
  states.	
  As	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  were	
  clearly	
  not	
  demonstrating	
  effective	
  administration	
  and	
  utilisation	
  of	
  their	
  territory	
  and	
  nor	
  were	
  they	
  politically	
  organised	
  into	
  recognised	
  sovereign	
  states	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  their	
  land	
  was	
  considered	
  as	
  available	
  for	
  European	
  annexation.	
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  (C.S.	
  Hammond	
  &	
  Company	
  1900)	
  63	
  (Orwell,	
  1981,	
  p.	
  118)	
  64	
  (Burghardt,	
  1973,	
  p.	
  229)	
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It	
  is	
  the	
  states	
  within	
  this	
  early	
  form	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  that	
  created	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  structure,	
  and	
  those	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  system	
  had	
  no	
  alternative	
  but	
  to	
  accept	
  the	
  results	
  due	
  to	
  their	
  limited	
  power.	
  It	
  has	
  been	
  noted	
  “the	
  very	
  structure	
  of	
  ‘international	
  law’	
  was	
  created	
  in	
  the	
  colonial	
  era,	
  by	
  the	
  colonial	
  powers.	
  It	
  is	
  based	
  on	
  a	
  mixture	
  of	
  Napoleonic,	
  Anglo-­‐Saxon,	
  and	
  before	
  that	
  Roman	
  legal	
  codes,	
  owing	
  nothing	
  much	
  to	
  any	
  non-­‐European	
  idea	
  of	
  legality.	
  But	
  then	
  the	
  legal	
  systems	
  of	
  most	
  ex-­‐colonies,	
  too,	
  are	
  based	
  on	
  those	
  of	
  their	
  former	
  masters.”65	
  The	
  social	
  patterns	
  accepted	
  as	
  rules	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  this	
  period	
  of	
  empire	
  were	
  themselves	
  the	
  products	
  of	
  earlier	
  eras	
  of	
  imperialism,	
  reinforcing	
  patterns	
  of	
  uneven	
  relationships	
  between	
  a	
  stronger	
  core	
  and	
  the	
  inferior	
  periphery.	
  These	
  social	
  patterns	
  were	
  also	
  transferred	
  to	
  expansion	
  into	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  affecting	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  the	
  people	
  living	
  there	
  and	
  the	
  integrity	
  of	
  the	
  environment.	
  
The	
  Arctic	
  was	
  explored	
  by	
  representatives	
  of	
  European	
  states,	
  including	
  adventurers	
  such	
  as	
  Vitus	
  Bering,	
  a	
  Dane	
  sailing	
  for	
  Russia,	
  Martin	
  Frobisher,	
  John	
  Franklin,	
  John	
  and	
  James	
  Ross	
  for	
  Great	
  Britain,	
  Fridtjof	
  Nansen	
  and	
  Otto	
  Sverdrup	
  for	
  Norway,	
  later	
  followed	
  by	
  Knud	
  Rasmussen	
  for	
  Denmark,	
  Robert	
  Peary	
  for	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Vilhjalmur	
  Stefansson	
  for	
  Canada.	
  While	
  some	
  of	
  these	
  explorers	
  were	
  for	
  seeking	
  glory	
  and	
  adventure	
  for	
  themselves,	
  they	
  were	
  also	
  part	
  of	
  a	
  larger	
  narrative	
  that	
  “[e]very	
  measure,	
  which	
  could	
  extend	
  the	
  boundaries	
  of	
  domestic	
  prosperity,	
  enlarge	
  the	
  shores	
  of	
  scientific	
  discovery	
  or	
  increase	
  the	
  benign	
  influence	
  and	
  empire	
  of	
  Christianity	
  and	
  with	
  it	
  the	
  sum	
  of	
  happiness	
  and	
  hope	
  to	
  man,	
  was	
  eagerly	
  adopted,	
  and	
  vigorously	
  pursued.”66	
  The	
  main	
  objectives	
  of	
  early	
  Arctic	
  exploration	
  included	
  developing	
  the	
  sea-­‐lanes	
  of	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Passage	
  and	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  and	
  to	
  discover	
  regions	
  from	
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  (Howe,	
  2002,	
  p.	
  3)	
  66	
  (Franklin,	
  1824,	
  p.	
  2)	
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where	
  resources,	
  such	
  as	
  whale	
  oil	
  could	
  be	
  extracted	
  for	
  the	
  economic	
  benefit	
  of	
  the	
  motherland,	
  (See	
  Figure	
  3).	
  Expansion	
  ended	
  when	
  all	
  territory	
  had	
  been	
  claimed	
  and	
  exploration	
  declined	
  as	
  the	
  demand	
  for	
  the	
  known	
  resources	
  dwindled.	
  
	
  Figure	
  3:	
  Landing	
  of	
  the	
  Treasures,	
  or	
  Results	
  of	
  the	
  Polar	
  Expedition,	
  181967	
  
Interest	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  for	
  purposes	
  of	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  waned	
  in	
  the	
  early	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  20th	
  century,	
  following	
  the	
  transition	
  to	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  due	
  to	
  several	
  factors.	
  The	
  primary	
  factor	
  was	
  that	
  all	
  known	
  land	
  was	
  claimed	
  by	
  the	
  littoral	
  states	
  through	
  either	
  discovery	
  or	
  through	
  the	
  declarations	
  made	
  via	
  the	
  sector	
  principle.	
  	
  A	
  second	
  factor	
  is	
  that	
  most	
  economic	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  had	
  revolved	
  around	
  the	
  fur	
  trade	
  and	
  the	
  acquisition	
  of	
  seal/whale	
  oil.	
  As	
  demand	
  for	
  these	
  resources	
  declined,	
  so	
  did	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  commercial	
  enterprises.	
  Thirdly,	
  a	
  major	
  focus	
  of	
  Arctic	
  exploration	
  had	
  been	
  the	
  opening	
  of	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Passage	
  and	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Routes	
  as	
  major	
  shipping	
  routes,	
  objectives	
  that	
  were	
  abandoned	
  due	
  to	
  climatic	
  conditions.	
  The	
  climate	
  also	
  deterred	
  other	
  resource-­‐based	
  interests	
  from	
  growing	
  as	
  commodity	
  demand	
  shifted	
  away	
  from	
  furs	
  and	
  whale	
  oil	
  to	
  fossil	
  fuels,	
  such	
  as	
  coal,	
  gas	
  and	
  oil.68	
  Thus,	
  intrepid	
  explorers	
  and	
  treasure-­‐seekers	
  abandoned	
  pursuit	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  for	
  territorial	
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  (Cruikshank,	
  1819)	
  68	
  Although	
  much	
  coal	
  was	
  extracted	
  from	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  this	
  is	
  a	
  land-­‐based	
  activity	
  that	
  fell	
  clearly	
  within	
  established	
  territorial	
  boundaries,	
  including	
  on	
  Svalbard.	
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expansion	
  and	
  in	
  stages	
  the	
  empires	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  began	
  transition	
  to	
  a	
  new	
  focus:	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  northern	
  territories,	
  and	
  a	
  focus	
  on	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  scientific	
  research	
  to	
  achieve	
  nation	
  interests.	
  	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  With	
  transition	
  into	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years,	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  drew	
  to	
  a	
  close;	
  however,	
  this	
  did	
  not	
  result	
  in	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  imperial	
  practices	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Instead	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  were	
  subject	
  to	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  changes	
  in	
  subjective	
  understandings	
  causing	
  the	
  processes	
  of	
  imperialism	
  to	
  be	
  applied	
  through	
  new	
  rules	
  and	
  for	
  new	
  state	
  interests.	
  The	
  most	
  dominant	
  of	
  these	
  rule	
  changes	
  included	
  the	
  limits	
  to	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  permitted	
  by	
  states.	
  These	
  limits	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  failure	
  to	
  establish	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  sea	
  ice	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  the	
  reinforcement	
  of	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  in	
  international	
  arbitration	
  when	
  mare	
  clausum	
  was	
  used	
  in	
  an	
  attempt	
  to	
  protect	
  maritime	
  resources.	
  The	
  securing	
  of	
  territorial	
  boundaries	
  to	
  protect	
  resources	
  needed	
  for	
  physical	
  security	
  is	
  typical	
  of	
  this	
  period	
  when	
  “almost	
  all	
  European	
  nations	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  were	
  highly	
  protectionist.”69	
  And	
  although	
  the	
  embryonic	
  liberal	
  institutionalism	
  that	
  began	
  developing	
  in	
  this	
  period	
  was	
  not	
  explicitly	
  present	
  in	
  Arctic	
  policy,	
  the	
  involvement	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  in	
  these	
  institutions	
  that	
  became	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  fabric	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  would	
  ultimately	
  impact	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  
The	
  sector	
  principle	
  was	
  applied	
  as	
  the	
  Arctic	
  became	
  more	
  accessible	
  due	
  to	
  flying	
  machines,	
  so	
  in	
  a	
  move	
  fulfil	
  their	
  legal	
  obligations	
  through	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  their	
  territories,	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  began	
  to	
  implement	
  domestic	
  development	
  policies.	
  This	
  included	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  moving	
  Russian	
  populations	
  northward,	
  as	
  “the	
  best	
  claim	
  to	
  any	
  territory,	
  legally	
  speaking,	
  is	
  effective	
  occupation.”70	
  This	
  was	
  to	
  combat	
  the	
  loss	
  of	
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  (Frieden	
  &	
  Lake,	
  2000,	
  p.	
  6)	
  70	
  (Horensma,	
  1991,	
  p.	
  18)	
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territory	
  to	
  states	
  with	
  aviation	
  capabilities	
  because	
  at	
  the	
  time,	
  flying	
  was	
  considered	
  as	
  good	
  as	
  effective	
  occupation	
  in	
  a	
  territory	
  in	
  which	
  it	
  was	
  impossible	
  to	
  physically	
  occupy.71	
  Although	
  this	
  occupation	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  initiated	
  under	
  Imperial	
  Russia,	
  a	
  fate	
  Joseph	
  Stalin	
  was	
  to	
  experience	
  as	
  a	
  political	
  exile	
  in	
  the	
  years	
  just	
  prior	
  to	
  the	
  Russian	
  Revolution,	
  it	
  was	
  continued	
  under	
  Soviet	
  policy.	
  It	
  was	
  likely	
  this	
  experience	
  influenced	
  Stalin	
  to	
  “impos[e]	
  on	
  the	
  Arctic	
  his	
  own	
  vision	
  of	
  the	
  future—as	
  a	
  source	
  of	
  wealth,	
  power	
  and	
  strategic	
  advantage	
  for	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union”72	
  and	
  gives	
  additional	
  rationale	
  for	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  within	
  Soviet	
  mythology.	
  	
  Although	
  the	
  usefulness	
  of	
  the	
  settlers	
  that	
  Stalin	
  moved	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  “extended	
  barely	
  beyond	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  they	
  helped	
  to	
  occupy	
  the	
  territory	
  for	
  the	
  sovereign	
  power,”73	
  Soviet	
  administration	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  was	
  reinforced	
  through	
  infrastructural	
  projects,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  unfinished	
  Trans-­‐Polar	
  Mainline,	
  which	
  would	
  help	
  to	
  move	
  resources	
  extracted	
  from	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  
Within	
  Canada,	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  maintain	
  effective	
  occupation	
  is	
  administered	
  through	
  domestic	
  policy	
  that	
  interfered	
  with	
  the	
  traditional	
  lifestyles	
  of	
  the	
  indigenous	
  populations.	
  This	
  implementation	
  of	
  imperialism	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  sees	
  a	
  Kiplingesque	
  application	
  of	
  the	
  civilising	
  processes	
  of	
  the	
  ‘white	
  man’s	
  burden’	
  in	
  the	
  engagement	
  by	
  imperial	
  governments	
  with	
  the	
  peoples	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  “imperialism	
  as	
  forcible	
  evangelizing.”74	
  From	
  a	
  pragmatic	
  perspective,	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants	
  are	
  perhaps	
  an	
  unfortunate	
  factor	
  in	
  the	
  acquisition	
  of	
  territory.	
  Often	
  considered	
  as	
  a	
  feature	
  of	
  imperialism,	
  colonialism	
  as	
  administrative	
  project	
  has	
  not	
  been	
  a	
  dominant	
  feature	
  of	
  Arctic	
  imperialism	
  within	
  Canada,	
  although	
  it	
  has	
  featured	
  in	
  both	
  the	
  American	
  and	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic.	
  However,	
  there	
  is	
  another,	
  more	
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  (Horensma,	
  1991,	
  p.	
  20)	
  72	
  (Emmerson,	
  2011,	
  p.	
  34)	
  73	
  (Armstong,	
  1965,	
  p.	
  86)	
  74	
  (Orwell,	
  1981,	
  p.	
  119)	
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dominate	
  feature	
  of	
  imperialism	
  of	
  import	
  obvious	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  and	
  this	
  is	
  the	
  asymmetric	
  relationship	
  of	
  the	
  core	
  administration	
  with	
  the	
  peripheral	
  populations.	
  	
  
An	
  apt	
  example	
  of	
  this	
  process	
  includes	
  the	
  dismemberment	
  of	
  traditional	
  Inuit	
  communities	
  by	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government,	
  sending	
  children	
  to	
  long	
  term	
  residential	
  schools	
  and	
  moving	
  communities	
  further	
  North	
  as	
  enforcement	
  of	
  their	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  described	
  as	
  “imposition	
  of	
  Canadian	
  sovereignty.”75	
  Within	
  Canada,	
  these	
  actions	
  have	
  received	
  a	
  formal	
  apology	
  from	
  the	
  Arctic	
  focussed	
  Harper	
  government,	
  saying,	
  “the	
  policy	
  of	
  assimilation	
  was	
  wrong”76	
  but	
  did	
  not	
  apologise	
  for	
  the	
  “non-­‐indigenous	
  settlement	
  and	
  resource	
  exploitation	
  [that]	
  followed.”77	
  The	
  Canadian	
  government	
  is	
  not	
  alone	
  in	
  employing	
  this	
  method	
  with	
  indigenous	
  communities	
  as	
  this	
  civilizing	
  tactic	
  was	
  also	
  used	
  by	
  the	
  U.S.	
  government	
  with	
  native	
  American	
  tribes	
  around	
  the	
  turn	
  of	
  the	
  twentieth	
  century,	
  both	
  states	
  intending	
  that	
  the	
  schools	
  would	
  “elevate	
  the	
  Indian	
  from	
  his	
  condition	
  of	
  savagery.”78	
  The	
  policy	
  of	
  aggressive	
  assimilation	
  was	
  continued	
  by	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  until	
  as	
  late	
  as	
  1996	
  and	
  shortly	
  after	
  the	
  policy’s	
  termination,	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  began	
  a	
  crusade	
  of	
  establishing	
  a	
  ‘northern	
  identity’,	
  claiming	
  that	
  “The	
  North	
  is	
  a	
  fundamental	
  part	
  of	
  our	
  heritage	
  and	
  our	
  national	
  identity,	
  and	
  it	
  is	
  vital	
  to	
  our	
  future”	
  when	
  for	
  so	
  long	
  the	
  attempt	
  had	
  been	
  to	
  give	
  The	
  North	
  and	
  its	
  inhabitants	
  a	
  Canadian	
  identity.	
  79	
  
Not	
  all	
  features	
  of	
  imperialism	
  in	
  this	
  second	
  phase	
  were	
  different	
  from	
  the	
  expansionist	
  phase	
  of	
  Arctic	
  imperialism	
  during	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  as	
  this	
  second	
  phase	
  also	
  included	
  some	
  emphasis	
  on	
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  (Metcalf	
  &	
  Bubela,	
  2012,	
  p.	
  278)	
  76	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  2008)	
  77	
  (Metcalf	
  &	
  Bubela,	
  2012,	
  p.	
  278)	
  78	
  (Johansen,	
  2000,	
  p.	
  12)	
  79	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  2009)	
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the	
  symbolic	
  or	
  exhibitionist	
  aspects	
  of	
  imperialism	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  hero	
  worship,	
  although	
  in	
  this	
  period	
  it	
  was	
  marketed	
  as	
  glory	
  for	
  the	
  state	
  rather	
  than	
  for	
  the	
  individual.	
  This	
  is	
  especially	
  seen	
  the	
  spectacles	
  produced	
  for	
  the	
  public	
  imaginary	
  in	
  the	
  persistent	
  use	
  of	
  visual	
  propaganda	
  to	
  keep	
  the	
  idea	
  of	
  imperialism	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  alive.	
  While	
  hero	
  worship	
  of	
  Arctic	
  explorers	
  was	
  prevalent	
  in	
  nineteenth	
  century	
  Britain,	
  it	
  also	
  continued	
  within	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Canada	
  where	
  “magazines	
  and	
  newspapers…got	
  caught	
  up	
  in	
  the	
  star	
  power	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  heroes,	
  offering	
  payments	
  in	
  return	
  for	
  exclusive	
  rights	
  to	
  publish	
  their	
  stories.”80	
  But	
  prevalence	
  of	
  hero	
  worship	
  was	
  more	
  obvious	
  in	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union,	
  who	
  promoted	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  as	
  a	
  method	
  for	
  determining	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  As	
  this	
  practice	
  began	
  to	
  wane	
  and	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  effective	
  occupation	
  became	
  more	
  dominant	
  in	
  international	
  relations,	
  it	
  became	
  important	
  to	
  emphasise	
  the	
  greatness	
  of	
  Arctic	
  expeditions	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  Soviet	
  sector.	
  Thus,	
  polar	
  literature	
  “offered	
  an	
  excellent	
  opportunity	
  to	
  convey	
  all	
  sorts	
  of	
  political	
  propaganda	
  because	
  [it]	
  was	
  not	
  fiction,	
  but	
  the	
  truth.”81	
  Additionally,	
  Arctic	
  explorers	
  were	
  showcased	
  to	
  Soviet	
  audiences,	
  increasing	
  public	
  support	
  for	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  and	
  strategy	
  by	
  providing	
  “a	
  continuum	
  of	
  heroic	
  episodes	
  which	
  allowed	
  the	
  Soviets	
  to	
  underpin	
  their	
  entire	
  history	
  with	
  a	
  framework	
  built	
  wholly	
  out	
  of	
  grand	
  adventures	
  and	
  cosmic	
  struggles,”82	
  (See	
  Figure	
  4).	
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  (Revkin,	
  2006,	
  p.	
  47)	
  81	
  (Horensma,	
  1991,	
  p.	
  59)	
  82	
  (McCannon,	
  1997,	
  p	
  365)	
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  Figure	
  4:	
  U.S.S.R.	
  Publicity	
  Poster	
  Stalin	
  and	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  193983	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  Cold	
  War	
  years,	
  the	
  third	
  phase	
  of	
  imperialism	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  begins	
  after	
  another	
  transition	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  from	
  a	
  multi-­‐polar	
  system	
  with	
  many	
  imperial	
  powers,	
  to	
  a	
  bi-­‐polar	
  system,	
  one	
  of	
  two	
  well	
  understood	
  transformations	
  in	
  the	
  distributional	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  following	
  the	
  World	
  Wars.84	
  This	
  happened	
  in	
  part	
  because	
  relations	
  between	
  states	
  had	
  forcibly	
  undergone	
  major	
  changes	
  due	
  to	
  advancement	
  in	
  several	
  areas	
  including	
  technology	
  and	
  science,	
  which	
  changed	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  communication,	
  war	
  and	
  medicine.	
  However,	
  more	
  important	
  are	
  the	
  changes	
  seen	
  in	
  growing	
  body	
  of	
  international	
  treaty	
  law	
  regulating	
  the	
  behaviour	
  between	
  states	
  and	
  the	
  insecurity	
  that	
  developed	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  competing	
  political	
  ideologies	
  into	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  For	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  this	
  change	
  toward	
  power	
  polarity	
  transformed	
  focus	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  into	
  a	
  testing	
  ground	
  for	
  the	
  games	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War.	
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  (McCannon,	
  1998,	
  p.	
  58)	
  84	
  (Buzan	
  &	
  Little,	
  1994,	
  p.	
  253)	
  
	
   65	
  
During	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
  the	
  primary	
  focus	
  of	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  no	
  longer	
  on	
  territorial	
  claims	
  and	
  effective	
  sovereignty,	
  although	
  these	
  policies	
  did	
  continued.	
  Instead,	
  a	
  new	
  layer	
  of	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  added	
  as	
  the	
  littoral	
  states	
  focused	
  on	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  potential	
  route	
  of	
  attack	
  on	
  the	
  core	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  and	
  began	
  to	
  utilise	
  the	
  expansive	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  to	
  create	
  a	
  buffer	
  zone	
  against	
  such	
  an	
  attack.	
  	
  This	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  vast	
  expanses	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  buffer	
  zone	
  emphasises	
  the	
  spatial	
  strategies	
  of	
  imperialism	
  by	
  the	
  littoral	
  states	
  as	
  “great	
  powers	
  are	
  not	
  only	
  about	
  material	
  power	
  capabilities,	
  but	
  also	
  about	
  spatial	
  and	
  ideational	
  aspects,”	
  making	
  great	
  powers	
  “better	
  conceived	
  of	
  as	
  empires”	
  through	
  the	
  combination	
  of	
  material,	
  spatial	
  and	
  ideational	
  strategies.85	
  Thus,	
  the	
  spatial	
  exploitation	
  of	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  used	
  to	
  reinforce	
  the	
  material	
  core	
  power	
  of	
  the	
  dominant	
  states,	
  while	
  the	
  expansionist	
  policies	
  of	
  ideological	
  imperialism	
  between	
  Communism	
  and	
  democracy	
  were	
  being	
  pursued.	
  
In	
  addition	
  to	
  the	
  focus	
  on	
  physical	
  security,	
  the	
  dismantling	
  of	
  formal	
  empire	
  that	
  was	
  typical	
  of	
  this	
  period	
  and	
  the	
  increasing	
  reliance	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  on	
  forms	
  of	
  collective	
  security	
  was	
  also	
  evident	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Affected	
  by	
  this	
  transition,	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada	
  began	
  forging	
  a	
  distinct	
  identity,	
  separate	
  from	
  merely	
  being	
  a	
  colony	
  of	
  Great	
  Britain,	
  including	
  developing	
  an	
  Arctic	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  forming	
  an	
  identity	
  as	
  an	
  Arctic	
  State.	
  Meanwhile,	
  Russia	
  dominated	
  most	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  periphery	
  in	
  Europe	
  and	
  Asia	
  while	
  Norway	
  and	
  Denmark	
  relied	
  on	
  their	
  relationships	
  in	
  NATO	
  as	
  their	
  best	
  defence	
  for	
  the	
  prevention	
  of	
  Soviet	
  incursions	
  into	
  their	
  territories.86	
  In	
  this	
  phase,	
  territorial	
  boundaries	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  are	
  relatively	
  static,	
  while	
  political	
  alliances	
  create	
  opportunity	
  for	
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  (Zielonka,	
  2012,	
  p.	
  520)	
  86	
  (Buteux,	
  1989,	
  p.	
  87-­‐99)	
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both	
  military	
  and	
  economic	
  exchanges,	
  forming	
  relationships	
  that	
  would	
  eventually	
  enable	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  governance	
  mechanisms.	
  	
  
In	
  this	
  period,	
  imperialism	
  sees	
  development	
  into	
  two	
  new	
  methods	
  as	
  imperialism	
  through	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  declined.	
  This	
  includes	
  the	
  manipulation	
  of	
  international	
  legal	
  mechanisms,	
  many	
  developed	
  through	
  the	
  institutions	
  created	
  at	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years.	
  These	
  mechanisms	
  created	
  the	
  conditions	
  for	
  a	
  future	
  phase	
  of	
  imperialism	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  The	
  second	
  method	
  has	
  its	
  origins	
  in	
  the	
  outcome	
  of	
  balance	
  of	
  power	
  at	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  Great	
  Wars	
  and	
  is	
  essentially	
  imperialism	
  implemented	
  through	
  the	
  method	
  of	
  development.	
  This	
  has	
  been	
  explored	
  by	
  Harvey	
  who	
  sees	
  imperialism	
  as	
  a	
  combination	
  of	
  the	
  “political	
  project	
  on	
  the	
  part	
  of	
  actors	
  whose	
  power	
  is	
  based	
  in	
  command	
  of	
  a	
  territory…and	
  the	
  molecular	
  processes	
  of	
  capital	
  accumulation	
  in	
  space	
  and	
  time.”87	
  It	
  is	
  imperialism	
  where	
  the	
  politicians	
  who	
  “operate	
  in	
  territorialized	
  space”	
  merge	
  with	
  the	
  capitalists	
  who	
  “operate	
  in	
  continuous	
  space	
  and	
  time,”	
  creating	
  the	
  opportunity	
  for	
  imperialism	
  that	
  is	
  not	
  confined	
  to	
  economic	
  activity	
  within	
  their	
  own	
  territorial	
  borders.88	
  	
  
An	
  interesting	
  feature	
  of	
  imperialism	
  in	
  this	
  stage	
  is	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  application	
  of	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  effective	
  administration	
  of	
  territory	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  reinforce	
  sovereignty	
  by	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  different	
  to	
  the	
  methods	
  of	
  effective	
  administration	
  implemented	
  by	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  beginning	
  in	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years.	
  In	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Alaska	
  transitioned	
  from	
  its	
  condition	
  as	
  a	
  federal	
  territory	
  to	
  a	
  full-­‐fledge	
  member	
  of	
  the	
  union	
  with	
  all	
  the	
  civil	
  rights	
  and	
  responsibilities	
  arising	
  from	
  this	
  status	
  in	
  1959.	
  Yet	
  much	
  of	
  the	
  land	
  in	
  Alaska	
  remained	
  federally	
  owned	
  and	
  colonists	
  in	
  the	
  territory	
  have	
  been	
  heavily	
  reliant	
  on	
  government	
  subsidies,	
  including	
  those	
  from	
  the	
  militarisation	
  of	
  Alaska	
  in	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
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  (Harvey,	
  2003,	
  p.	
  26)	
  88	
  (Harvey,	
  2003,	
  p.	
  27)	
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as	
  “federal	
  spending	
  was	
  the	
  principal	
  base	
  of	
  the	
  Alaska	
  economy.”89	
  This	
  remains	
  true	
  though	
  some	
  of	
  this	
  now	
  occurs	
  through	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Permanent	
  Fund,	
  which	
  pays	
  revenues	
  on	
  oil	
  profits	
  to	
  all	
  Alaskan	
  residents	
  and	
  so,	
  at	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  twentieth	
  century,	
  federal	
  dependency	
  remains	
  a	
  colonial	
  feature	
  of	
  Alaska	
  which	
  “continues	
  to	
  function	
  as	
  a	
  colony	
  for	
  corporate	
  investors	
  and	
  federal	
  managers.”90	
  	
  This	
  colonial	
  dependency	
  serves	
  to	
  confirm	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  the	
  continental	
  United	
  States	
  over	
  its	
  Arctic	
  territory,	
  far	
  removed	
  from	
  the	
  rest	
  of	
  the	
  continental	
  core.	
  
American	
  imperialism	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  also	
  exhibited	
  by	
  occupation	
  in	
  both	
  Canada	
  and	
  Greenland,	
  made	
  possible	
  by	
  diplomatic	
  agreement	
  and	
  material	
  superiority.	
  Although	
  there	
  are	
  claims	
  that	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  Greenland	
  was	
  vulnerable	
  from	
  “countries	
  friendly	
  with	
  Denmark,”91	
  a	
  defence	
  agreement	
  between	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Denmark	
  states	
  that	
  the	
  U.S.	
  “reiterates	
  its	
  recognition	
  of	
  and	
  respect	
  for	
  the	
  sovereignty”92	
  of	
  Denmark	
  over	
  Greenland.	
  During	
  this	
  time,	
  the	
  U.S.	
  military	
  developed	
  the	
  system	
  of	
  radar	
  stations	
  that	
  included	
  the	
  Distant	
  Early	
  Warning	
  line	
  spanning	
  from	
  Alaska	
  to	
  Greenland,	
  and	
  established	
  the	
  joint	
  military	
  operation	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  American	
  Aerospace	
  Defence	
  Command	
  with	
  Canada,	
  and	
  maintained	
  military	
  operations,	
  including	
  nuclear	
  sites,	
  in	
  Greenland.	
  The	
  need	
  for	
  the	
  incursions	
  by	
  the	
  U.S.	
  into	
  the	
  sovereign	
  territory	
  of	
  Canada	
  and	
  Denmark	
  diminished	
  as	
  technology,	
  such	
  as	
  Intercontinental	
  Ballistic	
  Missiles	
  and	
  nuclear	
  submarines	
  capable	
  of	
  operating	
  under	
  ice	
  were	
  developed	
  as	
  it	
  meant	
  that	
  the	
  USA	
  could	
  defend	
  its	
  borders	
  from	
  great	
  distances,	
  guaranteeing	
  their	
  ability	
  to	
  deliver	
  mutually	
  assured	
  destruction	
  in	
  the	
  event	
  of	
  Cold	
  War	
  escalation.	
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  (Haycox,	
  2002,	
  p.	
  168)	
  90	
  (Haycox,	
  2002,	
  p.	
  168)	
  91	
  (Rytter	
  et	
  al.,	
  2010,	
  p.	
  19)	
  92	
  (American	
  Society	
  of	
  International	
  Law,	
  1941,	
  p.	
  29)	
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Finally,	
  during	
  this	
  third	
  phase	
  of	
  international	
  system,	
  the	
  legal	
  structures	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  underwent	
  significant	
  development	
  with	
  the	
  transformation	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea,	
  which	
  for	
  centuries	
  was	
  dominated	
  by	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  the	
  ‘freedom	
  of	
  the	
  sea’	
  for	
  navigation	
  and	
  the	
  ‘cannon	
  shot’	
  rule	
  establishing	
  the	
  outer	
  limits	
  of	
  the	
  territorial	
  seas	
  of	
  coastal	
  states.	
  This	
  transformation	
  was	
  made	
  possible	
  by	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  the	
  dominant	
  state	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  releasing	
  the	
  Truman	
  
Proclamation	
  1945,	
  which	
  announced	
  the	
  exploitative	
  rights	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  to	
  the	
  resources	
  in	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  appurtenant	
  to	
  its	
  coast.	
  Within	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  space	
  equivalent	
  to	
  the	
  blink	
  of	
  an	
  eye,	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  evolved	
  and	
  no	
  longer	
  were	
  the	
  oceans	
  restricted	
  from	
  absorption	
  into	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  states	
  when	
  this	
  declaration	
  was	
  rapidly	
  accepted	
  as	
  customary	
  international	
  law	
  through	
  repetition	
  by	
  other	
  states	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  
The	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
  coupled	
  with	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  new	
  rules	
  introduced	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  made	
  way	
  for	
  the	
  institutions,	
  expectations	
  and	
  insecurities	
  introduced	
  during	
  the	
  earlier	
  periods	
  of	
  Arctic	
  imperialism	
  to	
  reach	
  a	
  new	
  stage	
  of	
  development,	
  initiating	
  the	
  contemporary	
  phase	
  of	
  imperialism	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  In	
  many	
  ways,	
  this	
  phase	
  is	
  merely	
  the	
  maturation	
  of	
  the	
  processes	
  begun	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period,	
  but	
  unencumbered	
  by	
  the	
  political	
  hostilities	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War.	
  This	
  phase	
  has	
  seen	
  a	
  reframing	
  of	
  priorities	
  and	
  a	
  major	
  shift	
  in	
  the	
  political	
  alliances	
  of	
  some	
  states	
  from	
  being	
  Cold	
  War	
  enemies	
  to	
  being	
  Arctic	
  allies,	
  making	
  this	
  period	
  of	
  imperialism	
  an	
  actionable	
  process.	
  Most	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  have	
  moved	
  beyond	
  the	
  policies	
  of	
  effective	
  occupation	
  and	
  rather	
  are	
  unintentionally	
  demonstrating	
  how	
  imperialism	
  can	
  be	
  implemented	
  at	
  a	
  foreign	
  policy	
  level	
  by	
  continuing	
  protectionist	
  policies	
  which	
  result	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  over	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
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  In	
  the	
  Post	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period,	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  has	
  once	
  again	
  become	
  a	
  feature	
  of	
  Arctic	
  imperialism,	
  though	
  it	
  has	
  not	
  been	
  the	
  “unlimited	
  expansion	
  of	
  national	
  area”	
  associated	
  with	
  the	
  classical	
  imperialism	
  in	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery.93	
  Often	
  inappropriately	
  labelled	
  as	
  the	
  ‘scramble	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic’	
  in	
  contemporary	
  discourses	
  by	
  casual	
  observers	
  of	
  Arctic	
  affairs,	
  this	
  expansion	
  has	
  not	
  been	
  over	
  terra	
  firma,	
  as	
  all	
  ‘real	
  land’	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  absorbed	
  into	
  the	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  first	
  phase	
  of	
  empire.	
  Then	
  during	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years,	
  any	
  undiscovered	
  land94	
  was	
  claimed	
  through	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  until	
  ice-­‐covered	
  ocean	
  was	
  all	
  that	
  remained	
  unclaimed	
  in	
  the	
  far	
  North.	
  The	
  ice	
  in	
  the	
  North	
  received	
  some	
  attention	
  as	
  a	
  potential	
  recipient	
  of	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction,	
  but	
  ultimately	
  the	
  sea	
  ice	
  and	
  the	
  ocean	
  spaces	
  in	
  the	
  maritime	
  North	
  were	
  recognised	
  under	
  
mare	
  liberum	
  until	
  a	
  new	
  rule	
  introduced	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  made	
  additional	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  permissible.	
  
Rather	
  than	
  an	
  outright	
  imperial	
  land	
  grab	
  employing	
  military	
  force	
  and	
  power,	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  in	
  the	
  final	
  phase	
  of	
  Arctic	
  imperialism	
  has	
  been	
  through	
  the	
  application	
  of	
  legal	
  structures	
  developed	
  in	
  the	
  middle	
  of	
  the	
  twentieth	
  century.	
  These	
  legal	
  structures	
  were	
  used	
  to	
  create	
  a	
  new	
  conception	
  of	
  territory,	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf,	
  which	
  is	
  defined	
  as	
  “the	
  seabed	
  and	
  subsoil	
  of	
  the	
  submarine	
  areas	
  adjacent	
  to	
  the	
  coast	
  but	
  outside	
  the	
  area	
  of	
  the	
  territorial	
  sea.”95	
  The	
  continental	
  shelf	
  is	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  earth	
  that	
  was	
  previously	
  inaccessible	
  to	
  man	
  and	
  was	
  conceptually	
  beyond	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  the	
  intellectual	
  legal	
  debate	
  between	
  Grotius	
  and	
  Selden	
  over	
  mare	
  liberum	
  versus	
  mare	
  clausum.	
  While	
  those	
  who	
  developed	
  the	
  structures	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  introduced	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  following	
  the	
  Great	
  Wars	
  did	
  not	
  likely	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  93	
  (Hobson,	
  2005,	
  p.	
  175)	
  94	
  It	
  was	
  believed	
  that	
  more	
  land	
  existed	
  in	
  the	
  far	
  North	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  presence	
  of	
  	
  	
  geological	
  features	
  found	
  on	
  ice.	
  These	
  features	
  were	
  later	
  found	
  to	
  be	
  rocks	
  that	
  had	
  been	
  deposited	
  on	
  the	
  ice	
  through	
  glacial	
  flows	
  and	
  carried	
  out	
  to	
  sea.	
  95	
  (United	
  Nations,	
  1958)	
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consider	
  the	
  political	
  organisation	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  advancements	
  in	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  and	
  the	
  turn	
  to	
  international	
  governance	
  created	
  tools	
  whereby	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  could	
  absorb	
  the	
  region	
  into	
  sovereign	
  control.	
  
In	
  an	
  earlier	
  period,	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  mare	
  liberum	
  became	
  the	
  modus	
  
operandi	
  in	
  an	
  earlier	
  phase	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  because	
  it	
  suited	
  the	
  needs	
  and	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  imperial	
  powers	
  of	
  the	
  period	
  by	
  those	
  desiring	
  to	
  weaken	
  the	
  hold	
  of	
  earlier	
  powers	
  on	
  maritime	
  control	
  for	
  commercial	
  and	
  economic	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  far	
  flung	
  places	
  of	
  the	
  globe.	
  From	
  this	
  point,	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  continued	
  as	
  a	
  dominant	
  rule	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  until	
  an	
  additional	
  rule	
  could	
  be	
  added	
  to	
  the	
  system,	
  which	
  maintained	
  the	
  integrity	
  of	
  mare	
  liberum,	
  while	
  creating	
  the	
  opportunity	
  for	
  states	
  to	
  continue	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  without	
  creating	
  insecurity	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  The	
  cumulative	
  effect	
  of	
  this	
  rule	
  layering	
  has	
  transformed	
  the	
  Arctic	
  into	
  what	
  is	
  essentially	
  an	
  enclosed	
  sea,	
  or	
  a	
  mare	
  clausum,	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  controlling	
  the	
  territory	
  and	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
  	
  
In	
  his	
  treatise	
  Of	
  the	
  Dominion,	
  or,	
  Ownership	
  of	
  the	
  Seas,	
  Selden	
  identified	
  three	
  arguments	
  often	
  summoned	
  to	
  counter	
  any	
  claims	
  of	
  dominion	
  or	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  seas,	
  including	
  those	
  relating	
  to	
  commerce	
  and	
  passage,	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  and	
  from	
  the	
  writings	
  of	
  ‘learned	
  men’,	
  specifically	
  Grotius’	
  mare	
  liberum.96	
  In	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  respect	
  for	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  continues	
  to	
  be	
  reaffirmed	
  by	
  the	
  states	
  littoral	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  albeit	
  with	
  caveat.	
  	
  One	
  of	
  these	
  provisions	
  includes	
  the	
  mandatory	
  Polar	
  Code	
  developed	
  by	
  the	
  International	
  Maritime	
  Organization,	
  which	
  will	
  likely	
  stipulate	
  what	
  types	
  of	
  vessels	
  are	
  allowed	
  within	
  Arctic	
  waters.	
  Thus,	
  while	
  there	
  is	
  de	
  facto	
  continuation	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas,	
  in	
  practice,	
  navigation	
  is	
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  (Selden,	
  2004,	
  p.	
  3)	
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permitted	
  for	
  those	
  with	
  acceptable	
  equipment.	
  Although	
  such	
  provisions	
  will	
  undoubtedly	
  reduce	
  the	
  risk	
  of	
  human	
  and	
  environmental	
  disaster	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  they	
  also	
  act	
  as	
  an	
  exclusion	
  mechanism	
  and	
  hence	
  in	
  reality,	
  reduce	
  the	
  condition	
  of	
  ‘free	
  seas’,	
  adding	
  another	
  dimension	
  of	
  mare	
  clausum	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  
A	
  final	
  exclusionary	
  technique	
  being	
  employed	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  States,	
  including	
  those	
  without	
  continental	
  shelf	
  claims	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  is	
  the	
  ‘members	
  only’	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council.	
  The	
  council	
  was	
  established	
  to	
  promote	
  “cooperation,	
  coordination	
  and	
  interaction	
  among	
  the	
  Arctic	
  States”97	
  and	
  the	
  founding	
  charter	
  stipulates	
  that	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  States	
  are	
  only	
  permitted	
  as	
  observers	
  to	
  the	
  Council	
  if	
  they	
  “recognize	
  Arctic	
  States'	
  sovereignty,	
  sovereign	
  rights	
  and	
  jurisdiction	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.”98	
  As	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  escalated	
  with	
  the	
  discovery	
  of	
  economic	
  resources	
  and	
  increasing	
  opportunities	
  for	
  access,	
  the	
  choice	
  of	
  excluding	
  outsiders	
  from	
  Arctic	
  decision	
  making-­‐processes	
  is	
  indicative	
  of	
  imperialist	
  strategies,	
  which	
  are	
  being	
  deployed	
  through	
  a	
  sort	
  of	
  collective	
  imperialism	
  via	
  a	
  cartel	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  States.	
  The	
  legal	
  institutions	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  established	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  determine	
  who	
  has	
  right	
  and	
  ability	
  to	
  profit	
  from	
  its	
  abundance,	
  and	
  these	
  mechanisms	
  direct	
  the	
  flow	
  of	
  resources	
  to	
  the	
  core	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  States.	
  	
  
With	
  empires	
  having	
  historically	
  extracted	
  economic	
  benefit	
  in	
  either	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  tribute,	
  taxes	
  or	
  raw	
  materials	
  from	
  their	
  conquered	
  territories,	
  it	
  is	
  customary	
  to	
  think	
  of	
  the	
  extraction	
  of	
  resources	
  from	
  the	
  dominated	
  periphery	
  for	
  the	
  economic	
  gain	
  of	
  the	
  core	
  as	
  a	
  method	
  of	
  imperialism.	
  It	
  is	
  no	
  secret	
  that	
  “interest	
  in	
  the	
  economic	
  potential	
  of	
  the	
  natural	
  resources…is	
  considered	
  by	
  some	
  to	
  have	
  always	
  been	
  the	
  main	
  force	
  behind	
  imperialism.”99	
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  (Arctic	
  Council,	
  1996)	
  98	
  (Arctic	
  Council,	
  2011	
  d)	
  99	
  (Worboys,	
  1990,	
  p.	
  164)	
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This	
  feature	
  of	
  imperialism	
  is	
  demonstrated	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  for	
  example,	
  by	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Land	
  Claims	
  Agreement	
  1993	
  between	
  the	
  Her	
  Majesty,	
  Queen	
  Elizabeth	
  II	
  and	
  the	
  formerly	
  unincorporated	
  territory	
  of	
  Nunavut.	
  	
  Not	
  only	
  has	
  the	
  agreement	
  been	
  conducted	
  via	
  the	
  monarch	
  of	
  an	
  imperial	
  nation	
  between	
  the	
  indigenous	
  population	
  of	
  a	
  territory,	
  itself	
  an	
  act	
  of	
  imperialism,	
  the	
  agreement	
  gives	
  rights	
  to	
  the	
  resources	
  found	
  in	
  the	
  land	
  to	
  the	
  Inuit,	
  yet	
  the	
  federal	
  government	
  retains	
  the	
  rights	
  over	
  the	
  resources	
  in	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  in	
  an	
  area	
  Canada	
  claims	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  via	
  the	
  Inuit	
  having	
  historically	
  utilised	
  the	
  region	
  “since	
  time	
  immemorial.”100	
  Similarly,	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Federal	
  government	
  owns	
  64%	
  of	
  the	
  territory	
  within	
  Alaska	
  and	
  manages	
  these	
  holdings	
  for	
  energy	
  and	
  resources	
  exploitation.101	
  Thus,	
  it	
  appears	
  that	
  exploitable	
  Arctic	
  resources,	
  both	
  on	
  land	
  and	
  at	
  sea,	
  are	
  being	
  utilised	
  by	
  the	
  states	
  holding	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  a	
  transfer	
  from	
  the	
  periphery	
  to	
  the	
  core.	
  	
  
This	
  contemporary	
  phase	
  of	
  Arctic	
  imperialism	
  continues	
  the	
  asymmetric	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  state	
  and	
  the	
  indigenous	
  peoples	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  in	
  both	
  domestic	
  and	
  international	
  arenas	
  through	
  reinvented	
  civilizing	
  missions,	
  economic	
  paternalism	
  and	
  inequality	
  in	
  participation	
  in	
  Arctic	
  governance.	
  Civilising	
  missions	
  have	
  not	
  disappeared,	
  but	
  rather	
  they	
  have	
  reached	
  a	
  maturation	
  and	
  have	
  become	
  incorporated	
  as	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  in	
  forming	
  their	
  Arctic	
  worldview.	
  It	
  is	
  said	
  that	
  “civilising	
  missions	
  are	
  not	
  merely	
  rhetorical	
  exercises:	
  they	
  help	
  empires	
  to	
  define	
  their	
  vision	
  of	
  the	
  world	
  and	
  their	
  own	
  role	
  in	
  this	
  world.”102	
  This	
  is	
  clearly	
  evident	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Russia,	
  who	
  failed	
  to	
  introduce	
  Soviet-­‐style	
  socialism	
  to	
  the	
  indigenous	
  Northerners	
  in	
  an	
  earlier	
  civilising	
  mission,	
  and	
  now	
  promotes	
  “traditional	
  activities	
  [which]	
  symbolize	
  a	
  special,	
  harmonic	
  and	
  intense	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  100	
  Interview	
  with	
  anonymous	
  member	
  of	
  Canadian	
  Diplomatic	
  Staff.	
  101	
  (State	
  of	
  Alaska,	
  2007)	
  102	
  (Zielonka,	
  2012,	
  p.	
  515)	
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interaction	
  with	
  the	
  natural	
  environment”	
  referring	
  to	
  them	
  as	
  ‘Children	
  of	
  Nature.’103	
  Similarly,	
  although	
  Canada	
  promotes	
  itself	
  as	
  being	
  a	
  ‘Northern	
  Nation’	
  and	
  claims	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  Arctic	
  by	
  virtue	
  of	
  the	
  ‘Canadian’	
  Inuit	
  having	
  lived	
  there	
  since	
  ‘time	
  immemorial’,	
  this	
  is	
  a	
  people	
  over	
  whom	
  they	
  once	
  tried	
  to	
  civilise	
  in	
  residential	
  schools	
  and	
  now	
  maintain	
  through	
  welfare,	
  pacified	
  through	
  devolution	
  of	
  government.	
  	
  
The	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  indigenous	
  people	
  has	
  assumed	
  a	
  form	
  of	
  economic	
  paternalism	
  “where	
  the	
  welfare	
  state	
  has	
  consisted	
  of	
  an	
  onslaught	
  of	
  government	
  programmes	
  to	
  achieve	
  [indigenous]	
  social	
  integration,	
  which	
  have	
  resulted	
  in	
  a	
  situation	
  of	
  imposed	
  and	
  ghettoized	
  dependency.”104	
  These	
  paternalistic	
  policies,	
  which	
  no	
  longer	
  use	
  the	
  approach	
  that	
  indigenous	
  people	
  are	
  a	
  problem,	
  but	
  rather	
  that	
  they	
  have	
  problems,	
  have	
  resulted	
  in	
  “government	
  policies	
  [which]	
  have	
  encouraged	
  large	
  scale	
  Aboriginal	
  unemployment	
  and	
  welfare	
  dependency.”105	
  In	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  this	
  has	
  occurred	
  through	
  historical	
  policies	
  combined	
  with	
  the	
  forces	
  of	
  climate	
  change	
  resulting	
  in	
  the	
  deterioration	
  of	
  traditional	
  ways	
  of	
  life,	
  leaving	
  little	
  recourse	
  for	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  other	
  than	
  to	
  rely	
  on	
  the	
  welfare	
  state	
  until	
  alternative	
  methods	
  for	
  survival	
  can	
  be	
  developed.	
  At	
  present,	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  decrease	
  reliance	
  on	
  the	
  core	
  political	
  unit	
  by	
  the	
  peripheral	
  populations	
  is	
  focused	
  on	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  resources	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  something	
  that	
  in	
  time	
  could	
  produce	
  a	
  major	
  shift	
  in	
  political	
  boundaries	
  if	
  the	
  peripheral	
  peoples	
  achieve	
  economic	
  and	
  political	
  dependence	
  from	
  their	
  imperial	
  caretakers.	
  This	
  situation	
  could	
  feasibly	
  develop	
  in	
  Greenland,	
  who	
  has	
  already	
  negotiated	
  terms	
  of	
  independence	
  with	
  Denmark	
  in	
  the	
  Act	
  on	
  Greenland	
  Self-­‐
Government	
  2009.106	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  103	
  (Fondahl,	
  1997,	
  p.	
  73)	
  104	
  (Shewell	
  &	
  Spagnut,	
  1995,	
  p.	
  25)	
  105	
  (Furniss,	
  1999,	
  p.	
  201)	
  106	
  (Kleist,	
  2010,	
  p.	
  171)	
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The	
  asymmetric	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  states	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  the	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  (who	
  provide	
  the	
  human	
  element	
  over	
  which	
  sovereign	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  are	
  being	
  held	
  through	
  incorporation	
  of	
  indigenous	
  historical	
  titles	
  to	
  territory	
  into	
  the	
  federal	
  systems	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states)	
  is	
  also	
  demonstrated	
  in	
  their	
  interaction	
  in	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  institutions.	
  Although	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  “is	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  few	
  international	
  forums	
  in	
  the	
  world	
  where	
  indigenous	
  people	
  are	
  consulted	
  at	
  such	
  a	
  high	
  and	
  consistent	
  level,”107	
  it	
  fails	
  to	
  eliminate	
  political	
  and	
  legal	
  inequality.	
  Despite	
  their	
  calls	
  to	
  be	
  treated	
  as	
  equals,	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  are	
  considered	
  only	
  as	
  ‘permanent	
  observers’	
  rather	
  than	
  as	
  ‘members’;	
  this	
  is	
  representative	
  of	
  continued	
  imperial	
  “relationships	
  of	
  political	
  control”108	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Additionally,	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  into	
  structural	
  form	
  where	
  States	
  prevent	
  non-­‐state	
  groups	
  from	
  acting	
  as	
  equal	
  participants	
  is	
  a	
  continuation	
  of	
  the	
  “attempt	
  to	
  permanently	
  order	
  the	
  world	
  of	
  states	
  and	
  markets	
  according	
  to	
  its	
  national	
  interests,”109	
  and	
  perpetuates	
  relationships	
  of	
  inequality	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  
Conclusions	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  In	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  the	
  melting	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  objective	
  has	
  been	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  who	
  owns	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  how	
  that	
  ownership	
  has	
  been	
  determined.	
  Sovereignty	
  of	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  been	
  has	
  established	
  through	
  accepted	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  several	
  given	
  eras.	
  As	
  a	
  socially	
  constructed	
  rule,	
  sovereignty	
  is	
  a	
  concept	
  that	
  has	
  been	
  established	
  by	
  both	
  tacit	
  and	
  codified	
  agreement	
  between	
  states	
  and	
  has	
  been	
  reinforced	
  through	
  patterns	
  of	
  behaviour.	
  The	
  condition	
  of	
  the	
  internal	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  states	
  designates	
  jurisdictional	
  authority	
  to	
  legislate	
  within	
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  (Bennet,	
  2013)	
  108	
  (Doyle,	
  1986,	
  p.	
  19)	
  109	
  (Ignatieff,	
  2003,	
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territory	
  on	
  behalf	
  of	
  its	
  citizens	
  through	
  a	
  social	
  contract,	
  while	
  external	
  sovereignty	
  is	
  international	
  recognition	
  validating	
  not	
  only	
  a	
  state’s	
  internal	
  sovereignty,	
  but	
  is	
  also	
  an	
  endorsement	
  of	
  a	
  state’s	
  right	
  to	
  engage	
  equally	
  with	
  other	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Together,	
  these	
  dimensions	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  also	
  determine	
  the	
  state	
  as	
  having	
  the	
  ultimate	
  authority,	
  and	
  thus	
  property	
  rights,	
  over	
  resources	
  within	
  a	
  delineated	
  territory	
  and	
  as	
  a	
  remote	
  and	
  largely	
  uninhabited	
  territory,	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  been	
  established	
  through	
  imperialist	
  methods.	
  It	
  the	
  condition	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  maritime	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  that	
  states	
  are	
  attempting	
  to	
  achieve	
  through	
  the	
  currently	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  pursue	
  their	
  national	
  interests.	
  	
  	
  
The	
  Arctic	
  with	
  its	
  hostile	
  climatic	
  conditions	
  is	
  considered	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  final	
  frontiers	
  on	
  earth	
  while	
  at	
  the	
  same	
  time	
  it	
  is	
  presenting	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  with	
  new	
  opportunities	
  for	
  imperialism	
  as	
  the	
  Arctic	
  States	
  are	
  employing	
  both	
  old	
  and	
  new	
  legal	
  institutions	
  to	
  establish	
  their	
  sovereignty	
  within	
  the	
  region.	
  In	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  hallmarks	
  of	
  imperialism	
  are	
  evident	
  not	
  only	
  in	
  its	
  ‘discovery’	
  by	
  actors	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  methods	
  by	
  which	
  it	
  has	
  been	
  coloured	
  on	
  the	
  map,	
  but	
  also	
  in	
  the	
  way	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  handled	
  in	
  contemporary	
  international	
  relations,	
  specifically	
  in	
  the	
  way	
  that	
  international	
  legal	
  mechanisms	
  have	
  been	
  developed	
  to	
  make	
  legitimate	
  its	
  exploitation	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  States.	
  Through	
  this,	
  a	
  sort	
  of	
  ‘Arctic	
  Mediterranean’,	
  or	
  a	
  mare	
  
clausum	
  has	
  been	
  created,	
  where	
  participation	
  in	
  the	
  decision-­‐making	
  processes	
  is	
  a	
  members	
  only	
  club	
  of	
  Arctic	
  States.	
  Imperialism	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  still	
  represented	
  through	
  control	
  over	
  territory,	
  but	
  it	
  is	
  also	
  a	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  legal	
  systems	
  that	
  regulate	
  the	
  region,	
  a	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  ideas	
  that	
  form	
  the	
  norms	
  of	
  conduct	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  a	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  resources,	
  and	
  finally	
  it	
  includes	
  domestic	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  and	
  separation	
  from	
  state	
  actors	
  in	
  international	
  governance.	
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The	
  international	
  system,	
  which	
  is	
  also	
  a	
  social	
  construction,	
  has	
  been	
  created	
  through	
  the	
  layering	
  of	
  rules	
  and	
  codes,	
  which	
  in	
  the	
  condition	
  of	
  anarchy	
  guide	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  resulting	
  in	
  security	
  in	
  the	
  relationships	
  between	
  states.	
  When	
  new	
  rules	
  are	
  added	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  it	
  evolves,	
  with	
  some	
  rules	
  adding	
  turning	
  points	
  in	
  the	
  overall	
  character	
  of	
  the	
  system.	
  This	
  layering	
  of	
  rules	
  can	
  be	
  seen	
  through	
  a	
  long	
  term	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty,	
  demonstrating	
  four	
  different	
  periods	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  which	
  states	
  have	
  followed	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  structure	
  in	
  their	
  engagement	
  with	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  
However,	
  despite	
  the	
  seeming	
  approach	
  to	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  claims	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  new	
  horizons	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  are	
  rising.	
  Already	
  being	
  considered	
  in	
  discourses	
  on	
  sovereignty	
  are	
  the	
  legal	
  implications	
  for	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  the	
  purchase	
  of	
  territory	
  from	
  one	
  sovereign	
  state	
  by	
  another.	
  In	
  earlier	
  phases	
  of	
  empire,	
  this	
  exchange	
  included	
  the	
  transfer	
  of	
  land	
  and	
  the	
  exchange	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  territory—and	
  indeed	
  this	
  is	
  how	
  some	
  Arctic	
  territory	
  has	
  been	
  acquired	
  by	
  current	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  This	
  type	
  of	
  exchange	
  has	
  been	
  absent	
  from	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  for	
  some	
  time,	
  and	
  thus	
  has	
  faded	
  from	
  practice.	
  However,	
  should	
  China	
  be	
  permitted	
  to	
  buy	
  territory	
  from	
  Greenland	
  or	
  Iceland,	
  and	
  should	
  the	
  rule	
  be	
  added	
  ‘sovereign	
  purchase	
  indicates	
  transfer	
  of	
  sovereignty’,	
  the	
  shape	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  and	
  indeed	
  the	
  Arctic	
  stands	
  to	
  face	
  a	
  mighty	
  transformation.	
  	
  
With	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  its	
  state	
  of	
  anarchy,	
  the	
  changes	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  reflect	
  changes	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  perpetuating	
  the	
  methods	
  of	
  imperialism.	
  The	
  methods	
  of	
  imperialism	
  are	
  those	
  that	
  implement	
  and	
  pursue	
  policies	
  of	
  imperialism.	
  The	
  hallmarks	
  of	
  imperialism	
  include	
  asymmetric	
  relationships	
  with	
  both	
  the	
  people	
  and	
  resources	
  of	
  a	
  territory.	
  These	
  asymmetric	
  relationships	
  occur	
  when	
  a	
  state	
  assumes	
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authority	
  over	
  a	
  people	
  without	
  the	
  advantages	
  of	
  a	
  social	
  contract	
  and	
  with	
  a	
  territory	
  when	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  periphery	
  are	
  exploited	
  for	
  the	
  benefit	
  of	
  the	
  national	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  core	
  state.	
  In	
  the	
  imperialist	
  practices	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  their	
  national	
  interests	
  are	
  being	
  pursued	
  through	
  the	
  layering	
  of	
  rules	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  securing	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  over	
  the	
  governance,	
  territory,	
  people,	
  and	
  most	
  importantly,	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  thus	
  ultimately	
  determining	
  who	
  owns	
  the	
  Arctic.	
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Chapter	
  II	
  
	
  
A	
  Genealogy	
  of	
  the	
  Rules	
  and	
  Codes	
  of	
  Arctic	
  
Sovereignty	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Within	
  view	
  of	
  an	
  international	
  audience,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  are	
  waging	
  diplomatic	
  campaigns	
  over	
  ownership	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Pole.	
  Just	
  before	
  Christmas	
  2013,	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  issued	
  Santa	
  Claus	
  with	
  a	
  passport,	
  an	
  act	
  that	
  specifically	
  implied	
  that	
  because	
  Father	
  Christmas	
  is	
  resident	
  at	
  the	
  pole,	
  it	
  lies	
  within	
  Canadian	
  territory.	
  	
  The	
  Russian	
  government	
  upped	
  the	
  ante	
  by	
  calling	
  for	
  an	
  increase	
  of	
  military	
  presence	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  defend	
  their	
  claim	
  to	
  the	
  pole	
  via	
  the	
  Lomonosov	
  Ridge,	
  a	
  claim	
  formally	
  submitted	
  to	
  the	
  UN	
  Commission	
  on	
  the	
  Continental	
  Shelf.	
  These	
  acts	
  demonstrate	
  that	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  has	
  become	
  a	
  territorial	
  focal	
  point	
  in	
  a	
  region	
  already	
  the	
  centre	
  of	
  a	
  geopolitical	
  contest	
  over	
  maritime	
  territory,	
  which	
  can	
  be	
  claimed	
  through	
  procedures	
  only	
  recently	
  developed	
  within	
  international	
  law.	
  These	
  states	
  are	
  both	
  communicating	
  to	
  a	
  domestic	
  audience,	
  but	
  also	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  community,	
  that	
  this	
  imaginary	
  and	
  socially	
  constructed	
  geographical	
  point	
  is	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  their	
  delineated	
  political	
  territorial	
  borders.	
  Their	
  assertions	
  to	
  following	
  international	
  law	
  to	
  determine	
  their	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  territorial	
  claims	
  while	
  making	
  these	
  melodramatic	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  causes	
  some	
  consternation	
  among	
  observers	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  as	
  this	
  diplomatic	
  duel	
  appears	
  to	
  be	
  accelerating,	
  although	
  these	
  two	
  states	
  have	
  been	
  including	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  in	
  maps	
  and	
  other	
  political	
  imagery	
  for	
  nearly	
  a	
  century.	
  Whether	
  or	
  not	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russian	
  are	
  permitted	
  within	
  international	
  law	
  to	
  incorporate	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  as	
  recognised	
  legitimate	
  territory	
  introduces	
  questions	
  on	
  how	
  the	
  Arctic	
  came	
  to	
  be	
  situated	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  legal	
  order:	
  What	
  are	
  the	
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rules	
  for	
  establishing	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  who	
  made	
  these	
  rules	
  and	
  how	
  have	
  the	
  rules	
  changed?	
  	
  The	
  discourse	
  surrounding	
  this	
  diplomatic	
  row	
  focuses	
  on	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  
on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  as	
  the	
  method	
  for	
  determining	
  potential	
  ownership	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Pole.	
  Can	
  the	
  geographic	
  North	
  Pole,	
  a	
  socially	
  constructed	
  concept,	
  be	
  included	
  in	
  the	
  sovereign	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  littoral	
  states?	
  What	
  the	
  discourse	
  fails	
  to	
  identify,	
  is	
  that	
  like	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  the	
  rules	
  ordering	
  the	
  behaviour	
  between	
  states,	
  both	
  tacit	
  and	
  codified	
  within	
  international	
  law,	
  are	
  also	
  a	
  social	
  construct	
  based	
  upon	
  solutions	
  for	
  political	
  problems	
  of	
  a	
  given	
  period.	
  International	
  law	
  is	
  a	
  collection	
  of	
  codified	
  rules,	
  or	
  guidelines	
  for	
  organising	
  the	
  behaviour	
  between	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  They	
  are	
  not	
  hard	
  and	
  fast,	
  but	
  are	
  malleable	
  when	
  either	
  a	
  powerful	
  state	
  initiates	
  a	
  rule	
  change	
  or	
  a	
  group	
  of	
  states	
  agree	
  in	
  practice	
  or	
  in	
  codified	
  law	
  that	
  a	
  rule	
  change	
  is	
  necessary;	
  furthermore,	
  these	
  rules	
  apply	
  only	
  to	
  states	
  as	
  the	
  dominant	
  actors	
  in	
  international	
  relations.	
  There	
  are	
  two	
  stipulations	
  regarding	
  the	
  function	
  of	
  law	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system:	
  that	
  the	
  rules	
  are	
  not	
  concrete	
  and	
  they	
  apply	
  only	
  to	
  states,	
  as	
  illustrated	
  by	
  the	
  cinematic	
  quote	
  	
  “You	
  must	
  be	
  a	
  pirate	
  for	
  the	
  pirate’s	
  code	
  to	
  apply….	
  [And]	
  the	
  code	
  is	
  more	
  what	
  you’d	
  call	
  ‘guidelines’	
  than	
  actual	
  rules.”110	
  	
  	
  A	
  condition	
  of	
  anarchy	
  has	
  characterised	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  since	
  the	
  decline	
  of	
  Papal	
  authority	
  as	
  a	
  political	
  leader	
  in	
  Europe,	
  causing	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  system	
  of	
  self-­‐help.	
  Thus,	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  create	
  stability	
  and	
  protection	
  for	
  national	
  interests	
  without	
  the	
  building	
  of	
  walls-­‐-­‐and	
  more	
  importantly	
  to	
  ensure	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  engage	
  in	
  trade	
  and	
  commerce	
  without	
  a	
  global	
  free-­‐for-­‐all,	
  the	
  framework	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  has	
  developed	
  as	
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  (Pirates	
  of	
  the	
  Carribean:	
  The	
  Curse	
  of	
  the	
  Black	
  Pearl,	
  2003)	
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states	
  agreed	
  upon	
  rules	
  of	
  interaction,111	
  including	
  the	
  annexation	
  of	
  territory,	
  passage	
  in	
  the	
  seas,	
  sovereignty,	
  piracy	
  and	
  exploitation	
  of	
  maritime	
  resources,	
  amongst	
  others.	
  The	
  territorial	
  division	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  including	
  the	
  determination	
  of	
  who	
  can	
  own	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  is	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  long-­‐term	
  development	
  of	
  this	
  self-­‐help	
  system	
  that	
  states	
  have	
  established	
  to	
  protected	
  their	
  interests.	
  	
  	
  In	
  current	
  Arctic	
  geopolitics	
  there	
  are	
  specific	
  notions	
  on	
  what	
  behaviour	
  is	
  allowed	
  by	
  states	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  relations	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic;	
  however,	
  there	
  is	
  an	
  inherent	
  incomprehension	
  regarding	
  how	
  these	
  expectations	
  have	
  been	
  developed.	
  This	
  development	
  has	
  been	
  moulded	
  by	
  states	
  addressing	
  their	
  national	
  interests	
  since	
  the	
  discovery	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  by	
  European	
  empires,	
  although	
  many	
  of	
  these	
  expectations	
  were	
  not	
  formed	
  in	
  direct	
  relation	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  but	
  were	
  developed	
  in	
  response	
  to	
  the	
  national	
  interests	
  of	
  states	
  regarding	
  territory	
  and	
  resources	
  in	
  other	
  parts	
  of	
  the	
  world.	
  Their	
  application	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  often	
  a	
  residual	
  outcome	
  of	
  this	
  development.	
  This	
  chapter	
  on	
  international	
  law	
  has	
  two	
  objectives.	
  Firstly,	
  it	
  traces	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  new	
  rules	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  that	
  result	
  in	
  the	
  current	
  expectations	
  on	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  contemporary	
  international	
  relations	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Secondly,	
  it	
  shows	
  the	
  codified	
  developments	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  resulting	
  in	
  the	
  division	
  of	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  As	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  over	
  the	
  last	
  few	
  centuries	
  is	
  an	
  enormous	
  collection	
  of	
  material,	
  this	
  chapter	
  focuses	
  only	
  on	
  the	
  lineage	
  of	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  that	
  frame	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  contemporary	
  international	
  relations.	
  	
  	
  The	
  objectives	
  of	
  this	
  chapter	
  are	
  illustrated	
  in	
  the	
  graph	
  below	
  (Figure	
  1),	
  which	
  shows	
  in	
  a	
  timeline	
  both	
  the	
  estimated	
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  The	
  conceptual	
  approach	
  to	
  rules	
  is	
  developed	
  in	
  Chapter	
  1.	
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introduction	
  of	
  rules	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  applicable	
  to	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  and	
  also	
  the	
  international	
  legal	
  agreements	
  or	
  ‘codes’	
  as	
  they	
  are	
  codified	
  international	
  law,	
  which	
  delineate	
  both	
  terrestrial	
  and	
  maritime	
  boundaries	
  for	
  the	
  circumpolar	
  Arctic,	
  although	
  the	
  text	
  of	
  this	
  chapter	
  focuses	
  specifically	
  on	
  the	
  lineage	
  of	
  territorial	
  sovereignty	
  for	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia.	
  This	
  lineage	
  has	
  been	
  situated	
  within	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  the	
  four	
  divisions	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  that	
  this	
  thesis	
  uses	
  as	
  its	
  organisational	
  framework,	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years,	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  and	
  post	
  Cold	
  War	
  Periods.	
  The	
  graph	
  also	
  illustrates	
  the	
  approximate	
  decline	
  of	
  Papal	
  authority	
  and	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  states	
  emanating	
  from	
  the	
  Peace	
  of	
  Westphalia.	
  The	
  constraint	
  of	
  this	
  graph,	
  is	
  that	
  due	
  to	
  limitations	
  of	
  software,	
  the	
  exact	
  date	
  boundaries	
  corresponding	
  with	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  codes	
  and	
  rules	
  is	
  not	
  precisely	
  measured	
  and	
  thus	
  the	
  reading	
  of	
  this	
  graph	
  requires	
  some	
  discretional	
  interpretation.	
  	
  	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  Figure	
  1:	
  Timeline	
  of	
  Rules	
  and	
  Codes	
  in	
  Arctic	
  International	
  Law	
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Research	
  Questions	
  	
  
• How	
  have	
  actors,	
  and	
  which	
  actors,	
  legitimised	
  particular	
  practices	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  polar	
  law?	
  
• How	
  have	
  the	
  addition	
  of	
  new	
  rules	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  contributed	
  to	
  the	
  fundamental	
  legal	
  order	
  that	
  places	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  its	
  present	
  geopolitical	
  context	
  and	
  what	
  are	
  those	
  rules?	
  
• What	
  is	
  the	
  genealogy	
  of	
  the	
  codification	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  that	
  places	
  the	
  Arctic	
  within	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  littoral	
  states	
  and	
  what	
  are	
  those	
  codes?	
  	
  
Rules	
  and	
  Codes	
  in	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  An	
  idea	
  never	
  acknowledged	
  in	
  the	
  discourse	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  is	
  that	
  in	
  1494,	
  as	
  terra	
  nullius	
  and	
  otherwise	
  lacking	
  the	
  complete	
  formal	
  incorporation	
  of	
  territory	
  within	
  the	
  political	
  boundaries	
  of	
  states	
  (as	
  few	
  states	
  existed	
  at	
  this	
  point	
  in	
  time),	
  the	
  Arctic	
  belonged	
  to	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  with	
  the	
  line	
  of	
  territorial	
  demarcation	
  placed	
  along	
  the	
  division	
  of	
  the	
  eastern	
  from	
  the	
  western	
  hemispheres.	
  	
  Clearly,	
  the	
  Iberian	
  empires	
  never	
  discovered	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  the	
  Grecian	
  Pytheas	
  had	
  earlier	
  referred	
  to	
  the	
  ‘congealed’	
  polar	
  seas	
  in	
  his	
  accounts	
  of	
  European	
  exploration	
  in	
  the	
  third	
  century	
  BCE.	
  Nor	
  had	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  ever	
  placed	
  their	
  flag	
  upon	
  territory	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  or	
  exploited	
  its	
  resources	
  for	
  the	
  benefit	
  of	
  the	
  motherland,	
  as	
  had	
  the	
  Vikings,	
  who	
  during	
  the	
  tenth	
  century	
  CE	
  first	
  utilised	
  the	
  margins	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Nor	
  did	
  they	
  submit	
  claims	
  the	
  territory	
  within	
  the	
  sea	
  to	
  the	
  UN	
  Commission	
  on	
  the	
  Continental	
  Shelf,	
  as	
  have	
  all	
  the	
  states	
  littoral	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  bar	
  the	
  United	
  States.	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  failed	
  to	
  fulfil	
  any	
  of	
  these	
  accepted	
  rules	
  of	
  territorial	
  conquest	
  because	
  they	
  had	
  yet	
  to	
  be	
  developed	
  and	
  were	
  not	
  included	
  as	
  the	
  expected	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states.	
  Instead,	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  initially	
  bequeathed	
  through	
  a	
  different	
  
	
   83	
  
form	
  of	
  legitimacy	
  in	
  a	
  different	
  phase	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  was	
  followed	
  by	
  a	
  bilateral	
  agreement	
  between	
  these	
  two	
  fledgling	
  states.	
  Here	
  follows	
  the	
  genealogy	
  of	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  within	
  international	
  law	
  as	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  developed	
  into	
  its	
  current	
  form.	
  	
  The	
  year	
  1492	
  is	
  arguably	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  most	
  important	
  moments	
  in	
  both	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  as	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  year	
  that	
  sparked	
  a	
  rapid	
  acceleration	
  of	
  the	
  expansion	
  of	
  European	
  knowledge.	
  It	
  was	
  in	
  1492	
  that	
  Christopher	
  Columbus	
  sailed	
  the	
  ocean	
  blue	
  ‘discovering’	
  the	
  New	
  World,	
  when	
  the	
  processes	
  of	
  the	
  Columbian	
  exchange	
  began	
  with	
  the	
  expansion	
  of	
  European	
  empires	
  culminating	
  in	
  an	
  irreversible	
  global	
  transformation.	
  While	
  one	
  does	
  not	
  usually	
  associate	
  the	
  adventures	
  of	
  Christopher	
  Columbus	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  his	
  actions	
  and	
  the	
  political	
  events	
  of	
  his	
  time	
  provide	
  the	
  seed	
  from	
  which	
  germinates	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  legal	
  order	
  relating	
  to	
  maritime	
  and	
  territorial	
  law.	
  School	
  children	
  learning	
  the	
  modern	
  history	
  of	
  Western	
  civilization	
  are	
  given	
  this	
  date	
  as	
  a	
  starting	
  point	
  of	
  history,	
  and	
  for	
  the	
  purpose	
  of	
  this	
  study,	
  it	
  is	
  also	
  the	
  starting	
  point	
  for	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  maritime	
  law.	
  	
  While	
  Europe	
  had	
  long	
  since	
  moved	
  beyond	
  the	
  idea	
  of	
  a	
  flat	
  earth,	
  maps	
  used	
  by	
  navigators	
  of	
  the	
  fifteenth	
  century	
  still	
  depicted	
  a	
  world	
  of	
  unknowns.	
  This	
  includes	
  a	
  map	
  drawn	
  by	
  Columbus	
  circa	
  1490,	
  (See	
  Figure	
  2),	
  which	
  shows	
  the	
  known	
  discoveries	
  of	
  Portugal	
  in	
  Africa,112	
  but	
  nothing	
  beyond	
  the	
  Atlantic	
  Ocean.	
  	
  Before	
  Columbus	
  was	
  commissioned	
  by	
  the	
  Spanish	
  monarchs	
  Ferdinand	
  II	
  and	
  Isabel	
  I	
  to	
  sail	
  west	
  in	
  search	
  of	
  new	
  lands	
  for	
  resources,	
  Portugal	
  had	
  already	
  been	
  claiming	
  ownership	
  of	
  lands	
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  Columbus	
  had	
  some	
  personal	
  knowledge	
  of	
  the	
  Portuguese	
  possessions	
  off	
  the	
  west	
  coast	
  of	
  Africa	
  as	
  he	
  had	
  lived	
  for	
  several	
  years	
  on	
  the	
  island	
  of	
  Porto	
  Santo,	
  near	
  Madeira.	
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beyond	
  Europe	
  for	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  years,	
  secured	
  through	
  the	
  approval	
  of	
  the	
  Vatican,	
  the	
  de	
  facto	
  authority	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  The	
  Portuguese	
  discoveries	
  provided	
  the	
  impetus	
  for	
  Spain	
  to	
  also	
  secure	
  new	
  resources,	
  without	
  challenging	
  Portugal	
  or	
  risking	
  the	
  wrath	
  of	
  Rome.	
  Spain	
  knew	
  that	
  “Portuguese	
  expansion	
  along	
  the	
  coasts	
  of	
  Africa	
  had	
  established	
  a	
  sequence	
  for	
  gaining	
  possession	
  of	
  these	
  lands:	
  first,	
  discovery;	
  second,	
  construction	
  of	
  a	
  fort	
  and	
  establishment	
  of	
  a	
  garrison;	
  third,	
  a	
  papal	
  bull	
  granting	
  possession	
  to	
  Portugal;	
  fourth,	
  by	
  negotiation	
  or	
  by	
  war,	
  a	
  treaty	
  in	
  which	
  Spain	
  accepted	
  the	
  situation.”113	
  And	
  then	
  Columbus	
  discovered	
  the	
  New	
  World	
  for	
  Spain.114	
  	
  	
  
	
  	
   Figure	
  2:	
  Map	
  by	
  Columbus115	
  	
  Spain	
  quickly	
  followed	
  the	
  precedents	
  established	
  by	
  Portugal	
  to	
  establish	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  their	
  new	
  discoveries.116	
  The	
  year	
  1492	
  was	
  followed	
  by	
  two	
  more	
  eventful	
  years	
  of	
  discovering	
  new	
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  (Davies,	
  1967,	
  p.	
  339)	
  114	
  Perhaps	
  ‘rediscovered’	
  is	
  a	
  better	
  term	
  as	
  when	
  Columbus	
  arrived	
  in	
  the	
  New	
  World,	
  there	
  already	
  existed	
  established	
  civilizations.	
  There	
  is	
  also	
  evidence	
  that	
  Benedictine	
  Irish	
  Monks,	
  the	
  Vikings	
  and	
  perhaps	
  even	
  the	
  Chinese	
  Muslim	
  explorer	
  Xheng	
  He	
  all	
  found	
  North	
  America	
  before	
  Columbus.	
  	
  See	
  (Menzies,	
  2002).	
  115	
  (Columb,	
  1490)	
  116	
  (Prescott,	
  1838,	
  p.	
  259)	
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territory	
  and	
  claims	
  for	
  the	
  Iberian	
  empires,	
  which	
  led	
  to	
  confusion	
  and	
  conflict	
  over	
  which	
  power	
  owned	
  what	
  territory.	
  So,	
  through	
  the	
  issuing	
  of	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  Papal	
  Bulls,	
  including	
  Bull	
  Inter	
  
Cetera,	
  based	
  upon	
  recommendations	
  from	
  Columbus,117	
  the	
  Pope	
  divided	
  the	
  Western	
  hemisphere	
  between	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  “in	
  virtue	
  of	
  his	
  territorial	
  supremacy	
  over	
  the	
  whole	
  world.”118	
  Spain	
  received	
  the	
  territory	
  to	
  the	
  West	
  of	
  the	
  division	
  line	
  and	
  Portugal	
  received	
  the	
  territory	
  to	
  the	
  East.	
  Even	
  though	
  this	
  meant	
  a	
  diminished	
  role	
  in	
  the	
  New	
  World,	
  Portugal	
  accepted	
  the	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  the	
  Pope,	
  the	
  de	
  facto	
  head	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  as	
  this	
  was	
  also	
  the	
  source	
  of	
  their	
  supremacy	
  in	
  Africa	
  and	
  they	
  subsequently	
  focused	
  their	
  efforts	
  to	
  the	
  East.119	
  	
  	
  By	
  1494,	
  the	
  crowns	
  of	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  had	
  determined	
  that	
  the	
  terms	
  of	
  delimitation	
  provided	
  in	
  the	
  Papal	
  Bulls	
  was	
  inconvenient—not	
  only	
  was	
  the	
  line	
  of	
  delimitation	
  in	
  an	
  unsuitable	
  place,	
  but	
  it	
  also	
  only	
  established	
  a	
  line	
  through	
  the	
  Western	
  hemisphere	
  and	
  it	
  was	
  deemed	
  necessary	
  to	
  also	
  have	
  a	
  boundary	
  in	
  the	
  Eastern	
  hemisphere.	
  	
  So	
  in	
  the	
  now	
  seemingly	
  insignificant	
  village	
  of	
  Tordesillas,	
  Spain,	
  representatives	
  authorised	
  by	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  met	
  to	
  negotiate	
  a	
  bilateral	
  treaty,	
  “possibly	
  the	
  most	
  pregnant	
  treaty	
  in	
  world	
  history.”120	
  Here,	
  they	
  bypassed	
  Papal	
  authority	
  and	
  changed	
  the	
  placement	
  of	
  the	
  line	
  of	
  demarcation	
  between	
  Portuguese	
  and	
  Spanish	
  possession	
  in	
  the	
  New	
  World	
  to	
  a	
  more	
  favourable	
  position	
  for	
  Portugal,	
  demonstrating	
  the	
  strength	
  of	
  Portuguese	
  diplomacy	
  of	
  the	
  period.121	
  	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  117	
  Columbus	
  is	
  given	
  credit	
  for	
  being	
  the	
  Father	
  of	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Tordesillas	
  in	
  (Davies,	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  1967)	
  	
  118	
  (Phillimore,	
  1854,	
  p.	
  vii)	
  119	
  (Davies,	
  1967,	
  p.	
  339)	
  120	
  (Davies,	
  1967,	
  p.	
  338)	
  121	
  (Reeves,	
  1944,	
  p.	
  541)	
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The	
  treaty	
  states	
  that	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  settle	
  the	
  controversy,	
  preserve	
  the	
  peace	
  and	
  the	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  monarchs	
  that	
  they	
  agree:	
  	
  	
   “that	
  a	
  boundary	
  or	
  straight	
  line	
  be	
  determined	
  and	
  drawn	
  north	
  and	
  south,	
  from	
  pole	
  to	
  pole,	
  on	
  the	
  said	
  ocean	
  sea,	
  from	
  the	
  Arctic	
  to	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  pole,”122	
  (See	
  Figure	
  3).	
  And,	
  	
   “inasmuch	
  as	
  the	
  said	
  ships	
  of	
  [Spain]	
  sailing...	
  from	
  their	
  kingdoms	
  and	
  seigniories	
  to	
  their	
  said	
  possessions	
  on	
  the	
  other	
  side	
  of	
  the	
  said	
  line,	
  must	
  cross	
  the	
  seas	
  on	
  this	
  side	
  of	
  the	
  line,	
  pertaining	
  to	
  [Portugal],	
  it	
  is	
  therefore	
  concerted	
  and	
  agreed	
  that	
  the	
  said	
  ships	
  of	
  [Spain]	
  shall,	
  at	
  any	
  time	
  and	
  without	
  any	
  hindrance,	
  sail	
  in	
  either	
  direction,	
  freely,	
  securely,	
  and	
  peacefully,	
  over	
  the	
  said	
  seas	
  of	
  [Portugal]...	
  .”123	
  
	
  	
   Figure	
  3:	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Tordesillas124	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  122	
  (Davenport,	
  1917,	
  p.	
  95)	
  123	
  (Davenport,	
  1917,	
  p.	
  97)	
  124	
  (Davies,	
  1967,	
  p.	
  338)	
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  There	
  are	
  at	
  least	
  four	
  implications	
  for	
  international	
  relations	
  and	
  international	
  law	
  that	
  can	
  be	
  taken	
  from	
  the	
  political	
  events	
  that	
  culminated	
  in	
  the	
  legal	
  agreement	
  of	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Tordesillas	
  1494.	
  The	
  first	
  is	
  that	
  by	
  agreeing	
  to	
  the	
  terms	
  of	
  the	
  treaty,	
  contrary	
  to	
  the	
  decision	
  of	
  Pope	
  Alexander	
  VI	
  in	
  his	
  series	
  of	
  Bulls,	
  the	
  monarchs	
  of	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  were	
  signalling	
  the	
  decline	
  of	
  the	
  authority	
  of	
  the	
  Papacy	
  in	
  matters	
  of	
  state	
  affairs.	
  However,	
  it	
  would	
  be	
  several	
  centuries	
  before	
  this	
  would	
  be	
  established	
  as	
  a	
  permanent	
  feature	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  The	
  decline	
  of	
  Papal	
  authority	
  would	
  ultimately	
  make	
  way	
  for	
  other	
  rising	
  imperial	
  powers	
  to	
  expropriate	
  the	
  territory	
  given	
  to	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal.	
  	
  	
  Second,	
  although	
  ultimately	
  connected	
  to	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  through	
  extrapolation,	
  the	
  line	
  of	
  demarcation	
  established	
  first	
  by	
  the	
  Bulls	
  and	
  then	
  by	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Tordesillas	
  has	
  had	
  a	
  lasting	
  effect	
  on	
  the	
  shape	
  of	
  geopolitical	
  boundaries	
  familiar	
  to	
  us	
  today.	
  	
  By	
  consulting	
  Figure	
  2,	
  it	
  is	
  at	
  once	
  apparent	
  that	
  the	
  division	
  of	
  South	
  America	
  created	
  “the	
  interesting	
  historical	
  result	
  that	
  the	
  people	
  of	
  the	
  largest	
  single	
  political	
  unit	
  in	
  South	
  America	
  [Brazil]	
  speak	
  Portuguese.”125	
  Looking	
  further	
  north	
  along	
  that	
  line,	
  imagine	
  if	
  Portugal	
  had	
  spent	
  any	
  time	
  exploring	
  its	
  northern	
  possessions—Grœnlanders	
  today	
  might	
  also	
  be	
  speaking	
  Portuguese	
  rather	
  than	
  being	
  incorporated	
  as	
  a	
  sovereign	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  Kingdom	
  of	
  Denmark.	
  As	
  the	
  Iberian	
  empires	
  ignored	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  it	
  was	
  instead	
  explored	
  by	
  the	
  British,	
  Danish	
  and	
  Norwegians,	
  which	
  is	
  reflected	
  in	
  contemporary	
  Arctic	
  affairs.	
  	
  	
  Another	
  implication	
  is	
  that,	
  even	
  if	
  only	
  selectively,	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  
Tordesillas	
  also	
  introduced	
  the	
  application	
  of	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  the	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  125	
  (Reeves,	
  1944,	
  p.	
  541)	
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freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  to	
  the	
  entirely	
  of	
  the	
  global	
  seas.126	
  The	
  treaty	
  specifically	
  gave	
  provision	
  for	
  Spain	
  to	
  be	
  allowed	
  to	
  sail	
  through	
  the	
  Portuguese	
  half	
  of	
  the	
  world	
  to	
  reach	
  their	
  possessions	
  abroad.	
  	
  	
  This	
  provision	
  shows	
  the	
  need	
  for	
  right	
  of	
  innocent	
  passage,	
  even	
  if	
  in	
  practice	
  these	
  two	
  powers	
  deemed	
  the	
  whole	
  planet	
  already	
  ‘carved	
  up’	
  and	
  provided	
  for	
  the	
  codification	
  of	
  idea	
  of	
  innocent	
  passage	
  in	
  a	
  legal	
  document.	
  	
  	
  	
  And	
  finally,	
  the	
  treaty	
  established	
  for	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal-­‐-­‐	
  not	
  a	
  line	
  of	
  explicit	
  territorial	
  division-­‐-­‐as	
  it	
  would	
  be	
  impossible	
  to	
  maintain	
  control	
  over	
  such	
  vast	
  areas	
  of	
  the	
  globe,	
  but	
  rather	
  “spheres	
  of	
  influence.”127	
  Near	
  the	
  line	
  dividing	
  the	
  Western	
  hemisphere,	
  it	
  is	
  clear	
  that	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  adhered	
  to	
  the	
  provisions	
  of	
  the	
  treaty,	
  given	
  the	
  geopolitical	
  boundaries	
  earlier	
  mentioned.	
  Portugal	
  largely	
  lost	
  out	
  on	
  the	
  riches	
  of	
  the	
  New	
  World,	
  but	
  “fortunately	
  the	
  accomplishment	
  of	
  the	
  passage	
  round	
  the	
  Cape	
  of	
  Good	
  Hope,	
  which	
  occurred	
  soon	
  afterwards,	
  led	
  the	
  Portuguese	
  in	
  an	
  opposite	
  direction	
  to	
  their	
  Spanish	
  rivals;	
  their	
  Brazilian	
  possessions	
  having	
  too	
  little	
  attractions,	
  at	
  first,	
  to	
  turn	
  them	
  from	
  the	
  splendid	
  path	
  of	
  discovery	
  thrown	
  open	
  in	
  the	
  East.”128	
  This	
  eventually	
  leads	
  to	
  another	
  event	
  with	
  future	
  impact	
  on	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  international	
  maritime	
  law,	
  discussed	
  later	
  in	
  this	
  chapter.	
  	
  	
  It	
  is	
  also	
  evident	
  that	
  many	
  other	
  European	
  nations	
  eventually	
  chose	
  to	
  ignore	
  the	
  Papal	
  Bulls	
  and	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Tordesillas	
  as	
  they	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  126	
  There	
  are	
  two	
  additional	
  differing	
  opinions	
  on	
  this	
  matter.	
  Steinberg	
  claims	
  “Spain's	
  and	
  Portugal's	
  claims	
  to	
  exclusive	
  rights	
  should	
  not	
  be	
  viewed	
  as	
  claims	
  to	
  possession	
  of	
  the	
  sea”	
  (Steinberg,	
  1999,	
  p.	
  257)	
  while	
  Baird	
  claims	
  “State	
  practice	
  suggests	
  both	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  believed	
  they	
  possessed	
  exclusive	
  navigation	
  rights	
  and	
  trade	
  privileges	
  over	
  an	
  enormous	
  expanse	
  of	
  the	
  earth's	
  oceans,”	
  (Baird,	
  1996,	
  p.	
  278).	
  127	
  Reeves	
  comments	
  that	
  “The	
  line	
  which	
  was	
  set	
  up	
  was	
  not	
  in	
  all	
  respects	
  a	
  line	
  dividing	
  territory	
  according	
  to	
  our	
  modern	
  thought	
  so	
  much	
  as	
  it	
  was	
  a	
  line	
  setting	
  forth	
  what	
  in	
  our	
  modern	
  parlance	
  would	
  be	
  called	
  a	
  sphere	
  of	
  influence,	
  or	
  a	
  sphere	
  of	
  interest,”	
  (Reeves,	
  1944,	
  p.	
  539)	
  while	
  Steinberg	
  says	
  “the	
  two	
  countries'	
  claims	
  implied	
  that	
  the	
  sea	
  had	
  been	
  divided	
  into	
  "spheres	
  of	
  influence"	
  in	
  which	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  were	
  granted	
  rights	
  of	
  stewardship,”	
  (Steinberg,	
  1999,	
  p.	
  257).	
  128	
  (Prescott,	
  1838,	
  p.	
  269)	
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explored	
  and	
  claimed	
  possession	
  of	
  many	
  North	
  American,	
  African	
  and	
  even	
  some	
  Asian	
  territory.	
  This	
  may	
  be	
  in	
  a	
  large	
  part	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  overwhelming	
  size	
  of	
  the	
  spheres	
  of	
  influence	
  that	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  claimed,	
  having	
  little	
  ability	
  to	
  prevent	
  others	
  from	
  pursuing	
  economic	
  exploitation	
  and	
  commercial	
  interests	
  in	
  these	
  new	
  territories.	
  But	
  this	
  race	
  to	
  secure	
  the	
  riches	
  of	
  the	
  New	
  World	
  “led	
  both	
  nations	
  to	
  over-­‐extend	
  themselves.	
  It	
  proved	
  a	
  major	
  factor	
  in	
  the	
  weakening	
  of	
  the	
  Portuguese	
  empire,	
  which	
  collapsed	
  to	
  the	
  Dutch	
  in	
  one	
  naval	
  battle	
  in	
  1604.”129	
  	
  A	
  little	
  over	
  a	
  century	
  later	
  finds	
  the	
  Iberian	
  kingdoms	
  of	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  a	
  united	
  empire.	
  The	
  Spanish	
  had	
  been	
  rather	
  successfully	
  plundering	
  the	
  New	
  World,	
  turning	
  it	
  into	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  wealthiest	
  countries	
  in	
  Europe.	
  Additionally,	
  the	
  Iberian	
  power	
  had	
  convinced	
  other	
  European	
  nations	
  that	
  they	
  owned	
  a	
  monopoly	
  on	
  the	
  East	
  Indian	
  spice	
  trade,	
  although	
  this	
  temporary	
  control	
  can	
  also	
  be	
  contributed	
  to	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  any	
  real	
  competition.130	
  Yet	
  with	
  expansionist	
  agendas	
  and	
  policies	
  of	
  extracting	
  tribute	
  to	
  finance	
  their	
  expanding	
  empire,	
  Spain	
  created	
  an	
  empire	
  with	
  detrimental	
  flaws.	
  	
  	
  During	
  the	
  middle	
  of	
  the	
  16th	
  century,	
  Spain’s	
  ‘ownership’	
  over	
  the	
  territories	
  designated	
  by	
  Papal	
  degree	
  had	
  been	
  challenged	
  by	
  other	
  European	
  nations.	
  This	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  “arrangement	
  of	
  ‘the	
  lines	
  of	
  amity’	
  and	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  ‘no	
  peace	
  beyond	
  the	
  line’,	
  which	
  had	
  sought	
  to	
  block	
  the	
  advance	
  of	
  other	
  European	
  powers	
  into	
  the	
  new	
  oceans	
  and	
  continents,”131	
  (See	
  Figure	
  4).	
  This	
  agreement	
  eventually	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  weakening	
  of	
  the	
  Spanish	
  empire	
  for	
  several	
  reasons,	
  including	
  that	
  while	
  their	
  empire	
  consisted	
  of	
  exacting	
  resources	
  from	
  their	
  overseas	
  empires,	
  other	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  129	
  (Davies,	
  1967,	
  pp.	
  342-­‐3)	
  130	
  Monteiro	
  says,	
  “During	
  this	
  time,	
  England	
  and	
  France	
  were	
  still	
  recovering	
  from	
  the	
  Hundred	
  Years'	
  War.	
  Faced	
  with	
  Portuguese	
  sea	
  power,	
  the	
  European	
  countries	
  were	
  forced	
  to	
  accept	
  the	
  doctrine	
  of	
  the	
  mare	
  clausum	
  and	
  to	
  abdicate	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  navigate	
  their	
  ships	
  south	
  of	
  the	
  Canary	
  Islands,”	
  (Monteiro,	
  2001,	
  p.	
  9).	
  131	
  (Grewe,	
  2000,	
  p.	
  157)	
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European	
  nations	
  turned	
  to	
  mercantilist	
  strategies	
  of	
  income	
  accumulation.	
  It	
  also	
  had	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  creating	
  a	
  black	
  market	
  for	
  the	
  spice	
  trade	
  from	
  “high	
  prices	
  resulting	
  from	
  the	
  suppression	
  of	
  competition	
  in	
  Portugal	
  and	
  the	
  Indies”	
  encouraging	
  smuggling	
  and	
  privateering	
  by	
  the	
  Dutch	
  and	
  English,	
  and	
  not	
  surprisingly,	
  also	
  by	
  Portuguese	
  captains.132	
  The	
  high	
  volume	
  of	
  illicit	
  trade	
  created	
  financial	
  woes	
  for	
  the	
  Spanish	
  treasury.133	
  	
  
	
  	
   Figure	
  4:	
  Lines	
  of	
  Amity134	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  As	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  complicated	
  European	
  history,	
  during	
  this	
  time	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  were	
  also	
  subjects	
  of	
  the	
  Spanish	
  empire	
  and	
  in	
  mid-­‐sixteenth	
  century	
  launched	
  a	
  revolt	
  in	
  a	
  bid	
  for	
  independence.	
  	
  For	
  some	
  time,	
  Spain	
  allowed	
  Dutch	
  merchants	
  to	
  continue	
  trading	
  in	
  Spanish	
  ports135	
  but	
  eventually	
  Philip	
  II,	
  the	
  Spanish	
  monarch,	
  banned	
  the	
  Dutch	
  from	
  their	
  ports,	
  including	
  those	
  in	
  Portugal—and	
  so	
  “the	
  enterprising	
  [Dutch]	
  traders	
  began	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  132	
  (Hamilton,	
  1948,	
  p.	
  38)	
  133	
  (Sluiter,	
  1948,	
  p.	
  181)	
  134	
  (Grewe,	
  2000,	
  p.	
  158)	
  135	
  (Sluiter,	
  1948,	
  p.	
  167)	
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to	
  sail	
  directly	
  to	
  the	
  East	
  Indies.”136	
  	
  	
  Meanwhile	
  England,	
  France	
  and	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  agreed	
  to	
  a	
  collective	
  security	
  alliance.	
  Spain	
  realised	
  that	
  “the	
  rebellion	
  in	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  had	
  to	
  be	
  suppressed.	
  Chances	
  of	
  a	
  Spanish	
  victory	
  there	
  grew	
  slimmer	
  the	
  more	
  England	
  intervened,”137	
  leading	
  to	
  the	
  creation	
  and	
  defeat	
  of	
  the	
  infamous	
  Spanish	
  Armada,	
  a	
  venture	
  that	
  would	
  nearly	
  bankrupt	
  Spain.138	
  	
  Challenging	
  the	
  monopoly	
  of	
  the	
  Portuguese	
  empire	
  to	
  the	
  trade	
  routes	
  of	
  the	
  East	
  Indies,	
  both	
  England	
  and	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  granted	
  charters	
  to	
  venture	
  trading	
  companies,	
  the	
  East	
  India	
  Trading	
  Company	
  (1600)	
  and	
  the	
  Vereenigde	
  Oost-­‐Indische	
  Compagnie,	
  or	
  the	
  VOC	
  (1602),	
  respectively.	
  By	
  now,	
  England	
  had	
  negotiated	
  its	
  own	
  treaty	
  with	
  Spain,	
  “effectively	
  abandoning	
  the	
  Netherlands.”139	
  As	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  Spanish-­‐English	
  negotiations,	
  England	
  refused	
  to	
  continue	
  accepting	
  the	
  once	
  agreed	
  lines	
  of	
  amity	
  and	
  agreed	
  only	
  to	
  be	
  excluded	
  from	
  expanding	
  and	
  trading	
  where	
  Spaniards	
  had	
  already	
  established	
  settlements	
  and	
  trade.140	
  Eventually,	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  attempted	
  to	
  negotiate	
  a	
  similar	
  treaty	
  in	
  1608,	
  but	
  as	
  the	
  subjects	
  of	
  Spanish	
  rule	
  they	
  had	
  more	
  obstacles	
  to	
  overcome	
  and	
  the	
  first	
  attempt	
  at	
  a	
  peace	
  treaty	
  was	
  abandoned	
  because	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  would	
  not	
  give	
  up	
  on	
  the	
  exercise	
  of	
  religion	
  or	
  trade	
  in	
  the	
  East	
  Indies.141	
  This	
  defiance	
  by	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  combined	
  with	
  the	
  growing	
  power	
  of	
  England,	
  contributed	
  to	
  the	
  approaching	
  turning	
  point	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  Despite	
  the	
  setback,	
  the	
  Dutch	
  were	
  not	
  prepared	
  to	
  completely	
  surrender	
  to	
  the	
  demands	
  of	
  Spain	
  as	
  they	
  “believed	
  the	
  trade	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  136	
  (Hamilton,	
  1948,	
  p.	
  43)	
  137	
  (Jenson,	
  1988,	
  p.	
  639)	
  138	
  (Grattan,	
  1830,	
  p.	
  221)	
  139	
  (Davenport,	
  1917,	
  p.	
  258)	
  140	
  (Grewe,	
  2000,	
  p.	
  158)	
  141	
  (Grattan,	
  1830,	
  pp.	
  225-­‐6)	
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necessary	
  to	
  their	
  existence”142	
  for	
  a	
  variety	
  of	
  reasons.	
  Trade	
  created	
  a	
  source	
  of	
  revenue	
  from	
  outside	
  the	
  state,	
  paid	
  for	
  ships	
  and	
  crew	
  while	
  increasing	
  sea	
  power,	
  all	
  the	
  while	
  decreasing	
  Spain’s	
  relative	
  strength	
  and	
  making	
  friends	
  and	
  allies.143	
  	
  	
  Meanwhile	
  Hugo	
  Grotius,	
  working	
  for	
  the	
  VOC,	
  attempted	
  to	
  convince	
  Europe	
  of	
  the	
  rights	
  of	
  the	
  Dutch	
  to	
  the	
  wealth	
  of	
  the	
  world	
  trade	
  that	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  had	
  been	
  selfishly	
  hoarding.	
  Grotius	
  had	
  earlier	
  written	
  a	
  defence	
  for	
  the	
  VOC	
  in	
  De	
  Jure	
  Prædae	
  (1605),	
  arguing	
  that	
  the	
  capture	
  and	
  sale	
  of	
  a	
  Portuguese	
  vessel	
  and	
  cargo	
  was	
  justified	
  on	
  account	
  of	
  the	
  Portuguese	
  having	
  “wrongfully	
  tried	
  to	
  exclude	
  the	
  Dutch	
  (and	
  others)	
  from	
  [trade	
  with	
  eastern	
  countries].”144	
  Finally,	
  on	
  the	
  eve	
  of	
  1609	
  as	
  a	
  peace	
  treaty	
  was	
  negotiated	
  between	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  and	
  Spain,	
  Grotius	
  was	
  persuaded	
  to	
  publish	
  a	
  chapter	
  of	
  his	
  next	
  defence	
  for	
  the	
  VOC,	
  Mare	
  Liberum	
  or	
  The	
  Right	
  which	
  belongs	
  to	
  the	
  Dutch	
  to	
  take	
  
part	
  in	
  the	
  East	
  Indian	
  Trade	
  (1609).145	
  	
  	
  In	
  Mare	
  Liberum,	
  Grotius	
  makes	
  several	
  points	
  regarding	
  the	
  inequality	
  of	
  Spanish	
  monopolisation	
  of	
  trade	
  routes.	
  He	
  says:	
  “Indeed	
  can	
  anything	
  more	
  unjust	
  be	
  conceived	
  than	
  for	
  the	
  Spaniards	
  to	
  hold	
  the	
  entire	
  world	
  tributary,	
  so	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  permissible	
  to	
  buy	
  or	
  to	
  sell	
  except	
  at	
  their	
  good	
  pleasure?”146	
  Grotius	
  professes	
  to	
  understand	
  the	
  intent	
  of	
  the	
  Iberian	
  claims	
  to	
  a	
  monopoly	
  of	
  trade	
  in	
  the	
  Indies,	
  but	
  contends	
  that	
  the	
  Spanish	
  and	
  Portuguese	
  assertion	
  that	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  territory	
  being	
  firmly	
  with	
  their	
  control	
  is	
  “far	
  fetched	
  and	
  unjust.”147	
  He	
  understands	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  in	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  competition	
  for	
  any	
  business	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  142	
  (Davenport,	
  1917,	
  p.	
  260)	
  143	
  (Davenport,	
  1917,	
  p.	
  260)	
  144	
  (Anand,	
  1982,	
  p.	
  442)	
  145	
  (Anand,	
  1982,	
  p.	
  442).	
  Mare	
  Liberum	
  (1609)	
  was	
  initially	
  published	
  anonymously.	
  Armitage	
  also	
  claims	
  “The	
  publication	
  of	
  Hugo	
  Grotius's	
  Mare	
  Liberum	
  in	
  1609	
  coincided	
  with	
  James's	
  policy	
  of	
  restricting	
  Dutch	
  fishing	
  in	
  British	
  waters,”	
  (Armitage,	
  1997,	
  p.	
  52).	
  146	
  (Grotius,	
  1916,	
  p.	
  70)	
  	
  147	
  (Grotius,	
  1916,	
  p.	
  69)	
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venturer	
  to	
  make	
  attempts	
  to	
  retain	
  all	
  profit	
  for	
  their	
  own	
  gain—but	
  the	
  techniques	
  being	
  used	
  could	
  not	
  constitute	
  rivalry	
  or	
  even	
  fair	
  competition,	
  rather	
  they	
  were	
  simply	
  sordid	
  tactics.	
  With	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  having	
  been	
  under	
  Spanish	
  rule,	
  they	
  felt	
  particularly	
  victimised	
  by	
  Spanish	
  policies,	
  which	
  had	
  seen	
  some	
  concessions	
  in	
  agreements	
  with	
  other	
  powers.	
  	
  	
  	
  Grotius	
  says:	
  	
   “Is	
  the	
  same	
  thing	
  then	
  which	
  is	
  considered	
  grievous	
  and	
  pernicious	
  in	
  the	
  smaller	
  community	
  of	
  a	
  state	
  to	
  be	
  put	
  up	
  with	
  all	
  in	
  that	
  great	
  community	
  of	
  the	
  human	
  race?	
  ...Therefore	
  the	
  Portuguese	
  may	
  cry	
  as	
  loud	
  and	
  as	
  long	
  as	
  they	
  shall	
  please:	
  ‘You	
  are	
  cutting	
  down	
  our	
  profits’!	
  The	
  Dutch	
  will	
  answer:	
  ‘Nay!	
  We	
  are	
  but	
  looking	
  out	
  for	
  our	
  own	
  interests!’.”148	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Grotius	
  made	
  evident	
  that	
  the	
  purpose	
  of	
  his	
  argument	
  was	
  to	
  defend	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  VOC,	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  and	
  the	
  whole	
  of	
  the	
  human	
  race.	
  Defending	
  their	
  right	
  to	
  the	
  traffic	
  the	
  globe	
  as	
  “in	
  many	
  parts	
  where	
  they	
  traded	
  the	
  King	
  of	
  Spain	
  exercised	
  no	
  authority,	
  or	
  was	
  hated	
  by	
  the	
  natives,	
  or	
  was	
  unable	
  to	
  defend	
  himself.”149	
  Following,	
  Grotius	
  attempted	
  to	
  prove	
  through	
  legal	
  argument	
  the	
  “Portuguese	
  claims	
  of	
  dominium	
  over	
  the	
  seas	
  on	
  grounds	
  of	
  first	
  discovery,	
  papal	
  donation,	
  rights	
  of	
  conquest	
  or	
  title	
  of	
  occupation.”150	
  By	
  invoking	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  nature	
  and	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  possession	
  previously	
  established	
  as	
  procedure	
  by	
  Portugal	
  before	
  its	
  pact	
  with	
  Spain—Grotius	
  systematically	
  argues	
  why	
  on	
  every	
  point	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  have	
  no	
  right	
  to	
  prohibit	
  the	
  Dutch	
  from	
  expanding	
  their	
  trade	
  network,	
  demonstrating	
  they	
  have	
  failed	
  in	
  effective	
  occupation.	
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  (Grotius,	
  1916,	
  p.	
  71)	
  149	
  (Davenport,	
  1917,	
  p.	
  260)	
  150	
  (Armitage,	
  1997,	
  p.	
  53)	
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  By	
  1608	
  the	
  Spanish	
  empire	
  was	
  facing	
  significant	
  decline	
  from	
  the	
  challenges	
  of	
  maintaining	
  the	
  high	
  cost	
  of	
  war	
  on	
  several	
  fronts,	
  but	
  also	
  the	
  cost	
  of	
  defending	
  its	
  overseas	
  territories	
  and	
  trade	
  routes.	
  Thus,	
  when	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  again	
  broached	
  a	
  peace	
  treaty,	
  they	
  were	
  in	
  a	
  unique	
  position	
  to	
  negotiate	
  for	
  the	
  return	
  of	
  their	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  additionally	
  caused	
  Spain	
  to	
  make	
  concessions	
  regarding	
  the	
  East	
  Indian	
  trade	
  routes.	
  	
  After	
  decades	
  of	
  fighting,	
  a	
  Twelve	
  Years	
  Truce	
  or	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Antwerp	
  1609	
  was	
  agreed,	
  containing	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  key	
  provisions	
  with	
  implications	
  for	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  international	
  relations.	
  The	
  first	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  states	
  of	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  received	
  the	
  return	
  of	
  their	
  sovereignty	
  following	
  the	
  years	
  of	
  domination	
  by	
  Spain.	
  This	
  unprecedented	
  event	
  elicited	
  surprise	
  within	
  international	
  relations,	
  with	
  historian	
  John	
  Motley	
  remarking	
  that,	
  “Mankind	
  were	
  amazed	
  at	
  this	
  result—an	
  event	
  hitherto	
  unknown	
  in	
  history.	
  When	
  before	
  had	
  a	
  sovereign	
  acknowledged	
  the	
  independence	
  of	
  his	
  rebellious	
  subjects	
  and	
  signed	
  a	
  treaty	
  with	
  them	
  as	
  equals?”151	
  But	
  for	
  the	
  Netherlands,	
  this	
  was	
  only	
  one	
  element	
  of	
  their	
  victory.	
  	
  In	
  another	
  provision	
  of	
  the	
  treaty,	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  also	
  received	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  trade	
  in	
  the	
  East	
  Indies.	
  However,	
  the	
  Spanish	
  commissioners	
  were	
  “forbidden,	
  by	
  express	
  order	
  from	
  Spain,	
  to	
  name	
  the	
  Indies	
  in	
  writing”152	
  as	
  this	
  would	
  set	
  a	
  legal	
  precedent	
  for	
  Spain’s	
  acknowledgement	
  that	
  they	
  were	
  not	
  entitled	
  to	
  dominion	
  of	
  the	
  whole	
  earth	
  granted	
  through	
  Papal	
  authority.	
  Instead	
  they	
  agreed	
  to	
  a	
  second	
  ‘secret	
  treaty’	
  that	
  “pledged	
  the	
  faith	
  of	
  the	
  king	
  and	
  of	
  his	
  successors	
  that	
  his	
  Majesty	
  would	
  cause	
  no	
  impediment,	
  whether	
  by	
  sea	
  or	
  land,	
  to	
  the	
  states.”153	
  	
  This	
  agreement	
  was	
  only	
  intended	
  to	
  be	
  for	
  the	
  duration	
  of	
  the	
  truce,	
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  (Motley,	
  1860,	
  p.	
  341)	
  152	
  (Motley,	
  1860,	
  p.	
  336)	
  153	
  (Motley,	
  1860,	
  p.	
  336)	
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but	
  as	
  the	
  Spanish	
  empire	
  had	
  lost	
  its	
  power,	
  it	
  was	
  never	
  able	
  to	
  reclaim	
  its	
  former	
  dominion.	
  	
  	
  Finally,	
  while	
  the	
  provisions	
  of	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Antwerp	
  signalled	
  a	
  victory	
  on	
  the	
  part	
  of	
  Grotius,	
  the	
  VOC	
  and	
  the	
  Netherlands,	
  it	
  opened	
  up	
  a	
  new	
  era	
  of	
  conflict	
  over	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas.	
  Other	
  European	
  nations	
  intent	
  on	
  expanding	
  their	
  trade	
  networks	
  and	
  sovereignty	
  seaward	
  saw	
  the	
  Dutch	
  victory	
  as	
  an	
  attack	
  on	
  their	
  efforts.	
  This	
  includes	
  King	
  James	
  who	
  felt	
  that	
  “Mare	
  Liberum,	
  as	
  if	
  aimed	
  at	
  mortifying	
  the	
  Spaniards'	
  usurpation	
  in	
  the	
  W.	
  and	
  E.	
  Indyes,	
  but	
  aimed	
  indeed	
  at	
  England.”154	
  Soon,	
  there	
  would	
  be	
  another	
  struggle	
  to	
  determine	
  whether	
  the	
  seas	
  truly	
  were	
  the	
  common	
  property	
  of	
  all	
  and	
  the	
  private	
  property	
  of	
  none.	
  	
  	
  
	
  Following	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Antwerp,	
  the	
  Dutch	
  built	
  a	
  commercial	
  empire	
  in	
  trading	
  the	
  goods	
  from	
  the	
  Far	
  East,	
  operating	
  on	
  the	
  doctrine	
  of	
  the	
  ‘freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas’	
  as	
  a	
  guiding	
  principle	
  of	
  state	
  practice.	
  “Dutch	
  power	
  was	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  command	
  of	
  the	
  seas...these	
  trading	
  companies,	
  together	
  with	
  the	
  massive	
  Dutch	
  fishing	
  fleet,	
  constituted	
  the	
  backbone	
  of	
  Dutch	
  world	
  power.”155	
  But	
  this	
  power	
  would	
  also	
  lead	
  to	
  their	
  vulnerability	
  in	
  that	
  while	
  they	
  maintained	
  great	
  power	
  in	
  commerce,	
  they	
  did	
  not	
  maintain	
  a	
  navy	
  to	
  protect	
  this	
  as	
  “they	
  operated	
  under	
  conditions	
  of	
  limited	
  military	
  power.”156	
  	
  The	
  Dutch	
  empire	
  expanded	
  rapidly	
  and	
  “enjoyed	
  a	
  short-­‐lived	
  international	
  ascendancy.”157	
  However,	
  this	
  was	
  quickly	
  curtailed	
  as	
  the	
  rivalry	
  between	
  the	
  nations	
  of	
  Western	
  Europe	
  created	
  many	
  of	
  the	
  developments	
  in	
  international	
  law	
  and	
  international	
  commerce	
  that	
  would	
  shape	
  international	
  relations	
  for	
  next	
  several	
  centuries	
  “witness[ing]	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  a	
  new	
  and	
  qualitatively	
  different	
  type	
  of	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  154	
  (Armitage,	
  1997,	
  p.	
  53)	
  155	
  (Cafruny,	
  1995,	
  p.	
  291)	
  156	
  (Cafruny,	
  1995,	
  p.	
  291)	
  157	
  (Cafruny,	
  1995,	
  p.	
  290)	
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international	
  system,	
  based	
  not	
  only	
  on	
  military	
  prowess,	
  but	
  also	
  on	
  industrial	
  strength	
  and	
  commercial	
  superiority,	
  especially	
  in	
  banking,	
  shipping	
  and	
  shipbuilding.”158	
  	
  During	
  the	
  years	
  in	
  which	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  had	
  dominated	
  the	
  global	
  trade,	
  England	
  and	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  had	
  been	
  in	
  an	
  alliance	
  against	
  the	
  Iberian	
  powers,	
  and	
  so	
  for	
  some	
  time	
  England	
  had	
  supported	
  Dutch	
  arguments	
  against	
  the	
  Papal	
  decrees	
  appointing	
  the	
  unexplored	
  world	
  to	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal.	
  	
  Both	
  England	
  and	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  “plundered	
  the	
  Caribbean	
  waters	
  to	
  their	
  mutual	
  profit,	
  and	
  both	
  prosecuted	
  colonial	
  strategies	
  at	
  the	
  expense	
  of	
  the	
  Iberian	
  powers	
  in	
  South	
  America.	
  Both	
  sought	
  easy	
  profits	
  in	
  the	
  south,	
  while	
  pursuing	
  more	
  elusive	
  empires	
  in	
  the	
  north.”159	
  But	
  by	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Antwerp,	
  the	
  relationship	
  had	
  grown	
  cold	
  and	
  when	
  the	
  Dutch	
  commercial	
  empire	
  gained	
  dominance,	
  “the	
  English	
  government	
  began	
  to	
  chip	
  away	
  at	
  the	
  legal	
  foundations	
  of	
  the	
  Dutch	
  maritime	
  power.	
  In	
  1609	
  it	
  declared	
  that	
  fishing	
  in	
  English	
  waters	
  should	
  be	
  reserved	
  for	
  English	
  vessels.”160	
  This	
  had	
  the	
  effect	
  severely	
  limiting	
  the	
  fish	
  stocks	
  available	
  to	
  Dutch	
  fisherman	
  nearer	
  to	
  home,	
  allowing	
  English	
  fishermen	
  better	
  access	
  to	
  fish	
  stocks	
  and	
  trading.	
  As	
  England	
  had	
  the	
  superior	
  navy,	
  the	
  Dutch	
  were	
  forced	
  to	
  concede.	
  	
  In	
  defence	
  of	
  the	
  English	
  policy	
  restricting	
  foreign	
  activity	
  within	
  ‘English’	
  seas,	
  and	
  as	
  a	
  response	
  to	
  Grotius’	
  Mare	
  Liberum,	
  John	
  Selden	
  penned	
  Mare	
  Clausum161	
  defending	
  of	
  the	
  English	
  position	
  on	
  the	
  dominion	
  of	
  the	
  seas.	
  He	
  says:	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  158	
  (Cafruny,	
  1995,	
  p.	
  290)	
  159	
  (Schmidt,	
  1997,	
  p.	
  549)	
  160	
  (Cafruny,	
  1995,	
  p.	
  292	
  )	
  161	
  	
  Selden’s	
  Mare	
  Clausum,	
  though	
  written	
  in	
  1618	
  at	
  the	
  request	
  of	
  James	
  I,	
  was	
  not	
  published	
  until	
  1635	
  by	
  order	
  of	
  Charles	
  I.	
  James	
  I	
  had	
  worried	
  that	
  the	
  work	
  might	
  “displease	
  the	
  King	
  of	
  Denmark”	
  (Johnson,	
  1962,	
  p.	
  418),	
  while	
  Charles	
  I	
  “was	
  so	
  much	
  impressed	
  by	
  it	
  that	
  he	
  instructed	
  in	
  1619	
  his	
  ambassador	
  in	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  to	
  complain	
  of	
  the	
  audacity	
  of	
  Grotius	
  and	
  to	
  request	
  that	
  the	
  author	
  of	
  Mare	
  Liberum	
  should	
  be	
  punished,”	
  (Oppenheim,	
  1912,	
  p.	
  319).	
  
	
   97	
  
“Dominion,	
  which	
  is	
  the	
  Right	
  of	
  Using,	
  Enjoying,	
  Alienating	
  and	
  free	
  Disposing,	
  is	
  either	
  Common	
  to	
  all	
  men	
  as	
  Possessors	
  without	
  Distinction,	
  or	
  Private	
  and	
  peculiar	
  only	
  to	
  some;	
  that	
  is	
  to	
  say,	
  distributed	
  and	
  set	
  apart	
  by	
  any	
  particular	
  States,	
  Princes,	
  or	
  persons	
  whatsoever,	
  in	
  such	
  a	
  manner	
  that	
  others	
  are	
  excluded,	
  or	
  at	
  least	
  in	
  some	
  form	
  barred	
  from	
  a	
  Libertie	
  of	
  Use	
  and	
  Enjoyment.”162	
  
	
  It	
  is	
  often	
  thought	
  that	
  Selden’s	
  position	
  was	
  advocating	
  the	
  complete	
  antithesis	
  of	
  Grotius’	
  position	
  on	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas,	
  which	
  was	
  an	
  attempt	
  to	
  end	
  Iberian	
  dominance	
  and	
  also	
  to	
  gain	
  access	
  to	
  English	
  fisheries.163	
  	
  However,	
  Selden	
  was	
  arguing	
  “that	
  the	
  sea	
  could	
  be	
  appropriated	
  through	
  law	
  and	
  custom	
  [and	
  that]	
  English	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  territorial	
  waters	
  was	
  based	
  on	
  long	
  and	
  continuous	
  possession.”164	
  England	
  predominately	
  wanted	
  to	
  protect	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  its	
  fishermen	
  in	
  the	
  waters	
  surrounding	
  the	
  British	
  isles,165	
  which	
  coincidentally	
  also	
  happened	
  to	
  be	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  most	
  convenient	
  fishing	
  waters	
  for	
  Dutch	
  fishermen	
  (see	
  Figure	
  5)	
  and	
  	
  “England	
  had	
  never	
  pushed	
  her	
  claims	
  so	
  far	
  as	
  to	
  attempt	
  the	
  prohibition	
  of	
  free	
  navigation	
  on	
  the	
  so-­‐called	
  British	
  Seas.”166	
  By	
  making	
  this	
  claim,	
  England	
  was	
  establishing	
  the	
  principle	
  for	
  territorial	
  waters	
  and	
  rights	
  of	
  exploitation	
  within	
  these	
  waters	
  by	
  claiming	
  all	
  the	
  sea	
  to	
  the	
  adjacent	
  coastlines,	
  as	
  yet	
  “a	
  definite	
  yardstick	
  for	
  measuring	
  the	
  extent	
  of	
  territorial	
  waters	
  had	
  not	
  been	
  found.”167	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  162	
  (Selden,	
  1652,	
  p.	
  16)	
  163	
  (Scott,	
  2008,	
  p.136)	
  164	
  (Scott,	
  2008,	
  p.136)	
  165	
  	
  “Although	
  the	
  English	
  doctrine	
  of	
  the	
  regime	
  of	
  the	
  High	
  Seas	
  has	
  witnessed	
  some	
  fluctuations	
  and	
  contradictions,	
  from	
  Queen	
  Elizabeth	
  I	
  who	
  made	
  herself	
  champion	
  of	
  the	
  "open	
  seas"	
  to	
  the	
  Mare	
  Clausum	
  of	
  Selden	
  (1635)	
  under	
  the	
  high	
  patronage	
  of	
  James	
  I,	
  it	
  must	
  be	
  conceded	
  that	
  once	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  High	
  Seas	
  was	
  affirmed	
  and	
  British	
  naval	
  supremacy	
  assured,	
  Great	
  Britain	
  became	
  the	
  standard	
  bearer	
  for	
  the	
  regulation	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  by	
  the	
  international	
  community,”	
  (Okere,	
  1981,	
  pp.	
  515-­‐16).	
  166	
  (Oppenheim,	
  1912,	
  p.	
  319)	
  167	
  (Columbia	
  Law	
  Review	
  Association,	
  1939,	
  p.	
  320)	
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  Figure	
  5:	
  Selden’s	
  Mare	
  Clausum168	
  	
  	
  From	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Antwerp	
  and	
  during	
  the	
  next	
  half	
  a	
  century	
  “the	
  most	
  violent	
  animosity	
  subsisted	
  between	
  the	
  two	
  nations	
  [England	
  and	
  Holland]”	
  in	
  their	
  competition	
  for	
  trade	
  and	
  fisheries.169	
  Yet	
  this	
  disagreement	
  remained	
  predominately	
  diplomatic	
  in	
  nature.	
  However,	
  in	
  1651,	
  the	
  English	
  Rump	
  Parliament	
  passed	
  the	
  Navigation	
  Acts,170	
  which	
  were	
  “deliberately	
  designed	
  to	
  challenge	
  Dutch	
  shipping”171	
  and	
  generated	
  more	
  animosity	
  by	
  limiting	
  markets	
  for	
  Dutch	
  traders.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Navigation	
  Act	
  stipulated	
  that:	
  	
  	
   “no	
  goods	
  or	
  commodities	
  whatsoever	
  of	
  the	
  growth,	
  production	
  or	
  manufacture	
  of	
  Asia,	
  Africa	
  or	
  America,	
  or	
  of	
  any	
  part	
  thereof;	
  or	
  of	
  any	
  islands	
  belonging	
  to	
  them,	
  or	
  which	
  are	
  described	
  or	
  laid	
  down	
  in	
  the	
  usual	
  maps	
  or	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  168	
  (Selden,	
  1652,	
  p.	
  185)	
  169	
  (Smith,	
  1957,	
  p.	
  407-­‐8)	
  170	
  The	
  Navigation	
  Act	
  1651	
  was	
  passed	
  under	
  Cromwell’s	
  Rump	
  Parliament	
  but	
  the	
  Act	
  was	
  passed	
  again	
  in	
  1660	
  after	
  the	
  Restoration.	
  	
  171	
  (Schmidt,	
  1997,	
  p.	
  550)	
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cards	
  of	
  those	
  places,	
  as	
  well	
  of	
  the	
  English	
  plantations	
  as	
  others,	
  shall	
  be	
  imported	
  or	
  brought	
  into	
  this	
  Commonwealth	
  of	
  England,	
  or	
  into	
  Ireland,	
  or	
  any	
  other	
  lands,	
  islands,	
  plantations,	
  or	
  territories	
  to	
  this	
  Commonwealth	
  belonging,	
  or	
  in	
  their	
  possession,	
  in	
  any	
  other	
  ship	
  or	
  ships,	
  vessel	
  or	
  vessels	
  whatsoever,	
  but	
  only	
  in	
  such	
  as	
  do	
  truly	
  and	
  without	
  fraud	
  belong	
  only	
  to	
  the	
  people	
  of	
  this	
  Commonwealth,	
  or	
  the	
  plantations	
  thereof,	
  as	
  the	
  proprietors	
  or	
  right	
  owners	
  thereof;	
  and	
  whereof	
  the	
  master	
  and	
  mariners	
  are	
  also	
  for	
  the	
  most	
  part	
  of	
  them	
  of	
  the	
  people	
  of	
  this	
  Commonwealth.”172	
  
	
  With	
  the	
  passage	
  of	
  this	
  law,	
  the	
  English	
  effectively	
  eliminated	
  competition	
  for	
  English	
  merchants	
  and	
  shipping	
  companies	
  within	
  any	
  realm	
  of	
  the	
  Commonwealth	
  by	
  “substitut[ing]	
  English	
  shipping	
  for	
  Dutch.”173	
  	
  This	
  was	
  highly	
  successful	
  by	
  taking	
  “the	
  colonial	
  trade	
  from	
  the	
  Dutch,	
  ...depriv[ing]	
  them	
  of	
  being	
  the	
  carriers	
  of	
  Europe,	
  and	
  oblig[ing]	
  [English]	
  merchants	
  to	
  become	
  themselves	
  the	
  carriers	
  for	
  those	
  nations	
  who	
  had	
  no	
  shipping	
  belonging	
  to	
  them”174	
  and	
  at	
  the	
  same	
  time,	
  the	
  Act	
  provided	
  some	
  element	
  of	
  job	
  security	
  for	
  English	
  mariners.	
  The	
  Navigation	
  Act	
  was	
  deemed	
  not	
  only	
  a	
  commercial	
  disadvantage,	
  but	
  also	
  a	
  political	
  slight	
  to	
  their	
  former	
  Dutch	
  allies.175	
  	
  In	
  the	
  half	
  century	
  before	
  the	
  passage	
  of	
  the	
  Navigation	
  Act,	
  the	
  Dutch	
  had	
  acquired	
  their	
  freedom	
  from	
  Spain,	
  gained	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  trade	
  in	
  the	
  East	
  Indies	
  through	
  establishing	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  172	
  (Scobell,	
  1651,	
  p.	
  176)	
  173	
  (Farnell,	
  1964,	
  p.	
  447)	
  174	
  (Holt,	
  1824,	
  p.	
  79)	
  	
  175	
  (Holt,	
  1824,	
  p.	
  74)	
  (Farnell,	
  1964,	
  p.	
  449)	
  There	
  is	
  a	
  “dispute	
  among	
  historians	
  about	
  the	
  relationship	
  which	
  exists	
  between	
  the	
  passage	
  of	
  that	
  law	
  and	
  the	
  commencement	
  of	
  the	
  First	
  Dutch	
  War.	
  The	
  standard	
  textbook	
  accounts	
  assume	
  a	
  causal	
  connexion	
  between	
  the	
  Act	
  and	
  the	
  war	
  and	
  that	
  the	
  issues	
  were	
  mercantile	
  in	
  character.	
  Samuel	
  R.	
  Gardiner,	
  however,	
  held	
  that	
  the	
  cause	
  of	
  the	
  Dutch	
  War	
  was	
  not	
  directly	
  related	
  to	
  trade	
  but	
  to	
  national	
  pride	
  and	
  the	
  old	
  power	
  dispute	
  revolving	
  around	
  the	
  issue	
  of	
  Mare	
  Clausum,”	
  (Farnell,	
  1964,	
  pp.	
  439-­‐40).	
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seas	
  and	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  effective	
  occupation	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  claim	
  territorial	
  supremacy	
  only	
  to	
  be	
  faced	
  with	
  their	
  former	
  ally	
  whittling	
  away	
  at	
  the	
  fisheries	
  it	
  used	
  and	
  its	
  other	
  commercial	
  and	
  shipping	
  opportunities.	
  “The	
  Navigation	
  Act	
  of	
  1651,	
  in	
  conjunction	
  with	
  related	
  acts,	
  constituted	
  a	
  grave	
  provocation	
  to	
  the	
  Dutch,	
  showing	
  that	
  England	
  was	
  determined	
  to	
  curb	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  as	
  an	
  economic	
  and	
  military	
  rival.”176	
  As	
  a	
  result,	
  the	
  Dutch	
  declared	
  war	
  against	
  England	
  in	
  1652.	
  The	
  first	
  Anglo-­‐Dutch	
  war	
  was	
  fought	
  entirely	
  at	
  sea	
  which	
  resulted	
  in	
  victory	
  for	
  England	
  as	
  the	
  dominant	
  naval	
  power,	
  and	
  then	
  “two	
  additional	
  wars	
  (1665-­‐7;	
  1672-­‐4),	
  both	
  won	
  by	
  England,	
  hastened	
  the	
  decline	
  of	
  Dutch	
  power	
  as	
  England	
  then	
  further	
  tightened	
  the	
  restrictions	
  on	
  open	
  seas.”177	
  Each	
  of	
  these	
  developments	
  contributed	
  to	
  the	
  predominance	
  of	
  England	
  as	
  a	
  dominant	
  imperial	
  power,	
  and	
  the	
  Anglo-­‐Dutch	
  rivalry	
  formally	
  ended	
  ten	
  days	
  after	
  the	
  marriage	
  of	
  William	
  and	
  Mary	
  of	
  Orange	
  in	
  1677,	
  when	
  terms	
  of	
  a	
  peace	
  treaty	
  were	
  revealed	
  and	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  became	
  the	
  peripheral	
  power.178	
  	
  The	
  effects	
  of	
  the	
  Navigation	
  Act	
  and	
  its	
  subsequent	
  versions	
  reached	
  far	
  wider	
  than	
  ending	
  commercial	
  rivalry	
  between	
  the	
  English	
  and	
  the	
  Dutch.	
  	
  In	
  1607,	
  the	
  Virginia	
  Trading	
  Company	
  was	
  chartered	
  and	
  England	
  began	
  establishing	
  colonies	
  in	
  the	
  Americas.	
  The	
  early	
  Navigation	
  Acts	
  were	
  probably	
  advantageous	
  to	
  the	
  colonies	
  as	
  they	
  eliminated	
  competition	
  for	
  the	
  fledgling	
  economy,	
  but	
  in	
  time,	
  they	
  “represented	
  a	
  noticeable	
  burden	
  on	
  the	
  colonial	
  economy.”179	
  In	
  time,	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  British	
  North	
  American	
  colonies	
  would	
  secede	
  as	
  the	
  Navigation	
  Acts,	
  along	
  with	
  a	
  plethora	
  of	
  additional	
  taxation	
  vehicles	
  “imposed	
  substantial	
  burdens	
  on	
  key	
  actors	
  in	
  the	
  revolutionary	
  struggle,	
  and	
  that	
  these	
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  (Cafruny,	
  1995,	
  p.	
  293)	
  177	
  (Cafruny,	
  1995,	
  p.	
  293)	
  178	
  (Grose,	
  1924,	
  p.	
  350)	
  179	
  (Ransom,	
  1968,	
  p.	
  434)	
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burdens	
  played	
  an	
  important	
  role	
  in	
  motivating	
  them	
  to	
  rebel.”180	
  But	
  in	
  spite	
  of	
  the	
  eventual	
  loss	
  of	
  these	
  North	
  American	
  colonies,	
  England	
  still	
  considered	
  the	
  policies	
  as	
  advantageous	
  to	
  their	
  commercial	
  prosperity	
  and	
  were	
  “universally	
  regarded	
  as	
  among	
  the	
  chief	
  causes	
  and	
  most	
  important	
  bulwarks	
  of	
  their	
  prosperity”181	
  through	
  	
  “discriminate[ing]	
  equally,	
  with	
  slight	
  exception,	
  against	
  the	
  merchant	
  marine	
  of	
  every	
  foreign	
  power.”182	
  The	
  Acts	
  continued	
  as	
  a	
  protectionist	
  policy	
  for	
  English	
  trade	
  and	
  commerce	
  until	
  they	
  were	
  repealed	
  in	
  1854.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Navigation	
  Act	
  of	
  1651	
  can	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  an	
  early	
  attempt	
  to	
  codify	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  territorial	
  waters,	
  an	
  area	
  understood	
  in	
  the	
  contemporary	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  to	
  have	
  rights	
  of	
  exploitation	
  of	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  coastal	
  state	
  and	
  the	
  rights	
  of	
  territorial	
  defence.	
  However,	
  England’s	
  domination	
  of	
  the	
  whole	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Sea	
  would	
  become	
  untenable	
  in	
  international	
  law.	
  Coastal	
  states	
  have	
  equal	
  rights	
  along	
  any	
  body	
  of	
  water	
  and	
  for	
  several	
  centuries,	
  the	
  accepted	
  breadth	
  of	
  territorial	
  waters	
  was	
  limited	
  to	
  the	
  three	
  mile	
  range	
  of	
  cannons,	
  which	
  is	
  the	
  distance	
  a	
  military	
  could	
  reasonably	
  expect	
  to	
  defend.	
  	
  Representing	
  the	
  ideas	
  of	
  the	
  age	
  of	
  mercantilism,	
  the	
  Act	
  held	
  that	
  “gains	
  from	
  international	
  trade	
  arose	
  solely	
  from	
  exporting	
  and	
  that	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  these	
  gains	
  made	
  international	
  trade	
  equivalent	
  to	
  a	
  zero-­‐sum	
  game”183	
  and	
  that	
  “extensive	
  government	
  regulation	
  of	
  international	
  trade	
  to	
  ensure	
  that	
  these	
  gains	
  accrued	
  to	
  one's	
  own	
  country.”184	
  Though	
  the	
  protectionist	
  policies	
  of	
  the	
  English	
  government	
  would	
  continue	
  for	
  several	
  centuries,	
  in	
  an	
  era	
  of	
  absolute	
  globalised	
  commercial	
  networks,	
  protectionist	
  policies	
  are	
  now	
  discouraged	
  as	
  a	
  means	
  of	
  protecting	
  a	
  local	
  market.	
  The	
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  (Sawers,	
  1992,	
  p.	
  262)	
  181	
  (Hodges,	
  1892,	
  p.	
  217)	
  182	
  (McGovney,	
  1904,	
  p.	
  725)	
  	
  183	
  (Irwin,	
  1991,	
  p.	
  1296-­‐7)	
  184	
  (Irwin,	
  1991,	
  p.	
  1296-­‐7)	
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destruction	
  that	
  the	
  Navigation	
  Acts	
  had	
  on	
  the	
  economies	
  of	
  neighbouring	
  European	
  countries	
  is	
  demonstrative	
  of	
  the	
  damaging	
  effects	
  protectionist	
  policies	
  can	
  have	
  on	
  expanding	
  economies	
  in	
  a	
  global	
  marketplace.	
  	
  The	
  Rules	
  of	
  Territorial	
  Expansion	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  movement	
  of	
  European	
  explorers	
  searching	
  for	
  a	
  new	
  route	
  to	
  Asia	
  and	
  the	
  Indies	
  by	
  sailing	
  West	
  set	
  in	
  motion	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  laws	
  regulating	
  the	
  processes	
  of	
  territorial	
  expansion.	
  Columbus	
  never	
  truly	
  discovered	
  the	
  New	
  World,	
  as	
  “actually	
  millions	
  of	
  human	
  beings	
  were	
  already	
  living	
  full	
  and	
  imaginative	
  lives	
  on	
  the	
  continent	
  in	
  1492.	
  That	
  was	
  simply	
  the	
  year	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  sea	
  pirates	
  began	
  to	
  cheat	
  and	
  rob	
  and	
  kill	
  them.”185	
  The	
  implication	
  of	
  discovery	
  was	
  in	
  actuality	
  to	
  determine	
  which	
  European	
  was	
  first	
  to	
  sight	
  a	
  new	
  territory,	
  the	
  first	
  step	
  in	
  the	
  developing	
  rules	
  of	
  procedure	
  for	
  the	
  annexation	
  of	
  new	
  and	
  formerly	
  ‘undiscovered’	
  territory	
  by	
  European	
  empires.	
  The	
  traditions	
  established	
  during	
  this	
  period	
  that	
  developed	
  into	
  customary	
  international	
  law	
  have	
  provided	
  the	
  still	
  existing	
  standards	
  for	
  the	
  acquisition	
  of	
  territory,	
  though	
  now	
  all	
  lands,	
  discovered	
  or	
  undiscovered	
  are	
  in	
  some	
  way	
  claimed	
  by	
  contemporary	
  states.	
  	
  	
  New	
  land	
  was	
  often	
  claimed	
  by	
  explorers	
  on	
  official	
  missions	
  for	
  European	
  sovereigns	
  charged	
  with	
  expanding	
  state	
  territory	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  acquire	
  resources	
  or	
  access	
  sea	
  routes.	
  To	
  establish	
  claims	
  and	
  to	
  leave	
  a	
  trace	
  for	
  those	
  who	
  might	
  eventually	
  find	
  the	
  same	
  territory,	
  symbolic	
  mementos,	
  such	
  as	
  national	
  flags	
  or	
  plaques	
  were	
  left	
  to	
  inform	
  others	
  the	
  land	
  was	
  no	
  longer	
  available	
  for	
  appropriation.	
  Symbolic	
  acts	
  “may	
  be	
  interpreted	
  also	
  as	
  a	
  device	
  to	
  show	
  to	
  the	
  world	
  that	
  an	
  inchoate	
  title	
  to	
  the	
  discovered	
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  (Vonnegut,	
  1973,	
  p.	
  10)	
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region	
  was	
  acquired	
  which	
  rendered	
  it	
  terra	
  prohibita	
  as	
  far	
  as	
  other	
  States	
  were	
  concerned.”186	
  It	
  is	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  these	
  symbolic	
  acts	
  into	
  contemporary	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  that	
  has	
  often	
  caused	
  great	
  consternation,	
  even	
  though	
  they	
  currently	
  have	
  no	
  standing	
  within	
  international	
  law.	
  	
  	
  Symbolic	
  acts	
  varied	
  greatly	
  in	
  practice	
  from	
  state	
  to	
  state.	
  The	
  Spanish	
  were	
  fond	
  of	
  unfurling	
  flags	
  while	
  Russian	
  practice	
  included	
  the	
  burial	
  of	
  copper	
  plates	
  with	
  the	
  inscription	
  Russia	
  
Imperial	
  Territory	
  over	
  which	
  a	
  cross	
  was	
  erected.	
  Peary	
  understood	
  the	
  necessity	
  of	
  symbolic	
  acts	
  accompanying	
  claim	
  to	
  discovery,	
  and	
  upon	
  his	
  arrival	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  in	
  1909	
  also	
  executed	
  symbolic	
  acts	
  to	
  indicate	
  that	
  he	
  was	
  first	
  to	
  acquire	
  the	
  pole.	
  Peary	
  says	
  “my	
  flag	
  was	
  displayed,	
  and	
  photographs	
  taken	
  of	
  it	
  and	
  the	
  party,”	
  even	
  though	
  he	
  admitted	
  that	
  “careful	
  examination	
  of	
  the	
  horizon	
  in	
  every	
  direction	
  with	
  a	
  telescope	
  showed	
  no	
  indication	
  of	
  land.”187	
  The	
  importance	
  of	
  symbolic	
  acts	
  in	
  claiming	
  territory	
  and	
  its	
  universal	
  recognition	
  as	
  the	
  first	
  step	
  to	
  sovereign	
  control	
  of	
  an	
  area	
  is	
  significant	
  when	
  considering	
  the	
  Russian	
  act	
  in	
  2007	
  to	
  place	
  a	
  titanium	
  Russian	
  flag	
  on	
  the	
  seabed	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  symbolically	
  claiming	
  the	
  territory	
  beneath	
  the	
  surface	
  of	
  the	
  sea.	
  	
  	
  Initially,	
  claim	
  to	
  territory	
  through	
  symbolic	
  annexation	
  was	
  sufficient	
  to	
  maintain	
  title	
  without	
  expiration.	
  Queen	
  Elizabeth	
  I	
  verified	
  this	
  fact	
  through	
  admission	
  of	
  error	
  after	
  she	
  attempted	
  to	
  take	
  possession	
  of	
  Florida,	
  with	
  Spain	
  notifying	
  her	
  that	
  it	
  had	
  been	
  possessed	
  for	
  some	
  time.	
  Even	
  though	
  the	
  Queen	
  may	
  have	
  conceded	
  for	
  political	
  reasons	
  “the	
  legal	
  force	
  of	
  this	
  admission	
  cannot	
  be	
  vitiated	
  by	
  the	
  consideration	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  probably	
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  (Heydte,	
  1935,	
  p.	
  454)	
  187	
  (Peary	
  &	
  Harris,	
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  p.	
  138)	
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dictated	
  by	
  political	
  motives;	
  the	
  question	
  was	
  a	
  legal	
  one.”188	
  In	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Alaska,	
  Behring	
  “left	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  articles,	
  consisting	
  of	
  beads,	
  an	
  iron	
  kettle,	
  and	
  some	
  coins,	
  as	
  evidence	
  of	
  his	
  presence	
  there,”	
  and	
  this	
  was	
  sufficient	
  evidence	
  of	
  Russian	
  ownership	
  when	
  Cook	
  explored	
  the	
  region	
  in	
  1778.189	
  However,	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  developed	
  so	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  necessary	
  for	
  symbolic	
  annexation	
  to	
  be	
  followed	
  by	
  effective	
  occupation.	
  Discovery	
  and	
  symbolic	
  acts	
  granted	
  only	
  initial	
  rights	
  and	
  a	
  rudimentary,	
  albeit	
  worthless	
  title	
  and	
  “the	
  inchoate	
  title	
  finally	
  perishes	
  unless	
  it	
  is	
  followed	
  and	
  perfected	
  by	
  effective	
  possession	
  in	
  a	
  reasonable	
  time.”190	
  Symbolic	
  declaration	
  had	
  to	
  eventually	
  be	
  followed	
  by	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  territory	
  and	
  extension	
  of	
  government	
  administration.	
  	
  	
  Discovery	
  and	
  symbolic	
  acts	
  were	
  established	
  in	
  international	
  custom	
  as	
  the	
  first	
  two	
  elements	
  of	
  claiming	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  new	
  lands,	
  but	
  this	
  had	
  to	
  be	
  followed	
  by	
  effective	
  control	
  “imply[ing]	
  continuous	
  administration	
  and	
  effective	
  occupying	
  of	
  the	
  land;	
  ideally,	
  the	
  territory	
  should	
  be	
  settled	
  throughout	
  and	
  the	
  natural	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  area	
  should	
  be	
  developed	
  and	
  used.”191	
  Historically	
  this	
  was	
  demonstrated	
  in	
  the	
  New	
  World	
  through	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  trading	
  companies,	
  colonies	
  and	
  the	
  administration	
  of	
  governors	
  with	
  authority	
  granted	
  through	
  charters	
  issued	
  by	
  European	
  monarchs.	
  However,	
  effectiveness	
  has	
  variable	
  definitions	
  as	
  “the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  territory	
  affects	
  the	
  degree	
  of	
  sovereign	
  activity	
  needed	
  to	
  establish	
  effective	
  control.”192	
  In	
  the	
  Arctic	
  there	
  are	
  limited	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  to	
  which	
  government	
  administration	
  can	
  be	
  applied	
  and	
  the	
  rest	
  of	
  the	
  land	
  is	
  a	
  frozen	
  and	
  empty	
  expanse.	
  The	
  remainder	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  is	
  assorted	
  ocean	
  spaces,	
  which	
  currently	
  fall	
  under	
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  (Keller	
  et	
  al.,	
  1938,	
  p.	
  47)	
  189	
  (Keller	
  et	
  al.,	
  1938,	
  p.	
  144)	
  190	
  (Heydte,	
  1935,	
  p.	
  454)	
  191	
  (Burghardt,	
  1973,	
  p.229)	
  192	
  (Burghardt,	
  1973,	
  p.228)	
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the	
  jurisdictional	
  areas	
  of	
  territorial	
  waters,	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zones,	
  and	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  regime.	
  Even	
  though	
  the	
  entire	
  world	
  is	
  claimed	
  under	
  the	
  sovereign	
  control	
  of	
  states,	
  demonstration	
  of	
  effective	
  control	
  and	
  occupation	
  still	
  finds	
  its	
  way	
  into	
  contemporary	
  policy	
  documents.	
  	
  As	
  the	
  Iberian	
  claims	
  to	
  ownership	
  of	
  the	
  entire	
  New	
  World	
  disintegrated,	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  became	
  standard	
  practice	
  for	
  states	
  seeking	
  to	
  expand	
  their	
  territory	
  outside	
  of	
  Europe.	
  Thus,	
  when	
  Henry	
  Hudson	
  was	
  attempting	
  to	
  find	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Passage	
  and	
  a	
  route	
  to	
  China	
  for	
  England	
  in	
  1611,	
  he	
  discovered	
  and	
  claimed	
  the	
  bay	
  in	
  contemporary	
  Canada	
  that	
  still	
  bears	
  his	
  name	
  (and	
  the	
  place	
  where	
  he	
  is	
  ultimately	
  suspected	
  to	
  have	
  died	
  following	
  a	
  mutiny	
  and	
  then	
  being	
  set	
  adrift	
  in	
  a	
  small	
  boat	
  with	
  some	
  meagre	
  supplies).193	
  The	
  discovery	
  of	
  Hudson	
  Bay	
  was	
  followed	
  by	
  further	
  expeditions	
  sponsored	
  by	
  England	
  to	
  explore	
  the	
  region	
  and	
  then	
  to	
  fulfil	
  the	
  expectations	
  of	
  effective	
  occupation,	
  	
  “his	
  majesty	
  for	
  the	
  better	
  promoting	
  their	
  endeavours	
  for	
  the	
  good	
  of	
  his	
  people,	
  was	
  pleased	
  to	
  confer	
  on	
  them	
  exclusively	
  all	
  the	
  lands	
  and	
  territories	
  in	
  Hudson’s	
  Bay,	
  together	
  with	
  all	
  the	
  trade	
  thereof...	
  .”194	
  	
  	
  The	
  charter	
  of	
  the	
  Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  Company,	
  established	
  in	
  1670	
  by	
  Charles	
  II	
  reads:	
  	
  	
   “AND	
  WHEREAS	
  the	
  said	
  undertakers	
  for	
  theire	
  further	
  encouragement	
  in	
  the	
  said	
  designe	
  have	
  humbly	
  besought	
  us	
  to	
  Incorporate	
  them	
  and	
  grant	
  unto	
  them	
  and	
  theire	
  successors	
  the	
  sole	
  Trade	
  and	
  Commerce	
  of	
  all	
  those	
  Seas	
  Streightes	
  Bayes	
  Rivers	
  Lakes	
  Creekes	
  and	
  Soundes	
  in	
  whatsoever	
  Latitude	
  they	
  shall	
  bee	
  that	
  lye	
  within	
  the	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  193	
  (Asher,	
  1860)	
  	
  194	
  (Light,	
  1836,	
  p.	
  63)	
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entrance	
  of	
  the	
  Streightes	
  commonly	
  called	
  Hudsons	
  Streightes	
  together	
  with	
  all	
  the	
  Landes	
  Countryes	
  and	
  Territoryes	
  upon	
  the	
  Coastes	
  and	
  Confynes	
  of	
  the	
  Seas	
  Streightes	
  Bayes	
  Lakes	
  Rivers	
  Creekes	
  and	
  Soundes	
  aforesaid	
  which	
  are	
  not	
  now	
  actually	
  possessed	
  by	
  any	
  of	
  our	
  Subjectes	
  or	
  by	
  the	
  Subjectes	
  of	
  any	
  other	
  Christian	
  Prince	
  or	
  State...the	
  Governor	
  and	
  Company	
  of	
  	
  Adventurers	
  of	
  England	
  tradeing	
  into	
  Hudsons	
  Bay	
  one	
  Body	
  Corporate	
  and	
  Politique	
  in	
  deede	
  and	
  in	
  name	
  really	
  and	
  fully	
  forever	
  for	
  us	
  our	
  heirs	
  and	
  successors,”195	
  (See	
  Figure	
  6).	
  	
  	
  
	
  	
  Figure	
  6:	
  Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  circa	
  1700196	
  	
  While	
  the	
  language	
  of	
  the	
  old	
  English	
  charter	
  is	
  at	
  first	
  opaque,	
  this	
  charter	
  contains	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  significant	
  points.	
  First,	
  the	
  transfer	
  of	
  title	
  from	
  Charles	
  II	
  to	
  Prince	
  Rupert	
  and	
  his	
  partners	
  demonstrates	
  the	
  belief	
  that	
  European	
  sovereigns	
  assumed	
  	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  acquire	
  new	
  territory,	
  	
  even	
  though	
  it	
  was	
  already	
  inhabited.	
  Second,	
  the	
  charter	
  indicates	
  that	
  the	
  Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  195	
  (Hudson's	
  Bay	
  Company,	
  1949)	
  196	
  (Thornton,	
  1700)	
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Company	
  would	
  pass	
  to	
  the	
  heirs	
  and	
  descendants	
  of	
  the	
  original	
  recipients	
  for	
  purposes	
  of	
  exploitation,	
  indicating	
  perpetual	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  land	
  and	
  thus	
  exemption	
  by	
  other	
  states	
  for	
  appropriation.	
  The	
  charter	
  also	
  established	
  the	
  Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  Company	
  as	
  a	
  ‘body	
  corporate	
  and	
  politic	
  forever’,	
  giving	
  the	
  Company	
  powers	
  normally	
  associated	
  with	
  the	
  state	
  as	
  also	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  charters	
  of	
  the	
  East	
  India	
  Companies	
  of	
  both	
  England	
  and	
  the	
  Netherlands.197	
  Finally,	
  the	
  charter	
  gives	
  to	
  the	
  Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  Company	
  all	
  lands,	
  regardless	
  of	
  their	
  latitude	
  or	
  longitude,	
  in	
  the	
  entire	
  watershed	
  of	
  all	
  waters	
  that	
  terminated	
  in	
  the	
  Hudson	
  Bay.	
  With	
  this	
  transfer	
  of	
  Rupert’s	
  Land,	
  the	
  company	
  became	
  the	
  largest	
  private	
  landowner	
  on	
  earth,	
  owning	
  an	
  estimated	
  15%	
  of	
  land	
  in	
  North	
  America.198	
  	
  	
  The	
  Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  Company	
  began	
  capitalising	
  on	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  territory	
  by	
  trapping	
  and	
  trading	
  in	
  furs	
  in	
  this	
  remote	
  region	
  of	
  the	
  world,	
  which	
  were	
  ultimately	
  bound	
  for	
  European	
  markets	
  until	
  the	
  conflicts	
  of	
  Europe	
  found	
  their	
  way	
  into	
  the	
  New	
  World.	
  These	
  conflicts	
  migrated	
  due	
  to	
  a	
  fundamental	
  change	
  in	
  European	
  interests	
  transitioning	
  away	
  from	
  exploration	
  to	
  “a	
  new	
  wave	
  of	
  self-­‐conscious	
  settlement	
  overseas”	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  ideas	
  of	
  mercantilism	
  accelerating	
  colonial	
  rivalries.199	
  France	
  dominated	
  the	
  political	
  affairs	
  of	
  Europe	
  with	
  “unbounded	
  French	
  ambitions	
  for	
  territory	
  and	
  for	
  glory.”200	
  This	
  interest	
  extended	
  to	
  Canada,	
  which	
  was	
  extremely	
  economically	
  successful	
  due	
  the	
  positive	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  relationship	
  French	
  tradesmen	
  and	
  fur	
  trappers	
  maintained	
  with	
  Native	
  Americans.	
  	
  So	
  “by	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  17th	
  century,	
  French	
  ‘lands’	
  virtually	
  encircled	
  the	
  English”	
  jeopardising	
  English	
  possession	
  of	
  Rupert’s	
  Land	
  and	
  the	
  Hudson	
  Bay.201	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  197	
  (Hudson's	
  Bay	
  Company,	
  1949)	
  198	
  (Feldman	
  &	
  Golberg,	
  1987,	
  p.	
  37)	
  	
  199	
  (Rosner	
  &	
  Theibault,	
  2000,	
  pp.	
  189-­‐90)	
  200	
  (Pennington,	
  1989,	
  p.	
  509)	
  201	
  (Rosner	
  &	
  Theibault,	
  2000,	
  p.	
  199)	
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Following	
  a	
  temporary	
  loss	
  of	
  territory,	
  the	
  Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  Company,	
  through	
  the	
  leverage	
  of	
  the	
  British	
  crown,	
  managed	
  to	
  reclaim	
  their	
  possession	
  of	
  Rupert’s	
  Land	
  in	
  a	
  treaty	
  between	
  France	
  and	
  England	
  in	
  the	
  Peace	
  of	
  Utrecht	
  1713	
  which	
  states:	
  	
   “The	
  said	
  Most	
  Christian	
  King	
  shall	
  restore	
  to	
  the	
  Kingdom	
  and	
  Queen	
  of	
  Great	
  Britain,	
  to	
  be	
  possess’d	
  in	
  full	
  Right	
  for	
  ever,	
  the	
  Bay	
  and	
  Streights	
  of	
  Hudson,	
  together	
  with	
  all	
  Lands,	
  Seas,	
  Sea-­‐Coasts,	
  Rivers	
  and	
  Places	
  situate	
  in	
  the	
  said	
  Bay	
  and	
  Streights,	
  and	
  which	
  belong	
  thereto,	
  no	
  Tracts	
  of	
  Land	
  or	
  Sea	
  being	
  excepted,	
  which	
  are	
  a	
  present	
  possess’d	
  by	
  the	
  Subjects	
  of	
  France.”202	
  	
  The	
  Peace	
  of	
  Utrecht	
  1713	
  formally	
  ends	
  the	
  era	
  of	
  France’s	
  predominance	
  in	
  both	
  the	
  New	
  World	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  Old,	
  securing	
  British	
  claims	
  in	
  North	
  America.	
  Yet	
  despite	
  the	
  Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  being	
  discovered	
  by	
  England	
  and	
  utilised	
  by	
  the	
  Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  Company,	
  history	
  tends	
  to	
  imply	
  the	
  results	
  of	
  the	
  treaty	
  simply	
  as	
  territorial	
  gains	
  for	
  Britain	
  with	
  the	
  “Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  in	
  North	
  America...	
  [being]	
  taken	
  from	
  France.”203	
  However,	
  the	
  treaty	
  actually	
  reaffirms	
  the	
  customs	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  regarding	
  the	
  acquisition	
  of	
  territory	
  as	
  Britain	
  succeeded	
  in	
  placing	
  the	
  word	
  “restore”	
  in	
  the	
  terms	
  of	
  the	
  treaty,	
  causing	
  France	
  to	
  acknowledge	
  that	
  it	
  had	
  overstepped	
  its	
  bounds	
  in	
  allowing	
  its	
  traders	
  and	
  trappers	
  to	
  encroach	
  into	
  Rupert’s	
  Land.	
  	
  	
  Despite	
  the	
  decline	
  of	
  French	
  prowess	
  in	
  the	
  New	
  World,	
  this	
  was	
  not	
  the	
  final	
  conflict	
  over	
  access	
  to	
  resources	
  in	
  the	
  New	
  World	
  between	
  the	
  two	
  states.	
  In	
  1754	
  hostilities	
  would	
  begin	
  in	
  the	
  ‘French	
  and	
  Indian	
  War’,	
  which	
  finally	
  culminated	
  in	
  the	
  complete	
  surrender	
  of	
  French	
  territories	
  to	
  Great	
  Britain	
  under	
  terms	
  of	
  the	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  202	
  (Tyrrell,	
  1931,	
  p.	
  409)	
  203	
  (Sturdy,	
  2002,	
  p.363)	
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Treaty	
  of	
  Paris	
  1763,	
  leaving	
  only	
  Great	
  Britain,	
  Spain	
  and	
  Russia	
  with	
  territorial	
  claims	
  in	
  North	
  America.204	
  	
  Yet	
  Britain’s	
  possessions	
  in	
  the	
  New	
  World	
  would	
  see	
  further	
  fluctuations.	
  	
  In	
  1776,	
  the	
  War	
  for	
  Independence	
  by	
  Britain’s	
  thirteen	
  original	
  colonies	
  began,	
  eventually	
  culminating	
  in	
  the	
  
Treaty	
  of	
  Paris	
  1783,	
  where	
  the	
  British	
  Crown	
  acknowledged	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  these	
  colonies	
  “to	
  be	
  free	
  sovereign	
  and	
  independent	
  states...	
  [and]	
  relinquishes	
  all	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  government,	
  propriety,	
  and	
  territorial	
  rights	
  of	
  the	
  same	
  and	
  every	
  part	
  thereof.”205	
  	
  Great	
  Britain	
  was	
  effectively	
  left	
  only	
  with	
  the	
  possession	
  of	
  the	
  territories	
  it	
  received	
  from	
  France	
  and	
  Rupert’s	
  Land.	
  	
  	
  The	
  actual	
  extent	
  of	
  British	
  territories	
  in	
  North	
  America	
  would	
  remain	
  largely	
  unchanged	
  for	
  almost	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  next	
  century,	
  with	
  exception	
  of	
  the	
  boundary	
  between	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Canada	
  being	
  established	
  by	
  treaty	
  at	
  the	
  49th	
  parallel	
  in	
  Convention	
  of	
  
1818	
  and	
  the	
  delimitation	
  line	
  between	
  Russian	
  Alaska	
  and	
  the	
  British	
  Canadian	
  territories	
  also	
  being	
  determined	
  by	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  
St.	
  Petersburg	
  in	
  1825.	
  From	
  lessons	
  learned	
  in	
  the	
  tenuous	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  American	
  colonies,	
  Great	
  Britain’s	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  British	
  subjects	
  in	
  Canada	
  was	
  significantly	
  more	
  convivial,	
  though	
  this	
  has	
  also	
  been	
  regarded	
  as	
  appreciation	
  for	
  their	
  devotedness	
  of	
  these	
  early	
  Canadians	
  to	
  the	
  British	
  Crown	
  as	
  they	
  “resisted	
  with	
  fidelity	
  every	
  attempt	
  to	
  seduce	
  them	
  from	
  their	
  new	
  allegiance.”206	
  Over	
  the	
  next	
  century,	
  the	
  British	
  Crown	
  would	
  establish	
  a	
  representative	
  government	
  in	
  Canada	
  and	
  created	
  of	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada	
  as	
  political	
  entity	
  in	
  1867,	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  204	
  	
  In	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Paris	
  1763	
  Great	
  Britain	
  returned	
  to	
  France	
  the	
  tiny	
  archipelago	
  islands	
  of	
  Saint	
  Pierre	
  and	
  Miquelon,	
  located	
  off	
  the	
  coast	
  of	
  Newfoundland	
  as	
  to	
  shelter	
  French	
  fisherman,	
  over	
  which	
  France	
  retains	
  sovereignty	
  to	
  this	
  day.	
  205	
  (Treaty	
  of	
  Paris	
  1783,	
  1783)	
  206	
  (Bouchette,	
  1831,	
  p.	
  vi)	
  (Sumner,	
  1867)	
  The	
  reference	
  to	
  ‘new	
  allegiance’	
  is	
  to	
  remind	
  that	
  possession	
  of	
  a	
  significant	
  portion	
  of	
  Canadian	
  territory	
  had	
  passed	
  from	
  France	
  to	
  Britain	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Paris	
  1763.	
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though	
  Canada	
  remained	
  without	
  sovereignty	
  until	
  the	
  twentieth	
  century.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  year	
  of	
  1867	
  was	
  a	
  pivotal	
  date	
  for	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations.	
  	
  Firstly,	
  Russia	
  sold	
  its	
  North	
  American	
  possession	
  in	
  Alaska	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  secondly,	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada	
  established	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  main	
  political	
  entities	
  currently	
  holding	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  Arctic	
  territory	
  in	
  North	
  America.	
  From	
  this	
  point,	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada	
  would	
  incrementally	
  acquire	
  additional	
  British	
  territories,	
  slowly	
  changing	
  the	
  shape	
  of	
  future	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty,	
  as	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  transferred	
  from	
  British	
  control	
  to	
  Canadian	
  control	
  in	
  the	
  1870	
  transfer	
  of	
  the	
  land	
  of	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Territories,	
  Rupert’s	
  Land	
  and	
  the	
  1880	
  the	
  transfer	
  of	
  British	
  Arctic	
  islands,	
  (See	
  Figure	
  7).	
  However,	
  not	
  all	
  ‘Canadian	
  Arctic’	
  territories	
  included	
  in	
  this	
  transfer	
  belonged	
  to	
  Great	
  Britain	
  and	
  this	
  would	
  create	
  a	
  legacy	
  of	
  uncertainty	
  for	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  future	
  international	
  affairs.	
  	
  	
  While	
  European	
  powers	
  were	
  discovering,	
  exploring	
  and	
  occupying	
  the	
  Western	
  hemisphere	
  around	
  the	
  Atlantic,	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  was	
  annexing	
  Siberia	
  and	
  the	
  Russian	
  Czar	
  Peter	
  the	
  Great	
  was	
  “curious	
  to	
  know	
  if	
  Asia	
  and	
  America	
  were	
  separated	
  by	
  the	
  sea,	
  or	
  if	
  they	
  constituted	
  one	
  undivided	
  body	
  with	
  different	
  names.”207	
  	
  So	
  on	
  behalf	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  government,	
  in	
  1728	
  Vitus	
  Behring	
  discovered	
  St.	
  Lawrence	
  Island	
  and	
  in	
  1730	
  reached	
  the	
  Bering	
  Strait,	
  which	
  connects	
  the	
  Pacific	
  Ocean	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean.	
  This	
  expedition,	
  followed	
  by	
  several	
  others,	
  gave	
  “the	
  title	
  of	
  Russia	
  to	
  all	
  these	
  possessions...derived	
  from	
  prior	
  discovery	
  which	
  is	
  the	
  admitted	
  title	
  by	
  which	
  all	
  European	
  Powers	
  have	
  held	
  in	
  North	
  and	
  South	
  America...	
  .”208	
  And	
  so	
  the	
  story	
  of	
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  (Sumner,	
  1867,	
  p.	
  4)	
  208	
  	
  (Sumner,	
  1867,	
  p.	
  4)	
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sovereignty	
  of	
  Alaska	
  follows	
  in	
  a	
  parallel	
  development	
  through	
  imperial	
  practices	
  to	
  that	
  of	
  the	
  British	
  Arctic	
  territories	
  throughout	
  North	
  America.	
  	
  	
  In	
  order	
  to	
  maintain	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  their	
  North	
  American	
  possessions,	
  the	
  Russian-­‐American	
  Company	
  received	
  a	
  charter	
  from	
  the	
  Russian	
  government	
  to	
  carry	
  out	
  this	
  duty	
  by	
  proxy.	
  “By	
  this	
  instrument	
  it	
  was	
  recited	
  that	
  the	
  Emperor,	
  in	
  view	
  of	
  the	
  ‘benefits	
  and	
  advantages’	
  resulting	
  to	
  his	
  Empire	
  from	
  the	
  ‘hunting	
  and	
  trading’	
  carried	
  on	
  by	
  Russian	
  subjects	
  ‘in	
  the	
  northeastern	
  seas	
  and	
  along	
  the	
  coasts	
  of	
  America’,	
  had	
  taken	
  the	
  company,	
  which	
  was	
  ‘organized	
  for	
  the	
  above-­‐named	
  purpose	
  of	
  carrying	
  on	
  hunting	
  and	
  trading’,	
  under	
  his	
  immediate	
  and	
  ‘highest’	
  protection.”209	
  To	
  the	
  Russian	
  American	
  company	
  was	
  granted	
  all	
  rights	
  and	
  duties	
  associated	
  with	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  a	
  territory	
  under	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition:	
  exclusive	
  privileges	
  of	
  economic	
  exploitation,	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  claim	
  new	
  territories	
  in	
  the	
  name	
  of	
  the	
  motherland,	
  to	
  establish	
  and	
  defend	
  settlements	
  and	
  to	
  instigate	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  trading	
  networks	
  with	
  neighbouring	
  countries.	
  	
  	
  But	
  just	
  as	
  the	
  Hudson	
  Bay	
  Company	
  had	
  experienced	
  infringement	
  of	
  its	
  exclusive	
  rights	
  and	
  privileges	
  in	
  the	
  British	
  Arctic	
  by	
  French	
  traders	
  and	
  trappers,	
  the	
  Russian-­‐American	
  Company	
  suffered	
  encroachment	
  and	
  damages	
  upon	
  its	
  operations	
  from	
  citizens	
  of	
  the	
  bordering	
  countries,	
  primarily	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Great	
  Britain.	
  In	
  order	
  to	
  remove	
  the	
  offending	
  mote	
  wreaking	
  havoc	
  on	
  the	
  profits	
  of	
  the	
  Russian-­‐American	
  Company,	
  the	
  Russian	
  government	
  issued	
  the	
  Imperial	
  Ukase	
  of	
  1821,	
  which	
  prohibited:	
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  1898,	
  p.	
  755)	
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  “to	
  all	
  foreign	
  vessels	
  not	
  only	
  to	
  land	
  on	
  the	
  coasts	
  and	
  islands	
  belonging	
  to	
  Russia,	
  as	
  stated	
  above...but	
  also	
  to	
  approach	
  them	
  within	
  less	
  than	
  one	
  hundred	
  miles,”210	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  response	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  to	
  the	
  edict,	
  in	
  a	
  letter	
  by	
  U.S.	
  Secretary	
  of	
  State	
  John	
  Quincy	
  Adams,	
  held	
  that	
  “It	
  was	
  expected	
  that	
  any	
  act	
  which	
  should	
  define	
  the	
  boundary	
  between	
  the	
  territories	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Russia	
  on	
  this	
  continent,	
  that	
  the	
  same	
  would	
  have	
  been	
  arranged	
  by	
  treaty	
  between	
  the	
  parties.”211	
  In	
  his	
  letter,	
  Adams	
  makes	
  reference	
  to	
  common	
  standards	
  of	
  the	
  limits	
  of	
  the	
  territorial	
  sea	
  and	
  to	
  the	
  laws	
  and	
  usages	
  of	
  nations.	
  However,	
  despite	
  their	
  protests	
  to	
  Russian	
  methods,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  would	
  soon	
  issue	
  an	
  imperialist	
  declaration	
  of	
  their	
  own	
  in	
  the	
  Monroe	
  Doctrine.	
  	
  	
  The	
  protestation	
  by	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Great	
  Britain	
  to	
  the	
  Ukase	
  of	
  1821	
  as	
  discussed	
  by	
  many	
  scholars,212	
  resulted	
  in	
  two	
  conventions	
  which	
  determined	
  that	
  south	
  of	
  the	
  55°	
  boundary	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  would	
  be	
  protected	
  (including	
  the	
  rights	
  of	
  nations	
  to	
  access	
  fisheries	
  on	
  the	
  high	
  seas),	
  that	
  there	
  would	
  be	
  no	
  illicit	
  trade	
  of	
  guns	
  and	
  alcohol	
  with	
  the	
  native	
  inhabitants	
  and	
  that	
  there	
  would	
  be	
  no	
  permanent	
  settlement	
  by	
  citizens	
  of	
  other	
  nations.213	
  	
  In	
  the	
  US-­‐Russia	
  Convention	
  1824	
  the	
  “dividing	
  line	
  between	
  the	
  territorial	
  claims	
  or	
  ‘spheres	
  of	
  influence’	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Russia	
  on	
  the	
  northwest	
  coast	
  of	
  America	
  should	
  be	
  the	
  parallel	
  of	
  54°	
  40’	
  north	
  latitude”214	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  Russo-­‐British	
  
Convention	
  1825,	
  the	
  dividing	
  line	
  started	
  from	
  the	
  same	
  point	
  of	
  latitude,	
  continuing	
  northward	
  to	
  establish	
  the	
  land	
  boundary	
  between	
  British	
  Columbia	
  and	
  Alaska	
  and	
  then	
  following	
  “the	
  said	
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  (Higginson,	
  1910,	
  p.	
  37)	
  211	
  Adams,	
  John	
  Quincy	
  in	
  (Moore,	
  1898,	
  p.	
  757)	
  212	
  Including:	
  	
  (Baty,	
  1928)	
  (Miller,	
  1925)	
  (Lakhtine,	
  1930)	
  	
  213	
  	
  (Malloy,	
  1909,	
  p.	
  1513)	
  214	
  	
  (Moore,	
  1898,	
  p.	
  761)	
  
	
   113	
  
meridian	
  line	
  of	
  the	
  141st	
  degree,	
  in	
  its	
  prolongation	
  as	
  far	
  as	
  the	
  frozen	
  ocean.”215	
  	
  Despite	
  the	
  accords	
  in	
  North	
  America,	
  relations	
  between	
  Russia	
  and	
  Great	
  Britain	
  would	
  soon	
  sour	
  on	
  a	
  different	
  continent	
  in	
  a	
  struggle	
  for	
  yet	
  another	
  sphere	
  of	
  influence	
  in	
  the	
  struggle	
  of	
  the	
  Crimean	
  War.	
  This	
  conflict	
  created	
  insecurity	
  on	
  the	
  method	
  of	
  Russian	
  administration	
  of	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  territory,	
  making	
  it	
  become	
  a	
  territorial	
  liability	
  for	
  the	
  central	
  government.	
  As	
  “Russia	
  had	
  regarded	
  Alaska	
  as	
  an	
  investment	
  rather	
  than	
  a	
  colony	
  and	
  consequently	
  had	
  vested	
  all	
  her	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Russian	
  American	
  Company”216	
  and	
  consequently	
  without	
  infrastructure	
  of	
  permanent	
  defence	
  or	
  well	
  established	
  colonies,	
  “on	
  the	
  eve	
  of	
  the	
  Crimean	
  War,	
  in	
  1854,	
  Russia,	
  fearing	
  that	
  Great	
  Britain	
  might	
  seize	
  her	
  American	
  possessions,	
  intimated	
  a	
  desire	
  to	
  sell	
  this	
  territory	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  States.”217	
  The	
  United	
  States	
  was	
  not	
  prepared	
  for	
  this	
  transaction	
  and	
  so	
  instead	
  Russia	
  arranged	
  a	
  fictitious	
  sale	
  of	
  Alaska	
  to	
  an	
  interest	
  in	
  San	
  Francisco	
  to	
  prevent	
  Great	
  Britain	
  from	
  seizing	
  the	
  territory.218	
  	
  Due	
  to	
  influences	
  of	
  the	
  doctrine	
  of	
  Manifest	
  Destiny	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  had	
  interest	
  in	
  expanding	
  its	
  territorial	
  possessions	
  and	
  the	
  potential	
  purchase	
  of	
  Alaska	
  was	
  discussed	
  with	
  Russian	
  diplomatic	
  staff	
  in	
  Washington.	
  As	
  early	
  as	
  “1852	
  [Seward]	
  had	
  spoken	
  for	
  aid	
  to	
  the	
  whalers	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  and	
  had	
  taken	
  the	
  occasion	
  to	
  say	
  that	
  the	
  Pacific	
  Ocean	
  would	
  be	
  the	
  theatre	
  of	
  the	
  world’s	
  politics	
  in	
  the	
  future,	
  and	
  that	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  should	
  be	
  there.”219	
  However,	
  territorial	
  growth	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  accelerated	
  conflict	
  over	
  other	
  domestic	
  issues	
  and	
  the	
  purchase	
  of	
  Alaska	
  was	
  postponed	
  until	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  Civil	
  War.	
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  (Moore,	
  1898,	
  pg	
  762)	
  216	
  	
  (Clark,	
  1930,	
  p	
  64)	
  217	
  	
  (James,	
  1942,	
  p.	
  20)	
  218	
  	
  (Clark,	
  1930,	
  p	
  68)	
  219	
  	
  (Clark,	
  1930,	
  p.	
  78).	
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  The	
  relations	
  between	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Russia	
  remained	
  friendly	
  throughout	
  the	
  duration	
  of	
  the	
  Civil	
  War	
  and	
  the	
  Russian	
  Navy	
  stood	
  ready	
  in	
  both	
  California	
  and	
  New	
  York	
  ports	
  to	
  contribute	
  assistance	
  to	
  the	
  Union	
  in	
  the	
  event	
  that	
  Great	
  Britain	
  provided	
  aid	
  for	
  the	
  Confederacy.	
  Following	
  the	
  war,	
  “Baron	
  Edward	
  de	
  Stoeckl,	
  Russian	
  Minister,	
  returned	
  to	
  Washington	
  early	
  in	
  1867,	
  with	
  instructions	
  to	
  sell	
  the	
  territory.	
  More	
  significant	
  than	
  the	
  motive	
  of	
  friendship	
  was	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  this	
  possession	
  had	
  become	
  of	
  no	
  value	
  to	
  Russia	
  and	
  was	
  a	
  burden	
  to	
  the	
  government.”220	
  This	
  time,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  was	
  keen	
  to	
  purchase	
  Alaska,	
  in	
  part	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  to	
  the	
  rest	
  of	
  the	
  world	
  that	
  despite	
  having	
  just	
  financed	
  an	
  expensive	
  civil	
  war,	
  the	
  country	
  had	
  a	
  healthy	
  financial	
  position.	
  	
  	
  And	
  so	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  purchased	
  Alaska	
  from	
  Russia	
  for	
  the	
  sum	
  of	
  $7,200,000.00	
  in	
  gold.	
  The	
  Alaska	
  Treaty	
  states:	
  	
  	
   “His	
  Majesty	
  the	
  Emperor	
  of	
  all	
  the	
  Russias	
  agrees	
  to	
  cede	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  by	
  this	
  convention,	
  immediately	
  upon	
  the	
  exchange	
  of	
  the	
  ratifications	
  thereof,	
  all	
  the	
  territory	
  and	
  dominion	
  now	
  possessed	
  by	
  his	
  said	
  Majesty	
  on	
  the	
  continent	
  of	
  America	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  adjacent	
  islands,	
  the	
  same	
  being	
  contained	
  within	
  the	
  geographical	
  limits	
  herein	
  set	
  forth,	
  to	
  wit:	
  The	
  eastern	
  limit	
  is	
  the	
  line	
  of	
  demarcation	
  between	
  the	
  Russian	
  and	
  the	
  British	
  possessions	
  in	
  North	
  America,	
  as	
  established	
  by	
  the	
  convention	
  between	
  Russia	
  and	
  Great	
  Britain,	
  of	
  February	
  28-­‐16,	
  1825...	
  .”221	
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  (James,	
  1942,	
  p.	
  20)	
  221	
  	
  (Miller,	
  1981,	
  p.	
  1)	
  Date	
  discrepancy	
  is	
  due	
  to	
  differences	
  between	
  the	
  Gregorian	
  and	
  Old	
  Style	
  calendars.	
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Russia	
  wanted	
  to	
  dispossess	
  herself	
  of	
  Alaska	
  for	
  several	
  different	
  reasons.222	
  Due	
  to	
  the	
  ineffective	
  method	
  employed	
  to	
  maintain	
  its	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  the	
  territory	
  through	
  the	
  Russian-­‐American	
  Company	
  as	
  “the	
  company	
  was	
  guilty	
  of	
  such	
  abuses	
  that	
  when	
  they	
  were	
  aired...the	
  government	
  decided	
  not	
  to	
  renew	
  the	
  charter	
  after	
  1862,	
  and	
  the	
  company	
  continued	
  to	
  do	
  business	
  merely	
  because	
  no	
  one	
  forbade	
  them	
  to.”223	
  This	
  demonstrates	
  the	
  ineffectual	
  control	
  that	
  Russia	
  actually	
  maintained	
  over	
  the	
  territory.	
  A	
  second	
  consideration	
  included	
  the	
  difficulty	
  of	
  protecting	
  and	
  maintaining	
  empire	
  abroad,	
  given	
  the	
  exceedingly	
  great	
  distance	
  between	
  the	
  Russian	
  capital	
  in	
  St.	
  Petersburg	
  and	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  territory.	
  The	
  Russian	
  government	
  had	
  noted,	
  “that	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  our	
  colonies	
  worsens	
  daily.	
  That,	
  distant	
  as	
  they	
  are	
  from	
  the	
  mother	
  country,	
  they	
  have	
  no	
  importance	
  for	
  Russia	
  while	
  the	
  necessity	
  of	
  defending	
  them	
  will	
  continue	
  to	
  be	
  in	
  the	
  future,	
  as	
  it	
  has	
  been	
  in	
  the	
  past,	
  as	
  difficult	
  as	
  expensive.	
  His	
  Imperial	
  Highness	
  is	
  of	
  the	
  opinion	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  urgent	
  to	
  abandon	
  them	
  by	
  ceding	
  them	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  States...	
  .”224	
  Russia	
  was	
  faced	
  with	
  the	
  likely	
  prospect	
  of	
  simply	
  losing	
  the	
  colony	
  to	
  another	
  power—and	
  without	
  opportunity	
  for	
  compensation.	
  Finally,	
  the	
  governance	
  structure	
  and	
  feudal	
  society	
  of	
  Russia	
  made	
  an	
  extended	
  empire	
  difficult	
  to	
  maintain.	
  This	
  was	
  noted	
  in	
  a	
  lengthy	
  three-­‐hour	
  speech	
  to	
  the	
  U.S.	
  	
  Congress	
  by	
  Senator	
  Sumner	
  who	
  said	
  that	
  Russia	
  “wished	
  to	
  strip	
  herself	
  of	
  all	
  her	
  outlying	
  possessions	
  as	
  Napoleon	
  had	
  stripped	
  himself	
  of	
  Louisiana	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  gather	
  her	
  strength	
  for	
  her	
  struggle	
  with	
  England	
  for	
  the	
  control	
  of	
  Asia.”225	
  And	
  so	
  Russia	
  sold	
  all	
  North	
  American	
  possessions	
  and	
  their	
  resources	
  without	
  realising	
  its	
  full	
  future	
  economic	
  potential.	
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  (Clark,	
  1930)	
  (James,	
  1942)	
  (Shiels,	
  1967)	
  	
  223	
  	
  (Clark,	
  1930,	
  p.	
  67)	
  224	
  	
  (Shiels,	
  1967,	
  p.	
  15)	
  225	
  	
  (Clark,	
  1930,	
  p.	
  67)	
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The	
  United	
  States	
  was	
  interested	
  in	
  Alaska	
  for	
  a	
  variety	
  of	
  reasons,	
  including	
  amity	
  with	
  Russia,	
  the	
  quest	
  for	
  additional	
  territory	
  in	
  promotion	
  of	
  ideas	
  of	
  manifest	
  destiny	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  an	
  opportunity	
  to	
  implement	
  the	
  Monroe	
  Doctrine.	
  However,	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Treaty	
  was	
  rather	
  unpopular	
  to	
  the	
  general	
  public	
  who	
  referred	
  to	
  the	
  territory	
  as	
  ‘Seward’s	
  Folly’,	
  ‘Walrussia’	
  and	
  the	
  ‘Polar	
  Bear	
  Garden’.	
  The	
  exchange	
  was	
  described	
  in	
  a	
  leading	
  newspaper	
  as	
  “Russia	
  has	
  sold	
  us	
  a	
  sucked	
  orange.”226	
  The	
  government	
  had	
  some	
  difficulty	
  in	
  convincing	
  the	
  House	
  of	
  Representatives	
  to	
  ratify	
  funding	
  for	
  the	
  final	
  payment	
  of	
  the	
  purchase,	
  but	
  this	
  was	
  eventually	
  overcome	
  in	
  part	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  had	
  transferred	
  occupation	
  and	
  had	
  begun	
  administration	
  of	
  Alaska	
  immediately	
  following	
  the	
  signing	
  of	
  the	
  treaty.	
  As	
  such	
  it	
  would	
  have	
  been	
  an	
  embarrassment	
  for	
  the	
  government	
  to	
  rescind	
  on	
  the	
  treaty.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  While	
  the	
  changes	
  in	
  territorial	
  sovereignty	
  that	
  occurred	
  in	
  the	
  
Alaska	
  Treaty	
  had	
  major	
  implications	
  for	
  international	
  relations	
  in	
  that	
  it	
  removed	
  Russia	
  from	
  North	
  America	
  and	
  made	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  an	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  state,	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  further	
  significant	
  development	
  with	
  major	
  implications	
  for	
  the	
  trajectory	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  is	
  the	
  culmination	
  of	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  events	
  including	
  the	
  Bering	
  Sea	
  Arbitration	
  1893,	
  the	
  North	
  Pacific	
  
Fur	
  Seal	
  Convention	
  1911	
  and	
  eventually	
  the	
  insertion	
  of	
  a	
  special	
  clause	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  that	
  introduced	
  the	
  idea	
  of	
  stewardship	
  into	
  international	
  environmental	
  law,	
  which	
  is	
  pursued	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  and	
  by	
  Canada	
  as	
  a	
  mechanism	
  of	
  territorial	
  control.	
  	
  Soon	
  after	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Treaty,	
  various	
  entrepreneurial	
  individuals	
  took	
  advantage	
  of	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  effective	
  administration	
  and	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  government	
  in	
  Alaska	
  and	
  engaged	
  in	
  extensive	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  226	
  New	
  York	
  World,	
  1	
  April	
  1867	
  in	
  	
  (Shiels,	
  1967,	
  p.	
  2)	
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hunting	
  and	
  killing	
  of	
  fur	
  seals,	
  which	
  had	
  breading	
  grounds	
  located	
  in	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  Archipelago.	
  	
  When	
  Washington	
  received	
  tales	
  of	
  the	
  slaughter,	
  they	
  quickly	
  moved	
  to	
  prevent	
  indiscriminate	
  destruction	
  of	
  the	
  species	
  with	
  an	
  1870	
  act	
  that	
  stated:	
  	
   “It	
  shall	
  be	
  unlawful	
  for	
  any	
  person	
  or	
  persons	
  to	
  kill	
  any...	
  fur	
  seal,	
  or	
  other	
  fur-­‐bearing	
  animal,	
  within	
  the	
  limits	
  of	
  said	
  territory,	
  or	
  in	
  the	
  waters	
  thereof;	
  and	
  any	
  person	
  guilty	
  thereof	
  shall...	
  be	
  fined	
  ...	
  or	
  imprisoned,	
  or	
  both	
  at	
  the	
  discretion	
  of	
  the	
  court,	
  and	
  all	
  vessels,	
  their	
  tackle,	
  apparel,	
  furniture,	
  and	
  cargo,	
  found	
  engaged	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  this	
  act,	
  shall	
  be	
  forfeited.”227	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  Secretary	
  was	
  also	
  permitted	
  by	
  law	
  to	
  determine	
  who	
  and	
  when	
  fur	
  seals	
  could	
  be	
  hunted	
  and	
  soon	
  after	
  the	
  enactment	
  of	
  this	
  legislation,	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Commercial	
  Company	
  was	
  granted	
  a	
  twenty	
  year	
  lease	
  with	
  “the	
  right	
  to	
  take	
  seals	
  on	
  the	
  Pribilof	
  Islands	
  [agreeing]	
  to	
  kill	
  no	
  more	
  than	
  100,000	
  young	
  male	
  seals”228	
  in	
  the	
  months	
  from	
  June-­‐Oct	
  of	
  each	
  year.	
  	
  Despite	
  this	
  exclusive	
  charter	
  from	
  the	
  government	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  to	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Commercial	
  Company,	
  the	
  monopoly	
  was	
  “soon	
  threatened	
  by	
  pelagic	
  sealers	
  attracted	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pacific	
  and	
  Bearing	
  Sea	
  by	
  the	
  enticement	
  of	
  quick	
  fortunes.”229	
  While	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Commercial	
  Company	
  was	
  restricted	
  in	
  their	
  hunting	
  methods,	
  the	
  methods	
  used	
  by	
  rogue	
  sealers	
  profoundly	
  impacted	
  the	
  fur	
  seal	
  population.	
  While	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Commercial	
  Company	
  only	
  hunted	
  male	
  seals	
  on	
  land,	
  the	
  rogue	
  sealers	
  would	
  indiscriminately	
  kill	
  both	
  male	
  and	
  female	
  fur	
  seals	
  at	
  sea,	
  which	
  had	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  killing	
  three	
  seals	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  227	
  (Sanger,	
  1869,	
  p.	
  241)	
  228	
  (Gay,	
  1987,	
  p.	
  23)	
  229	
  (Gay,	
  1987,	
  p.	
  24)	
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with	
  one	
  blow:	
  a	
  pregnant	
  female	
  and	
  her	
  unborn	
  pup	
  and	
  a	
  hungry	
  pup	
  on	
  land	
  that	
  no	
  other	
  seal	
  would	
  feed.230	
  	
  	
  When	
  the	
  fur	
  seal	
  experienced	
  an	
  extreme	
  decline	
  in	
  population	
  in	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  one	
  season,231	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  government,	
  fearing	
  the	
  extinction	
  of	
  the	
  species,	
  used	
  the	
  Navy	
  to	
  enforce	
  the	
  1870	
  legislation	
  and	
  confiscated	
  the	
  equipment	
  of	
  all	
  rogue	
  sealers.	
  As	
  a	
  significant	
  number	
  of	
  these	
  sealers	
  were	
  citizens	
  of	
  Canada,	
  the	
  British	
  government,232	
  responded	
  to	
  the	
  pressures	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  to	
  protest	
  the	
  United	
  States’	
  policy	
  and	
  the	
  confiscations.	
  However,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  maintained	
  because	
  Russia	
  had	
  formerly	
  claimed	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  Bering	
  Sea,	
  that	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Treaty,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  had	
  inherited	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  exercise	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  their	
  newly	
  acquired	
  half	
  of	
  the	
  Bering	
  Sea.	
  Disagreement	
  ensued	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  agreed	
  to	
  go	
  to	
  international	
  arbitration	
  over	
  the	
  issue.	
  	
  The	
  issues	
  presented	
  to	
  the	
  Paris	
  Court	
  of	
  Arbitration	
  in	
  1892,	
  included	
  whether	
  Russia	
  had	
  maintained	
  exclusive	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  the	
  Bering	
  Sea,	
  and	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Treaty,	
  whether	
  “the	
  United	
  States	
  has	
  any	
  right,	
  and	
  if	
  so,	
  what	
  right	
  of	
  protection	
  or	
  property	
  in	
  the	
  fur	
  seals...when	
  such	
  seas	
  are	
  found	
  outside	
  the	
  ordinary	
  three-­‐mile	
  limit.”233	
  The	
  United	
  States	
  had	
  never	
  tried	
  to	
  prevent	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  navigation,	
  nor	
  the	
  right	
  of	
  other	
  nations	
  to	
  fish	
  upon	
  the	
  high	
  seas,	
  but	
  had	
  only	
  attempted	
  to	
  protect	
  the	
  fur	
  seal	
  from	
  extinction.	
  They	
  claimed:	
  	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  230	
  (Gay,	
  1987,	
  p.	
  26)	
  (Moore,	
  1898,	
  p.	
  767)	
  231	
  Estimates	
  calculate	
  that	
  the	
  seal	
  population	
  saw	
  a	
  decline	
  of	
  around	
  75%	
  in	
  one	
  season.	
  232	
  Great	
  Britain	
  handled	
  foreign	
  policy	
  for	
  the	
  government	
  of	
  Canada	
  until	
  the	
  mid	
  twentieth	
  century.	
  233	
  (Gay,	
  1987,	
  p.	
  73)	
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  “In	
  view	
  of	
  the	
  common	
  interest	
  of	
  all	
  nations	
  in	
  preventing	
  the	
  indiscriminate	
  destruction	
  and	
  consequent	
  extermination	
  of	
  an	
  animal	
  which	
  contributes	
  so	
  importantly	
  to	
  the	
  commercial	
  wealth	
  and	
  general	
  use	
  of	
  mankind...[the	
  United	
  States]	
  invite	
  it	
  (the	
  international	
  community)	
  to	
  enter	
  into	
  such	
  an	
  arrangement...as	
  will	
  prevent	
  the...speedy	
  extermination	
  of	
  those	
  animals	
  and	
  consequent	
  serious	
  loss	
  to	
  mankind.”234	
  	
  The	
  arbitration	
  court	
  found	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  and	
  that	
  as	
  Russia	
  had	
  no	
  right	
  to	
  restrict	
  access	
  of	
  commercial	
  adventurers	
  in	
  the	
  Bering	
  Sea,	
  so	
  also	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  had	
  no	
  right	
  to	
  confiscate	
  the	
  equipment	
  of	
  pelagic	
  fur	
  sealers	
  and	
  was	
  required	
  to	
  compensate	
  those	
  whom	
  they	
  had	
  economically	
  disadvantaged.	
  	
  	
  While	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  lost	
  their	
  moral	
  appeal	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  community	
  in	
  their	
  claims	
  of	
  stewardship	
  over	
  the	
  fur	
  seal	
  to	
  the	
  government	
  of	
  Canada	
  on	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  economic	
  injustice,	
  the	
  result	
  is	
  that	
  within	
  a	
  few	
  years	
  the	
  maritime	
  nations	
  around	
  the	
  north	
  Pacific	
  entered	
  into	
  the	
  North	
  Pacific	
  Fur	
  Seal	
  Convention	
  
1911.	
  	
  So	
  despite	
  their	
  apparent	
  initial	
  legal	
  loss,	
  the	
  international	
  legal	
  challenge	
  of	
  United	
  States’	
  domestic	
  legislation	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  international	
  environmental	
  legislation	
  on	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  stewardship,	
  largely	
  considered	
  to	
  be	
  the	
  first	
  case	
  for	
  stewardship	
  of	
  natural	
  resources	
  in	
  international	
  law.235	
  Of	
  striking	
  interest,	
  Canada,	
  the	
  ‘belligerent’	
  against	
  the	
  stewardship	
  claim	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  regarding	
  the	
  fur	
  seals,	
  now	
  uses	
  the	
  same	
  stewardship	
  argument	
  to	
  promoting	
  their	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Passage.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  234	
  (Moore,	
  1898,	
  p.	
  776)	
  235	
  (Fitzmaurice,	
  2009,	
  p.	
  134)	
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The	
  contribution	
  of	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Treaty	
  to	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  and	
  of	
  both	
  international	
  maritime	
  and	
  environmental	
  law	
  is	
  significant.	
  Not	
  only	
  did	
  it	
  make	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  a	
  maritime	
  Arctic	
  territory	
  and	
  eliminate	
  all	
  Russian	
  influence	
  from	
  North	
  American	
  territory,	
  but	
  it	
  established	
  a	
  clear	
  obstacle	
  to	
  British	
  political	
  and	
  military	
  supremacy	
  in	
  the	
  North	
  Pacific.	
  Eventually,	
  this	
  transfer	
  of	
  territory	
  also	
  created	
  clear	
  divisions	
  between	
  North	
  American	
  allies	
  against	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  in	
  Cold	
  War	
  fronts	
  as	
  the	
  Arctic	
  became	
  seen	
  both	
  as	
  a	
  theatre	
  of	
  war	
  and	
  as	
  a	
  route	
  of	
  attack.	
  The	
  political	
  and	
  legislative	
  events	
  following	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Treaty	
  also	
  led	
  to	
  creation	
  of	
  the	
  idea	
  of	
  environmental	
  stewardship	
  and	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  the	
  common	
  heritage	
  of	
  mankind	
  that	
  would	
  eventually	
  become	
  imbedded	
  in	
  both	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  
Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  and	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  
1959.	
  And	
  finally,	
  the	
  non-­‐precise	
  language	
  and	
  disagreements	
  over	
  translations	
  of	
  the	
  1825	
  Anglo-­‐Russo	
  Convention	
  and	
  the	
  
Alaska	
  Treaty	
  1867	
  have	
  led	
  to	
  current,	
  unsettled	
  disputes	
  regarding	
  the	
  delimitation	
  of	
  the	
  maritime	
  boundary	
  between	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Canada	
  in	
  the	
  Beaufort	
  Sea.	
  	
  
	
  Figure	
  7:	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada	
  1882236	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  236	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  1957	
  a)	
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The	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  and	
  events	
  that	
  occur	
  within	
  this	
  period	
  have	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  implications	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region,	
  even	
  though	
  the	
  political-­‐legal	
  aspects	
  of	
  many	
  of	
  the	
  events	
  themselves	
  occurred	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  definitions	
  of	
  the	
  physical	
  Arctic.	
  	
  The	
  first	
  is	
  that	
  these	
  laws	
  and	
  the	
  processes	
  of	
  enforcing	
  them	
  established	
  ‘ownership’	
  and	
  subsequently	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  states	
  over	
  North	
  American	
  Arctic	
  territories.	
  Whereas,	
  had	
  these	
  laws	
  not	
  been	
  developed,	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  would	
  have	
  retained	
  the	
  ownership	
  of	
  the	
  land,	
  but	
  as	
  European	
  empires	
  deemed	
  that	
  the	
  land	
  was	
  not	
  ‘effectively	
  occupied’	
  for	
  legal	
  purposes,	
  they	
  were	
  able	
  to	
  assume	
  administration	
  and	
  ownership	
  of	
  the	
  whole	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  American	
  Arctic.	
  	
  The	
  principles	
  of	
  territorial	
  law	
  continued	
  to	
  be	
  reinforced	
  through	
  the	
  granting	
  of	
  territorial	
  charters,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  transfer	
  that	
  gave	
  all	
  of	
  Rupert’s	
  Land	
  to	
  the	
  Hudson	
  Bay	
  Company	
  and	
  also	
  through	
  treaties	
  granting	
  restoration	
  of	
  illegitimately	
  seized	
  land,	
  as	
  occurred	
  in	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Utrecht.	
  	
  Finally,	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  provided	
  the	
  legal	
  mechanism	
  which	
  determined	
  the	
  geopolitical	
  boundaries	
  that	
  are	
  seen	
  today	
  in	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  and	
  also	
  created	
  principles	
  of	
  utility	
  and	
  occupation	
  that	
  continue	
  to	
  be	
  relevant	
  in	
  contemporary	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  debates.	
  	
  
Rules	
  and	
  Codes	
  of	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  brought	
  with	
  them	
  a	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  focus	
  levied	
  on	
  the	
  Arctic	
  by	
  the	
  states	
  that	
  claimed	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  its	
  territory.	
  Although	
  exploration	
  continued	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region,	
  sometimes	
  sponsored	
  by	
  states,	
  but	
  often	
  funded	
  by	
  private	
  investors,	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  exploration	
  transitioned	
  from	
  the	
  pure	
  pursuit	
  of	
  territory	
  to	
  scientific	
  exploration,	
  although	
  this	
  scientific	
  exploration	
  was	
  also	
  used	
  in	
  pursuit	
  of	
  territory.	
  Into	
  the	
  1930s	
  it	
  was	
  believed	
  there	
  might	
  be	
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additional	
  yet	
  undiscovered	
  islands	
  hiding	
  within	
  the	
  sea	
  ice	
  and	
  the	
  new	
  technologies	
  of	
  the	
  period	
  were	
  used	
  to	
  search	
  for	
  these	
  unclaimed	
  territories.	
  However,	
  aside	
  from	
  the	
  possibility	
  of	
  these	
  few	
  islands,	
  all	
  known	
  land	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  had	
  been	
  annexed	
  by	
  the	
  states	
  of	
  Canada,	
  Russia,	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Denmark	
  and	
  Norway.	
  This	
  period	
  brought	
  with	
  it	
  new	
  conversation	
  in	
  territorial	
  possibilities,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  potential	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  sea	
  ice,	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  and	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  final	
  determinations	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  land	
  caught	
  up	
  in	
  the	
  decline	
  of	
  the	
  empire.	
  	
  	
  The	
  acquisition	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  by	
  Peary	
  in	
  1909	
  for	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  heralded	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  age	
  of	
  territorial	
  discovery	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  when	
  Peary,	
  operating	
  under	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  telegraphed	
  U.S.	
  President	
  Taft,	
  “placing	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  at	
  his	
  disposal.”237	
  Taft	
  congratulated	
  Peary	
  on	
  this	
  immense	
  achievement,	
  but	
  replied:	
  “Thank	
  you	
  for	
  your	
  generous	
  offer.	
  I	
  do	
  not	
  know	
  exactly	
  what	
  I	
  could	
  do	
  with	
  it…I	
  sincerely	
  hope	
  that	
  your	
  observations	
  will	
  contribute	
  substantially	
  to	
  scientific	
  knowledge.”238	
  This	
  rejection	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  of	
  the	
  opportunity	
  to	
  claim	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  this	
  layer	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  on	
  the	
  basis	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  located	
  in	
  the	
  middle	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  on	
  sea	
  ice	
  and	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  high	
  seas	
  established	
  precedence	
  within	
  international	
  relations	
  that	
  this	
  aspect	
  of	
  the	
  pole	
  was	
  outside	
  the	
  realms	
  of	
  territorial	
  claims	
  by	
  sovereign	
  states.	
  	
  	
  This	
  outward	
  projection	
  of	
  exploration	
  into	
  the	
  maritime	
  was	
  indicative	
  that	
  all	
  the	
  continental	
  territory	
  adjacent	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  had	
  been	
  coloured	
  into	
  political	
  maps.	
  Within	
  North	
  America,	
  the	
  Hays-­‐Herbert	
  Treaty	
  of	
  1903	
  determined	
  the	
  land	
  boundary	
  between	
  British	
  Colombia	
  and	
  Alaska,	
  leaving	
  only	
  the	
  borders	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  to	
  be	
  delineated,	
  as	
  other	
  land	
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  (The	
  New	
  York	
  Times,	
  1909)	
  238	
  (The	
  New	
  York	
  Times,	
  1909)	
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boundaries	
  had	
  been	
  determined	
  in	
  the	
  last	
  century.	
  In	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  many	
  islands,	
  which	
  had	
  been	
  discovered	
  by	
  explorers	
  from	
  many	
  countries,	
  created	
  a	
  tangled	
  web	
  of	
  territorial	
  division.	
  Additionally,	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  major	
  islands	
  such	
  as	
  Greenland	
  and	
  Svalbard	
  had	
  yet	
  to	
  be	
  legally	
  determined,	
  as	
  they	
  had	
  been	
  utilised	
  by	
  many	
  countries,	
  thus	
  weakening	
  the	
  claims	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  by	
  discovery	
  due	
  to	
  inefficiency	
  of	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  effective	
  occupation.	
  	
  	
  Meanwhile,	
  aviation	
  technology	
  was	
  being	
  used	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  determine	
  if	
  any	
  more	
  undiscovered	
  islands	
  existed	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Circle.	
  This	
  exploration	
  activity,	
  coupled	
  with	
  the	
  tangled	
  web	
  of	
  existing	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  minor	
  islands	
  via	
  discovery	
  and	
  the	
  uncertain	
  sovereignty	
  due	
  to	
  inconsistent	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  the	
  minor	
  Arctic	
  islands	
  created	
  a	
  condition	
  of	
  insecurity	
  over	
  the	
  northern	
  territorial	
  borders	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  To	
  address	
  this	
  issue,	
  in	
  1926	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  issued	
  a	
  proclamation	
  introducing	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  circumpolar	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.	
  They	
  said:	
  	
   	
  	
  “All	
  discovered	
  lands	
  and	
  islands,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  all	
  those	
  that	
  may	
  in	
  the	
  future	
  be	
  discovered,	
  which	
  are	
  not	
  at	
  the	
  date	
  of	
  the	
  publication	
  of	
  this	
  degree	
  recognized	
  by	
  the	
  Government	
  of	
  the	
  USSR	
  as	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  a	
  foreign	
  Power,	
  are	
  declared	
  to	
  be	
  territories	
  belonging	
  to	
  the	
  USSR…	
  .”239	
  	
  This	
  formal	
  declaration	
  followed	
  pronouncements	
  made	
  by	
  a	
  Canadian	
  senator,	
  who	
  held	
  that	
  Canada	
  held	
  sovereignty	
  to	
  its	
  sector	
  on	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  four	
  claims,	
  including	
  discovery	
  by	
  Great	
  Britain,	
  transfer	
  in	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Utrecht,	
  the	
  occupation	
  of	
  the	
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  (Degras,	
  1952,	
  p.	
  104)	
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Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  Company,	
  and	
  at	
  last,	
  the	
  sector	
  principle.240	
  Although	
  Canada	
  never	
  made	
  a	
  formal	
  declaration	
  of	
  the	
  sector	
  principle,	
  maps	
  produced	
  by	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  were	
  displaying	
  the	
  Canadian	
  sector	
  at	
  least	
  until	
  2007,	
  depicting	
  the	
  sector	
  line	
  as	
  an	
  international	
  boundary,	
  (See	
  figure	
  8).	
  	
  
	
  	
   Figure	
  8:	
  Canadian	
  Maps	
  1927241	
  and	
  2007242	
  	
  Equivalent	
  to	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  the	
  ‘regions	
  of	
  attraction’	
  included	
  in	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Monroe	
  Doctrine	
  of	
  1823,	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  indicated	
  that	
  all	
  states	
  were	
  to	
  relinquish	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  areas	
  within	
  this	
  sector.	
  It	
  has	
  been	
  seen	
  as	
  parallel	
  to	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  
Tordesillas	
  as	
  an	
  early	
  demonstration	
  of	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  with	
  the	
  “practice	
  of	
  claiming	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  a	
  sector	
  of	
  the	
  earth's	
  surface,	
  as	
  measured	
  by	
  meridians	
  of	
  longitude”243	
  being	
  utilised	
  to	
  divide	
  the	
  world	
  between	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal.	
  Within	
  the	
  Canadian	
  sector,	
  the	
  U.S.	
  was	
  happy	
  to	
  comply	
  as	
  the	
  only	
  territory	
  to	
  which	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  had	
  any	
  claim	
  were	
  minor	
  islands	
  within	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Archipelago.	
  This	
  proclamation	
  also	
  had	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  solidifying	
  Canadian	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  territories	
  transferred	
  in	
  the	
  1880	
  Arctic	
  Islands	
  transfer	
  from	
  the	
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  (Head,	
  1963,	
  p.	
  203)	
  241	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  1957	
  a)	
  This	
  evoluationary	
  map	
  also	
  explains	
  that	
  “By	
  1925,	
  Canada	
  extended	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole.”	
  242	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  2007	
  a)	
  243	
  (Head,	
  1963,	
  p.	
  202)	
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Great	
  Britain,	
  who	
  had	
  not	
  fully	
  established	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  islands	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  archipelago	
  through	
  either	
  discovery	
  or	
  effective	
  occupation.	
  Although	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  had	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  establishing	
  regions	
  of	
  attraction	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Circle	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  U.S.	
  not	
  pursuing	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  within	
  the	
  sector	
  left	
  to	
  them	
  by	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Soviet	
  and	
  Canadian	
  sectors,	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  failed	
  to	
  become	
  the	
  dominant	
  rule	
  for	
  establishing	
  territorial	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  maritime	
  areas	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  and	
  only	
  applied	
  to	
  terra	
  
firma	
  within	
  those	
  sectors.	
  	
  	
  The	
  final	
  determinations	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  land	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  occurred	
  in	
  the	
  Svalbard	
  Treaty	
  1920	
  and	
  the	
  judgement	
  on	
  the	
  
Legal	
  Status	
  of	
  East	
  Greenland	
  1933.	
  In	
  both	
  of	
  these	
  locations,	
  multiple	
  states	
  had	
  been	
  utilising	
  the	
  land	
  and	
  the	
  resources,	
  eliminating	
  Norway	
  and	
  Denmark	
  from	
  establishing	
  clear	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  territory	
  and	
  thus	
  it	
  was	
  necessary	
  to	
  settle	
  the	
  issue	
  through	
  legal	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  The	
  Svalbard	
  Treaty	
  provided	
  that	
  all	
  member	
  states	
  already	
  utilising	
  the	
  Svalbard	
  islands	
  to	
  “carry	
  on	
  there	
  without	
  impediment	
  all	
  maritime,	
  industrial,	
  mining	
  and	
  commercial	
  operations	
  on	
  a	
  footing	
  of	
  absolute	
  equality,”244	
  important	
  for	
  states	
  mining	
  coal	
  on	
  the	
  islands	
  to	
  diminish	
  their	
  energy	
  needs.	
  So	
  although	
  the	
  treaty	
  gave	
  ‘most’	
  sovereignty	
  to	
  Norway,	
  it	
  prevented	
  it	
  from	
  having	
  permanent	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  Svalbard,	
  usually	
  understood	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  condition	
  of	
  territorial	
  sovereignty.	
  	
  	
  In	
  Greenland,	
  due	
  to	
  divisions	
  of	
  empire	
  in	
  Scandinavia	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  Napoleonic	
  Wars,	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  this	
  large	
  Arctic	
  island	
  had	
  failed	
  to	
  be	
  established	
  through	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  a	
  single	
  sovereign	
  state.	
  Similar	
  to	
  the	
  support	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
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  (The	
  Svalbard	
  Treaty,	
  1920)	
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to	
  Canada’s	
  claim	
  over	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Archipelago	
  via	
  the	
  sector	
  claim	
  and	
  despite	
  an	
  agreement	
  with	
  Denmark	
  to	
  use	
  Greenland	
  during	
  the	
  First	
  World	
  War	
  for	
  military	
  purposes,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  did	
  “not	
  object	
  to	
  the	
  Danish	
  Government	
  extending	
  their	
  political	
  and	
  economic	
  interests	
  to	
  the	
  whole	
  of	
  Greenland,”245	
  additionally	
  there	
  was	
  recognition	
  of	
  Danish	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  Greenland	
  by	
  other	
  states.	
  This	
  is	
  important	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  international	
  recognition	
  as	
  being	
  a	
  component	
  of	
  state	
  sovereignty.	
  However,	
  the	
  discussion	
  over	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  Greenland	
  was	
  a	
  matter	
  of	
  contention	
  between	
  Denmark	
  and	
  Norway,	
  who	
  were	
  once	
  both	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  same	
  empire,	
  with	
  Norway	
  making	
  declarations	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  area	
  of	
  East	
  Greenland.	
  The	
  International	
  Court	
  of	
  Justice	
  ruled	
  in	
  the	
  judgement	
  on	
  the	
  Legal	
  Status	
  of	
  Eastern	
  Greenland	
  1933	
  that	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  island	
  fell	
  within	
  Danish	
  sovereignty,	
  concluding	
  the	
  determination	
  of	
  the	
  final	
  major	
  land	
  borders	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.246	
  	
  	
  There	
  are	
  several	
  implications	
  for	
  international	
  relations	
  and	
  international	
  law	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  during	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years.	
  The	
  first	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  began	
  to	
  create	
  solutions	
  for	
  dealing	
  with	
  the	
  circumpolar	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.	
  This	
  includes	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  sector	
  principle,	
  which	
  although	
  this	
  method	
  failed	
  to	
  establish	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  maritime	
  areas	
  due	
  to	
  lack	
  of	
  application	
  by	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  it	
  succeeded	
  in	
  finalising	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  many	
  little	
  islands	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  with	
  the	
  exception	
  of	
  Hans	
  Island.	
  The	
  result	
  of	
  this	
  period	
  is	
  the	
  solidification	
  of	
  terrestrial	
  territorial	
  boundaries,	
  a	
  move	
  necessary	
  due	
  to	
  processes	
  of	
  decolonisation	
  within	
  Great	
  Britain	
  and	
  Scandinavia.	
  It	
  is	
  mere	
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  (International	
  Court	
  of	
  Justice,	
  1933,	
  p.	
  36)	
  246	
  There	
  is	
  currently	
  a	
  dispute	
  over	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  an	
  island,	
  a	
  mere	
  rock,	
  called	
  ‘Hans	
  Island’	
  between	
  Canada	
  and	
  Denmark	
  in	
  the	
  Davis	
  Strait.	
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providence	
  that	
  saw	
  these	
  sovereignty	
  claims	
  settled	
  before	
  the	
  knowledge	
  of	
  the	
  vast	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  was	
  truly	
  realised.	
  	
  	
  A	
  second	
  implication	
  is	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  also	
  was	
  determined	
  that	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  at	
  the	
  surface	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  could	
  not	
  be	
  claimed	
  by	
  states	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  pole	
  being	
  positioned	
  in	
  the	
  middle	
  of	
  the	
  high	
  seas,	
  and	
  	
  also	
  being	
  located	
  on	
  a	
  gyrating	
  structure	
  of	
  sea	
  ice.	
  Although	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  requires	
  further	
  development,	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  this	
  rule	
  of	
  ‘no	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  sea	
  ice’	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  U.S.	
  declining	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  and	
  also	
  sets	
  precedent	
  for	
  the	
  other	
  legal	
  layers	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  that	
  will	
  eventually	
  be	
  developed	
  as	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  evolves	
  throughout	
  the	
  twentieth	
  century.	
  	
  
	
  
Rules	
  and	
  Codes	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  	
  The	
  Cold	
  War	
  years	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  brought	
  with	
  it	
  radical	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  codes	
  and	
  rules	
  that	
  frame	
  the	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  as	
  the	
  focus	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  began	
  to	
  dwell	
  on	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  world’s	
  oceans.	
  The	
  interstate	
  conflict	
  of	
  the	
  Great	
  Wars	
  during	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  had	
  emphasised	
  the	
  need	
  of	
  states	
  to	
  secure	
  new	
  sources	
  of	
  energy,	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  maintain	
  energy	
  security	
  for	
  defence	
  and	
  for	
  economic	
  growth.	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  the	
  need	
  for	
  additional	
  energy,	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  had	
  seen	
  vast	
  development	
  in	
  technology,	
  creating	
  more	
  opportunity	
  and	
  options	
  for	
  the	
  extraction	
  of	
  resources	
  in	
  previously	
  unreachable	
  places—especially	
  within	
  the	
  oceans.	
  These	
  interests	
  and	
  capabilities	
  of	
  states	
  thus	
  introduced	
  an	
  opportunity	
  for	
  a	
  major	
  shift	
  within	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  governing	
  the	
  maritime	
  regions	
  and	
  the	
  simple	
  rules	
  in	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea,	
  mare	
  
liberum	
  and	
  mare	
  clausum,	
  were	
  about	
  to	
  undergo	
  a	
  major	
  transformation.	
  	
  
	
   128	
  
	
  This	
  transformative	
  shift	
  in	
  the	
  rules	
  organising	
  the	
  behaviour	
  between	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  maritime	
  was	
  introduced	
  by	
  U.S.	
  President	
  Truman	
  in	
  the	
  Truman	
  Proclamation	
  1945,	
  which	
  states:	
  	
  	
  “Having	
  concern	
  for	
  the	
  urgency	
  of	
  conserving	
  and	
  prudently	
  utilizing	
  its	
  natural	
  resources,	
  the	
  Government	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  regards	
  the	
  natural	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  subsoil	
  and	
  sea	
  bed	
  of	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  beneath	
  the	
  high	
  seas	
  but	
  contiguous	
  to	
  the	
  coasts	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  as	
  appertaining	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  subject	
  to	
  its	
  jurisdiction	
  and	
  control.	
  …The	
  character	
  as	
  high	
  seas	
  of	
  the	
  waters	
  above	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  and	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  their	
  free	
  and	
  unimpeded	
  navigation	
  are	
  in	
  no	
  way	
  thus	
  affected.”247	
  	
  With	
  this	
  proclamation,	
  the	
  areas	
  over	
  which	
  a	
  state	
  could	
  claim	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  expanded	
  instantly	
  to	
  include	
  large	
  expanses	
  of	
  territory	
  that	
  was	
  formerly	
  conceived	
  of	
  as	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  high	
  seas.	
  Like	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  all	
  rules,	
  the	
  Truman	
  Proclamation	
  required	
  international	
  consensus	
  to	
  become	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  fabric	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  and	
  as	
  most	
  other	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  greatly	
  expanded	
  international	
  system	
  saw	
  the	
  advantages	
  of	
  this	
  rule	
  to	
  their	
  own	
  national	
  interests,	
  the	
  rule	
  quickly	
  became	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  customary	
  international	
  law.	
  It	
  is	
  this	
  lack	
  of	
  international	
  recognition	
  that	
  is	
  the	
  reason	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  failed	
  to	
  establish	
  maritime	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  why	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  have	
  turned	
  to	
  the	
  new	
  framework	
  of	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  to	
  establish	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  maritime	
  Arctic.	
  	
  	
  This	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  was	
  soon	
  codified	
  in	
  international	
  law,	
  along	
  with	
  several	
  other	
  additional	
  rules,	
  was	
  introduced	
  in	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  247	
  (Truman,	
  1945)	
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the	
  first	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1958,	
  adding	
  new	
  legal	
  spaces	
  of	
  territory	
  to	
  the	
  body	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  in	
  territorial	
  waters:	
  the	
  contiguous	
  zone	
  and	
  the	
  high	
  seas.	
  Changing	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  established	
  during	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  the	
  Convention	
  determined	
  that	
  “the	
  rights	
  of	
  the	
  coastal	
  State	
  over	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  do	
  not	
  depend	
  on	
  occupation,	
  effective	
  or	
  notional,	
  or	
  on	
  any	
  express	
  proclamation”248	
  and	
  that	
  failure	
  to	
  utilise	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  did	
  not	
  create	
  permissions	
  for	
  other	
  states	
  to	
  use	
  it.	
  Yet,	
  these	
  new	
  legal	
  spaces,	
  although	
  ‘permitting’	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  extend	
  their	
  jurisdiction	
  along	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  200	
  nautical	
  miles	
  (nm)	
  into	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  does	
  not	
  completely	
  define	
  the	
  claims	
  to	
  maritime	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  of	
  today.	
  It	
  would	
  take	
  further	
  deliberation	
  in	
  two	
  more	
  Conventions	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1960	
  (II)	
  and	
  1973-­‐1982	
  (III)	
  to	
  fully	
  develop	
  the	
  layers	
  of	
  rules	
  that	
  currently	
  apply	
  to	
  maritime	
  claims	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean.	
  	
  	
  The	
  resulting	
  maritime	
  legal	
  spaces	
  coming	
  out	
  of	
  the	
  deliberations	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  
Sea	
  1982	
  include:	
  the	
  breadth	
  of	
  the	
  territorial	
  sea	
  between	
  three	
  to	
  twelve	
  nautical	
  miles,	
  an	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zone	
  of	
  200nm,	
  and	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  claim	
  up	
  to	
  350nm	
  along	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf,	
  providing	
  a	
  state	
  can	
  prove	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  a	
  natural	
  prolongation	
  of	
  their	
  mainland	
  territory.	
  It	
  also	
  establishes	
  the	
  areas	
  outside	
  of	
  state	
  jurisdiction	
  as	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  common	
  heritage	
  of	
  mankind,	
  (See	
  Figure	
  9).	
  The	
  text	
  of	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  
Sea	
  1982	
  holds	
  that:	
  	
   	
  “the	
  codification	
  and	
  progressive	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  achieved	
  in	
  this	
  Convention	
  will	
  contribute	
  to	
  the	
  strengthening	
  of	
  peace,	
  security,	
  cooperation	
  and	
  friendly	
  relations	
  among	
  all	
  nations	
  in	
  conformity	
  with	
  the	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  248	
  (United	
  Nations,	
  1958,	
  p.	
  314)	
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principles	
  of	
  justice	
  and	
  equal	
  rights	
  and	
  will	
  promote	
  the	
  economic	
  and	
  social	
  advancement	
  of	
  all	
  peoples	
  of	
  the	
  world.”249	
  	
  	
  
	
  Figure	
  9:	
  Maritime	
  Zones	
  under	
  UNCLOS	
  III250	
  	
  For	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  
on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  resulted	
  in	
  giving	
  states	
  claiming	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Oceans	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  through	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  a	
  means	
  to	
  now	
  claim	
  that	
  territory	
  through	
  codified	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  rather	
  than	
  clinging	
  to	
  rules	
  that	
  had	
  failed	
  to	
  gain	
  international	
  consensus.	
  However,	
  it	
  can	
  be	
  seen	
  that	
  as	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  wait	
  for	
  their	
  claims	
  of	
  up	
  to	
  350nm	
  to	
  be	
  reviewed	
  by	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Commission	
  on	
  the	
  Continental	
  Shelf,	
  they	
  continue	
  to	
  reiterate	
  their	
  historical	
  borders	
  established	
  through	
  the	
  sector	
  principle.	
  Thus,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  are	
  now	
  staking	
  claims	
  to	
  multiple	
  legal	
  layers	
  of	
  space	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  through	
  their	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  Commission	
  through	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  and	
  with	
  their	
  continuing	
  diplomatic	
  statements	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  pole.	
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In	
  addition	
  to	
  the	
  potential	
  territory	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  these	
  new	
  legal	
  spaces	
  through	
  the	
  addition	
  of	
  new	
  rules	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  begin	
  to	
  introduce	
  several	
  new	
  territorial	
  conflicts	
  to	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations,	
  including	
  the	
  disputes	
  between	
  Canada	
  and	
  Denmark	
  in	
  the	
  Davis	
  Straight,	
  Russia	
  and	
  Norway	
  in	
  the	
  Barents	
  Sea	
  Norway	
  and	
  Denmark	
  in	
  the	
  Greenland	
  Sea	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Canada	
  in	
  the	
  Beaufort	
  Sea.	
  During	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period	
  the	
  maritime	
  boundaries	
  between	
  Canada	
  and	
  Demark,	
  excluding	
  Hans	
  Island	
  and	
  the	
  Lincoln	
  Sea	
  were	
  determined	
  in	
  the	
  Canada-­‐Denmark	
  Maritime	
  Agreement	
  
1973	
  using	
  the	
  median	
  line	
  as	
  the	
  method	
  for	
  delimitation.251	
  A	
  final	
  territorial	
  line	
  to	
  be	
  determined	
  within	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period	
  is	
  the	
  U.S.S.R.-­‐United	
  States	
  
Maritime	
  Boundary	
  Agreement	
  1990	
  which	
  clarifies	
  the	
  boundaries	
  of	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Purchase	
  1867	
  in	
  the	
  Bering	
  Sea,	
  but	
  still	
  awaits	
  ratification	
  by	
  the	
  Duma	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation.	
  	
  The	
  final	
  overarching	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period	
  was	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  itself,	
  existing	
  not	
  in	
  codification	
  but	
  only	
  in	
  the	
  understanding	
  of	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  interacting	
  with	
  one	
  another	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  sphere—marked	
  by	
  an	
  arms	
  race	
  fuelled	
  by	
  physical	
  insecurity	
  and	
  suspicions	
  of	
  intentions	
  as	
  each	
  side	
  promulgated	
  their	
  political	
  ideologies	
  to	
  a	
  wider	
  audience.	
  For	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  which	
  was	
  the	
  shortest	
  route	
  between	
  the	
  two	
  sides	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  conflict,	
  this	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  being	
  seen	
  as	
  both	
  an	
  arena	
  for	
  warfare	
  and	
  also	
  a	
  direct	
  route	
  of	
  attack.	
  This	
  caused	
  many	
  displays	
  of	
  military	
  prowess	
  and	
  demonstration	
  of	
  capability	
  to	
  operate	
  in	
  the	
  region.	
  While	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  no	
  longer	
  exists	
  in	
  subjective	
  understandings,	
  the	
  technology	
  developed	
  in	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  251	
  In	
  the	
  dispute	
  in	
  the	
  Beaufort	
  Sea	
  between	
  Canada	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  the	
  U.S.	
  claims	
  the	
  boundary	
  line	
  follows	
  the	
  median,	
  or	
  equidistant	
  principle.	
  Canada,	
  contrary	
  to	
  the	
  method	
  used	
  in	
  the	
  Davis	
  Straight,	
  claims	
  a	
  line	
  perpendicular	
  to	
  the	
  territorial	
  boundary.	
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this	
  period	
  is	
  equipping	
  the	
  states	
  to	
  defend	
  their	
  prospective	
  Arctic	
  claims	
  in	
  the	
  maritime	
  regions.	
  	
  	
  The	
  implications	
  for	
  international	
  relations	
  and	
  international	
  law	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  years	
  include	
  that	
  the	
  period	
  was	
  marked	
  by	
  several	
  major	
  transitions.	
  The	
  first	
  includes	
  the	
  addition	
  of	
  new	
  rules	
  to	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea,	
  making	
  it	
  acceptable	
  to	
  appropriate	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  maritime	
  regions	
  once	
  considered	
  as	
  outside	
  the	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  states.	
  The	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  new	
  layers	
  of	
  legal	
  territory	
  within	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  was	
  facilitated	
  by	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  liberal	
  institutionalism	
  rising	
  out	
  of	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  to	
  address	
  not	
  only	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  mediate	
  global	
  conflict,	
  but	
  also	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  growing	
  number	
  of	
  states	
  interacting	
  within	
  the	
  sphere	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Finally,	
  although	
  the	
  sector	
  principle,	
  still	
  implemented	
  by	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  has	
  apparently	
  given	
  way	
  to	
  the	
  new	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea,	
  the	
  capabilities	
  developed	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  continue	
  to	
  provide	
  muscle	
  to	
  their	
  current	
  claims	
  over	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  and	
  the	
  extensions	
  of	
  their	
  continental	
  shelves.	
  	
  	
  
Rules	
  and	
  Codes	
  Post	
  Cold	
  War	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  Post	
  Cold	
  War	
  years	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  are	
  bringing	
  with	
  them	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  way	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  engage	
  with	
  each	
  other	
  as	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  understanding	
  of	
  ‘Cold	
  War’	
  has	
  disappeared.	
  Additionally,	
  states	
  are	
  increasingly	
  cooperating	
  on	
  environmental	
  matters	
  for	
  the	
  region	
  and	
  have	
  also	
  developed	
  a	
  new	
  framework	
  for	
  organising	
  political	
  action	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  governance	
  through	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council.	
  In	
  this	
  period,	
  it	
  is	
  also	
  seen	
  that	
  nearly	
  all	
  the	
  bilateral	
  boundaries	
  (those	
  not	
  including	
  the	
  overlapping	
  claims	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole)	
  are	
  also	
  being	
  codified	
  within	
  international	
  law.	
  Thus,	
  it	
  seems	
  that	
  in	
  this	
  period	
  
	
   133	
  
of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  the	
  codes	
  and	
  rules	
  framing	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  continue	
  to	
  be	
  developed	
  within	
  the	
  evolving	
  interests	
  of	
  states	
  in	
  their	
  actions	
  with	
  one	
  another	
  and	
  in	
  their	
  interaction	
  with	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  	
  The	
  dominant	
  rule	
  added	
  to	
  international	
  relations	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  that	
  of	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  originally	
  evolving	
  out	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Environmental	
  Protection	
  Strategy	
  1991	
  between	
  all	
  eight	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  The	
  cooperation	
  provided	
  through	
  this	
  agreement	
  so	
  near	
  to	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  gave	
  states	
  a	
  platform	
  for	
  launching	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  originally	
  intended	
  as	
  an	
  informal	
  forum	
  for	
  discussing	
  issues	
  relating	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  However,	
  in	
  2011,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  was	
  made	
  into	
  a	
  formal	
  organisation	
  with	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  a	
  permanent	
  secretariat,	
  with	
  the	
  additional	
  intent	
  of	
  coordinating	
  action	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  The	
  addition	
  of	
  this	
  rule	
  to	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  adds	
  a	
  new	
  layer	
  of	
  complexity,	
  as	
  it	
  deals	
  with	
  issues	
  outsides	
  of	
  the	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  state	
  sovereignty,	
  providing	
  a	
  mechanism	
  for	
  states	
  to	
  project	
  their	
  Arctic	
  specific	
  interests	
  into	
  the	
  international	
  realm.	
  	
  	
  	
  As	
  the	
  new	
  rule	
  of	
  ‘exclusive	
  economic	
  zones’	
  and	
  ‘extended	
  continental	
  shelf’	
  were	
  added	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  the	
  last	
  period,	
  maritime	
  territorial	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  continues	
  to	
  be	
  on	
  the	
  agenda	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  In	
  1993,	
  Norway	
  and	
  Denmark	
  came	
  to	
  an	
  agreement	
  on	
  their	
  boundary	
  in	
  the	
  Greenland	
  Sea,	
  in	
  2011	
  Norway	
  and	
  Russia	
  agreed	
  on	
  the	
  delimitation	
  of	
  their	
  maritime	
  boundaries,	
  a	
  dispute	
  that	
  had	
  lasted	
  around	
  forty	
  years.	
  The	
  last	
  remaining	
  bilateral	
  boundary	
  to	
  be	
  determined	
  is	
  that	
  between	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Canada	
  in	
  the	
  Beaufort	
  Sea.	
  The	
  exigency	
  for	
  determining	
  these	
  boundaries	
  includes	
  the	
  creation	
  and	
  addition	
  of	
  new	
  rules	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  but	
  also	
  the	
  discovery	
  of	
  vast	
  quantities	
  of	
  oil	
  and	
  gas	
  in	
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the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  in	
  2002	
  by	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Geological	
  Survey.	
  Before	
  1982,	
  the	
  rule	
  on	
  the	
  extended	
  continental	
  shelf	
  did	
  not	
  exist	
  and	
  before	
  2002	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  were	
  largely	
  unaware	
  of	
  the	
  potential	
  energy	
  within	
  the	
  region	
  and	
  thus	
  the	
  impetus	
  to	
  establish	
  these	
  boundaries	
  is	
  a	
  contemporary	
  issue.	
  What	
  continues	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  matter	
  of	
  diplomatic	
  contention	
  is	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  claims	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  while	
  states	
  wait	
  for	
  rulings	
  from	
  the	
  Commission	
  on	
  the	
  Continental	
  Shelf.	
  	
  
	
  Figure	
  10:	
  Maritime	
  Jurisdiction	
  and	
  Boundaries	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Region252	
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The	
  implications	
  for	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  and	
  specifically	
  for	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  in	
  this	
  period	
  includes	
  the	
  turn	
  toward	
  environmental	
  cooperation	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  and	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  cooperation	
  based	
  on	
  regional	
  interests,	
  developed	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  institutions	
  formed	
  in	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period.	
  This	
  turn	
  towards	
  cooperation	
  is	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  diplomatic	
  stand-­‐down	
  of	
  Arctic	
  militarisation,	
  although	
  the	
  technology	
  for	
  this	
  still	
  exists.	
  States	
  are	
  still	
  exercising	
  their	
  ability	
  to	
  operate	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  a	
  military	
  capacity,	
  but	
  some	
  of	
  this	
  is	
  done	
  in	
  tangent	
  with	
  one	
  another	
  as	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  Search	
  and	
  Rescue	
  Agreement	
  
2011.	
  This	
  cooperation	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  regulatory	
  frameworks	
  and	
  military	
  cooperation	
  will	
  allow	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  prepare	
  for	
  the	
  onslaught	
  of	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  resources	
  and	
  shipping	
  lanes	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean.	
  Finally,	
  the	
  impetus	
  to	
  solidify	
  maritime	
  boundaries	
  for	
  resource	
  security	
  in	
  the	
  newly	
  created	
  territorial	
  legal	
  spaces	
  in	
  the	
  Artic	
  has	
  been	
  a	
  continuing	
  focus	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  in	
  contemporary	
  international	
  relations.	
  	
  
Conclusions	
  	
  Contemporary	
  claims	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  the	
  historical	
  division	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  territory	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  can	
  be	
  understood	
  by	
  tracing	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  political	
  and	
  legal	
  events	
  from	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Tordesillas	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  
Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982.	
  The	
  discovery	
  of	
  the	
  New	
  World	
  by	
  Europeans	
  created	
  a	
  vacuum	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  where	
  shared	
  understandings	
  of	
  expected	
  behaviour	
  by	
  states	
  expanding	
  their	
  political	
  boundaries	
  into	
  the	
  territories	
  of	
  far	
  away	
  lands	
  was	
  undefined.	
  The	
  creation	
  of	
  this	
  vacuum	
  acted	
  as	
  a	
  catalyst	
  for	
  introducing	
  a	
  new	
  set	
  of	
  rules	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Although	
  the	
  unincorporated	
  world	
  was	
  initially	
  divided	
  between	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  by	
  the	
  accepted	
  international	
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authority	
  of	
  the	
  period,	
  within	
  a	
  century	
  the	
  legitimacy	
  of	
  this	
  rule	
  was	
  challenged	
  by	
  the	
  rising	
  powers	
  of	
  England,	
  France	
  and	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  as	
  the	
  power	
  of	
  Papal	
  influence	
  diminished	
  in	
  correlation	
  with	
  the	
  rise	
  of	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  territorial	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  the	
  right	
  of	
  monarchs	
  to	
  be	
  the	
  ultimate	
  authority	
  within	
  their	
  territorial	
  boundaries.	
  	
  	
  The	
  legitimacy	
  and	
  ultimately,	
  the	
  dominion,	
  of	
  the	
  expansive	
  possessions	
  of	
  the	
  Iberian	
  empires	
  was	
  reduced	
  by	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  new	
  rules	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  and	
  maintenance,	
  practices	
  that	
  through	
  custom	
  and	
  consensus	
  became	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  nations;	
  when	
  these	
  rules	
  were	
  violated,	
  they	
  were	
  often	
  reinforced	
  through	
  treaty	
  agreements,	
  returning	
  the	
  territory	
  to	
  the	
  dispossessed	
  state	
  with	
  rightful	
  claims.	
  So	
  when	
  France	
  made	
  illicit	
  claims	
  on	
  the	
  territories	
  of	
  the	
  Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  Company	
  held	
  in	
  charter	
  from	
  Great	
  Britain,	
  they	
  were	
  reinstated	
  in	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Utrecht,	
  with	
  punitive	
  repercussions	
  in	
  the	
  both	
  the	
  Old	
  and	
  the	
  New	
  Worlds.	
  Thus,	
  all	
  terrestrial	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  have	
  been	
  established	
  through	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition,	
  or	
  by	
  the	
  transfer	
  of	
  these	
  discovered	
  territories	
  by	
  legal	
  cessation	
  from	
  one	
  state	
  to	
  another,	
  with	
  the	
  only	
  purchase	
  of	
  territory	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  littoral	
  states	
  occurring	
  in	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Purchase	
  Treaty.	
  	
  	
  As	
  the	
  early	
  claims	
  to	
  territory	
  held	
  by	
  Spain	
  and	
  Portugal	
  succumbed	
  to	
  the	
  rising	
  commercial	
  interests	
  of	
  other	
  European	
  states,	
  new	
  rules	
  regarding	
  the	
  organisation	
  of	
  maritime	
  territory	
  were	
  also	
  added	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  
mare	
  liberum.	
  This	
  principle	
  reduced	
  the	
  exclusivity	
  of	
  trading	
  privileges	
  of	
  the	
  Iberian	
  empire	
  and	
  enabled	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  trade	
  routes	
  by	
  Great	
  Britain	
  and	
  the	
  Netherlands	
  who	
  established	
  trading	
  companies	
  and	
  authorised	
  privateering,	
  bringing	
  wealth	
  and	
  resources	
  back	
  to	
  northern	
  Europe.	
  It	
  was	
  this	
  expansion	
  of	
  
	
   137	
  
trade	
  routes	
  that	
  led	
  to	
  the	
  intense	
  exploration	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  by	
  Great	
  Britain	
  as	
  they	
  endeavoured	
  to	
  utilise	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Passage.	
  Through	
  this	
  activity,	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  began	
  to	
  attract	
  commercial	
  interest	
  and	
  the	
  harsh	
  Arctic	
  territory	
  was	
  incorporated	
  into	
  the	
  political	
  boundaries	
  of	
  states	
  through	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition.	
  	
  Yet	
  the	
  expanding	
  opportunities	
  for	
  trade	
  networks	
  and	
  the	
  increase	
  in	
  maritime	
  traffic	
  also	
  introduced	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  maritime	
  protectionism	
  in	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  mare	
  clausum	
  as	
  Great	
  Britain	
  attempted	
  to	
  protect	
  resources	
  in	
  waters	
  around	
  Britannia	
  from	
  exploitation	
  by	
  other	
  states.	
  The	
  introduction	
  of	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  territorial	
  waters	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  allowed	
  for	
  states	
  to	
  claim	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  maritime	
  territory	
  within	
  the	
  limits	
  of	
  the	
  cannon	
  shot	
  rule	
  of	
  three	
  nautical	
  miles.	
  These	
  two	
  rules,	
  mare	
  
liberum	
  and	
  mare	
  clausum,	
  became	
  the	
  expected	
  behaviour	
  within	
  the	
  global	
  maritime,	
  established	
  as	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  nations.	
  Thus,	
  when	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  apparently	
  claimed	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  Bering	
  Sea	
  in	
  the	
  effort	
  to	
  protect	
  fugacious	
  seal	
  populations,	
  it	
  was	
  determined	
  through	
  international	
  arbitration	
  that	
  this	
  attempt	
  at	
  extraterritorial	
  control	
  was	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  expected	
  standards	
  of	
  behaviour	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  However,	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  standards	
  for	
  the	
  notions	
  of	
  territorial	
  waters	
  and	
  the	
  high	
  seas	
  was	
  not	
  the	
  finale	
  for	
  the	
  transformation	
  of	
  rules	
  organising	
  the	
  division	
  of	
  maritime	
  territory	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  The	
  principle	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  outside	
  of	
  territorial	
  waters	
  continued	
  to	
  be	
  reinforced	
  as	
  the	
  dominant	
  maritime	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  but	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  limits	
  to	
  territorial	
  waters	
  was	
  challenged	
  by	
  the	
  national	
  interests	
  of	
  states	
  following	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery.	
  It	
  is	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  mare	
  liberum	
  that	
  caused	
  the	
  failure	
  of	
  the	
  incorporation	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  at	
  the	
  surface	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  ice	
  into	
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the	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  in	
  the	
  early	
  twentieth	
  century.	
  This	
  is	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  declining	
  with	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  and	
  the	
  rapid	
  growth	
  of	
  the	
  community	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Thus,	
  sea	
  ice	
  and	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  itself,	
  as	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  high	
  seas,	
  were	
  accepted	
  as	
  outside	
  the	
  reach	
  of	
  sovereign	
  claims.	
  	
  	
  Accepted	
  through	
  state	
  practice	
  and	
  customary	
  law,	
  the	
  maritime	
  rule	
  of	
  mare	
  liberum	
  continued	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  dominating	
  guideline	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  into	
  the	
  twentieth	
  century.	
  However,	
  this	
  time	
  period	
  brought	
  with	
  it	
  enormous	
  challenges	
  to	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  as	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  oceans	
  changed	
  from	
  merely	
  a	
  focus	
  on	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  maintain	
  trading	
  networks,	
  to	
  also	
  having	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  resources	
  contained	
  within	
  the	
  seas.	
  Thus,	
  the	
  new	
  rules	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  continental	
  shelves	
  and	
  the	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zones	
  were	
  added,	
  eventually	
  becoming	
  codified	
  in	
  the	
  
United	
  Nations	
  Conventions	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea.	
  It	
  is	
  these	
  new	
  rules	
  that	
  have	
  created	
  the	
  expansion	
  and	
  the	
  complexity	
  of	
  claims	
  of	
  the	
  littoral	
  states	
  to	
  territory	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  by	
  creating	
  new	
  layers	
  of	
  territory	
  and	
  new	
  procedures	
  for	
  establishing	
  legitimacy	
  over	
  those	
  claims.	
  	
  It	
  can	
  be	
  seen	
  that	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  that	
  structure	
  contemporary	
  Arctic	
  territorial	
  claims	
  are	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  legitimisation	
  of	
  certain	
  practices	
  suited	
  to	
  the	
  needs	
  and	
  interests	
  of	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  particular	
  eras	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Much	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  absorbed	
  through	
  imperial	
  expansion,	
  but	
  changes	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  had	
  brought	
  an	
  end	
  to	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition.	
  So	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  held	
  that	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  of	
  1909	
  was	
  outside	
  the	
  potential	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  as	
  this	
  socially	
  constructed	
  geographical	
  point	
  was	
  located	
  only	
  on	
  the	
  sea	
  ice,	
  a	
  feature	
  of	
  the	
  high	
  seas.	
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However,	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  of	
  2013	
  has	
  new	
  rules	
  guiding	
  the	
  behaviour	
  between	
  states,	
  which	
  apply	
  to	
  its	
  condition	
  as	
  becoming	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  sovereign	
  territory	
  of	
  a	
  littoral	
  state.	
  	
  	
  Through	
  the	
  creation	
  and	
  layering	
  of	
  rules	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  there	
  are	
  now	
  four	
  potential	
  legal	
  spaces	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  is	
  situated:	
  airspace,	
  ice	
  at	
  the	
  surface	
  of	
  the	
  sea,	
  the	
  sea	
  column	
  and	
  the	
  seabed.	
  The	
  delineation	
  of	
  airspace	
  customarily	
  follows	
  the	
  lines	
  of	
  territorial	
  waters.	
  However,	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  while	
  the	
  U.S.	
  claims	
  territorial	
  airspace	
  along	
  the	
  lines	
  of	
  territorial	
  waters,	
  both	
  Russia	
  and	
  Canada	
  claim	
  territorial	
  airspace	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole.	
  Through	
  conversations	
  on	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice,	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  on	
  the	
  surface	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  ice	
  is	
  not	
  subject	
  on	
  its	
  own	
  to	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction.	
  Additionally,	
  the	
  sea	
  column	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  is	
  outside	
  the	
  limits	
  of	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zone	
  and	
  thus	
  its	
  resources	
  are	
  part	
  high	
  seas	
  and	
  the	
  common	
  heritage	
  of	
  mankind.	
  However,	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  final	
  category	
  that	
  attracts	
  the	
  interest	
  of	
  the	
  littoral	
  states	
  in	
  contemporary	
  international	
  relations:	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  on	
  the	
  seabed	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  a	
  tangible	
  geographic	
  point	
  where	
  currently	
  waves	
  the	
  Russian	
  tricolour,	
  and	
  the	
  actual	
  point	
  of	
  contention	
  between	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  as	
  they	
  wait	
  their	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Commission	
  on	
  the	
  Continental	
  Shelf.	
  So	
  while	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  wait	
  for	
  their	
  maritime	
  territorial	
  claims	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  to	
  be	
  determined	
  through	
  the	
  current	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  they	
  continue	
  to	
  make	
  diplomatic	
  gestures	
  using	
  old	
  familiar	
  rules,	
  although	
  some	
  of	
  them	
  have	
  expired,	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  the	
  validity	
  of	
  their	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  community	
  of	
  states.	
  	
  	
  As	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  continues	
  to	
  evolve,	
  so	
  also	
  change	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  that	
  guide	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  this	
  structure.	
  Although	
  the	
  maritime	
  territorial	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
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Arctic	
  is	
  being	
  determined	
  through	
  the	
  current	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  is	
  not	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  evolution	
  of	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  region	
  within	
  the	
  system.	
  As	
  new	
  resources	
  and	
  new	
  technologies	
  are	
  discovered,	
  new	
  layers	
  of	
  territory	
  become	
  accessible	
  and	
  new	
  voids	
  are	
  identified	
  in	
  the	
  legal	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  The	
  ongoing	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  specific	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  will	
  continue	
  to	
  be	
  the	
  product	
  of	
  the	
  needs	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  in	
  response	
  to	
  the	
  constraints	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  guidelines	
  are	
  developed.	
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Chapter	
  III	
  	
  
U.S.	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  1867-­‐2013	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  of	
  the	
  twenty-­‐first	
  century	
  is	
  showing	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  to	
  be	
  engaging	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  a	
  tentative	
  and	
  even	
  an	
  arguably	
  low	
  profile	
  manner	
  compared	
  with	
  the	
  often	
  brash	
  and	
  bold	
  activities	
  and	
  policy	
  statements	
  produced	
  by	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia.	
  This	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  U.S.	
  internal	
  political	
  scene,	
  where	
  partisan	
  and	
  bureaucratic	
  politics	
  have	
  hampered	
  decisions	
  on	
  a	
  range	
  of	
  issues	
  from	
  drilling	
  for	
  fossil	
  fuels	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  National	
  Wildlife	
  Refuge	
  to	
  the	
  ratification	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  
1982.	
  	
  The	
  United	
  States	
  has	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  smallest	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  sectors	
  and	
  also	
  has	
  a	
  short	
  continental	
  shelf	
  that	
  likely	
  will	
  not	
  result	
  in	
  an	
  extended	
  claim	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  under	
  international	
  law.	
  Holding	
  a	
  certainty	
  of	
  sovereign	
  title	
  over	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  Alaska,	
  U.S.	
  strategy	
  in	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  pursues	
  a	
  different	
  set	
  of	
  objectives	
  to	
  those	
  of	
  the	
  other	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  especially	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia,	
  who	
  are	
  vying	
  for	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole.	
  While	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  pursue	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policies	
  to	
  establish	
  and	
  extend	
  sovereign	
  claims	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  is	
  pursing	
  an	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  that	
  fulfils	
  broader	
  U.S.	
  national	
  interests	
  including	
  interest	
  of	
  security,	
  the	
  environment,	
  and	
  economic	
  and	
  infrastructural	
  development.	
  U.S.	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  has	
  deviated	
  little	
  throughout	
  the	
  periods	
  of	
  U.S.	
  engagement	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  although	
  the	
  methods	
  for	
  pursuing	
  this	
  policy	
  have	
  changed	
  with	
  the	
  transitions	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
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  Research	
  Questions:	
  	
  
• What	
  is	
  the	
  historical	
  development	
  of	
  U.S.	
  Arctic	
  policy?	
  
• Is	
  U.S.	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  largely	
  reflective	
  of	
  their	
  broad	
  foreign	
  policy	
  strategies	
  in	
  a	
  given	
  era?	
  
• How	
  was	
  U.S.	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  implemented	
  in	
  the	
  different	
  eras	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system?	
  
• What	
  national	
  interests	
  can	
  be	
  identified	
  in	
  U.S.	
  Arctic	
  policy?	
  	
  
• What	
  rules	
  have	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  followed	
  in	
  their	
  pursuit	
  of	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  their	
  Arctic	
  policy?	
  	
  
U.S.	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  during	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  U.S.	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  began	
  during	
  a	
  period	
  of	
  imperial	
  expansion	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  by	
  dominant	
  states.	
  For	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  this	
  can	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  a	
  form	
  of	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  security	
  in	
  the	
  national	
  interest,	
  spurred	
  by	
  two	
  major	
  concepts	
  within	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  in	
  the	
  middle	
  of	
  the	
  nineteenth	
  century:	
  the	
  Monroe	
  Doctrine	
  and	
  Manifest	
  Destiny.	
  Early	
  thought	
  within	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  had	
  determined	
  that	
  the	
  Mississippi	
  River	
  offered	
  a	
  defensible	
  and	
  formidable	
  natural	
  geographic	
  boundary;	
  however,	
  when	
  the	
  Louisiana	
  Purchase	
  was	
  acquired	
  in	
  1803,	
  purchased	
  almost	
  by	
  accident	
  from	
  Napoleon	
  who	
  could	
  no	
  longer	
  afford	
  sustain	
  his	
  American	
  empire	
  while	
  expanding	
  his	
  empire	
  in	
  Europe,	
  the	
  territorial	
  size	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  doubled	
  over	
  night.	
  Following	
  this	
  rapid	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  by	
  the	
  U.S.	
  government,	
  American	
  settlement	
  and	
  economic	
  activites	
  gradually	
  expanded	
  westward.	
  Under	
  the	
  new	
  attitude	
  of	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  it	
  was	
  soon	
  realised	
  that	
  European	
  empires,	
  such	
  as	
  Spain,	
  Russia	
  and	
  Great	
  Britain,	
  who	
  held	
  territorial	
  claims	
  in	
  parts	
  of	
  North	
  America,	
  were	
  retarding	
  U.S.	
  expansion	
  “thwarting	
  our	
  policy	
  and	
  hampering	
  our	
  power,	
  limiting	
  our	
  greatness	
  and	
  checking	
  the	
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fulfillment	
  of	
  our	
  manifest	
  destiny	
  to	
  overspread	
  the	
  continent	
  allotted	
  by	
  Providence	
  for	
  the	
  free	
  development	
  of	
  our	
  yearly	
  multiplying	
  millions.”253	
  This	
  turn	
  toward	
  expansionist	
  imperialist	
  policy	
  was	
  combined	
  with	
  the	
  Monroe	
  Doctrine	
  which	
  formally	
  warned	
  that	
  where	
  “the	
  rights	
  and	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  are	
  involved,	
  that	
  the	
  American	
  continents,	
  by	
  the	
  free	
  and	
  independent	
  condition	
  which	
  they	
  have	
  assumed	
  and	
  maintain,	
  are	
  henceforth	
  not	
  to	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  subjects	
  for	
  future	
  colonization	
  by	
  any	
  European	
  powers.”254	
  The	
  Monroe	
  Doctrine,	
  although	
  tempering	
  European	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  in	
  the	
  Americas,	
  was	
  also	
  specifically	
  directed	
  at	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  who	
  had	
  indicated	
  that	
  they	
  also	
  intended	
  to	
  expand	
  from	
  Alaska	
  to	
  the	
  Oregon	
  Territories,	
  territory	
  that	
  the	
  now	
  growing	
  United	
  States	
  believed	
  to	
  be	
  the	
  new	
  western	
  limits	
  of	
  their	
  boundaries.	
  	
  It	
  was	
  during	
  this	
  period	
  of	
  imperial	
  expansion	
  when	
  William	
  H.	
  Seward,	
  believing	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Constitution	
  to	
  be	
  “adapted	
  to	
  the	
  inevitable	
  expansion	
  of	
  the	
  empire,”	
  served	
  as	
  a	
  Senator	
  in	
  the	
  upper	
  house	
  of	
  Congress,	
  as	
  a	
  war	
  minister	
  during	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Civil	
  War	
  and	
  eventually	
  as	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Secretary	
  of	
  State.255	
  An	
  advocate	
  of	
  U.S.	
  expansionist	
  policies	
  and	
  pursuing	
  national	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  including	
  territorial	
  and	
  resource	
  acquisition,	
  Seward	
  attempted	
  a	
  failed	
  purchase	
  of	
  Greenland	
  but	
  successfully	
  added	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Territory	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  territorial	
  holdings	
  in	
  1867,	
  for	
  the	
  sum	
  of	
  7.2	
  million	
  dollars	
  in	
  gold,	
  or	
  $0.02	
  per	
  acre.	
  This	
  transaction	
  ultimately	
  signalled	
  to	
  other	
  powers	
  that	
  might	
  challenge	
  U.S.	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  that	
  the	
  U.S.	
  government	
  had	
  sufficient	
  resources,	
  even	
  following	
  the	
  costly	
  Civil	
  War,	
  to	
  make	
  extravagant	
  purchases	
  in	
  gold.	
  If	
  sufficiently	
  solvent	
  to	
  expand	
  territory,	
  they	
  were	
  also	
  economically	
  equipped	
  to	
  defend	
  their	
  territory	
  with	
  the	
  military	
  infrastructure	
  that	
  remained	
  after	
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  (Sullivan,	
  1845,	
  p.	
  6)	
  254	
  (Monroe,	
  1823)	
  255	
  (Seward,	
  1858,	
  p.	
  15)	
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the	
  Civil	
  War.	
  Additionally,	
  this	
  purchase	
  actively	
  implemented	
  the	
  Monroe	
  Doctrine	
  by	
  removing	
  a	
  European	
  power	
  completely	
  from	
  the	
  landscape	
  of	
  North	
  America.	
  	
  	
  Ratification	
  for	
  the	
  allocation	
  of	
  funds	
  to	
  conclude	
  the	
  Treaty	
  with	
  
Russia	
  1867,	
  also	
  known	
  as	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  Purchase	
  Treaty	
  was	
  delayed	
  for	
  several	
  months	
  after	
  the	
  treaty	
  was	
  signed	
  as	
  Congress	
  was	
  divided	
  over	
  whether	
  the	
  empty	
  ‘wasteland’	
  of	
  Alaska	
  was	
  worth	
  the	
  price	
  tag	
  set	
  by	
  the	
  Russians.	
  Congressional	
  debates	
  on	
  the	
  purchase	
  of	
  Alaska	
  in	
  the	
  40th	
  Congressional	
  session	
  depict	
  the	
  character	
  of	
  United	
  States	
  as	
  “a	
  land	
  stealing	
  people	
  by	
  nature,	
  and	
  that	
  our	
  propensities	
  and	
  our	
  manifest	
  destiny	
  are	
  to	
  steal	
  land	
  until	
  our	
  ‘abutments’…shall	
  be	
  the	
  one	
  on	
  the	
  Atlantic	
  and	
  the	
  Pacific	
  and	
  also	
  upon	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  on	
  the	
  tropic	
  seas.”256	
  If	
  the	
  land	
  could	
  eventually	
  be	
  seized,	
  there	
  was	
  little	
  impulse	
  to	
  purchase	
  the	
  territory.	
  However,	
  the	
  position	
  that	
  although	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  was	
  the	
  	
  “most	
  despotic	
  Government	
  in	
  the	
  world,	
  [but]	
  in	
  that	
  Government	
  has	
  always	
  been	
  found	
  a	
  friend	
  an	
  ally,”257	
  determined	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  in	
  the	
  best	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  to	
  maintain	
  a	
  favourable	
  Russian	
  alliance.	
  It	
  is	
  for	
  these	
  two	
  reasons—manifest	
  destiny	
  and	
  the	
  desire	
  to	
  maintain	
  positive	
  diplomatic	
  relations	
  with	
  Russia	
  that	
  Congress	
  ultimately	
  ratified	
  the	
  investment	
  capital	
  for	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  Purchase	
  Treaty.	
  	
  	
  The	
  entire	
  Alaskan	
  region	
  was	
  believed	
  to	
  be	
  icebound	
  and	
  desolate,	
  so	
  political	
  opponents	
  who	
  deemed	
  its	
  acquisition	
  as	
  a	
  foolish	
  venture	
  labelled	
  the	
  purchase	
  ‘Seward’s	
  Folly’.	
  However,	
  Seward	
  believed	
  in	
  the	
  project	
  of	
  American	
  expansion	
  and	
  also	
  saw	
  value	
  in	
  the	
  new	
  territory,	
  which	
  had	
  scarcely	
  been	
  utilised	
  by	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  due	
  to	
  corruption	
  by	
  the	
  Russian-­‐American	
  company,	
  the	
  administrators	
  of	
  Russian	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  region.	
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  (Shellabarger,	
  1868,	
  p.	
  377)	
  257	
  (Shellabarger,	
  1868,	
  p.	
  377)	
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Imperial	
  Russia	
  was	
  prompted	
  to	
  sell	
  their	
  American	
  Arctic	
  possession	
  in	
  part	
  due	
  to	
  rumours	
  of	
  gold	
  and	
  the	
  inability	
  of	
  the	
  government	
  and	
  the	
  Russian-­‐American	
  company	
  to	
  cope	
  with	
  the	
  results	
  of	
  a	
  gold	
  rush,	
  as	
  recently	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  California	
  Gold	
  Rush	
  less	
  than	
  twenty	
  years	
  previous.258	
  Additionally,	
  by	
  selling	
  the	
  territory	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  pre-­‐emptively	
  prevented	
  loss	
  of	
  the	
  territory	
  to	
  the	
  British	
  Empire,	
  who	
  was	
  still	
  in	
  the	
  throes	
  of	
  global	
  territorial	
  expansion.259	
  Visiting	
  the	
  new	
  territory	
  in	
  1869,	
  Seward	
  said,	
  “I	
  realized,	
  if	
  indeed	
  I	
  did	
  not	
  discover	
  in	
  those	
  [Alaskan]	
  Territories	
  a	
  new,	
  peculiar,	
  and	
  magnificent	
  field	
  of	
  commerce	
  and	
  empire.”260	
  And	
  so,	
  the	
  vision	
  of	
  an	
  American	
  imperialist,	
  pursuing	
  the	
  national	
  interest	
  of	
  territorial	
  expansion,	
  made	
  the	
  U.S.	
  into	
  an	
  Arctic	
  state	
  long	
  before	
  the	
  true	
  security	
  and	
  economic	
  values	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  were	
  realised.	
  	
  The	
  Alaskan	
  Treaty	
  Purchase	
  can	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  the	
  first	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  document	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  territory	
  as	
  it	
  executes	
  U.S	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  by	
  defining	
  boundaries	
  of	
  the	
  territory,	
  gives	
  the	
  terms	
  of	
  the	
  cession	
  in	
  property	
  and	
  commercial	
  contracts,	
  and	
  outlines	
  the	
  treatment	
  of	
  foreign	
  citizens,	
  natives	
  and	
  military	
  instillations.	
  In	
  the	
  treaty,	
  the	
  U.S.	
  federal	
  government	
  immediately	
  assumes	
  authority	
  over	
  all	
  terra	
  firma	
  in	
  Alaska.	
  However,	
  while	
  they	
  agreed	
  to	
  honour	
  existing	
  rights	
  of	
  private	
  property,	
  all	
  existing	
  commercial	
  contracts	
  were	
  cancelled,	
  all	
  Russian	
  government	
  papers	
  were	
  surrendered	
  to	
  the	
  U.S.	
  and	
  any	
  military	
  equipment	
  and	
  personnel	
  were	
  immediately	
  expelled.	
  Foreign	
  citizens	
  were	
  permitted	
  to	
  return	
  to	
  native	
  lands,	
  or	
  within	
  the	
  space	
  of	
  a	
  few	
  years	
  could	
  become	
  naturalised	
  citizens	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  with	
  all	
  associated	
  rights	
  and	
  privileges.	
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  Fort	
  Ross,	
  Imperial	
  Russia’s	
  other	
  North	
  American	
  possession,	
  was	
  sold	
  to	
  John	
  Sutter	
  in	
  1840.	
  It	
  was	
  at	
  Sutter’s	
  Mill	
  where	
  the	
  ore	
  that	
  sparked	
  the	
  Gold	
  Rush	
  of	
  ’49	
  was	
  found.	
  259	
  (Bolkhovitinov,	
  1993)	
  260	
  (Seward,	
  1869,	
  p.	
  24)	
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However,	
  continuing	
  the	
  paternalistic	
  and	
  asymmetric	
  relationship	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  held	
  with	
  native	
  tribes	
  in	
  the	
  continental	
  United	
  States,	
  any	
  indigenous	
  populations,	
  or	
  ‘uncivilized	
  tribes,’	
  became	
  “subject	
  to	
  such	
  laws	
  and	
  regulations	
  as	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  may,	
  from	
  time	
  to	
  time,	
  adopt	
  in	
  regard	
  to	
  aboriginal	
  tribes	
  of	
  that	
  country.”261	
  This	
  clause	
  is	
  of	
  great	
  significance	
  because	
  it	
  establishes	
  the	
  custodial	
  relationship	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  with	
  the	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants	
  of	
  Alaska,	
  with	
  future	
  relevance	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  debates	
  in	
  other	
  states	
  over	
  Arctic	
  territory	
  and	
  primacy	
  of	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  the	
  twenty-­‐first	
  century.	
  	
  Within	
  the	
  space	
  of	
  a	
  few	
  years,	
  rather	
  than	
  the	
  generation	
  of	
  time	
  that	
  Seward	
  predicted,	
  the	
  economic	
  value	
  of	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  Territory	
  was	
  initially	
  realised.	
  	
  It	
  was	
  written	
  of	
  this	
  early	
  realisation	
  of	
  Alaskan	
  value	
  that	
  “hitherto	
  our	
  new	
  possession	
  has	
  seemed	
  almost	
  a	
  myth	
  too	
  vague	
  an	
  intangible…like	
  an	
  unexpected	
  legacy,	
  its	
  magnificence	
  and	
  value	
  have	
  not	
  yet	
  been	
  comprehended;	
  but	
  the	
  time	
  is	
  close	
  at	
  hand	
  when	
  her	
  mighty	
  forests	
  will	
  yield	
  their	
  treasures,	
  her	
  mines	
  will	
  open	
  out	
  their	
  richness,	
  her	
  seas	
  will	
  give	
  of	
  their	
  abundance,	
  and	
  all	
  her	
  quiet	
  coves	
  will	
  be	
  converted	
  into	
  busy	
  harbours.”262	
  Within	
  twenty	
  years,	
  the	
  purchase	
  price	
  of	
  the	
  territory	
  was	
  regained	
  from	
  the	
  trade	
  of	
  seal	
  furs	
  alone,263	
  By	
  the	
  1950s,	
  Alaska	
  had	
  paid	
  for	
  itself	
  four	
  hundred	
  and	
  twenty-­‐five	
  times	
  over.264	
  It	
  was	
  through	
  the	
  economic	
  development	
  of	
  Alaska	
  and	
  the	
  charter	
  of	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  Commercial	
  Company	
  in	
  1870	
  that	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  first	
  demonstrated	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  Alaska	
  in	
  the	
  same	
  method	
  as	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  had	
  done	
  through	
  the	
  Russian-­‐American	
  Company.	
  It	
  is	
  this	
  interest	
  for	
  economic	
  affairs,	
  and	
  eventually	
  the	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  261	
  (Government	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  1867,	
  p.	
  542)	
  262	
  (Hallock,	
  1886,	
  p.	
  ii)	
  263	
  (Lee,	
  1998,	
  p.	
  63)	
  264	
  (Fairbanks	
  Daily	
  News-­‐Miner,	
  1958)	
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seal	
  fur	
  trade,	
  that	
  soon	
  led	
  to	
  two	
  disputes	
  with	
  neighbouring	
  Canada.	
  	
  	
  The	
  United	
  States	
  initially	
  faced	
  difficulty	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  effective	
  administration	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  despite	
  having	
  passed	
  
Congressional	
  Act	
  No.	
  211	
  in	
  1867	
  which	
  extended	
  “the	
  laws	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  relating	
  to	
  customs,	
  commerce,	
  and	
  navigation”265	
  to	
  the	
  territory,	
  it	
  required	
  further	
  legislation	
  to	
  provide	
  for	
  military	
  operations	
  including	
  Executive	
  Order	
  July	
  3,	
  1875	
  prohibiting	
  the	
  importation	
  of	
  military	
  hardware	
  into	
  Alaska.	
  Additionally,	
  the	
  government	
  failed	
  to	
  incorporate	
  the	
  residents	
  of	
  Alaska	
  into	
  the	
  administrative	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  federal	
  government,	
  denying	
  their	
  rights	
  as	
  U.S.	
  citizens	
  under	
  the	
  Constitution	
  by	
  remaining	
  as	
  an	
  unincorporated	
  territory.	
  President	
  Arthur	
  remarked	
  to	
  Congress	
  in	
  1881:	
  	
  	
   “I	
  regret	
  to	
  state	
  that	
  the	
  people	
  of	
  Alaska	
  have	
  reason	
  to	
  complain	
  that	
  they	
  are	
  as	
  yet	
  unprovided	
  with	
  any	
  form	
  of	
  government	
  by	
  which	
  life	
  or	
  property	
  can	
  be	
  protected.	
  While	
  the	
  extent	
  of	
  its	
  population	
  does	
  not	
  justify	
  the	
  application	
  of	
  the	
  costly	
  machinery	
  of	
  Territorial	
  administration,	
  there	
  is	
  immediate	
  necessity	
  for	
  constituting	
  such	
  a	
  form	
  of	
  government	
  as	
  will	
  promote	
  the	
  education	
  of	
  the	
  people	
  and	
  secure	
  the	
  administration	
  of	
  justice.”266	
  	
  The	
  U.S.	
  Constitution	
  enables	
  for	
  the	
  Federal	
  government	
  to	
  extend	
  laws	
  and	
  regulation	
  to	
  a	
  new	
  territory,	
  and	
  the	
  Northwest	
  
Ordinance	
  1787	
  provides	
  direction	
  for	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  territorial	
  government,	
  which	
  in	
  the	
  first	
  stage	
  includes	
  appointing	
  a	
  governor,	
  three	
  justices	
  and	
  a	
  secretary.	
  However,	
  this	
  system	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  265	
  (Zabriskie,	
  1870,	
  p.	
  874)	
  266	
  (Arthur,	
  1881)	
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was	
  initially	
  problematic	
  in	
  Alaska	
  as	
  “the	
  total	
  white	
  population	
  of	
  Alaska	
  is	
  about	
  250,	
  and	
  for	
  purposes	
  of	
  political	
  illustration,	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  voters	
  is	
  usually	
  put	
  down	
  at	
  fifteen.	
  To	
  find	
  this	
  handful	
  of	
  people	
  a	
  Governor	
  and	
  a	
  representation	
  in	
  Congress,	
  to	
  say	
  nothing	
  of	
  the	
  courts,	
  would	
  be	
  a	
  farce	
  of	
  the	
  broadest	
  kind.”267	
  Congress	
  ultimately	
  provided	
  Alaska	
  with	
  the	
  final	
  element	
  of	
  effective	
  occupation	
  by	
  establishing	
  Alaska	
  with	
  a	
  civil	
  government	
  in	
  the	
  1884	
  Alaska	
  Organic	
  Act,	
  making	
  U.S.	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  Alaska	
  complete.	
  	
  The	
  development	
  of	
  U.S.	
  economic	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  with	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Commercial	
  Company	
  led	
  to	
  legislative	
  protectionism	
  over	
  commercial	
  resources,	
  when	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  prohibited	
  the	
  harvesting	
  of	
  fur	
  seals	
  by	
  any	
  unauthorised	
  persons	
  within	
  the	
  waters	
  delimited	
  by	
  the	
  Alaska	
  
Purchase	
  Treaty,	
  passing	
  a	
  resolution	
  to	
  permit	
  the	
  removal	
  and	
  confiscation	
  of	
  property	
  of	
  those	
  found	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  legislation.268	
  Tensions	
  were	
  created	
  with	
  neighbouring	
  Canada	
  when	
  these	
  acts	
  were	
  enforced,	
  in	
  part	
  because	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  claimed	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  all	
  the	
  seas	
  within	
  the	
  treaty	
  limits	
  as	
  territorial	
  waters,	
  beyond	
  the	
  limits	
  of	
  the	
  customary	
  three	
  nautical	
  miles	
  with	
  the	
  U.S.	
  trying	
  to	
  protect	
  the	
  commercial	
  longevity	
  and	
  continuation	
  of	
  this	
  valuable	
  resource.269	
  The	
  issue	
  was	
  ultimately	
  resolved	
  by	
  an	
  international	
  tribunal	
  who	
  determined	
  “recognized	
  the	
  potency	
  of	
  venerable	
  legal	
  relics”	
  that	
  “the	
  United	
  States	
  had	
  no	
  rights	
  of	
  protection	
  or	
  property”	
  over	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  267	
  (The	
  New	
  York	
  Times,	
  1880)	
  268	
  See	
  27	
  July	
  1868,	
  An	
  Act	
  to	
  extend	
  the	
  Laws	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  relating	
  to	
  Customs,	
  Commerce	
  and	
  Navigation,	
  Section	
  6	
  and	
  3	
  March	
  1869	
  A	
  Resolution	
  more	
  efficiently	
  to	
  Protect	
  the	
  Fur	
  Seal	
  in	
  Alaska,	
  No.	
  22.	
  	
  	
  269	
  The	
  methods	
  of	
  Canadian	
  sealers	
  attempting	
  to	
  avoid	
  detection	
  and	
  detention	
  by	
  U.S.	
  authorities	
  led	
  to	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  extraordinarily	
  destructive	
  methods	
  which	
  killed	
  and	
  wasted	
  both	
  pregnant	
  females	
  and	
  pups	
  leading	
  to	
  the	
  decline	
  and	
  near	
  extinction	
  of	
  this	
  seal	
  population.	
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the	
  fur	
  seals,	
  signalling	
  and	
  end	
  to	
  the	
  ability	
  of	
  states	
  to	
  unilaterally	
  declare	
  control	
  over	
  territory.270	
  	
  Following	
  the	
  Bering	
  Sea	
  Arbitration,	
  in	
  1897	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  negotiated	
  a	
  multi-­‐lateral	
  convention	
  delivering	
  a	
  temporary	
  moratorium	
  on	
  seal	
  hunting,	
  agreed	
  between	
  Japan,	
  Russia	
  and	
  United	
  States.	
  The	
  first	
  international	
  conservation	
  treaty,	
  the	
  
North	
  Pacific	
  Fur	
  Seal	
  Treaty	
  1911,	
  regulated	
  the	
  fur	
  seal	
  industry	
  between	
  the	
  states	
  littoral	
  to	
  the	
  Bering	
  Sea	
  and	
  is	
  arguably	
  the	
  first	
  act	
  of	
  multi-­‐lateral	
  Arctic	
  governance.	
  The	
  U.S.	
  followed	
  this	
  treaty	
  with	
  a	
  domestic	
  five-­‐year	
  moratorium	
  on	
  seal	
  hunting	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  allow	
  herd	
  populations	
  to	
  regenerate.	
  Additionally,	
  under	
  the	
  leadership	
  of	
  the	
  progressive,	
  yet	
  imperialistically	
  inclined	
  President	
  Roosevelt,271	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  environmental	
  stewardship-­‐-­‐if	
  only	
  rationalised	
  for	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  economic	
  resources—becomes	
  a	
  feature	
  of	
  U.S.	
  policy,	
  including	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Under	
  this	
  administration,	
  the	
  Pribilof	
  and	
  Alexander	
  Archipelago	
  reserves	
  were	
  established	
  in	
  Alaska.	
  These	
  legislative	
  developments	
  reinforced	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas,	
  initiated	
  an	
  era	
  of	
  both	
  domestic	
  and	
  international	
  legislation	
  based	
  on	
  environmental	
  consideration	
  and	
  finally,	
  it	
  also	
  provided	
  opportunity	
  for	
  states	
  bordering	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  to	
  begin	
  cooperating	
  on	
  issues	
  of	
  international	
  interest.	
  	
  Yet	
  despite	
  this	
  rudimentary	
  international	
  cooperation	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  other	
  territorial	
  rivalries	
  remained.	
  The	
  territorial	
  land	
  boundary	
  between	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  and	
  Canadian	
  British	
  Columbia	
  had	
  never	
  been	
  clearly	
  delimited	
  due	
  to	
  disagreement	
  over	
  the	
  interpretation	
  of	
  the	
  Anglo-­‐Russian	
  Convention	
  of	
  1825	
  and	
  the	
  
Alaska	
  Purchase	
  Treaty	
  also	
  failed	
  to	
  address	
  this	
  issue.	
  This	
  lead	
  to	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  boundary	
  dispute	
  with	
  Canada	
  when	
  the	
  economic	
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  (Brown,	
  1894,	
  pp.	
  364-­‐5)	
  271	
  President	
  T.	
  Roosevelt,	
  an	
  avid	
  outdoorsman,	
  established	
  the	
  National	
  Park	
  System,	
  including	
  the	
  preservation	
  of	
  Yellowstone	
  and	
  Yosemite.	
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potentials	
  of	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  Territory	
  were	
  at	
  last	
  being	
  realised	
  and	
  economic	
  interests	
  were	
  further	
  accelerated	
  by	
  the	
  Alaskan/Klondike	
  Gold	
  Rush	
  in	
  1896.	
  Previously,	
  the	
  ill-­‐defined	
  boundary	
  had	
  been	
  of	
  little	
  consequence	
  as	
  the	
  region	
  was	
  so	
  sparsely	
  populated.	
  	
  American	
  imperialists	
  had	
  also	
  anticipated	
  that	
  this	
  territory	
  would	
  ultimately	
  become	
  the	
  property	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  potential	
  that	
  diminished	
  when	
  British	
  Columbia	
  joined	
  the	
  Confederation	
  of	
  Canada.	
  	
  	
  Unable	
  to	
  reach	
  an	
  agreement	
  with	
  Canada	
  on	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  the	
  boundary,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  superseded	
  the	
  Canadian	
  home	
  government	
  and	
  negotiated	
  directly	
  with	
  Great	
  Britain,	
  agreeing	
  to	
  arbitration	
  by	
  a	
  mixed	
  tribunal,	
  who	
  ultimately	
  determined	
  the	
  final	
  location	
  of	
  the	
  boundary.272	
  As	
  the	
  U.S.	
  position	
  of	
  the	
  boundary	
  was	
  supported	
  by	
  Great	
  Britain	
  over	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  the	
  boundary	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  claim,	
  Canada	
  felt	
  betrayed	
  by	
  their	
  imperial	
  motherland.273	
  President	
  Roosevelt	
  declared	
  the	
  agreement	
  “furnished	
  a	
  signal	
  proof	
  of	
  the	
  fairness	
  and	
  good	
  will	
  with	
  which	
  two	
  friendly	
  nations	
  can	
  approach	
  and	
  determine	
  issues	
  involving	
  national	
  sovereignty.”274	
  However,	
  the	
  contemporary	
  Beaufort	
  Sea	
  dispute	
  is	
  a	
  continuation	
  of	
  the	
  same	
  disagreement	
  over	
  the	
  interpretation	
  of	
  the	
  1825	
  treaty,	
  and	
  the	
  issue	
  remains	
  for	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  to	
  resolve	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  finalise	
  their	
  Arctic	
  territorial	
  claims	
  and	
  resource	
  rights.	
  	
  	
  Pursuing	
  interests	
  within	
  the	
  territory	
  following	
  the	
  completion	
  of	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Purchase	
  Treaty,	
  the	
  attention	
  of	
  the	
  U.S.	
  government	
  turned	
  to	
  the	
  wider	
  Arctic	
  regions.	
  In	
  1870,	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Congress	
  passed	
  a	
  resolution	
  providing	
  $50,000	
  to	
  the	
  Department	
  of	
  the	
  Navy	
  to	
  send	
  an	
  expedition	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  with	
  results	
  to	
  be	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  272	
  The	
  tribunal	
  was	
  composed	
  of	
  3	
  Americans,	
  2	
  Canadians	
  and	
  1	
  Briton.	
  	
  273	
  (Keenleyside	
  &	
  Brown,	
  1952)	
  274	
  (Roosevelt,	
  1903)	
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reported	
  to	
  the	
  National	
  Academy	
  of	
  Sciences,275	
  renewing	
  momentum	
  for	
  exploration	
  lost	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  American	
  Civil	
  War.	
  	
  Reporting	
  on	
  his	
  expeditions,	
  American	
  explorer	
  Isaac	
  Hayes	
  determined	
  that	
  the	
  motives	
  for	
  Arctic	
  exploration,	
  despite	
  the	
  repeated	
  failures	
  and	
  hardships	
  included:	
  access	
  to	
  commercial	
  passages,	
  procurement	
  of	
  resources	
  and	
  ultimately,	
  the	
  motive	
  of	
  discovery:	
  possession.276	
  During	
  this	
  period	
  of	
  expansion,	
  the	
  U.S.	
  acquired	
  ‘first	
  stage’	
  possession	
  of	
  many	
  islands	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Archipelago,	
  even	
  claiming	
  to	
  Greenland,	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Navy	
  when	
  one	
  explorer	
  “landed,	
  unrolled	
  the	
  national	
  flag,	
  and	
  took	
  possession	
  of	
  the	
  land	
  which	
  he	
  had	
  discovered.”277	
  Congress	
  continued	
  to	
  sponsor	
  both	
  naval	
  and	
  army	
  expeditions,	
  led	
  by	
  explorers	
  such	
  as	
  Hall,	
  Greeley,	
  and	
  De	
  Long,	
  every	
  expedition	
  failing	
  to	
  reach	
  the	
  North	
  Pole.	
  At	
  last,	
  the	
  privately	
  financed	
  Admiral	
  Peary	
  acquired	
  the	
  prize	
  of	
  the	
  period	
  in	
  1909.	
  	
  	
  However,	
  by	
  the	
  time	
  Peary	
  reached	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  the	
  tide	
  of	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  through	
  discovery	
  was	
  turning	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  affecting	
  the	
  spread	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  claims	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  So	
  although	
  Peary	
  claimed	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  for	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  expensive	
  lessons	
  from	
  declaring	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  maritime	
  areas	
  in	
  the	
  Bering	
  Sea	
  had	
  been	
  recently	
  learned	
  by	
  the	
  United	
  States.	
  So	
  the	
  opportunity	
  to	
  accept	
  this	
  possession	
  was	
  rejected	
  by	
  President	
  Taft.	
  Yet,	
  Taft	
  still	
  noted	
  Peary’s	
  accomplishment	
  in	
  a	
  message	
  to	
  Congress	
  saying:	
  	
  “The	
  complete	
  success	
  of	
  our	
  country	
  in	
  Arctic	
  exploration	
  should	
  not	
  remain	
  unnoticed.	
  For	
  centuries	
  there	
  has	
  been	
  friendly	
  rivalry	
  in	
  this	
  field	
  of	
  effort	
  between	
  the	
  foremost	
  nations	
  and	
  between	
  the	
  bravest	
  and	
  most	
  accomplished	
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  The	
  National	
  Academy	
  of	
  Sciences	
  is	
  an	
  institute	
  established	
  by	
  an	
  Act	
  of	
  Congress	
  in	
  1862	
  to	
  “provide	
  scientific	
  advice	
  to	
  the	
  government	
  ‘whenever	
  called	
  upon’”,	
  (National	
  Academy	
  of	
  Sciences,	
  2013).	
  276	
  (Hayes,	
  1868)	
  Hayes	
  specifically	
  mentions	
  whale	
  oil.	
  277	
  (United	
  States	
  Department	
  of	
  the	
  Navy,	
  1876,	
  p.	
  104)	
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men.	
  Enlightened	
  governments	
  have	
  encouraged	
  expeditions	
  to	
  the	
  unknown	
  North	
  and	
  deserved	
  honours	
  have	
  been	
  granted	
  to	
  the	
  daring	
  men	
  who	
  have	
  conducted	
  them.	
  The	
  unparalleled	
  accomplishment	
  of	
  an	
  American	
  in	
  reaching	
  the	
  North	
  Pole…has	
  added	
  to	
  the	
  distinction	
  of	
  our	
  navy,	
  to	
  which	
  he	
  belongs,	
  and	
  reflects	
  credit	
  upon	
  his	
  country.”278	
  	
  With	
  the	
  last	
  of	
  all	
  known	
  land	
  having	
  been	
  discovered,	
  recorded	
  and	
  mapped	
  within	
  the	
  political	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  the	
  states	
  littoral	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  preserved,	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  expired	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  The	
  introduction	
  of	
  these	
  rules,	
  or	
  shared	
  understandings	
  which	
  restricted	
  unlimited	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  within	
  international	
  relations	
  bring	
  a	
  transition	
  into	
  the	
  next	
  phase	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system:	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  when	
  a	
  new	
  rule	
  would	
  be	
  attempted	
  to	
  secure	
  those	
  territories	
  yet	
  undiscovered	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  	
  	
  United	
  States	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  during	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  saw	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  several	
  objectives	
  for	
  the	
  U.S.	
  government	
  including	
  the	
  expansion	
  of	
  territory,	
  extension	
  of	
  the	
  functions	
  and	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  government	
  over	
  the	
  new	
  territory,	
  establishing	
  control	
  over	
  resources	
  and	
  the	
  exploitation	
  of	
  their	
  economic	
  potential.	
  Additionally,	
  the	
  government	
  reinforced	
  the	
  asymmetric	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  maintained	
  elsewhere	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  by	
  excluding	
  them	
  from	
  rights	
  and	
  privileges	
  of	
  ordinary	
  U.S.	
  citizens,	
  instead	
  absorbing	
  them	
  within	
  an	
  unequal	
  custodial	
  relationship.	
  The	
  progressive	
  finale	
  of	
  this	
  period	
  also	
  saw	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  environmental	
  stewardship	
  agendas,	
  even	
  if	
  only	
  for	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  commercial	
  interests,	
  this	
  practice	
  triggered	
  the	
  beginning	
  of	
  environmental	
  conservation	
  and	
  preservation	
  principles	
  into	
  the	
  realm	
  of	
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international	
  relations.	
  The	
  initial	
  failure	
  of	
  U.S.	
  environmental	
  legislation	
  in	
  international	
  territory	
  meanwhile	
  reinforced	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas,	
  which	
  goes	
  forward	
  as	
  a	
  predominant	
  concern	
  of	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  to	
  this	
  day.	
  	
  
U.S.	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  during	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  and	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  transitioned	
  during	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years,	
  moving	
  both	
  to	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  American	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  tactical	
  cache	
  of	
  resources,	
  but	
  also	
  using	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  American	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  security	
  buffer	
  zone	
  and	
  staging	
  point	
  for	
  military	
  operations.	
  Exploration	
  and	
  the	
  impulse	
  for	
  discovery	
  continued,	
  but	
  as	
  technology	
  such	
  as	
  airplanes	
  and	
  radio	
  communications	
  were	
  developed,	
  these	
  tools	
  were	
  used	
  to	
  pursue	
  strategic	
  U.S.	
  interests,	
  in	
  science,	
  economics	
  and	
  security.	
  The	
  Monroe	
  Doctrine	
  continued	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  dominant	
  motivator	
  in	
  the	
  rationale	
  for	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  in	
  their	
  cooperation	
  agreements	
  and	
  development	
  decisions	
  in	
  Alaska,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Greenland,	
  but	
  the	
  rising	
  powers	
  of	
  Japan	
  and	
  a	
  unified	
  Germany	
  were	
  the	
  cause	
  of	
  security	
  concerns.	
  In	
  this	
  period,	
  the	
  modern	
  international	
  system	
  was	
  in	
  its	
  infancy	
  as	
  power	
  was	
  consolidated	
  between	
  political	
  units	
  in	
  Europe	
  to	
  form	
  states.	
  Meanwhile,	
  the	
  imperial	
  powers	
  of	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  began	
  to	
  turn	
  to	
  liberal	
  institutionalism	
  as	
  the	
  answer	
  for	
  the	
  prevention	
  of	
  conflict,	
  and	
  began	
  extensively	
  codifying	
  international	
  law	
  as	
  a	
  method	
  for	
  establishing	
  normative	
  expectations	
  for	
  behaviour	
  by	
  states	
  entering	
  into	
  the	
  international	
  community	
  of	
  states.	
  	
  	
  In	
  this	
  next	
  phase	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  Arctic	
  exploration	
  did	
  not	
  disappear	
  completely	
  with	
  the	
  acquisition	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  but	
  the	
  aims	
  of	
  exploration	
  turned	
  from	
  ‘discovery’	
  of	
  territory	
  as	
  a	
  primary	
  objective	
  toward	
  exploration	
  for	
  scientific	
  and	
  economic	
  aims.	
  Of	
  the	
  dwindling	
  number	
  of	
  expeditions	
  sent	
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into	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  investors	
  desirous	
  of	
  future	
  returns	
  privately	
  financed	
  many	
  of	
  these	
  expeditions.	
  Funding	
  from	
  the	
  U.S.	
  government	
  enabled	
  scientific	
  exploration	
  without	
  immediate	
  financial	
  returns	
  although	
  it	
  was	
  noted,	
  “purely	
  scientific	
  [research]	
  must	
  have	
  some	
  bearing,	
  and	
  very	
  often	
  a	
  direct	
  bearing	
  upon	
  economic	
  values	
  sooner	
  or	
  later.”279	
  This	
  scientific	
  exploration	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  enabled	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  both	
  the	
  economic	
  and	
  security	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  with	
  tax	
  funded	
  agencies	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Geological	
  Survey	
  assisting	
  with	
  the	
  mapping	
  of	
  the	
  terrain	
  and	
  discovery	
  of	
  natural	
  resources.	
  This	
  work	
  allowed	
  for	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  mining	
  through	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Mining	
  Commission,	
  established	
  by	
  Congress,	
  and	
  for	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  fishing	
  industry	
  enabled	
  by	
  Congressionally	
  funded	
  navigational	
  aids.	
  Areas	
  thought	
  to	
  contain	
  oil	
  were	
  removed	
  from	
  public	
  sale	
  and	
  were	
  set	
  aside	
  as	
  naval	
  petroleum	
  reserves	
  to	
  be	
  used	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  a	
  national	
  emergency.	
  Additionally,	
  the	
  polar	
  aviation	
  expeditions	
  flown	
  by	
  the	
  Air	
  Corps	
  of	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Army	
  were	
  used	
  to	
  survey	
  the	
  Arctic	
  for	
  any	
  remaining	
  unknown	
  islands,	
  which	
  could	
  be	
  added	
  to	
  the	
  U.S.	
  territorial	
  portfolio.	
  	
  With	
  a	
  territorial	
  government	
  established	
  in	
  Alaska,	
  the	
  thoughts	
  of	
  the	
  federal	
  government	
  turned	
  from	
  exploration	
  to	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  economic	
  capabilities	
  of	
  the	
  territory.	
  In	
  1913,	
  President	
  Wilson	
  said	
  “A	
  duty	
  faces	
  us	
  with	
  regard	
  to	
  Alaska,	
  which	
  seems	
  to	
  me	
  very	
  pressing	
  and	
  very	
  imperative;	
  perhaps	
  I	
  should	
  say	
  a	
  double	
  duty,	
  for	
  it	
  concerns	
  both	
  the	
  political	
  and	
  the	
  material	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Territory.	
  The	
  people	
  of	
  Alaska	
  should	
  be	
  given	
  the	
  full	
  Territorial	
  form	
  of	
  government,	
  and	
  Alaska,	
  as	
  a	
  storehouse,	
  should	
  be	
  unlocked.”280	
  This	
  development	
  included	
  supporting	
  the	
  construction	
  of	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Railroad,	
  in	
  a	
  bill	
  providing	
  financing	
  “for	
  government	
  construction	
  of	
  railroads	
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  (Debenham,	
  1930,	
  p.	
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in	
  Alaska	
  under	
  the	
  full	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  president.”281	
  This	
  project	
  was	
  further	
  enabled	
  through	
  the	
  federal	
  government	
  transferring	
  federal	
  public	
  land	
  to	
  be	
  used	
  by	
  the	
  railway,	
  as	
  had	
  been	
  done	
  to	
  complete	
  the	
  Transcontinental	
  Railroad	
  following	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Civil	
  War,	
  which	
  greatly	
  opened	
  up	
  migration	
  and	
  economic	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  American	
  West.	
  However,	
  while	
  the	
  railroad	
  supported	
  tourism	
  and	
  the	
  movement	
  of	
  goods	
  within	
  Alaska,	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  a	
  link	
  to	
  the	
  continental	
  U.S.	
  failed	
  to	
  enable	
  the	
  expected	
  economic	
  boom,	
  initially	
  muting	
  the	
  suggestions	
  of	
  building	
  an	
  extended	
  railroad	
  or	
  highway	
  from	
  Alaska	
  through	
  Canada	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  States.	
  	
  	
  As	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  opening	
  of	
  Alaska	
  in	
  the	
  early	
  1930s,	
  the	
  building	
  of	
  a	
  highway	
  through	
  Canada	
  from	
  Alaska	
  was	
  promoted	
  as	
  being	
  in	
  the	
  economic	
  interest	
  of	
  U.S.	
  Arctic	
  policy.	
  A	
  report	
  to	
  Congress	
  deemed	
  that	
  a	
  highway	
  increasing	
  accessibility	
  to	
  Alaska	
  would	
  not	
  only	
  increase	
  tax	
  revenues	
  for	
  the	
  Federal	
  government,	
  but	
  by	
  “providing	
  a	
  new	
  and	
  valuable	
  area	
  for	
  exploration,	
  for	
  recreation,	
  or	
  business	
  purposes”	
  would	
  “promot[e]	
  friendly	
  relations	
  between	
  citizens	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Canada”	
  as	
  the	
  highway	
  would	
  traverse	
  through	
  Canada	
  to	
  reach	
  Alaska.282	
  However,	
  as	
  the	
  fur	
  trade	
  declined	
  and	
  Alaska’s	
  only	
  oil	
  field	
  at	
  Katalla	
  failed,	
  the	
  economic	
  incentives	
  of	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  Highway	
  were	
  meagre	
  in	
  the	
  wake	
  of	
  the	
  Great	
  Depression.	
  	
  Security	
  incentives	
  for	
  the	
  project	
  were	
  initiated	
  in	
  the	
  Second	
  World	
  War	
  after	
  the	
  invasion	
  of	
  Imperial	
  Japan	
  in	
  territory	
  throughout	
  the	
  Pacific	
  and	
  of	
  Germany	
  into	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union,	
  with	
  one	
  U.S.	
  General	
  saying	
  “the	
  progress	
  of	
  events	
  has	
  inclined	
  me	
  to	
  the	
  view	
  that	
  the	
  construction	
  of	
  an	
  Alaskan	
  road	
  is	
  advisable	
  as	
  a	
  long	
  range	
  military	
  measure.”283	
  Thus,	
  in	
  1942,	
  both	
  Congress	
  and	
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  (San	
  Francisco	
  Call,	
  1913)	
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  (Bucksar,	
  1968,	
  p.	
  218)	
  283	
  (Embick,	
  1989,	
  p.	
  394)	
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the	
  War	
  Department	
  approved	
  the	
  project	
  for	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  	
  “furnish[ing]	
  a	
  route	
  to	
  link	
  up	
  the	
  established	
  airfields	
  and	
  thus	
  permit	
  their	
  expansion”	
  and	
  to	
  “provide	
  an	
  overland	
  auxiliary	
  supply	
  route	
  to	
  Alaska.”284	
  It	
  was	
  agreed	
  that	
  following	
  the	
  war,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  would	
  surrender	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  segment	
  of	
  the	
  highway.	
  This	
  approach	
  to	
  security	
  policy	
  through	
  cooperative	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  American	
  Arctic	
  carries	
  into	
  the	
  next	
  phase	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  The	
  concerted	
  effort	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  to	
  make	
  secure	
  the	
  homeland	
  led	
  to	
  two	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  outcomes	
  through	
  continued	
  enforcement	
  of	
  the	
  Monroe	
  Doctrine	
  and	
  engagement	
  with	
  other	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  cooperate	
  in	
  pursuit	
  of	
  collective	
  security.	
  	
  One	
  example	
  is	
  during	
  this	
  period	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  the	
  changed	
  their	
  position	
  on	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  Greenland	
  by	
  surrendering	
  any	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  island.	
  This	
  became	
  an	
  issue	
  of	
  both	
  security	
  and	
  cooperation	
  when	
  it	
  became	
  apparent	
  that	
  were	
  the	
  Germans	
  to	
  be	
  successful	
  in	
  their	
  hostile	
  efforts,	
  Greenland	
  and	
  Newfoundland	
  could	
  be	
  used	
  as	
  staging	
  points	
  for	
  a	
  Nazi	
  invasion	
  of	
  North	
  America.285	
  Thus,	
  the	
  State	
  Department	
  negotiated	
  the	
  US-­‐Danish	
  
Agreement	
  on	
  Greenland	
  1941,	
  where	
  the	
  U.S.	
  confirmed	
  their	
  acknowledgement	
  of	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  Denmark	
  over	
  Greenland,	
  but	
  assumed	
  “responsibility	
  of	
  assisting	
  Greenland	
  in	
  the	
  maintenance	
  of	
  its	
  present	
  status,”	
  securing	
  “the	
  right	
  to	
  construct,	
  maintain	
  and	
  operate	
  such	
  landing	
  fields,	
  seaplane	
  facilities	
  and	
  radio	
  and	
  meteorological	
  installations	
  as	
  may	
  be	
  necessary	
  for	
  the	
  accomplishment	
  of	
  the[se]	
  purposes.”286	
  The	
  policy	
  of	
  funding	
  both	
  infrastructural	
  development	
  and	
  scientific	
  research	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  now	
  considered	
  standard	
  practice	
  by	
  the	
  U.S.	
  government,	
  aided	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  military	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  284	
  (Bucksar,	
  1968,	
  p.	
  221)	
  285	
  Greenland	
  became	
  the	
  sole	
  possession	
  of	
  Denmark	
  following	
  a	
  tribunal	
  in	
  the	
  International	
  Court	
  of	
  Permanent	
  Justice	
  1933,	
  and	
  Newfoundland	
  was	
  a	
  British	
  possession.	
  	
  286	
  (	
  (United	
  States	
  Department	
  of	
  State,	
  1941,	
  p.	
  130)	
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infrastructure,	
  including	
  roads,	
  radio	
  communications	
  and	
  airstrips.287	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  their	
  pursing	
  their	
  own	
  research	
  objectives,	
  the	
  U.S.	
  participated	
  in	
  the	
  Second	
  International	
  Polar	
  Year	
  in	
  1932,	
  collaborating	
  on	
  research	
  to	
  solve	
  the	
  abnormalities	
  of	
  magnetic	
  field	
  lines	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  environment	
  that	
  caused	
  interference	
  in	
  radio	
  communications.	
  This	
  information	
  was	
  sorely	
  needed	
  during	
  the	
  Second	
  World	
  War	
  when	
  the	
  Aleutian	
  Islands	
  were	
  occupied	
  by	
  Japan,	
  and	
  when	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Convoys	
  carried	
  supplies	
  from	
  North	
  America	
  via	
  Iceland	
  to	
  the	
  contribute	
  to	
  the	
  war	
  effort	
  in	
  Europe.	
  To	
  support	
  military	
  communications	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  Presidents	
  Wilson	
  and	
  F.D.	
  Roosevelt	
  requisitioned	
  public	
  land	
  in	
  Alaska	
  to	
  establish	
  Naval	
  radio	
  stations.	
  	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  researching	
  technology	
  for	
  military	
  use,	
  the	
  U.S	
  policy	
  also	
  supported	
  operational	
  and	
  training	
  research	
  for	
  the	
  troops.	
  Commissioned	
  by	
  the	
  War	
  Department,	
  polar	
  explorer	
  Stefansson	
  produced	
  a	
  military	
  Arctic	
  manual	
  because	
  “there	
  might	
  be	
  a	
  war	
  coming	
  which	
  would	
  carry	
  our	
  troops	
  to	
  spheres	
  of	
  operations	
  where	
  they	
  would	
  need	
  an	
  Arctic	
  technique	
  and	
  a	
  knowledge	
  of	
  Arctic	
  conditions—basic…to	
  the	
  success	
  of	
  the	
  operations….”288	
  In	
  these	
  examples,	
  it	
  is	
  seen	
  that	
  the	
  policy	
  decision	
  to	
  fund	
  the	
  scientific	
  exploration	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  had	
  its	
  pay	
  out	
  in	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  use	
  the	
  knowledge	
  to	
  pursue	
  the	
  policy	
  objective	
  of	
  security	
  as	
  a	
  primary	
  national	
  interest.	
  	
  	
  This	
  security	
  interest	
  continues	
  in	
  the	
  U.S.	
  position	
  on	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  maritime	
  areas.	
  After	
  Taft	
  declined	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  from	
  then	
  onward	
  became	
  a	
  dominant	
  theme	
  of	
  both	
  U.S.	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  and	
  U.S.	
  foreign	
  policy,	
  in	
  general.	
  This	
  policy	
  position	
  was	
  delivered	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  community	
  by	
  President	
  Wilson	
  in	
  his	
  Fourteen	
  Points	
  speech	
  calling	
  for	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  287	
  Now	
  known	
  as	
  research	
  &	
  development.	
  288	
  (Stefansson,	
  1944,	
  p.	
  25)	
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“Absolute	
  freedom	
  of	
  navigation	
  upon	
  the	
  seas,	
  outside	
  territorial	
  waters,	
  alike	
  in	
  peace	
  an	
  in	
  war….”289	
  Freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas,	
  for	
  U.S.	
  national	
  interests,	
  meant	
  not	
  only	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  continue	
  commerce	
  and	
  trade	
  in	
  time	
  of	
  war,	
  but	
  also	
  allowed	
  access	
  through	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Passage	
  and	
  other	
  areas	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  for	
  both	
  scientific	
  exploration	
  and	
  access	
  to	
  distant	
  Arctic	
  islands	
  over	
  which	
  the	
  U.S.	
  held	
  incomplete	
  	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  archipelago.290	
  As	
  the	
  field	
  of	
  aviation	
  developed,	
  the	
  U.S	
  also	
  extended	
  this	
  concept	
  of	
  ‘freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas’	
  in	
  customary	
  law	
  to	
  the	
  skies,	
  promoting	
  the	
  ‘freedom	
  of	
  over	
  flight’,	
  which	
  was	
  used	
  widely	
  in	
  the	
  Polar	
  routes.	
  	
  	
  Finally,	
  for	
  the	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants	
  of	
  Alaska,	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  continued	
  to	
  maintain	
  the	
  custodial	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  tribes.	
  However,	
  given	
  the	
  struggling	
  conditions	
  of	
  Native	
  American	
  reservations	
  in	
  the	
  lower	
  forty-­‐eight,	
  the	
  decision	
  was	
  made	
  not	
  to	
  establish	
  reservations	
  in	
  Alaska.	
  Despite	
  the	
  Fourteenth	
  Amendment	
  to	
  the	
  Constitution	
  providing	
  that	
  all	
  persons	
  born	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  would	
  be	
  citizens,	
  given	
  the	
  protectorate	
  relationship	
  of	
  the	
  federal	
  government	
  with	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants,	
  there	
  was	
  uncertainty	
  over	
  whether	
  this	
  applied	
  to	
  the	
  American	
  natives.	
  Thus,	
  Congress	
  passed	
  the	
  Indian	
  Citizenship	
  
Act	
  of	
  1924,	
  declaring,	
  “all	
  noncitizen	
  Indians	
  born	
  within	
  the	
  territorial	
  limits	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  be,	
  and	
  they	
  are	
  hereby,	
  declared	
  to	
  be	
  citizens	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States.”291	
  While	
  this	
  act	
  indirectly	
  becomes	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  U.S.	
  Arctic	
  policy,	
  it	
  ultimately	
  causes	
  a	
  conflict	
  in	
  relations	
  between	
  the	
  government	
  and	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  indigenous	
  peoples	
  in	
  later	
  years.	
  	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  289	
  (Wilson,	
  1918)	
  290	
  The	
  U.S.	
  surrendered	
  this	
  incomplete	
  sovereignty	
  to	
  Canada	
  following	
  their	
  sectoral	
  declaration	
  during	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years.	
  	
  291	
  (United	
  States	
  Government,	
  1929,	
  p.	
  1165)	
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United	
  States	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  saw	
  a	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  objectives	
  of	
  exploration	
  from	
  that	
  of	
  discovery	
  and	
  expansion	
  of	
  territory	
  towards	
  the	
  motives	
  of	
  exploration	
  for	
  scientific	
  knowledge	
  and	
  economic	
  incentives.	
  As	
  this	
  knowledge	
  expanded	
  and	
  the	
  U.S.	
  faced	
  the	
  upheaval	
  of	
  two	
  world	
  wars,	
  decisions	
  were	
  made	
  on	
  the	
  type	
  of	
  infrastructure	
  that	
  should	
  be	
  developed	
  through	
  government-­‐funded	
  projects.	
  This	
  development	
  had	
  two	
  primary	
  focuses-­‐-­‐-­‐one	
  on	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  infrastructure,	
  such	
  as	
  roads	
  and	
  railroads	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  exploit	
  the	
  wealth	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  moving	
  the	
  economic	
  capital	
  back	
  to	
  the	
  continental	
  United	
  States.	
  The	
  second	
  focus	
  was	
  made	
  exigent	
  by	
  the	
  turmoil	
  within	
  the	
  community	
  of	
  states	
  as	
  they	
  struggled	
  to	
  transition	
  from	
  the	
  expansionist	
  practices	
  of	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  to	
  a	
  system	
  made	
  smaller	
  by	
  technology,	
  the	
  consolidation	
  of	
  power	
  in	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  European	
  states	
  and	
  the	
  gradual	
  solidifying	
  of	
  what	
  would	
  become	
  the	
  modern	
  international	
  system	
  supported	
  by	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  public	
  international	
  law.	
  	
  	
  
U.S.	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  U.S.	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  developed	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  construct	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  shared	
  understandings	
  of	
  the	
  hostility,	
  suspicion	
  and	
  threat	
  of	
  the	
  bi-­‐polar	
  world.	
  Throughout	
  the	
  world,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  promoted	
  peace	
  and	
  security	
  through	
  international	
  institutions	
  that	
  became	
  of	
  feature	
  of	
  the	
  modern	
  international	
  system.	
  These	
  institutions	
  were	
  used	
  to	
  provide	
  order	
  to	
  expanding	
  community	
  of	
  states	
  introduced	
  to	
  the	
  system	
  through	
  decolonisation	
  and	
  the	
  decline	
  of	
  formal	
  empire.	
  However,	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  tended	
  to	
  rely	
  on	
  bilateral	
  forms	
  of	
  cooperation	
  and	
  security	
  interests	
  dominated	
  the	
  visible	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  resources	
  and	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
  As	
  Alaska	
  and	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  are	
  separated	
  in	
  the	
  Bering	
  Strait	
  by	
  only	
  fifty	
  three	
  miles,	
  the	
  reality	
  that	
  “there	
  is	
  no	
  physical	
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frontier	
  between	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union…the	
  American	
  and	
  Soviet	
  flags	
  are	
  within	
  a	
  few	
  miles	
  of	
  each	
  other...”	
  became	
  significant	
  with	
  development	
  of	
  airplanes	
  and	
  other	
  advanced	
  weapons	
  in	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  which	
  caused	
  these	
  miles	
  to	
  become	
  increasingly	
  diminutive	
  as	
  a	
  frontier	
  buffer	
  zone.292	
  	
  To	
  this	
  end,	
  territorial	
  borders	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  were	
  secured	
  by	
  surveillance	
  technology,	
  and	
  infrastructure	
  was	
  developed	
  to	
  provide	
  energy	
  security	
  while	
  the	
  environment	
  issues	
  were	
  used	
  as	
  neutral,	
  non-­‐security	
  related	
  point	
  of	
  cooperation.	
  	
  	
  In	
  1946,	
  General	
  Arnold,	
  wartime	
  commander	
  of	
  the	
  Army	
  Air	
  Force,	
  announced	
  to	
  the	
  graduating	
  class	
  of	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Military,	
  that	
  the	
  nation’s	
  first	
  line	
  of	
  defence	
  now	
  lay	
  to	
  the	
  north.	
  If	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  were	
  ever	
  attacked,	
  the	
  enemy	
  “will	
  surely	
  come	
  from	
  over	
  the	
  Pole.”293	
  As	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  this	
  belief	
  in	
  the	
  potential	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  being	
  employed	
  as	
  both	
  a	
  theatre	
  of	
  war	
  and	
  as	
  a	
  route	
  of	
  attack,	
  security	
  interests	
  dominated	
  Arctic	
  policy,	
  and	
  funding	
  was	
  allocated	
  to	
  the	
  research	
  and	
  development	
  of	
  technologies	
  capable	
  of	
  operating	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  conditions,	
  especially	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  submarines,	
  but	
  also	
  including	
  icebreakers	
  and	
  radar	
  surveillance	
  systems.	
  The	
  strategic	
  importance	
  of	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  operate	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  for	
  the	
  U.S.	
  military	
  was	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  commendations	
  of	
  President	
  Eisenhower	
  with	
  “a	
  sincere	
  Well	
  Done”	
  to	
  the	
  crew	
  of	
  the	
  U.S.S.	
  Nautilus	
  who	
  broke	
  through	
  the	
  surface	
  of	
  the	
  ice	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  lauding	
  their	
  achievements	
  in	
  “a	
  revolution	
  in	
  naval	
  tactics	
  and	
  construction.”294	
  While	
  much	
  of	
  this	
  was	
  pursued	
  through	
  general	
  Cold	
  War	
  policy,	
  the	
  National	
  Security	
  Decision	
  Memorandum	
  1971,	
  states	
  the	
  explicit	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  objective	
  of	
  “improving	
  the	
  U.S.	
  capability	
  to	
  inhabit	
  and	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  292	
  (Chamberlin,	
  1950,	
  p.	
  80	
  )	
  293	
  (Leary	
  &	
  LeSchack,	
  1996,	
  p.	
  2)	
  294	
  (Eisenhower,	
  1958)	
  
	
   162	
  
operate	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.”295	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  submarine	
  capabilities,	
  this	
  ability	
  was	
  also	
  pursued	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Wind-­‐class	
  ice-­‐breakers	
  and	
  through	
  an	
  1988	
  agreement	
  on	
  Arctic	
  cooperation,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Canada	
  collaborated	
  in	
  “the	
  opportunity	
  to	
  increase	
  their	
  knowledge	
  of	
  the	
  marine	
  environment	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  through	
  research	
  conducted	
  during	
  icebreaker	
  voyages,	
  and	
  their	
  shared	
  interest	
  in	
  safe,	
  effective	
  icebreaker	
  navigation.”296	
  Meanwhile	
  the	
  U.S.	
  maintained	
  their	
  policy	
  on	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  and	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Passage	
  as	
  an	
  international	
  strait.	
  	
  Another	
  method	
  implemented	
  by	
  the	
  U.S.	
  in	
  promoting	
  their	
  security	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  through	
  continued	
  cooperation	
  on	
  pre-­‐existing	
  arrangements	
  with	
  Canada	
  and	
  Denmark,	
  begun	
  during	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years.	
  In	
  1951,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  renewed	
  its	
  agreement	
  for	
  the	
  defence	
  of	
  Greenland	
  “in	
  accordance	
  with	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  self-­‐help	
  and	
  mutual	
  aid”297	
  but	
  this	
  time	
  to	
  defend	
  against	
  incursions	
  by	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union,	
  a	
  former	
  ally	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Even	
  though	
  it	
  was	
  understood	
  that	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  had	
  more	
  vulnerable	
  targets	
  in	
  their	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  targets	
  in	
  the	
  north	
  did	
  not	
  make	
  the	
  U.S.	
  feel	
  secure	
  and	
  they	
  turned	
  to	
  early	
  warning	
  systems	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  Distant	
  Early	
  Warning	
  line	
  stretching	
  from	
  Alaska	
  to	
  Greenland,	
  to	
  prevent	
  surprise	
  attacks	
  from	
  coming	
  from	
  the	
  U.S.S.R.	
  across	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  A	
  security	
  secret,	
  labelled	
  Project	
  572,	
  the	
  Distant	
  Early	
  Warning	
  line	
  was	
  “the	
  most	
  important	
  link	
  in	
  the	
  10,000	
  miles	
  outer	
  ring	
  of	
  radar	
  fence”	
  and	
  was	
  established	
  through	
  bilateral	
  U.S.-­‐Canadian	
  cooperation,	
  which	
  also	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  North	
  American	
  Air	
  Defense	
  Command	
  Agreement	
  1958,	
  establishing	
  ‘NORAD’	
  for	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  air	
  surveillance	
  and	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  295	
  (National	
  Security	
  Council	
  ,	
  1971)	
  As	
  a	
  classified	
  security	
  document,	
  it	
  was	
  determined	
  in	
  the	
  NSDM	
  144	
  that	
  “there	
  should	
  be	
  no	
  public	
  statements	
  concerning	
  the	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,”	
  rationale	
  for	
  this	
  assumed	
  in	
  the	
  intent	
  of	
  keeping	
  the	
  Soviets	
  unaware	
  of	
  a	
  specific	
  Arctic	
  strategy	
  by	
  the	
  United	
  States.	
  296	
  (Government	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  1988)	
  297	
  (Government	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  1957)	
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defence,	
  including	
  the	
  annual	
  tracking	
  of	
  Santa’s	
  sleigh	
  journey	
  from	
  the	
  North	
  Pole.298	
  	
  U.S.	
  environmental	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  era	
  had	
  a	
  two-­‐pronged	
  approach.	
  The	
  first	
  approach	
  implemented	
  the	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  directive	
  of	
  “promoting	
  mutual	
  beneficial	
  international	
  cooperation	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic”	
  and	
  was	
  pursued	
  through	
  multilateral	
  and	
  bilateral	
  environmental	
  agreements	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  1973	
  
Agreement	
  on	
  the	
  Conservation	
  of	
  Polar	
  Bears	
  with	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  circumpolar	
  Arctic,	
  continuing	
  the	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  endangered	
  species	
  seen	
  in	
  a	
  earlier	
  period	
  with	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  the	
  fur	
  seals.299	
  The	
  United	
  States	
  also	
  agreed	
  to	
  the	
  U.S.-­‐Soviet	
  
Cooperation	
  in	
  Environmental	
  Protection	
  1972	
  which	
  “aimed	
  at	
  solving	
  the	
  most	
  important	
  aspects	
  of	
  the	
  problems	
  of	
  the	
  environment	
  and	
  will	
  be	
  devoted	
  to	
  working	
  out	
  measures	
  to	
  prevent	
  pollution,	
  to	
  study	
  pollution	
  and	
  its	
  effect	
  on	
  the	
  environment,	
  and	
  to	
  develop	
  the	
  basis	
  for	
  controlling	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  human	
  activities	
  on	
  nature.”300	
  This	
  policy	
  development	
  paved	
  the	
  way	
  for	
  the	
  later	
  cooperation	
  that	
  would	
  culminate	
  in	
  the	
  1991	
  
Arctic	
  Environmental	
  Protection	
  Strategy	
  signed	
  by	
  all	
  eight	
  of	
  the	
  circumpolar	
  states.	
  	
  However,	
  despite	
  this	
  turn	
  to	
  multi-­‐lateral	
  cooperation	
  and	
  policy	
  supporting	
  the	
  cooperation	
  in	
  environmental	
  issues,	
  it	
  was	
  in	
  this	
  period	
  that	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  developed	
  its	
  position	
  on	
  the	
  possibilities	
  for	
  an	
  ‘Arctic	
  Treaty’	
  similar	
  to	
  the	
  one	
  agreed	
  upon	
  for	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  in	
  1959,	
  with	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  postponing	
  sovereign	
  territorial	
  claims	
  in	
  that	
  region.	
  Under	
  the	
  Nixon	
  administration,	
  this	
  potential	
  Arctic	
  Treaty	
  System	
  was	
  called	
  the	
  ‘Northlands	
  Compact’	
  approach.	
  In	
  a	
  national	
  security	
  memorandum,	
  Secretary	
  of	
  State	
  Henry	
  Kissinger	
  informed	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Departments	
  of	
  State	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  298	
  (Morenus,	
  1957,	
  p.	
  49)	
  299	
  (National	
  Security	
  Council	
  ,	
  1971)	
  300	
  (Government	
  of	
  the	
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  States,	
  1972)	
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and	
  Defense	
  that	
  “The	
  President	
  does	
  not	
  desire,	
  however,	
  that	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  undertake	
  discussions	
  at	
  this	
  time	
  with…	
  countries	
  with	
  Arctic	
  interests	
  with	
  the	
  aim	
  of	
  promoting	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  a	
  multinational	
  Northlands	
  and	
  Arctic	
  Cooperation	
  Compact	
  and	
  the	
  convening	
  of	
  an	
  international	
  conference	
  to	
  this	
  end.”301	
  The	
  position	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  regarding	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Treaty	
  currently	
  remains	
  unchanged.	
  	
  	
  The	
  second	
  approach	
  of	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  on	
  Arctic	
  environment	
  is	
  guided	
  by	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  “supporting	
  sound	
  and	
  rational	
  development	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region,	
  while	
  minimizing	
  the	
  effects	
  on	
  environment.”302	
  Efforts	
  to	
  minimise	
  the	
  effects	
  of	
  pollution	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  has	
  been	
  implement	
  by	
  cooperation	
  in	
  scientific	
  research	
  and	
  by	
  creating	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Research	
  Commission	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  
Research	
  and	
  Policy	
  Act	
  of	
  1984	
  with	
  the	
  aim	
  of	
  establishing	
  a	
  research	
  agenda	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  “mitigate	
  the	
  adverse	
  consequences	
  of	
  development	
  to	
  land,”	
  expanding	
  knowledge	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  to	
  “enhance	
  the	
  lives	
  of	
  Arctic	
  residents,	
  [and]	
  increase	
  opportunities	
  for	
  international	
  cooperation.”303	
  The	
  result	
  of	
  development	
  in	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  Arctic	
  has	
  included	
  the	
  extraction	
  of	
  fossil	
  fuels,	
  such	
  as	
  those	
  in	
  Prudhoe	
  Bay—for	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  national	
  energy	
  security	
  in	
  the	
  OPEC	
  crisis	
  of	
  the	
  1970s,	
  and	
  the	
  building	
  of	
  the	
  Trans-­‐Alaskan	
  Pipeline	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  transport	
  that	
  oil	
  to	
  the	
  warm	
  water	
  seaports	
  of	
  southern	
  Alaska	
  where	
  it	
  is	
  loaded	
  on	
  to	
  tankers	
  and	
  carried	
  elsewhere.	
  This	
  ultimately	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  1989	
  Exxon	
  Valdez	
  accident,	
  spilling	
  millions	
  of	
  barrels	
  of	
  oil	
  into	
  Arctic	
  waters,	
  destroying	
  fishing	
  industries	
  and	
  the	
  local	
  ecosystem.	
  Through	
  this,	
  it	
  is	
  seen	
  that	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  toward	
  national	
  security	
  and	
  economic	
  development	
  supersedes	
  its	
  policy	
  to	
  only	
  ‘minimise	
  effects’	
  on	
  the	
  Arctic	
  environment.	
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  Security	
  Council,	
  1972)	
  302	
  (Government	
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  the	
  United	
  States,	
  1983)	
  303	
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Although	
  Alaska	
  finally	
  became	
  a	
  U.S.	
  state	
  in	
  1959,	
  the	
  exigencies	
  of	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  and	
  Cold	
  War	
  era	
  policies	
  caused	
  the	
  federal	
  government	
  to	
  retain	
  control	
  of	
  more	
  than	
  half	
  of	
  terra	
  firma	
  within	
  Alaska.	
  Thus,	
  United	
  States	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  saw	
  the	
  continuation	
  of	
  some	
  objectives	
  for	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Government,	
  especially	
  in	
  areas	
  of	
  national	
  defence,	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  and	
  mutually	
  beneficial	
  international	
  cooperation.	
  New	
  objectives	
  introduced	
  include	
  the	
  approaches	
  of	
  environmental	
  and	
  development	
  policy	
  which	
  saw	
  a	
  transition	
  from	
  research	
  to	
  promote	
  national	
  defence	
  to	
  research	
  in	
  the	
  aim	
  of	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  resources	
  for	
  economic	
  and	
  energy	
  security	
  and	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  agencies	
  to	
  determine	
  policy	
  directions	
  and	
  orchestrate	
  research	
  which	
  furthers	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  agendas.	
  Finally,	
  in	
  a	
  move	
  away	
  from	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  international	
  institutions	
  which	
  are	
  characteristic	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  this	
  period,	
  the	
  U.S.	
  positioned	
  itself	
  against	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Treaty	
  System,	
  instead	
  preferring	
  a	
  collection	
  of	
  agreements	
  to	
  organise	
  cooperation	
  in	
  the	
  region.	
  	
  	
  
U.S.	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  Post-­‐Cold	
  War	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  U.S.	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  the	
  Post-­‐Cold	
  War	
  Period	
  responds	
  to	
  a	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  due	
  to	
  two	
  ideological	
  transitions:	
  the	
  failure	
  of	
  the	
  Communist	
  project	
  behind	
  the	
  Iron	
  curtain	
  resulting	
  in	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  bi-­‐polar	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  global	
  response	
  to	
  terrorism	
  led	
  by	
  the	
  now	
  hegemonic	
  United	
  States.	
  Additionally,	
  U.S.	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  responds	
  to	
  the	
  relative	
  decline	
  of	
  U.S.	
  power	
  as	
  other	
  states	
  such	
  as	
  China	
  become	
  more	
  influential	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  who	
  signal	
  increasing	
  interest	
  in	
  global	
  caches	
  of	
  resources	
  to	
  support	
  their	
  growing	
  economies-­‐-­‐including	
  those	
  resources	
  found	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  During	
  this	
  period,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  releases	
  three	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  documents	
  in	
  the	
  Clinton,	
  George	
  W.	
  Bush	
  and	
  Obama	
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administrations.	
  Each	
  policy	
  document	
  addresses	
  the	
  changing	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  focusing	
  on	
  national	
  security	
  and	
  defence	
  needs,	
  the	
  strengthening	
  of	
  cooperation	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  protecting	
  the	
  Arctic	
  environment,	
  increasing	
  scientific	
  monitoring	
  and	
  finally,	
  including	
  indigenous	
  communities	
  in	
  governance	
  mechanisms.	
  	
  	
  	
  International	
  cooperation	
  and	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  frameworks	
  for	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  is	
  a	
  significant	
  development	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  while	
  it	
  continues	
  to	
  avoid	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Treaty	
  System.	
  In	
  this	
  period,	
  international	
  cooperation	
  has	
  been	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  the	
  1991	
  Arctic	
  Environmental	
  Protection	
  
Strategy,	
  a	
  non-­‐binding	
  agreement	
  seeking	
  “cooperation	
  in	
  scientific	
  research	
  to	
  specify	
  sources,	
  pathways,	
  links	
  and	
  effects	
  of	
  pollution….”304	
  The	
  cooperation	
  behind	
  this	
  agreement	
  led	
  the	
  U.S.	
  to	
  consider	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  as	
  an	
  alternative	
  to	
  managing,	
  through	
  international	
  cooperation,	
  the	
  unique	
  issues	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  environment	
  not	
  already	
  adequately	
  addressed	
  within	
  international	
  law.	
  However,	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  has	
  determined	
  that	
  “the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  primarily	
  a	
  maritime	
  domain”	
  transferring	
  the	
  geographic	
  focus	
  of	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  from	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  territory	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean.305	
  However,	
  international	
  cooperation	
  has	
  not	
  been	
  entirely	
  within	
  the	
  remit	
  of	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  as	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  1997	
  Arctic	
  Military	
  Environmental	
  Program	
  which	
  was	
  developed	
  to	
  address	
  Soviet	
  Cold	
  War	
  nuclear	
  waste	
  deposits	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  marine	
  environment.	
  In	
  this	
  programme,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Norway	
  “pledged	
  to	
  promote	
  sustainable	
  development	
  and	
  protection	
  of	
  the	
  fragile	
  Arctic	
  environment”	
  in	
  addressing	
  this	
  issue.306	
  	
  The	
  U.S.	
  is	
  promoting	
  “environmentally	
  sustainable	
  development”	
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  (Arctic	
  Council,	
  1991,	
  p.	
  2)	
  305	
  (Government	
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  United	
  States,	
  2009)	
  306	
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while	
  “conserving	
  the	
  region’s	
  rich	
  and	
  unique	
  biological	
  resources.”307	
  Thus,	
  there	
  has	
  been	
  open	
  criticism	
  of	
  Japanese	
  and	
  Canadian	
  whaling	
  practices,	
  specifically	
  declaring	
  Canadian	
  practices	
  to	
  be	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  and	
  calling	
  the	
  action	
  	
  “unacceptable”,	
  as	
  “Canada's	
  conduct	
  jeopardizes	
  the	
  international	
  effort	
  that	
  has	
  allowed	
  whale	
  stocks	
  to	
  begin	
  to	
  recover	
  from	
  the	
  devastating	
  effects	
  of	
  historic	
  whaling.”308	
  Both	
  of	
  these	
  issues	
  concern	
  U.S.	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  ecosystem,	
  including	
  fisheries,	
  which	
  are	
  being	
  impacted	
  by	
  environmental	
  change.	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  now	
  formally	
  promotes	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  “responsible	
  Arctic	
  region	
  stewardship.”309	
  	
  A	
  multitude	
  of	
  diplomatic	
  statements	
  made	
  by	
  the	
  U.S.	
  continuously	
  reiterates	
  the	
  intent	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  to	
  abide	
  by	
  international	
  law,	
  although	
  policy	
  dictates	
  it	
  “is	
  prepared	
  to	
  operate	
  either	
  independently	
  or	
  with	
  other	
  states	
  to	
  safeguard	
  [U.S.]	
  interests.”310	
  This	
  statement	
  on	
  respecting	
  international	
  law	
  is	
  necessary,	
  as	
  the	
  U.S.	
  has	
  not	
  yet	
  acceded	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  
Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982,	
  which	
  provides	
  for	
  extended	
  territorial	
  claims	
  along	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf.	
  However,	
  territorial	
  claims	
  of	
  up	
  to	
  two	
  hundred	
  nautical	
  miles	
  entered	
  into	
  customary	
  law	
  through	
  the	
  Truman	
  Proclamation	
  in	
  1945,	
  a	
  principle	
  that	
  was	
  codified	
  into	
  international	
  law	
  in	
  the	
  Convention	
  
on	
  the	
  Continental	
  Shelf	
  1958.	
  Thus,	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  to	
  exercise	
  “authority	
  in	
  accordance	
  with	
  lawful	
  claims	
  of	
  United	
  States	
  sovereignty,	
  sovereign	
  rights	
  and	
  jurisdiction	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region,”311	
  however	
  recognising	
  that	
  acceding	
  to	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  Convention	
  is	
  the	
  means	
  to	
  “best	
  secure	
  international	
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recognition	
  of	
  our	
  sovereign	
  rights.”312	
  U.S.	
  practice	
  regarding	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  holds	
  that	
  with	
  the	
  exception	
  of	
  extended	
  continental	
  shelf	
  claims,	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  Arctic	
  territory	
  was	
  confirmed	
  and	
  established	
  in	
  a	
  previous	
  era.	
  Reflecting	
  this	
  view	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  throughout	
  the	
  circumpolar	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  U.S.	
  responded	
  to	
  Canadian	
  Prime	
  Minister	
  Stephen	
  Harper	
  on	
  his	
  statement	
  that	
  Canada	
  is	
  	
  “fully	
  committed	
  to	
  strengthening	
  its	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  on	
  every	
  level”	
  with	
  the	
  position	
  that	
  “the	
  United	
  States	
  does	
  not	
  question	
  Canadian	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  its	
  Arctic	
  islands.”313	
  To	
  improve	
  the	
  ability	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  to	
  gain	
  recognition	
  of	
  its	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  Arctic	
  fora,	
  Congress	
  has	
  recently	
  made	
  attempt	
  to	
  appoint	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Ambassador	
  for	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Department	
  of	
  State.	
  	
  	
  In	
  a	
  transition	
  from	
  earlier	
  Arctic	
  policies,	
  and	
  representative	
  of	
  the	
  rights	
  of	
  indigenous	
  peoples	
  promoted	
  through	
  the	
  United	
  Nations,	
  U.S	
  policy	
  on	
  indigenous	
  participation	
  in	
  Arctic	
  affairs	
  has	
  advanced	
  to	
  a	
  more	
  enlightened	
  position	
  than	
  that	
  assumed	
  during	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery.	
  Early	
  policy	
  treated	
  indigenous	
  residents	
  as	
  different	
  and	
  as	
  lesser	
  in	
  value	
  than	
  white	
  populations	
  in	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  territory,	
  and	
  even	
  prohibiting	
  through	
  legislation	
  the	
  sale	
  of	
  firearms	
  and	
  alcohol	
  to	
  indigenous	
  persons.	
  In	
  a	
  later	
  period,	
  indigenous	
  residents	
  were	
  granted	
  citizenship	
  under	
  domestic	
  law	
  through	
  a	
  Constitutional	
  amendment	
  and	
  eventually	
  gained	
  rights	
  to	
  own	
  land	
  and	
  establish	
  their	
  own	
  communities.	
  Current	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  now	
  provides	
  for	
  the	
  government	
  to	
  “engage	
  in	
  a	
  consultation	
  process	
  with	
  Alaska	
  natives”	
  recognising	
  that	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  environment	
  affects	
  their	
  traditional	
  ways	
  of	
  life,	
  although	
  the	
  policy	
  still	
  holds	
  that	
  “tribal	
  governments’	
  [have	
  a]	
  unique	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  United	
  States.”314	
  This	
  inclusion	
  of	
  indigenous	
  communities	
  is	
  also	
  being	
  replicated	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
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  (Government	
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  2013)	
  313	
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Council,	
  representing	
  change	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  through	
  the	
  addition	
  of	
  a	
  rule	
  on	
  the	
  rights	
  of	
  the	
  indigenous.	
  	
  The	
  primary	
  line	
  of	
  effort	
  in	
  U.S.	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  continues	
  to	
  pursue	
  United	
  States	
  security	
  interests,	
  including	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  defence	
  and	
  energy	
  security.	
  The	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  documents	
  of	
  this	
  era	
  have	
  highlighted	
  three	
  different	
  defence	
  approaches	
  with	
  the	
  Clinton	
  policy	
  having	
  the	
  objective	
  of	
  “meeting	
  post-­‐Cold	
  War	
  national	
  security	
  and	
  defense	
  needs”	
  and	
  that	
  the	
  U.S.	
  “must	
  maintain	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  protect	
  against	
  attack	
  across	
  the	
  Arctic.”315	
  The	
  George	
  W.	
  Bush	
  era	
  policy	
  identified	
  the	
  transition	
  within	
  the	
  U.S.	
  government	
  to	
  create	
  the	
  Department	
  of	
  Homeland	
  Security	
  and	
  holds	
  that	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  has	
  “fundamental	
  homeland	
  security	
  interests	
  in	
  preventing	
  terrorists	
  attacks	
  and	
  mitigating	
  those	
  criminal	
  or	
  hostile	
  acts	
  that	
  could	
  increase	
  United	
  States	
  vulnerability	
  to	
  terrorism	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.”316	
  Finally,	
  the	
  recent	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  Obama	
  administration	
  intends	
  to	
  “advance	
  United	
  States	
  security	
  interests	
  by	
  evolving	
  infrastructural	
  capabilities,	
  and	
  the	
  enhancement	
  of	
  domain	
  awareness	
  of	
  activities,	
  conditions,	
  and	
  trends	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  that	
  may	
  affect	
  our	
  safety,	
  security,	
  environmental	
  or	
  commercial	
  interests”	
  as	
  there	
  are	
  “many	
  nations	
  across	
  the	
  world	
  [who]	
  aspire	
  to	
  expand	
  their	
  role	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.”317	
  	
  	
  Energy	
  security	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  is	
  being	
  pursued	
  in	
  U.S.	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  through	
  exploration	
  of	
  energy	
  reserves	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  maritime,	
  discovered	
  in	
  the	
  2002	
  U.S.	
  Geological	
  Survey,	
  the	
  report	
  that	
  triggered	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  current	
  activity	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  The	
  U.S.	
  is	
  also	
  considering	
  utilising	
  energy	
  reserves	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  which	
  were	
  set	
  aside	
  in	
  earlier	
  eras,	
  such	
  those	
  in	
  the	
  Alaska	
  National	
  Wildlife	
  Refuge,	
  although	
  thus	
  far,	
  proposals	
  to	
  develop	
  these	
  resources	
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have	
  not	
  passed	
  through	
  Congress	
  due	
  to	
  partisan	
  politics.	
  It	
  thus	
  appears	
  that	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  the	
  energy	
  security	
  is	
  a	
  more	
  vital	
  interest	
  than	
  environmental	
  protection	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  regions.	
  	
  	
  Reflecting	
  changes	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  with	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
  United	
  States	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  during	
  the	
  post-­‐Cold	
  War	
  Period	
  saw	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  several	
  objectives	
  including	
  a	
  transition	
  from	
  the	
  realities	
  of	
  bi-­‐polarity	
  and	
  an	
  attack	
  from	
  across	
  the	
  Arctic	
  to	
  the	
  notions	
  of	
  the	
  need	
  for	
  homeland	
  security	
  an	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  prevent	
  terrorism	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  also	
  demonstrates	
  awareness	
  that	
  competition	
  for	
  resources	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  requires	
  active	
  development	
  of	
  infrastructure,	
  maritime	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  international	
  law	
  to	
  maintain	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  preserve	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  To	
  this	
  end,	
  international	
  cooperation	
  has	
  developed	
  from	
  the	
  language	
  of	
  “minimizing	
  adverse	
  effects	
  to	
  the	
  environment”318	
  to	
  that	
  of	
  “responsible	
  stewardship	
  [which]	
  requires	
  active	
  conservation	
  of	
  resources,	
  balanced	
  management,	
  and	
  the	
  application	
  of	
  scientific	
  and	
  traditional	
  knowledge.”319	
  This	
  cooperation	
  increasingly	
  involves	
  multilateral	
  agreements	
  through	
  all	
  eight	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  rather	
  than	
  mere	
  bilateral	
  agreements	
  on	
  environmental	
  issues.	
  And	
  finally,	
  reflective	
  of	
  a	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  is	
  the	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  on	
  the	
  inclusion	
  of	
  indigenous	
  participation	
  and	
  knowledge	
  in	
  discussions	
  of	
  Arctic	
  issues,	
  although	
  the	
  U.S.	
  continues	
  to	
  hold	
  an	
  asymmetric	
  relationship	
  with	
  indigenous	
  peoples	
  and	
  nor	
  are	
  indigenous	
  political	
  entities	
  considered	
  as	
  equal	
  with	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  realm.	
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  The	
  vast	
  and	
  frozen	
  wastelands	
  of	
  Alaska,	
  which	
  Seward	
  purchased	
  in	
  an	
  act	
  of	
  imperial	
  impulse,	
  has	
  been	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  greatest	
  sources	
  of	
  wealth	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  has	
  invested.	
  Since	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  this	
  purchase,	
  the	
  U.S.	
  has	
  had	
  six	
  main	
  policy	
  objectives	
  which	
  include	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  security,	
  the	
  environment,	
  economic	
  development,	
  advancement	
  of	
  scientific	
  knowledge,	
  relationships	
  with	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants,	
  and	
  finally,	
  international	
  cooperation.	
  In	
  this	
  chapter,	
  these	
  policy	
  objectives	
  and	
  methods	
  for	
  achieving	
  them	
  have	
  been	
  discussed	
  relevant	
  to	
  four	
  different	
  periods	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  which	
  rules	
  guiding	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  in	
  international	
  relations	
  have	
  been	
  introduced.	
  Through	
  this	
  long	
  term	
  development,	
  it	
  has	
  been	
  determined	
  that	
  U.S.	
  policy	
  and	
  their	
  pursuit	
  of	
  policy	
  objectives	
  and	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  reflects	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  as	
  they	
  have	
  adapted	
  their	
  behaviour	
  to	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  expanding	
  community	
  of	
  states.	
  	
  	
  It	
  has	
  also	
  been	
  seen	
  that	
  U.S.	
  engagement	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  continuously	
  pursued	
  national	
  interests	
  and	
  not	
  merely	
  their	
  Arctic	
  interests,	
  in	
  the	
  areas	
  of	
  defence,	
  economic	
  security,	
  and	
  insistence	
  upon	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  as	
  the	
  U.S.	
  could	
  have	
  claimed	
  the	
  glory	
  of	
  the	
  territorial	
  claim	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  and	
  the	
  application	
  of	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  as	
  did	
  other	
  Arctic	
  littoral	
  states.	
  Practices	
  such	
  as	
  this	
  avoidance	
  of	
  the	
  sectoral	
  concept,	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  in	
  the	
  Truman	
  
Proclamation	
  and	
  the	
  U.S.	
  avoidance	
  of	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Treaty	
  System	
  have	
  demonstrated	
  that	
  as	
  a	
  leading	
  power,	
  the	
  U.S.	
  has	
  been	
  instrumental	
  in	
  shaping	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  which	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  occur.	
  And	
  finally,	
  through	
  continued	
  and	
  deliberate	
  pursuit	
  of	
  international	
  cooperation,	
  and	
  restraint	
  from	
  continuing	
  the	
  expansionist	
  practices	
  of	
  dominant	
  powers	
  in	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  U.S.	
  practice	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  acts	
  as	
  a	
  stabilising	
  force	
  in	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  as	
  their	
  foreign	
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policy	
  reinforces	
  and	
  guides	
  the	
  expectations	
  of	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  the	
  other	
  Arctic	
  states.	
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Chapter	
  IV	
  
	
  
Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  1870-­‐2013	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  roots	
  of	
  modern	
  Canada,	
  tenuously	
  claiming	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  soil	
  (and	
  subsoil)	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  sector,	
  have	
  germinated	
  from	
  the	
  seed	
  of	
  an	
  imperialist	
  project.	
  	
  In	
  1867	
  Canada	
  gained	
  independence	
  from	
  its	
  colonial	
  administrators,	
  resulting	
  in	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  a	
  separate	
  political	
  unit	
  with	
  internal	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  population	
  in	
  a	
  limited	
  portion	
  of	
  British	
  North	
  America.	
  External	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  yet	
  unproven	
  as	
  Great	
  Britain	
  gradually	
  released	
  its	
  North	
  American	
  possessions	
  to	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada	
  and	
  until	
  the	
  mid	
  twentieth	
  century,	
  retained	
  responsibility	
  for	
  much	
  of	
  Canada’s	
  foreign	
  relations.	
  Yet	
  the	
  transfer	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  from	
  Great	
  Britain	
  to	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada	
  left	
  Canada	
  with	
  uncertain	
  sovereign	
  possession	
  of	
  some	
  of	
  these	
  territories,	
  as	
  British	
  sovereignty	
  was	
  not	
  itself	
  firmly	
  established.	
  As	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  this	
  uncertainty,	
  for	
  nearly	
  a	
  century,	
  Canada	
  has	
  used	
  a	
  variety	
  of	
  methods	
  to	
  eliminate	
  this	
  domestically	
  imagined	
  insecurity	
  and	
  gain	
  the	
  support	
  of	
  external	
  acknowledgement	
  of	
  Canadian	
  sovereignty,	
  which	
  with	
  the	
  exception	
  of	
  a	
  few	
  unresolved	
  disputes,	
  in	
  actuality	
  faces	
  no	
  external	
  challenges.	
  This	
  paper	
  argues	
  that	
  Canada’s	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  and	
  diplomatic	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  creates	
  a	
  crisis	
  of	
  legitimacy	
  in	
  their	
  position	
  in	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  that	
  this	
  anxiety	
  is	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  historical	
  processes	
  resulting	
  from	
  questionable	
  colonial	
  transfer,	
  shared	
  military	
  operations,	
  the	
  rebranding	
  Canadian	
  identity	
  as	
  a	
  Northern	
  state	
  and	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  additional	
  rules	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
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Research	
  Questions:	
  	
  
• What	
  is	
  the	
  historical	
  development	
  of	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  policy?	
  
• What	
  rules	
  has	
  Canada	
  used	
  to	
  secure	
  their	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  different	
  eras	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system?	
  
• What	
  national	
  interests	
  are	
  represented	
  in	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  policy?	
  
• What	
  artefacts	
  of	
  state	
  practice	
  support	
  their	
  pursuit	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty?	
  	
  
Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  in	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Canada	
  became	
  an	
  Arctic	
  state	
  in	
  1870	
  with	
  the	
  transfer	
  of	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Territories	
  and	
  Rupert’s	
  Land	
  through	
  letters	
  patent	
  from	
  the	
  British	
  Monarch,	
  Queen	
  Victoria,	
  who	
  transferred	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  these	
  territories	
  to	
  the	
  newly	
  created	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada.	
  Then	
  in	
  1880	
  the	
  British	
  Crown	
  transferred	
  title	
  of	
  its	
  Arctic	
  islands	
  to	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada.	
  This	
  included	
  the	
  British	
  Arctic	
  territories	
  acquired	
  by	
  right	
  of	
  discovery	
  from	
  the	
  brave	
  ventures	
  of	
  explorers	
  like	
  Martin	
  Frobisher,	
  Henry	
  Hudson	
  and	
  Sir	
  John	
  Franklin;	
  however,	
  it	
  also	
  included	
  islands	
  discovered	
  by	
  explorers	
  representing	
  other	
  states.	
  The	
  idea	
  of	
  the	
  uncertainty	
  of	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  borders	
  as	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  1880	
  transfer	
  has	
  been	
  discussed	
  by	
  legal	
  scholars,	
  including	
  Gordon	
  W.	
  Smith	
  who	
  stated,	
  “What	
  remained	
  uncertain,	
  was	
  the	
  extent	
  of	
  territories	
  granted	
  to	
  her	
  [Canada],	
  since	
  the	
  limits	
  of	
  Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  Company	
  had	
  never	
  been	
  conclusively	
  settled.	
  Equally	
  uncertain	
  was	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  the	
  islands	
  north	
  of	
  the	
  mainland.”320	
  It	
  is	
  certain	
  that	
  since	
  this	
  time,	
  including	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  present	
  day,	
  Canada	
  has	
  been	
  attempting	
  to	
  establish	
  its	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  	
  The	
  reason	
  for	
  this	
  uncertainty	
  is	
  that	
  given	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  the	
  acquisition	
  of	
  territory,	
  it	
  is	
  possible	
  that	
  some	
  islands	
  belonged	
  to	
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the	
  United	
  States	
  or	
  to	
  Norway	
  by	
  right	
  of	
  discovery.	
  Because	
  of	
  this	
  doubt,	
  the	
  wording	
  of	
  the	
  transfer	
  was	
  left	
  ambiguous	
  in	
  the	
  hope	
  that	
  over	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  time,	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  the	
  uncertain	
  possessions	
  would	
  be	
  forgotten.	
  To	
  demonstrate	
  the	
  evidence	
  of	
  this	
  uncertainty,	
  it	
  has	
  been	
  claimed,	
  “Canada	
  took	
  no	
  steps	
  to	
  govern	
  or	
  incorporate	
  the	
  added	
  territory	
  between	
  1880	
  and	
  1895	
  and	
  implies	
  that	
  uncertainty	
  as	
  to	
  Canadian	
  ownership.”321	
  From	
  1895,	
  legal	
  scholar	
  Gordon	
  Smith	
  concludes	
  that	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  eradicate	
  the	
  uncertainty	
  over	
  legitimate	
  sovereignty,	
  the	
  Government	
  of	
  Canada	
  began	
  to	
  organise	
  the	
  territories	
  and	
  to	
  bring	
  them	
  under	
  sufficient	
  effective	
  administration	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  their	
  sovereign	
  status.	
  In	
  part,	
  this	
  task	
  was	
  begun	
  by	
  informing	
  commercial	
  operations,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  American	
  whalers	
  operating	
  near	
  Baffin	
  Island,	
  that	
  “they	
  were	
  subject	
  to	
  Canadian	
  regulation.”322	
  Today,	
  Canada	
  claims	
  “The	
  legal	
  basis	
  for	
  Canadian	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  these	
  islands	
  rests	
  predominantly	
  on	
  a	
  mix	
  of	
  cession	
  and	
  occupation,	
  to	
  which	
  considerations	
  of	
  self-­‐determination	
  could	
  be	
  added.”323	
  This	
  position	
  is	
  reflected	
  in	
  contemporary	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  policy,	
  which	
  frequently	
  makes	
  reference	
  to	
  effective	
  occupation	
  and	
  by	
  virtue	
  of	
  Canada’s	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants.	
  	
  	
  During	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada	
  found	
  itself	
  in	
  an	
  interesting	
  position	
  located	
  somewhere	
  in	
  between	
  the	
  conditions	
  of	
  internally	
  and	
  externally	
  sovereign,	
  with	
  even	
  their	
  title	
  indicating	
  that	
  they	
  were	
  subordinate	
  to	
  another	
  political	
  authority.	
  Traditional	
  notions	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  have	
  been	
  focused	
  on	
  state-­‐centric	
  notions	
  of	
  legitimacy	
  and	
  authority;	
  sovereignty	
  within	
  the	
  state	
  recieves	
  its	
  legitimacy	
  from	
  the	
  consent	
  of	
  the	
  governed,	
  the	
  state	
  using	
  its	
  derived	
  authority	
  to	
  promote	
  the	
  interest	
  of	
  its	
  citizens.	
  However,	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada	
  was	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  321	
  King,	
  W.F.	
  in	
  (Smith,	
  1961,	
  p.	
  53)	
  322	
  (Mills,	
  2003,	
  p.	
  129)	
  	
  323	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  2008	
  b)	
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created	
  in	
  a	
  colonial	
  project	
  and	
  is	
  the	
  outcome	
  of	
  the	
  atrophying	
  of	
  the	
  British	
  Empire.	
  This	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  what	
  in	
  contemporary	
  politics	
  would	
  be	
  labelled	
  as	
  ‘home	
  government’,	
  which	
  is	
  an	
  interim	
  government	
  established	
  as	
  a	
  transitional	
  project	
  to	
  full	
  sovereignty.	
  Yet	
  in	
  colonial	
  projects	
  such	
  as	
  Canada,	
  when	
  this	
  transfer	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  was	
  conveyed	
  from	
  the	
  British	
  Crown	
  to	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada,	
  the	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  were	
  once	
  again	
  prey	
  to	
  imperial	
  practices.	
  	
  	
  When	
  empires	
  absorbed	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  through	
  discovery	
  and	
  proclamation,	
  the	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants	
  were	
  not	
  recognised	
  as	
  having	
  any	
  political	
  rights.	
  Although	
  this	
  was	
  status	
  quo	
  behaviour	
  in	
  the	
  early	
  years	
  of	
  the	
  age	
  of	
  empire,	
  by	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  the	
  1870	
  and	
  1880	
  transfers,	
  the	
  idea	
  of	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  as	
  a	
  people	
  with	
  political	
  rights	
  was	
  gaining	
  momentum.	
  So	
  in	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada,	
  the	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  have	
  not	
  enjoyed	
  the	
  same	
  theoretical	
  transfer	
  of	
  authority	
  from	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  nature	
  into	
  a	
  social	
  contract.	
  Instead,	
  indigenous	
  cultures	
  have	
  been	
  the	
  casualty	
  of	
  colonial	
  projects	
  and	
  have	
  been	
  assimilated	
  into	
  the	
  sovereign	
  state	
  by	
  ‘right’	
  of	
  the	
  customary	
  law	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  and	
  the	
  dictates	
  of	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  ‘effective	
  occupation’.	
  Such	
  is	
  the	
  case	
  with	
  the	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  and	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  Canada,	
  a	
  reality	
  that	
  continues	
  to	
  cause	
  consternation	
  for	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  in	
  their	
  Arctic	
  policy.	
  	
  
Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  in	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Although	
  Canada	
  did	
  not	
  face	
  challenges	
  from	
  states	
  with	
  claims	
  to	
  various	
  islands	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  archipelago,	
  the	
  attitude	
  of	
  insecurity	
  over	
  their	
  sovereignty	
  was	
  already	
  seeded.	
  By	
  1925,	
  Canada	
  had	
  dabbled	
  in	
  various	
  efforts	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  sufficient	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  a	
  vast	
  area	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  from	
  Ellesmere	
  Island	
  in	
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the	
  east	
  to	
  Wrangel	
  Island,	
  located	
  north	
  of	
  Russia	
  in	
  the	
  west.	
  	
  Some	
  of	
  this	
  activity	
  included	
  sending	
  explorers	
  to	
  survey	
  the	
  territory,	
  including	
  Vilhjalmur	
  Stefansson’s	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Expedition	
  from	
  1913-­‐18	
  and	
  a	
  trip	
  across	
  Arctic	
  Canada	
  by	
  L.T.	
  Burwash	
  from	
  the	
  Mackenzie	
  Delta	
  to	
  Hudson	
  Bay	
  in	
  1925-­‐26,	
  to	
  collect	
  information	
  (economic,	
  geological,	
  etc.)	
  “under	
  orders	
  from	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Government.”324	
  Even	
  today,	
  sending	
  scientists	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  considered	
  an	
  acceptable	
  display	
  of	
  government	
  endorsed	
  sovereign	
  activity	
  in	
  fulfilment	
  of	
  effective	
  occupation	
  in	
  regions	
  not	
  fit	
  for	
  human	
  habitation.	
  	
  	
  Yet,	
  these	
  scientific	
  displays	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  were	
  not	
  sufficient	
  to	
  dissipate	
  the	
  anxiety	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  regarding	
  questionable	
  entitlement	
  to	
  some	
  Arctic	
  territory,	
  as	
  aviation	
  made	
  it	
  possible	
  to	
  explore	
  the	
  vast	
  expanses	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  with	
  less	
  hardship.	
  	
  Even	
  though	
  title	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  had	
  apparently	
  transferred	
  from	
  Great	
  Britain	
  to	
  Canada	
  and	
  the	
  government	
  of	
  Canada	
  had	
  been	
  exercising	
  sovereignty	
  as	
  much	
  as	
  was	
  possible	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  they	
  felt	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  additionally	
  clarify	
  their	
  exact	
  Arctic	
  claims.	
  Senator	
  Pascal	
  Poirier	
  established	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  as	
  Canadian	
  method	
  in	
  1907	
  with	
  a	
  speech	
  to	
  the	
  Senate	
  saying	
  “the	
  time	
  has	
  come	
  for	
  Canada	
  to	
  make	
  a	
  formal	
  declaration	
  of	
  possession	
  of	
  the	
  lands	
  and	
  islands	
  situated	
  in	
  the	
  north	
  of	
  the	
  Dominion,	
  extending	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,”	
  though	
  a	
  few	
  of	
  his	
  peers	
  chose	
  to	
  disassociate	
  themselves	
  with	
  this	
  position	
  on	
  the	
  grounds	
  of	
  an	
  uncertain	
  legal	
  position	
  as	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  was	
  not	
  an	
  accepted	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.325	
  	
  Poirier	
  identified	
  that	
  Canada	
  could	
  maintain	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  via	
  four	
  legitimate	
  methods:	
  through	
  English	
  discoveries,	
  through	
  transfer	
  of	
  French	
  territories	
  to	
  Britain,	
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  (Burwash,	
  1929,	
  p.	
  553)	
  325	
  Canada	
  Senate	
  Debates	
  1907	
  at	
  266	
  in	
  (Pharand,	
  1988,	
  p.	
  8)	
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through	
  occupation	
  of	
  the	
  Hudson	
  Bay	
  and	
  finally,	
  through	
  the	
  sector	
  principle.	
  Poirier	
  said,	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  “From	
  141	
  to	
  60	
  degrees	
  west	
  we	
  are	
  on	
  Canadian	
  territory.	
  That	
  is	
  the	
  territory	
  that	
  has	
  been	
  discovered	
  by	
  the	
  seamen	
  of	
  England,	
  which	
  has	
  been	
  traversed	
  by	
  McClure	
  and	
  by	
  Franklin.	
  It	
  is	
  the	
  territory	
  that	
  has	
  been	
  taken	
  possession	
  of	
  by	
  the	
  Hudson	
  Bay	
  Company,	
  and	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  territory	
  that	
  we	
  claim,	
  and	
  I	
  hold	
  that	
  no	
  foreigner	
  has	
  a	
  right	
  to	
  go	
  and	
  hoist	
  a	
  flag	
  on	
  it	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  north	
  pole,	
  because	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  only	
  within	
  the	
  sphere	
  of	
  possession	
  of	
  England,	
  but	
  it	
  is	
  in	
  the	
  actual	
  possession	
  of	
  England.”326	
  	
  Although	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  never	
  issued	
  an	
  official	
  declaration	
  defining	
  their	
  sovereign	
  territory	
  as	
  did	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  in	
  1926,	
  the	
  formalisation	
  of	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  by	
  the	
  government	
  of	
  Canada	
  is	
  considered	
  to	
  have	
  received	
  official	
  endorsement	
  in	
  1925	
  through	
  the	
  Senate	
  Debates	
  “laying	
  claim	
  to	
  everything	
  between	
  the	
  longitudinal	
  lines	
  of	
  61	
  degrees	
  west	
  and	
  141	
  degrees	
  west,	
  extending	
  ‘right	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  Pole’.”327	
  A	
  parliamentary	
  bill	
  requiring	
  scientists	
  and	
  explorers	
  to	
  acquire	
  a	
  license	
  from	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  to	
  operate	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  followed	
  this	
  endorsement.328	
  Finally,	
  the	
  government	
  of	
  Canada	
  further	
  solidified	
  this	
  position	
  through	
  the	
  publication	
  of	
  maps	
  by	
  government	
  departments	
  showing	
  the	
  international	
  boundaries	
  of	
  Canada	
  as	
  extending	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole.	
  This	
  includes	
  the	
  Atlas	
  of	
  Canada	
  1957	
  showing	
  the	
  political	
  evolution	
  of	
  Canadian	
  Territory	
  stating,	
  “by	
  1925	
  Canada	
  extended	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole.”329	
  Although	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  was	
  never	
  formally	
  accepted	
  as	
  a	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  although	
  it	
  is	
  contrary	
  to	
  the	
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  Canada	
  Senate	
  Debates	
  1906	
  in	
  (Head,	
  1963,	
  p.	
  204)	
  327	
  (Honderich,	
  1987,	
  p.	
  30)	
  328	
  (Smedel,	
  1931,	
  p.	
  66)	
  	
  329	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  1957	
  a)	
  	
  
	
   179	
  
existing	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea,	
  Canadian	
  maps	
  as	
  late	
  as	
  2007	
  continued	
  to	
  represent	
  the	
  international	
  border	
  in	
  this	
  location.	
  	
  	
  Senator	
  Poirier	
  made	
  his	
  pronouncement	
  that	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  was	
  a	
  possession	
  of	
  Canada	
  by	
  virtue	
  of	
  transfer	
  from	
  Great	
  Britain,	
  yet	
  at	
  this	
  point	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  had	
  still	
  not	
  been	
  reached	
  and	
  he	
  was	
  thus	
  arguing	
  for	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  a	
  ‘spheres	
  of	
  influence’	
  claim	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Ordinarily,	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  would	
  dictate	
  that	
  territory	
  is	
  first	
  discovered	
  and	
  then	
  effectively	
  occupied,	
  yet	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  difficulties	
  present	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region,	
  the	
  need	
  for	
  effective	
  occupation	
  has	
  sometimes	
  been	
  dismissed	
  by	
  legal	
  scholars,	
  such	
  as	
  Lakhtin,	
  who	
  argued	
  as	
  “‘effective	
  occupation’	
  cannot	
  be	
  reasonably	
  realised,	
  a	
  substitute	
  principle	
  that	
  sovereignty	
  ought	
  to	
  attach	
  to	
  littoral	
  states	
  according	
  to	
  their	
  ‘region	
  of	
  attraction’.”330	
  Lakhtin	
  also	
  claimed	
  that	
  the	
  terra	
  nullius	
  status	
  of	
  any	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  had	
  been	
  “owing	
  chiefly	
  to	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  any	
  political	
  or	
  economic	
  motive	
  for	
  attempting	
  occupation	
  and	
  annexation.”331	
  This	
  era	
  was	
  quickly	
  drawing	
  to	
  a	
  close.	
  	
  Within	
  just	
  over	
  a	
  year	
  of	
  Senator	
  Poirier’s	
  statements	
  on	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  Admiral	
  Peary	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  Navy	
  reached	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  in	
  1909332	
  and	
  planted	
  the	
  U.S.	
  flag	
  as	
  was	
  the	
  custom	
  of	
  many	
  explorers,	
  symbolically	
  claiming	
  the	
  geographic	
  point	
  for	
  the	
  United	
  States.	
  However,	
  U.	
  S.	
  President	
  William	
  Taft	
  “refused	
  to	
  claim	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  the	
  pack	
  ice”333	
  as	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  sea	
  were	
  not	
  permitted	
  in	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  Although	
  the	
  U.S.	
  has	
  never	
  tried	
  to	
  establish	
  sovereignty	
  by	
  used	
  of	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  or	
  the	
  regions	
  of	
  attraction,	
  they	
  also	
  never	
  denied	
  Canada’s	
  right	
  to	
  do	
  so.	
  	
  In	
  fact,	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
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  (Lakhtine,	
  1930,	
  p.	
  705)	
  	
  331	
  (Lakhtine,	
  1930,	
  p.	
  704)	
  	
  332	
  This	
  actuality	
  of	
  this	
  ‘fact’	
  has	
  been	
  questioned;	
  however	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  way	
  of	
  disproving	
  Peary’s	
  claim.	
  333	
  (Pharand,	
  1973,	
  p.	
  169)	
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diplomatic	
  correspondence	
  following	
  the	
  over	
  flight	
  of	
  the	
  pole	
  by	
  a	
  dirigible	
  in	
  the	
  early	
  1920s,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  acknowledged	
  the	
  sovereign	
  rights	
  of	
  Canada	
  within	
  its	
  sector	
  and	
  relinquished	
  any	
  former	
  potential	
  claims	
  to	
  territory	
  discovered	
  by	
  American	
  citizens.334	
  	
  	
  This	
  diplomatic	
  event	
  solved	
  the	
  first	
  question	
  over	
  the	
  legitimacy	
  of	
  Canada’s	
  claim	
  to	
  its	
  Arctic	
  territory,	
  namely	
  that	
  they	
  were	
  claiming	
  possession	
  of	
  lands	
  and	
  islands	
  that	
  had	
  not	
  been	
  discovered	
  by	
  British	
  or	
  Canadian	
  explorers	
  and	
  were	
  also	
  attempting	
  to	
  claim	
  title	
  to	
  areas	
  where	
  no	
  (white)	
  man	
  had	
  gone	
  before.	
  But	
  this	
  does	
  not	
  end	
  the	
  question	
  of	
  Canada’s	
  legitimate	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereign	
  under	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition.	
  Discovery	
  is	
  only	
  the	
  first	
  element	
  of	
  achieving	
  sovereignty.	
  	
  The	
  few	
  examples	
  discussed	
  above	
  introduce	
  another	
  difficulty	
  in	
  the	
  in	
  the	
  mind	
  set	
  of	
  the	
  Canadians	
  in	
  maintaining	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic:	
  the	
  Americans.	
  Through	
  collaboration	
  with	
  their	
  powerful	
  southerly	
  neighbours,	
  the	
  Canadians	
  encountered	
  a	
  second	
  assault	
  to	
  the	
  legitimacy	
  of	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  	
  Additionally,	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada	
  domestically	
  moved	
  a	
  step	
  closer	
  to	
  becoming	
  a	
  full	
  fledged	
  sovereignty	
  state	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  when	
  Great	
  Britain	
  passed	
  the	
  Statute	
  of	
  
Westminster	
  1931,	
  which	
  determined	
  that	
  the	
  laws	
  passed	
  by	
  parliaments	
  within	
  the	
  Domain	
  superseded	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  Great	
  Britain,	
  establishing	
  full	
  fledged	
  domestic	
  sovereignty	
  for	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada.	
  Although,	
  state	
  sovereignty	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  realm	
  has	
  traditionally	
  granted	
  entitlement	
  to	
  territorial	
  integrity	
  and	
  the	
  right	
  of	
  non-­‐interference	
  from	
  outside	
  forces,	
  Canada	
  still	
  legally	
  experienced	
  ‘interference	
  from	
  the	
  Crown.	
  	
  Britain	
  continued	
  to	
  be	
  responsible	
  for	
  much	
  of	
  Canada’s	
  foreign	
  policy	
  until	
  fears	
  of	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years,	
  such	
  as	
  occupation	
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by	
  Germany,	
  forced	
  these	
  responsibilities	
  to	
  be	
  assumed	
  by	
  Canada.	
  However,	
  the	
  prematurity	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  Canada	
  forced	
  them	
  to	
  consider	
  a	
  new	
  partner	
  to	
  assist	
  in	
  the	
  security	
  of	
  their	
  newly	
  acquired	
  external	
  sovereignty.	
  	
  	
  
Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  As	
  Canada	
  faced	
  a	
  new	
  security	
  threat	
  from	
  across	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  they	
  entered	
  into	
  a	
  new	
  phase	
  of	
  insecurity	
  regarding	
  its	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty:	
  effective	
  occupation,	
  or	
  as	
  much	
  as	
  could	
  be	
  reasonably	
  required	
  within	
  Canada’s	
  sector,	
  its	
  ‘region	
  of	
  attraction’.	
  	
  Arctic	
  researcher	
  Frank	
  Debenham	
  has	
  noted	
  that	
  the	
  early	
  days	
  of	
  polar	
  exploration	
  were	
  always	
  for	
  economic	
  purposes.	
  Early	
  explorers	
  confronted	
  the	
  rigours	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  search	
  of	
  a	
  shortcut	
  from	
  Europe	
  to	
  Asia	
  on	
  their	
  voyages	
  of	
  discovery,	
  or	
  sometimes	
  of	
  new	
  fishing	
  and	
  whaling	
  areas,	
  but	
  “we	
  always	
  detect	
  as	
  the	
  purpose	
  of	
  the	
  endeavour	
  the	
  lure	
  of	
  wealth	
  in	
  some	
  form	
  or	
  another.”335	
  This	
  economic	
  interest	
  turned	
  to	
  a	
  different	
  nature	
  once	
  “the	
  original	
  dream	
  of	
  feasible	
  northern	
  routes	
  for	
  broad	
  and	
  thriving	
  commerce	
  between	
  Western	
  Europe	
  and	
  the	
  Far	
  East	
  dropped	
  from	
  the	
  popular	
  mind,”	
  it	
  then	
  became	
  a	
  collaborative	
  project	
  between	
  science	
  and	
  economics.336	
  	
  	
  Scientists	
  were	
  sent	
  out	
  to	
  collect	
  all	
  forms	
  of	
  information,	
  in	
  part	
  necessary	
  because	
  so	
  much	
  was	
  still	
  unknown	
  about	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  but	
  also	
  because	
  “it	
  [was]	
  realised	
  in	
  fact	
  that	
  nearly	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  kind	
  of	
  research	
  which	
  is	
  described	
  as	
  purely	
  scientific	
  must	
  have	
  some	
  bearing	
  and	
  often	
  a	
  very	
  direct	
  bearing	
  upon	
  economic	
  values	
  sooner	
  or	
  later.”337	
  During	
  the	
  decades	
  from	
  the	
  1920s	
  to	
  the	
  1940s,	
  scientists	
  were	
  at	
  their	
  heyday	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  gathering	
  data	
  and	
  experimenting	
  with	
  various	
  developing	
  technology	
  without	
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  p.	
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any	
  real	
  pressure	
  to	
  produce	
  economic	
  value.	
  But	
  this	
  pursuit	
  of	
  scientific	
  exploration	
  for	
  economic	
  interests	
  was	
  about	
  to	
  make	
  a	
  determined	
  metamorphosis.	
  	
  	
  The	
  pressures	
  of	
  national	
  security	
  eventually	
  caused	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Canada	
  to	
  collaborate	
  in	
  their	
  Arctic	
  territories.	
  The	
  roots	
  of	
  this	
  military	
  insecurity	
  began	
  its	
  growth	
  during	
  World	
  War	
  II,	
  but	
  another	
  even	
  more	
  worrisome	
  conflict	
  would	
  push	
  Canada	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  to	
  further	
  unite	
  their	
  military	
  operations:	
  the	
  Cold	
  War.	
  When	
  it	
  was	
  realised	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  could	
  be	
  used	
  as	
  an	
  attack	
  route	
  and	
  also	
  as	
  a	
  theatre	
  of	
  attack,338	
  the	
  network	
  of	
  collaboration	
  between	
  the	
  two	
  nations	
  became	
  even	
  more	
  entangled,	
  but	
  the	
  physical	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  collaboration	
  primarily	
  occurred	
  in	
  Canadian	
  territory.	
  	
  	
  	
  As	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  increased	
  in	
  severity	
  and	
  with	
  technology	
  baring	
  the	
  vulnerabilities	
  created	
  by	
  the	
  proximity	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  the	
  U.S.S.R	
  across	
  the	
  minuteness	
  of	
  the	
  Bering	
  Strait	
  and	
  additionally	
  being	
  situated	
  on	
  directly	
  opposing	
  sides	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  from	
  both	
  Canada	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  the	
  strategic	
  significance	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  mushroomed.	
  Subsequently,	
  “developments	
  in	
  military	
  technology	
  have	
  enlarged	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  dramatically	
  as	
  a	
  theatre	
  of	
  operations	
  for	
  major	
  military	
  systems,	
  transforming	
  the	
  region	
  into	
  a	
  focal	
  point	
  of	
  contemporary	
  strategic	
  thinking.”339	
  This	
  led	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  building	
  the	
  Distance	
  Early	
  Warning	
  line	
  from	
  Alaska	
  to	
  Greenland	
  across	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  and	
  to	
  develop	
  the	
  North	
  American	
  Aerospace	
  Command.	
  As	
  advanced	
  armaments	
  developed	
  to	
  higher	
  and	
  higher	
  levels	
  of	
  sophistication	
  in	
  the	
  arms	
  race	
  between	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Russia,	
  it	
  meant	
  that	
  Canada	
  was	
  increasingly	
  reliant	
  upon	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  for	
  its	
  Arctic	
  security	
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and	
  defence.	
  With	
  Canada	
  unable	
  to	
  secure	
  its	
  Arctic	
  territories	
  without	
  the	
  assistance	
  of	
  another	
  government,	
  this	
  situation	
  continued	
  to	
  provide	
  a	
  source	
  of	
  worry	
  for	
  demonstrating	
  effective	
  Canadian	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  	
  But	
  again	
  science,	
  not	
  related	
  to	
  military	
  necessity,	
  began	
  to	
  play	
  another	
  role	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Naturally	
  as	
  technology	
  advances,	
  capabilities	
  expand	
  and	
  it	
  became	
  possible	
  for	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  move	
  beyond	
  the	
  hydrographical	
  soundings	
  that	
  had	
  been	
  recorded	
  by	
  Stefansson	
  during	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Expedition	
  1913-­‐1918	
  to	
  actually	
  having	
  the	
  capability	
  to	
  begin	
  mapping	
  the	
  entire	
  continental	
  shelf.	
  This	
  led	
  to	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  Polar	
  Continental	
  Shelf	
  Project	
  in	
  1958—the	
  same	
  year	
  in	
  which	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1958	
  made	
  its	
  debut	
  introducing	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  as	
  belonging	
  to	
  the	
  littoral	
  state	
  in	
  international	
  law.	
  Some	
  research	
  has	
  been	
  done	
  into	
  the	
  linking	
  of	
  science	
  programs	
  as	
  a	
  way	
  of	
  promoting	
  the	
  displays	
  of	
  sovereignty,	
  such	
  as	
  in	
  Powell’s	
  work	
  on	
  the	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  Diefenbaker	
  government	
  where	
  he	
  notes	
  that	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  found	
  it	
  “expedient	
  to	
  initiate	
  a	
  programme	
  of	
  hydrographic,	
  oceanographic,	
  geophysical,	
  and	
  biological	
  studies	
  of	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  as	
  a	
  direct	
  means	
  of	
  asserting	
  Canadian	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  High	
  Arctic.”340	
  It	
  can	
  be	
  argued	
  that	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Government	
  introduced	
  these	
  programmes	
  also	
  as	
  a	
  means	
  to	
  alleviate	
  the	
  insecurities	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  brought	
  about	
  through	
  the	
  continued	
  presence	
  of	
  the	
  occupation	
  of	
  a	
  foreign	
  military	
  and	
  scientists	
  on	
  their	
  soil	
  for	
  several	
  decades.	
  Ultimately,	
  the	
  mapping	
  of	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  was	
  necessitated	
  by	
  the	
  advent	
  of	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  
Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1958,	
  which	
  has	
  continued	
  with	
  the	
  project	
  to	
  fulfil	
  the	
  requirements	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  
the	
  Sea	
  1982.	
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  The	
  second	
  element	
  of	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period	
  is	
  a	
  decidedly	
  unfortunate	
  chapter	
  of	
  Canadian	
  history,	
  and	
  represents	
  a	
  continued	
  asymmetric	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  core	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  and	
  the	
  peripheral	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants.	
  	
  In	
  many	
  ways,	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  Canada	
  differs	
  little	
  from	
  that	
  of	
  its	
  nearest	
  neighbour,	
  though	
  it	
  might	
  be	
  considered	
  that	
  the	
  French	
  trappers	
  and	
  traders	
  maintained	
  better	
  relationships	
  with	
  the	
  natives	
  than	
  did	
  their	
  British	
  successors,	
  Canada	
  was	
  much	
  slower	
  in	
  recognising	
  the	
  political	
  rights	
  of	
  its	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants	
  than	
  was	
  the	
  United	
  States.	
  As	
  Canada	
  became	
  increasingly	
  Europeanised	
  in	
  tradition,	
  culture	
  and	
  language,341	
  it	
  meanwhile	
  ostracised	
  the	
  indigenous	
  populations,	
  extracting	
  them	
  from	
  their	
  homelands	
  and	
  decimating	
  their	
  traditional	
  ways	
  of	
  life	
  under	
  the	
  project	
  of	
  assimilation	
  to	
  “bring	
  the	
  original	
  inhabitants	
  of	
  Canadian	
  to	
  citizenship	
  as	
  quickly	
  as	
  that	
  can	
  reasonably	
  be	
  accomplished.”342	
  It	
  was	
  not	
  sufficient	
  that	
  indigenous	
  people	
  had	
  lost	
  their	
  traditional	
  territory	
  to	
  the	
  forces	
  of	
  imperialism;	
  they	
  were	
  also	
  required	
  to	
  become	
  citizens	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  Canada	
  by	
  default	
  of	
  their	
  birthplace.	
  	
  	
  As	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants,	
  the	
  Inuit	
  also	
  felt	
  the	
  brunt	
  effects	
  of	
  colonial	
  governance	
  and	
  this	
  policy	
  of	
  forcing	
  the	
  aboriginal	
  people	
  to	
  become	
  citizens.	
  As	
  trading	
  outposts	
  were	
  established,	
  many	
  Inuit	
  became	
  ‘semi-­‐nomadic’	
  as	
  there	
  was	
  less	
  need	
  to	
  move	
  about	
  with	
  the	
  sustained	
  frequency	
  of	
  earlier	
  periods.343	
  Yet,	
  this	
  caused	
  a	
  problem	
  for	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  as	
  they	
  were	
  worried	
  that	
  this	
  decline	
  in	
  Inuit	
  mobility	
  caused	
  “a	
  potential	
  weakening	
  of	
  its	
  claim	
  to	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty”	
  due	
  to	
  its	
  partnership	
  with	
  the	
  United	
  States.344	
  	
  To	
  mitigate	
  this	
  problem,	
  the	
  Canadian	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  341	
  Official	
  languages	
  of	
  Canada	
  are	
  French	
  and	
  English.	
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  of	
  Canada,	
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government	
  forced	
  many	
  Inuit	
  to	
  move	
  further	
  north,	
  away	
  from	
  lands	
  suitable	
  from	
  extracting	
  a	
  living,	
  and	
  during	
  the	
  1950s	
  they	
  were	
  reorganised	
  from	
  their	
  nomadic	
  communities	
  following	
  the	
  seasons	
  for	
  hunting	
  and	
  fishing,	
  to	
  permanent	
  communities	
  where	
  their	
  children	
  were	
  forced	
  into	
  residential	
  schools	
  where	
  they	
  lost	
  the	
  influence	
  of	
  the	
  community	
  elders	
  who	
  once	
  would	
  have	
  passed	
  on	
  Inuit	
  traditions	
  and	
  skills	
  through	
  a	
  natural	
  education.345	
  	
  	
  Canadians	
  have	
  not	
  distanced	
  themselves	
  from	
  Rousseau’s	
  observations	
  that	
  civilized	
  ‘westerners’	
  find	
  dissatisfaction,	
  and	
  even	
  consternation	
  with	
  the	
  lifestyles	
  of	
  those	
  nomadic	
  and	
  property-­‐less	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  as	
  they	
  tried	
  to	
  make	
  the	
  indigenous	
  citizens	
  and	
  to	
  use	
  them	
  to	
  further	
  their	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty.	
  Only	
  recently	
  has	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  formally	
  apologised	
  for	
  the	
  policies	
  of	
  this	
  era.	
  	
  	
  Finally,	
  during	
  this	
  period	
  Canada	
  found	
  another	
  method	
  through	
  which	
  to	
  enforce	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  their	
  territorial	
  claims	
  to	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  response	
  to	
  what	
  they	
  perceived	
  as	
  threats	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  from	
  the	
  United	
  States.	
  This	
  was	
  through	
  environmental	
  legislative	
  protection	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Waters	
  Pollution	
  
Protection	
  Act	
  1970	
  which	
  defines	
  Arctic	
  waters	
  as	
  “the	
  internal	
  waters	
  of	
  Canada	
  and	
  the	
  waters	
  of	
  the	
  territorial	
  sea	
  of	
  Canada	
  and	
  the	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zone	
  of	
  Canada,	
  within	
  the	
  area	
  enclosed	
  by	
  the	
  60th	
  parallel	
  of	
  north	
  latitude,	
  the	
  141st	
  meridian	
  of	
  west	
  longitude	
  and	
  the	
  outer	
  limit	
  of	
  the	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zone,”346	
  reinforcing	
  the	
  lines	
  drawn	
  of	
  Canadian	
  boundaries	
  in	
  historical	
  maps.	
  Through	
  this,	
  they	
  are	
  attempting	
  continued	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  sectoral	
  rule,	
  but	
  applying	
  it	
  with	
  the	
  new	
  language	
  of	
  the	
  
United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982,	
  even	
  though	
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  (Brody,	
  2010)	
  346	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  1985)	
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they	
  had	
  yet	
  to	
  ratify	
  this	
  code.	
  Through	
  this	
  pollution	
  prevention	
  legislation	
  was	
  declaration	
  of	
  Canadian	
  responsibility	
  to	
  prevent	
  environmental	
  degradation	
  in	
  ‘their’	
  Arctic	
  waters.	
  Thus,	
  Canada	
  was	
  not	
  only	
  attempting	
  a	
  similar	
  protectionist	
  policy	
  as	
  made	
  by	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  in	
  legislating	
  for	
  the	
  fugacious	
  fur	
  seal	
  population	
  in	
  an	
  earlier	
  era,	
  but	
  were	
  also	
  claiming	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Passage,	
  an	
  area	
  of	
  disputed	
  sovereignty	
  within	
  international	
  relations.	
  	
  	
  
Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  in	
  the	
  Post	
  Cold	
  War	
  Era	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  In	
  their	
  statement	
  on	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Sovereignty	
  in	
  2006,	
  the	
  Government	
  of	
  Canada	
  claims	
  that	
  sovereignty	
  is	
  defined	
  not	
  only	
  as	
  ultimate	
  authority	
  over	
  a	
  given	
  territory,	
  but	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  “increasingly	
  defined	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  state	
  responsibility”	
  and	
  is	
  “linked	
  to	
  the	
  maintenance	
  of	
  international	
  security”,	
  including	
  the	
  responsibility	
  of	
  stewardship	
  and	
  occupancy.”347	
  This	
  position	
  is	
  reflected	
  in	
  their	
  Northern	
  Strategy	
  2008348	
  and	
  in	
  their	
  Statement	
  
on	
  Canada’s	
  Arctic	
  Foreign	
  Policy	
  2010,	
  which	
  emphasise	
  the	
  four	
  pillars	
  of	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Policy:	
  exercising	
  sovereignty,	
  promoting	
  economic	
  and	
  social	
  development,	
  protecting	
  the	
  Arctic	
  environment	
  and	
  improving	
  and	
  devolving	
  governance.	
  Although	
  these	
  policy	
  objectives	
  pursue	
  Canadian	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  methods	
  by	
  which	
  Canada	
  has	
  pursued	
  these	
  national	
  interests	
  includes	
  the	
  promotion	
  of	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants	
  on	
  the	
  national	
  agenda	
  and	
  a	
  rebranding	
  of	
  Canada	
  as	
  a	
  ‘northern	
  nation’	
  indicating	
  that	
  Canada	
  still	
  fosters	
  uncertainty	
  over	
  the	
  sovereign	
  status	
  of	
  their	
  Arctic.	
  	
  	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  347	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  2006	
  b)	
  348	
  Although	
  the	
  official	
  languages	
  of	
  Canada	
  are	
  English	
  and	
  French	
  and	
  thus	
  all	
  government	
  documents	
  must	
  be	
  produced	
  in	
  both	
  languages,	
  the	
  Northern	
  Strategy	
  2008	
  is	
  also	
  published	
  in	
  Inuktitut.	
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Adapting	
  to	
  the	
  new	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  Canada	
  ratified	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  in	
  2003,	
  however,	
  the	
  ratification	
  of	
  this	
  legal	
  mechanism	
  provides	
  another	
  dimension	
  of	
  insecurity	
  for	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  regarding	
  its	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  Under	
  the	
  treaty,	
  a	
  country	
  is	
  able	
  to	
  claim	
  an	
  extension	
  along	
  its	
  continental	
  shelf	
  for	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  mineral	
  exploitation.	
  Yet,	
  a	
  great	
  deal	
  of	
  the	
  area	
  that	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  is	
  trying	
  to	
  prove	
  belongs	
  to	
  them	
  by	
  right	
  of	
  the	
  
United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982,	
  is	
  the	
  same	
  parts	
  of	
  territory	
  over	
  which	
  they	
  have	
  claimed	
  to	
  hold	
  sovereignty	
  since	
  1925	
  through	
  the	
  sector	
  principle,	
  if	
  not	
  since	
  1880	
  by	
  virtue	
  of	
  imperial	
  transfer.	
  The	
  need	
  for	
  Canada	
  to	
  adopt	
  this	
  code	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  to	
  validate	
  their	
  claims	
  to	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  If	
  Canadian	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  Arctic	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  was	
  certain	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  lines	
  drawn	
  on	
  Canadian	
  maps,	
  would	
  there	
  be	
  little	
  need	
  for	
  Canada	
  to	
  once	
  again	
  demonstrate	
  legitimate	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  their	
  ‘region	
  of	
  attraction’	
  via	
  the	
  new	
  rules.	
  Clearly,	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  sees	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  as	
  a	
  means	
  of	
  gaining	
  international	
  recognition	
  and	
  legitimacy	
  for	
  external	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  is	
  in	
  part	
  so	
  they	
  will	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  grant	
  resource	
  exploitation	
  licenses—as	
  no	
  reasonable	
  corporation	
  is	
  willing	
  to	
  take	
  risk	
  of	
  investment	
  without	
  legal	
  certainty	
  of	
  ownership.349	
  	
  Yet	
  in	
  addition	
  to	
  the	
  new	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  delimiting	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  maritime	
  territory,	
  Canada	
  faces	
  a	
  challenge	
  to	
  its	
  claims	
  to	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  from	
  another	
  angle.	
  	
  As	
  the	
  processes	
  of	
  enlightenment	
  over	
  the	
  rights	
  of	
  indigenous	
  peoples	
  have	
  continued,	
  political,	
  social	
  and	
  economic	
  rights	
  have	
  received	
  considerable	
  promotion	
  on	
  domestic	
  political	
  agendas,	
  especially	
  in	
  relation	
  to	
  the	
  rights	
  of	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  in	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  349	
  Chatham	
  House	
  Rules.	
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colonised	
  countries	
  and	
  an	
  acknowledgement	
  that	
  they	
  are	
  entitled	
  to	
  self-­‐determination.	
  Entitled	
  to	
  these	
  inherent	
  rights,	
  and	
  with	
  a	
  history	
  of	
  imperial	
  relationships	
  in	
  Canada	
  between	
  the	
  government	
  and	
  the	
  indigenous	
  tribes,	
  there	
  is	
  ultimately	
  the	
  threat	
  that	
  the	
  Inuit	
  will	
  claim	
  their	
  historical	
  territorial	
  rights	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  declare	
  political	
  independence	
  from	
  Canada.	
  Thus,	
  the	
  project	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period	
  that	
  began	
  transforming	
  indigenous	
  people	
  into	
  Canadian	
  citizens	
  is	
  yet	
  more	
  crucial	
  in	
  contemporary	
  policy.	
  	
  From	
  the	
  perspective	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  who	
  claims	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  thus	
  territorial	
  rights	
  over	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  people	
  who	
  have	
  called	
  the	
  Arctic	
  home	
  for	
  a	
  millennium	
  -­‐-­‐the	
  Inuit-­‐-­‐	
  are	
  the	
  weak	
  point	
  in	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  as	
  in	
  reality,	
  it	
  faces	
  no	
  real	
  external	
  threats	
  from	
  states	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  It	
  is	
  the	
  relationship	
  that	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  has	
  with	
  its	
  Inuit,	
  using	
  them	
  as	
  a	
  reinforcement	
  instrument	
  for	
  Canada’s	
  claim	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  realm	
  that	
  creates	
  an	
  unorthodox	
  second	
  layer,	
  or	
  dual	
  sovereignty,	
  within	
  Canada.	
  	
  Canada	
  as	
  the	
  primary	
  layer	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  has	
  created	
  a	
  second	
  layer	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  empowered	
  by	
  the	
  first	
  layer,	
  with	
  the	
  first	
  layer	
  demonstrating	
  dependency	
  upon	
  the	
  second	
  for	
  sovereign	
  legitimacy.	
  Through	
  improving	
  and	
  devolving	
  governance	
  to	
  the	
  Inuit	
  people	
  in	
  Canada,	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Government	
  has	
  created	
  a	
  sovereign	
  nation	
  within	
  a	
  sovereign	
  state	
  and	
  it	
  is	
  through	
  existence	
  of	
  the	
  sovereign	
  Inuit	
  nation	
  that	
  the	
  sovereign	
  Canadian	
  state	
  depends	
  on	
  for	
  maintaining	
  Canadian	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  	
  In	
  A	
  Circumpolar	
  Inuit	
  Declaration	
  on	
  Sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  
2009,	
  the	
  Inuit	
  refer	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  as	
  “the	
  absolute	
  and	
  independent	
  authority	
  of	
  a	
  community	
  or	
  nation	
  both	
  internally	
  
	
   189	
  
and	
  externally.”350	
  Rousseau	
  claimed,	
  contrary	
  to	
  Grotius,	
  that	
  sovereignty	
  is	
  indivisible.	
  It	
  is	
  an	
  integral	
  whole	
  and	
  cannot	
  be	
  divided,	
  for	
  if	
  it	
  can	
  be	
  divided,	
  sovereignty	
  is	
  inexistent.	
  The	
  declaration	
  also	
  claims	
  sovereignty	
  has	
  no	
  fixed	
  meaning	
  and	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  a	
  contentious	
  term.	
  The	
  Inuit	
  attempt	
  to	
  claim	
  several	
  different	
  theoretical	
  positions,	
  including	
  that	
  sovereignty	
  is	
  changing	
  and	
  that	
  sovereignties	
  frequently	
  overlap,	
  such	
  as	
  with	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  European	
  Union.	
  There	
  is	
  a	
  measure	
  of	
  truth	
  to	
  this	
  observation	
  of	
  dual	
  layers	
  of	
  sovereignty;	
  however	
  the	
  Inuit	
  are	
  attempting	
  as	
  a	
  people	
  to	
  supersede	
  beyond	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  state,	
  whereas	
  the	
  European	
  Union	
  is	
  an	
  collection	
  of	
  sovereign	
  states	
  designating	
  the	
  sovereign	
  power	
  of	
  specific	
  legislative	
  and	
  judicial	
  areas	
  to	
  an	
  overarching	
  body-­‐-­‐a	
  different	
  set	
  of	
  circumstances.	
  	
  	
  The	
  awakening	
  of	
  the	
  importance	
  of	
  the	
  people	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  has	
  been	
  an	
  acutely	
  slow	
  process	
  for	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Government.	
  After	
  the	
  limited	
  and	
  damaging	
  social	
  policies	
  of	
  the	
  1950s,	
  the	
  North	
  and	
  its	
  people	
  were	
  relatively	
  ignored	
  by	
  Canada	
  until	
  sometime	
  in	
  the	
  mid	
  1980s.	
  During	
  this	
  period,	
  there	
  was	
  a	
  shift	
  in	
  the	
  focus	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  to	
  the	
  lands	
  in	
  the	
  North.	
  	
  There	
  was	
  suddenly	
  a	
  realisation	
  that	
  parts	
  of	
  Canada	
  were	
  being	
  ignored	
  by	
  the	
  functions	
  of	
  government	
  and	
  that	
  the	
  social	
  and	
  economic	
  development	
  of	
  these	
  areas	
  could	
  be	
  beneficial	
  for	
  Canada	
  as	
  a	
  whole.351	
  	
  In	
  order	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  Canada	
  over	
  its	
  sector	
  of	
  the	
  circumpolar	
  north,	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  realises	
  the	
  need	
  for	
  consensus	
  from	
  the	
  people	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  is	
  demonstrated	
  by	
  the	
  statement	
  from	
  the	
  Hon.	
  Willie	
  Adams	
  an	
  Inuit	
  Senator	
  for	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Territories,	
  who	
  said	
  to	
  the	
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  (Inuit	
  Circumpolar	
  Council,	
  2009)	
  351	
  (Canadian	
  Diplomatic	
  Personel,	
  2010)	
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Canadian	
  Senate,	
  “If	
  we	
  want	
  to	
  assert	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty,	
  we	
  need	
  to	
  ensure	
  that	
  the	
  people	
  from	
  the	
  community	
  are	
  involved.	
  We	
  have	
  been	
  living	
  up	
  there	
  for	
  thousands	
  of	
  years.”352	
  Senator	
  Adams,	
  as	
  a	
  representative	
  of	
  the	
  Inuit	
  peoples	
  of	
  Canada	
  was	
  communicating	
  to	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  the	
  need	
  for	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Inuit	
  in	
  Canada’s	
  demonstration	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  	
  	
  As	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  relocation	
  policies	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period,	
  which	
  had	
  the	
  dual	
  aims	
  of	
  development	
  of	
  northern	
  territory,	
  but	
  most	
  importantly	
  to	
  establish	
  permanent	
  civilization	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  North	
  as	
  evidence	
  of	
  effective	
  occupation	
  with	
  government	
  administering	
  services	
  and	
  governance	
  over	
  the	
  people	
  of	
  the	
  North,	
  the	
  Inuit	
  in	
  actuality	
  have	
  become	
  a	
  lost	
  civilization	
  weakend	
  by	
  the	
  transitions	
  from	
  nature	
  to	
  civilized	
  society	
  as	
  Rousseau	
  so	
  acutely	
  observed	
  in	
  The	
  Noble	
  Savage.	
  	
  The	
  Inuit	
  leaders	
  of	
  today	
  are	
  eager	
  to	
  communicate	
  that	
  they	
  are	
  empowering	
  themselves	
  through	
  education	
  and	
  involvement	
  in	
  the	
  political	
  agendas	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  to	
  improve	
  the	
  lifestyles	
  of	
  the	
  Inuit,	
  regenerating	
  them	
  as	
  capable	
  leaders	
  of	
  their	
  own	
  affairs.	
  This	
  empowerment	
  is	
  acceptable	
  to	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  for	
  two	
  reasons:	
  the	
  first	
  is	
  that	
  if	
  the	
  Inuit	
  can	
  effectively	
  lead	
  themselves,	
  it	
  results	
  in	
  less	
  cost	
  for	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  who	
  is	
  heavily	
  subsidising	
  Inuit	
  communities	
  as	
  recompense	
  for	
  past	
  sins.	
  The	
  second	
  reason	
  is	
  that	
  an	
  effective	
  Inuit	
  government	
  working	
  in	
  tangent	
  with	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  provides	
  reinforcement	
  for	
  Canadian	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  Inuit	
  Arctic	
  for	
  purposes	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Inuit	
  Nation	
  of	
  Canada	
  finds	
  itself	
  in	
  a	
  seeming	
  distinctively	
  unique	
  position:	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  acceptance	
  of	
  the	
  Inuit	
  to	
  the	
  administrative	
  efforts	
  of	
  the	
  government	
  of	
  Canada	
  that	
  places	
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  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  2006	
  a,	
  at	
  1510)	
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Canada	
  in	
  position	
  to	
  claim	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  on	
  two	
  different	
  bases:	
  that	
  of	
  historic	
  title	
  from	
  the	
  Inuit	
  having	
  been	
  using	
  the	
  Arctic	
  environment	
  in	
  its	
  entirety,	
  including	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Passage,	
  since	
  time	
  immemorial	
  to	
  provide	
  for	
  their	
  livelihood	
  and	
  also	
  as	
  being	
  the	
  recipients	
  of	
  the	
  administrative	
  benefits	
  of	
  a	
  colonial	
  power.	
  This	
  has	
  resulted	
  in	
  many	
  benefits	
  for	
  Inuit,	
  including	
  the	
  formal	
  establishment	
  of	
  their	
  own	
  territory	
  under	
  a	
  consensus	
  form	
  of	
  government	
  and	
  the	
  2007	
  Land	
  Claims	
  Agreement,	
  which	
  gives	
  the	
  Inuit	
  legal	
  right	
  to	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  its	
  historic	
  land	
  (from	
  a	
  colonial	
  government).	
  But	
  there	
  is	
  serious	
  strategy	
  at	
  work	
  behind	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  devolving	
  governance	
  of	
  the	
  Inuit	
  People	
  as	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  second	
  Senate	
  reading	
  of	
  the	
  Nunivak	
  Inuit	
  Land	
  Claims	
  Agreement	
  Bill,	
  that	
  this	
  land	
  is	
  “a	
  vital	
  part	
  of	
  our	
  national	
  heritage	
  that	
  our	
  government	
  is	
  determined	
  to	
  protect	
  as	
  we	
  continue	
  to	
  assert	
  Canada’s	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.”353	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Another	
  element	
  of	
  important	
  note	
  is	
  that	
  by	
  legal	
  nature,	
  the	
  Land	
  Claims	
  Bill	
  is	
  actually	
  a	
  treaty	
  and	
  through	
  this	
  treaty	
  those	
  “who	
  are	
  party	
  to	
  this	
  agreement	
  agree	
  to	
  an	
  extinguishment	
  of	
  their	
  rights,	
  or	
  some	
  of	
  their	
  rights,	
  under	
  the	
  Charter.”354	
  A	
  treaty	
  is	
  ordinarily	
  a	
  legal	
  agreement	
  between	
  two	
  states,	
  and	
  by	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  entering	
  into	
  a	
  treaty	
  with	
  the	
  Inuit	
  people	
  it	
  has	
  in	
  effect	
  acknowledged	
  the	
  right	
  of	
  the	
  Inuit	
  to	
  territory	
  that	
  Canada	
  claims	
  under	
  its	
  sovereign	
  domain.	
  	
  Yet	
  this	
  is	
  perhaps	
  an	
  unequal	
  treaty	
  in	
  that	
  it	
  has	
  been	
  made	
  between	
  an	
  internationally	
  recognised	
  sovereign	
  state	
  and	
  an	
  indigenous	
  people	
  group	
  with	
  little	
  or	
  no	
  representation	
  on	
  the	
  international	
  stage.	
  Despite	
  the	
  attempt	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  to	
  promote	
  indigenous	
  participation	
  at	
  the	
  international	
  level,	
  the	
  Inuit	
  people	
  have	
  a	
  difficult	
  problem	
  in	
  attempting	
  to	
  exercise	
  their	
  ‘sovereignty’	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  353	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  2007	
  b,	
  at	
  1335)	
  	
  354	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  2007	
  b,	
  at	
  1440)	
  	
  
	
   192	
  
internationally	
  as,	
  while	
  they	
  are	
  a	
  nation	
  holding	
  some	
  internal	
  sovereignty,	
  they	
  are	
  not	
  a	
  sovereign	
  state	
  with	
  external	
  sovereignty.	
  As	
  such,	
  they	
  are	
  not	
  entitled	
  to	
  the	
  rights	
  and	
  privileges	
  normally	
  reserved	
  for	
  states,	
  and	
  this	
  is	
  reflected	
  in	
  their	
  membership	
  status	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council.	
  	
  	
  This	
  difficulty	
  has	
  been	
  made	
  manifest	
  by	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  inclusion	
  of	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  in	
  negotiations	
  of	
  Arctic	
  affairs	
  at	
  the	
  international	
  level,	
  including	
  the	
  occasion	
  of	
  the	
  Ilulissat	
  Declaration	
  2008,	
  in	
  which	
  only	
  sovereign	
  states,	
  indeed	
  only	
  the	
  littoral	
  Arctic	
  states	
  were	
  represented.	
  This	
  exclusion	
  has	
  been	
  noted	
  with	
  chagrin	
  by	
  several	
  people	
  including	
  Udloriak	
  Hanson,	
  special	
  advisor	
  to	
  the	
  Inuit	
  Tapiriit	
  Kanatami	
  who	
  has	
  pled	
  for	
  the	
  role	
  the	
  Inuit	
  people	
  deserve	
  and	
  wish	
  to	
  play	
  with	
  regards	
  to	
  the	
  decision-­‐making	
  processes	
  for	
  Arctic	
  affairs	
  to	
  be	
  communicated	
  to	
  those	
  operating	
  at	
  state	
  level	
  policy	
  development.355	
  At	
  the	
  same	
  time,	
  Dr.	
  Simon	
  Walmsley	
  of	
  the	
  WWF	
  remarked	
  that	
  they	
  had	
  failed,	
  despite	
  attempt,	
  to	
  include	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  on	
  the	
  panel	
  for	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Polar	
  Code	
  with	
  the	
  International	
  Maritime	
  Organisation.356	
  This	
  is	
  because	
  they	
  had	
  been	
  unable	
  to	
  bypass	
  the	
  sovereign	
  state	
  to	
  request	
  the	
  inclusion	
  of	
  representatives	
  of	
  indigenous	
  groups.	
  Thus	
  it	
  appears	
  that	
  this	
  status	
  is	
  reinforced	
  by	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  confirming	
  states	
  as	
  the	
  dominant	
  agent	
  within	
  this	
  system.	
  	
  	
  Regardless	
  of	
  this	
  structural	
  asymmetry,	
  the	
  Inuit	
  have	
  attempted	
  to	
  make	
  their	
  mark	
  on	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  by	
  issuing	
  A	
  
Circumpolar	
  Inuit	
  Declaration	
  on	
  Sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  2009.	
  This	
  declaration,	
  although	
  produced	
  by	
  the	
  Inuit	
  living	
  in	
  Canada,	
  appears	
  to	
  be	
  extended	
  to	
  include	
  all	
  Inuit	
  peoples	
  living	
  throughout	
  the	
  whole	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  and	
  includes	
  signatories	
  from	
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several	
  Inuit	
  groups.	
  The	
  declaration	
  argues	
  that	
  the	
  Inuit	
  have	
  historical	
  title	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  its	
  resources,	
  based	
  upon	
  their	
  presence	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  since	
  ‘time	
  immemorial,’	
  and	
  confirms	
  their	
  right	
  to	
  self-­‐determination	
  as	
  promoted	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Declaration	
  on	
  the	
  Rights	
  of	
  Indigenous	
  People.	
  	
  This	
  reference	
  to	
  ‘time	
  immemorial’	
  is	
  the	
  exact	
  phrased	
  echoed	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Museum	
  of	
  Civilization	
  and	
  the	
  Speeches	
  of	
  Stephen	
  Harper	
  and	
  thus,	
  it	
  appears	
  that	
  not	
  only	
  is	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  using	
  the	
  Inuit	
  to	
  maintain	
  their	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty,	
  but	
  that	
  the	
  Inuit	
  are	
  reminding	
  the	
  agents	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  that	
  despite	
  historic	
  transgressions,	
  that	
  domestically	
  they	
  have	
  the	
  opportunity	
  to	
  rise	
  above	
  the	
  suppression	
  of	
  imperialism.	
  	
  	
  In	
  their	
  declaration	
  the	
  Inuit	
  claim	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  people,	
  a	
  single	
  integral	
  unit	
  represented	
  by	
  the	
  Inuit	
  Circumpolar	
  Council.	
  They	
  extend	
  their	
  political	
  influence	
  to	
  label	
  themselves	
  as	
  citizens	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  citizens	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  sub-­‐units,	
  citizens	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  indigenous	
  citizens	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  with	
  all	
  the	
  rights	
  provided	
  by	
  the	
  UN	
  Declaration	
  of	
  the	
  Rights	
  of	
  Indigenous	
  Peoples.	
  However,	
  this	
  declaration	
  was	
  only	
  recently	
  recognised	
  by	
  the	
  Government	
  of	
  Canada	
  in	
  November	
  2010—while	
  at	
  the	
  same	
  time	
  issuing	
  a	
  disclaimer	
  that	
  this	
  recognition	
  posed	
  no	
  legal	
  restraints	
  on	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government,	
  again	
  reinforcing	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Declaration	
  on	
  the	
  Rights	
  of	
  Indigenous	
  People	
  which	
  does	
  not	
  encourage	
  the	
  indigenous	
  right	
  to	
  self-­‐determination	
  as	
  license	
  to	
  independence.	
  	
  It	
  seems	
  difficult	
  to	
  claim	
  citizenship	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  based	
  upon	
  all	
  these	
  levels,	
  when	
  ‘the	
  Arctic’	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  state	
  capable	
  of	
  conveying	
  citizenship,	
  and	
  the	
  state	
  which	
  does	
  grant	
  citizenship	
  to	
  the	
  Inuit	
  living	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  does	
  not	
  recognise	
  their	
  rights	
  as	
  an	
  indigenous	
  people.	
  	
  The	
  Inuit	
  are	
  laying	
  claim	
  to	
  the	
  right	
  of	
  self-­‐determination	
  of	
  peoples	
  as	
  a	
  means	
  of	
  claiming	
  right	
  to	
  participate	
  in	
  the	
  decision-­‐
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making	
  processes	
  of	
  governance	
  regimes	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  appears	
  to	
  be	
  gross	
  misunderstanding	
  of	
  what	
  the	
  right	
  of	
  self-­‐determination	
  of	
  peoples	
  entails.	
  While	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  has	
  allowed	
  permanent	
  participants	
  of	
  indigenous	
  groups,	
  this	
  is	
  different	
  than	
  the	
  role	
  played	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  member	
  states.	
  As	
  such,	
  this	
  position	
  does	
  not	
  represent	
  acknowledgement	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  of	
  the	
  Inuit	
  as	
  having	
  sovereign	
  powers.	
  There	
  are	
  at	
  least	
  two	
  pieces	
  of	
  evidence	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  this:	
  	
  The	
  first	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  is	
  not	
  permitted	
  to	
  discuss	
  anything	
  related	
  to	
  issues	
  of	
  security	
  and	
  defence,	
  a	
  power	
  typically	
  reserved	
  for	
  the	
  sovereign	
  state.	
  Thus,	
  the	
  Inuit	
  people	
  have	
  been	
  excluded	
  from	
  a	
  crucial	
  element	
  that	
  demonstrates	
  sovereignty.	
  Secondly,	
  membership	
  into	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  is	
  again	
  a	
  symbolic	
  acceptance	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  of	
  the	
  achievement	
  of	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  a	
  sovereign	
  state.	
  The	
  Inuit	
  people	
  have	
  not	
  been	
  considered	
  for	
  membership	
  in	
  this	
  international	
  governance	
  organisation	
  as	
  a	
  sovereign	
  unit.	
  Even	
  countries	
  like	
  Taiwan,	
  Republic	
  of	
  China,	
  who	
  have	
  been	
  operating	
  as	
  sovereign	
  states	
  for	
  many	
  years,	
  have	
  not	
  been	
  accepted	
  into	
  the	
  UN	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  risk	
  of	
  rousing	
  the	
  ire	
  of	
  China,	
  a	
  permanent	
  member	
  of	
  the	
  UN	
  Security	
  Council.	
  How	
  much	
  further	
  away	
  is	
  the	
  acceptance	
  of	
  a	
  people	
  group,	
  without	
  exclusive	
  control	
  of	
  a	
  territory,	
  being	
  granted	
  sovereign	
  status	
  via	
  the	
  United	
  Nations?	
  	
  There	
  are	
  other	
  examples	
  that	
  illustrate	
  the	
  political	
  shift	
  in	
  the	
  gradual	
  awakening	
  to	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  as	
  an	
  integral	
  part	
  of	
  Canada.	
  One	
  such	
  visible	
  example	
  is	
  a	
  reflection	
  on	
  the	
  change	
  of	
  the	
  representation	
  of	
  Canada	
  in	
  official	
  emblems,	
  such	
  as	
  Canada’s	
  coat	
  of	
  arms.	
  Canada’s	
  arms	
  had	
  initially	
  been	
  designed	
  with	
  the	
  phrase	
  A	
  Mari	
  Usque	
  ad	
  Mare,	
  but	
  during	
  the	
  last	
  twenty	
  years	
  this	
  has	
  been	
  colloquially	
  expanded	
  informally	
  to	
  ‘from	
  sea	
  to	
  sea	
  to	
  sea’	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  include	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  as	
  having	
  as	
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much	
  significance	
  as	
  the	
  Atlantic	
  and	
  Pacific	
  Oceans	
  to	
  the	
  framing	
  of	
  Canada.357	
  This	
  phrase	
  has	
  been	
  repeated	
  often	
  by	
  Canadian	
  officials	
  in	
  public	
  speeches.	
  This	
  movement	
  to	
  include	
  the	
  North	
  eventually	
  led	
  to	
  the	
  creation	
  in	
  1999	
  of	
  the	
  Territory	
  of	
  Nunavut	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  northeast	
  with	
  Iqaluit	
  (formerly	
  Frobisher	
  Bay)	
  on	
  Baffin	
  Island	
  designated	
  as	
  the	
  governmental	
  seat.	
  The	
  creation	
  of	
  Nunavut	
  provided	
  the	
  final	
  feather	
  in	
  the	
  cap	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  for	
  proving	
  that	
  final	
  clause	
  necessary	
  under	
  the	
  customary	
  law	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition:	
  effective	
  administrative	
  of	
  government	
  ministerial	
  functions	
  over	
  a	
  people	
  group	
  in	
  the	
  acquired	
  territory.	
  Before	
  this,	
  the	
  Inuit	
  people	
  living	
  within	
  the	
  area	
  of	
  Nunavut	
  had	
  remained	
  largely	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  control	
  or	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  and	
  thus	
  could	
  be	
  perceived	
  as	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  sovereign	
  control	
  over	
  Canadian	
  ‘territories’	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  	
  	
  Another	
  important	
  element	
  of	
  establishing	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  Canada	
  in	
  the	
  north	
  has	
  been	
  the	
  movement	
  to	
  encourage	
  the	
  citizens	
  of	
  Canada	
  to	
  embrace	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  the	
  Inuit	
  as	
  their	
  own,	
  and	
  in	
  turn	
  to	
  promote	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  the	
  Inuit	
  as	
  Canadians,	
  and	
  thus	
  the	
  Canadian	
  people	
  claiming	
  historic	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  One	
  example	
  of	
  this	
  being	
  done	
  is	
  through	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Museum	
  of	
  Civilization	
  in	
  Ottawa.	
  	
  The	
  museum	
  tells	
  through	
  artefacts,	
  the	
  tale	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  people’s	
  history	
  dating	
  back	
  to	
  the	
  late	
  Paleo-­‐Eskimo	
  Period	
  around	
  4500	
  BCE.	
  By	
  comparative	
  standard	
  of	
  known	
  histories	
  of	
  other	
  civilizations,	
  this	
  is	
  not	
  such	
  a	
  long	
  people’s	
  history.	
  Canadian	
  researchers	
  are	
  aware	
  of	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  a	
  previous	
  people	
  group,	
  but	
  this	
  people	
  left	
  little	
  archaeological	
  evidence	
  behind	
  when	
  they	
  mysteriously	
  disappeared.	
  The	
  first	
  people	
  group	
  that	
  the	
  Canadians	
  clearly	
  identify	
  with	
  are	
  known	
  as	
  the	
  ‘Thule’,	
  their	
  moniker	
  stemming	
  from	
  the	
  Greek	
  concept	
  of	
  
thule,	
  ‘the	
  most	
  northern	
  place’	
  as	
  recorded	
  by	
  Pytheas,	
  a	
  Greek	
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Arctic	
  explorer	
  who	
  found	
  either	
  Norway	
  or	
  Iceland	
  sometime	
  during	
  the	
  third	
  or	
  fourth	
  century	
  BCE.358	
  This	
  group	
  migrated	
  from	
  around	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  region	
  of	
  western	
  North	
  America	
  to	
  Greenland.	
  Here,	
  their	
  story	
  abruptly	
  ends.	
  	
  As	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  endeavours	
  to	
  form	
  an	
  attachment	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  people	
  to	
  their	
  Arctic	
  identity,	
  they	
  have	
  gone	
  to	
  impressive	
  lengths	
  to	
  build	
  an	
  iconic	
  temple	
  of	
  Arctic	
  history.	
  The	
  building	
  that	
  houses	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  Canadian	
  civilization,	
  designed	
  by	
  architect	
  Douglas	
  Cardinal	
  of	
  Blackfoot	
  ancestry	
  is	
  a	
  masterpiece	
  in	
  itself—defying	
  the	
  traditions	
  of	
  modern	
  design	
  with	
  only	
  curved	
  lines	
  throughout	
  the	
  entire	
  structure,	
  is	
  intended	
  to	
  represent	
  the	
  importance	
  of	
  the	
  influence	
  of	
  geography	
  on	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Canadian	
  history	
  and	
  culture.359	
  The	
  museum	
  claims	
  to	
  offer	
  for	
  Canadians	
  an	
  initiation	
  into	
  their	
  national	
  identity.360	
  What	
  this	
  national	
  identity	
  entails,	
  according	
  to	
  those	
  proffering	
  a	
  tour	
  in	
  Canadian	
  identity	
  can	
  be	
  found	
  in	
  the	
  names	
  of	
  the	
  permanent	
  exhibitions,	
  such	
  as	
  ‘From	
  Time	
  Immemorial—Tsimshian	
  Prehistory’,	
  ‘The	
  First	
  Peoples	
  Hall’,	
  and	
  ‘Canada	
  Hall’	
  which	
  displays	
  one	
  thousand	
  years	
  of	
  Canadian	
  social	
  history.	
  Upon	
  entering	
  this	
  museum	
  it	
  is	
  at	
  once	
  obvious	
  that	
  the	
  most	
  important	
  aspect	
  of	
  Canadian	
  identity	
  on	
  display	
  is	
  its	
  indigenous	
  people.	
  Very	
  little	
  is	
  said	
  of	
  the	
  British	
  or	
  French	
  who	
  colonised	
  Canada	
  from	
  the	
  1600s	
  and	
  even	
  less	
  is	
  said	
  of	
  the	
  Vikings	
  who	
  may	
  have	
  frequented	
  parts	
  of	
  Canada’s	
  eastern	
  seaboard	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  harvest	
  grapes	
  and	
  nuts.	
  	
  Because	
  a	
  large	
  percentage	
  of	
  present	
  day	
  Canadians	
  are	
  of	
  European	
  ancestry,	
  the	
  emphasis	
  on	
  the	
  First	
  Peoples	
  and	
  the	
  Inuit	
  seems	
  a	
  curiosity.361	
  But	
  when	
  the	
  import	
  of	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  is	
  considered	
  in	
  the	
  overall	
  scheme	
  of	
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  (Morrison,	
  2010)	
  (Mills,	
  2003,	
  p.	
  537)	
  (Simpson-­‐Housley,	
  1996,	
  p.	
  25)	
  359	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  2010)	
  (Canadian	
  Museum	
  of	
  Civilization,	
  2004)	
  360	
  (Canadian	
  Museum	
  of	
  Civilization,	
  2004)	
  	
  361	
  The	
  First	
  Peoples	
  and	
  Inuit	
  are	
  considered	
  as	
  separate	
  peoples	
  under	
  Canadian	
  domestic	
  law	
  structures.	
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Canada’s	
  strategy	
  in	
  its	
  Arctic	
  and	
  on	
  the	
  world	
  stage,	
  the	
  rational	
  is	
  at	
  once	
  clearer.	
  	
  A	
  relevant	
  exhibit	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  indigenous	
  agenda	
  of	
  this	
  purported	
  national	
  identity	
  greets	
  any	
  visitor	
  immediately	
  upon	
  entrance	
  into	
  the	
  museum	
  building.	
  In	
  life	
  size	
  model	
  is	
  a	
  re-­‐creation	
  of	
  the	
  figure	
  of	
  Vilhjalmer	
  Stefansson,	
  his	
  sled	
  and	
  his	
  team	
  from	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Expedition	
  1913-­‐18.	
  Stefansson	
  was	
  a	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  explorer	
  of	
  the	
  bravest	
  type	
  of	
  all	
  polar	
  explorers.	
  While	
  many	
  expeditions	
  before	
  him	
  had	
  met	
  their	
  demise	
  due	
  to	
  lack	
  of	
  provisions,	
  Stefansson	
  hypothesised	
  that	
  white	
  explorers	
  should	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  live	
  as	
  did	
  the	
  natives:	
  from	
  the	
  bounty	
  of	
  the	
  land.	
  Working	
  directly	
  under	
  the	
  auspices	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  on	
  his	
  third	
  and	
  final	
  expedition,	
  Stefansson	
  “discovered	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  world’s	
  last	
  major	
  landmasses…bringing	
  full	
  circle	
  a	
  process	
  his	
  Viking	
  ancestors	
  had	
  begun	
  almost	
  a	
  thousand	
  years	
  before.	
  Stefansson	
  delineated	
  and	
  redefined	
  for	
  mapmakers	
  many	
  of	
  the	
  coastlines	
  in	
  the	
  west-­‐central	
  Arctic.	
  His	
  hydro	
  graphic	
  soundings	
  made	
  while	
  he	
  was	
  drifting	
  dangerously	
  on	
  ice	
  floes	
  outlines,	
  for	
  the	
  first	
  time,	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  from	
  Alaska	
  to	
  Prince	
  Patrick	
  Island,	
  and	
  revealed	
  the	
  submarine	
  mountains	
  and	
  valleys	
  beneath	
  the	
  Beaufort	
  Sea.”362	
  Stefansson,	
  with	
  his	
  Viking	
  heritage	
  and	
  as	
  a	
  representative	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  did	
  much	
  to	
  further	
  Canadian	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  as	
  an	
  integral	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  identity.	
  	
  	
  In	
  recent	
  years,	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  has	
  been	
  broadcasting	
  an	
  intensified	
  stream	
  of	
  ‘Canadian	
  identity’.	
  One	
  way	
  this	
  has	
  been	
  done	
  is	
  through	
  the	
  work	
  of	
  museums,	
  like	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Museum	
  of	
  Civilization.	
  Museums	
  hold	
  a	
  special	
  status	
  in	
  the	
  mind	
  of	
  ordinary	
  citizens;	
  they	
  appear	
  to	
  many	
  as	
  being	
  hallowed	
  halls	
  of	
  preserved	
  history.	
  What	
  is	
  often	
  forgotten	
  is	
  that	
  history	
  has	
  been	
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  (Diubaldo,	
  1999,	
  p.	
  2)	
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presented	
  through	
  a	
  particular	
  historiographical	
  interpretation,	
  and	
  often	
  that	
  presentation	
  is	
  attached	
  to	
  a	
  particular	
  agenda.	
  	
  It	
  has	
  been	
  noted	
  that	
  “museums	
  have	
  long	
  served	
  to	
  house	
  a	
  national	
  heritage,	
  thereby	
  creating	
  a	
  national	
  identity	
  that	
  often	
  fulfilled	
  national	
  ambition”363	
  and	
  that	
  they	
  have	
  played	
  important	
  roles	
  in	
  creating	
  national	
  identity	
  and	
  in	
  promoting	
  national	
  agendas.”364	
  There	
  seems	
  little	
  room	
  to	
  doubt	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Museum	
  of	
  Civilization	
  as	
  a	
  tool	
  for	
  promoting	
  ‘the	
  North’	
  in	
  Canadian	
  national	
  identity	
  and	
  as	
  a	
  national	
  agenda	
  of	
  the	
  Harper	
  government.	
  	
  	
  The	
  formation	
  of	
  a	
  notion	
  of	
  identity	
  and	
  especially	
  that	
  of	
  a	
  national	
  identity	
  requires	
  the	
  meshing	
  of	
  cultural	
  and	
  social	
  notions	
  of	
  community	
  with	
  political	
  symbols	
  to	
  attach	
  the	
  emotional	
  sentiments	
  and	
  psychological	
  processes	
  associated	
  with	
  belonging.	
  Commonly	
  understood	
  national	
  symbols	
  include	
  state	
  flags	
  and	
  national	
  anthems,	
  which	
  are	
  “carefully	
  constructed,	
  carefully	
  represented	
  projected	
  image[s]	
  of	
  identity	
  that	
  result	
  from	
  a	
  conscious	
  decision	
  making	
  process.”365	
  Indeed,	
  even	
  the	
  Canadian	
  national	
  anthem	
  radiates	
  the	
  realm	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  the	
  identity	
  of	
  the	
  Canadians.	
  Canada	
  is	
  the	
  ‘True	
  North,	
  strong	
  and	
  free’.	
  	
  Not	
  merely	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  north,	
  but	
  a	
  strong,	
  free	
  and	
  true-­‐blue	
  Arctic	
  state.	
  When	
  asked	
  about	
  the	
  importance	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  to	
  Canada,	
  many	
  Canadians	
  immediately	
  refer	
  to	
  the	
  lyrics	
  of	
  the	
  national	
  anthem.	
  	
  	
  The	
  other	
  facet	
  of	
  this	
  intensified	
  stream	
  is	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  pronouncements	
  from	
  the	
  government	
  continuously	
  emphasising	
  the	
  “symbolic	
  significance	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  in	
  Canadian	
  national	
  identity.”366	
  Some	
  examples	
  of	
  this	
  can	
  be	
  seen	
  in	
  speeches	
  made	
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  (Kaplan,	
  1994,	
  p.	
  9)	
  364	
  (Kaplan,	
  1994,	
  p.	
  2)	
  365	
  (Cerulo,	
  1995,	
  p.	
  5)	
  366	
  (Dodds,	
  2010,	
  p.	
  372)	
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by	
  Prime	
  Minister	
  Stephen	
  Harper,	
  where	
  he	
  states,	
  “Canada’s	
  Arctic	
  is	
  central	
  to	
  our	
  identity	
  as	
  a	
  northern	
  nation”367	
  and	
  “We	
  are	
  a	
  northern	
  country.	
  Canadians	
  are	
  deeply	
  influenced	
  by	
  the	
  vast	
  expanse	
  of	
  our	
  Arctic	
  and	
  its	
  history	
  and	
  legends.”368	
  The	
  Arctic	
  has	
  reached	
  a	
  high	
  position	
  on	
  the	
  agenda	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  government	
  due	
  to	
  its	
  import	
  in	
  international	
  relations,	
  and	
  they	
  desire	
  to	
  articulate	
  and	
  even	
  convince	
  Canadian	
  citizens	
  of	
  the	
  value	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic—certainly	
  in	
  economic	
  terms,	
  but	
  most	
  definitely	
  in	
  cultural	
  terms	
  in	
  the	
  perception	
  of	
  Canadians.	
  	
  This	
  was	
  also	
  evidenced	
  in	
  the	
  used	
  of	
  the	
  Inuit	
  Inuksuk	
  as	
  the	
  official	
  emblem	
  of	
  the	
  Vancouver	
  2010	
  Winter	
  Olympics,	
  a	
  location	
  thousands	
  of	
  miles	
  away	
  from	
  the	
  place	
  where	
  this	
  figure	
  has	
  any	
  real	
  symbolic	
  or	
  practical	
  use.	
  Yet	
  the	
  presentation	
  of	
  this	
  identity	
  to	
  the	
  world	
  outside	
  is	
  a	
  hard	
  sell	
  given	
  the	
  historical	
  factors	
  of	
  colonial	
  exploitation	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  and	
  its	
  peoples.	
  	
  Finally,	
  within	
  their	
  international	
  engagement	
  for	
  Arctic	
  policy,	
  Canada	
  exhibits	
  an	
  almost	
  hysterical	
  position	
  on	
  their	
  defence	
  of	
  their	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole.	
  Since	
  the	
  signing	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982,	
  Canada	
  has	
  been	
  in	
  progress	
  of	
  establishing	
  their	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf,	
  a	
  new	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Competing	
  with	
  Canada	
  for	
  this	
  geographical	
  marker	
  is	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation,	
  both	
  having	
  claimed	
  up	
  to	
  this	
  point	
  through	
  the	
  sectoral	
  proclamation	
  during	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years.	
  	
  Although	
  it	
  remains	
  to	
  be	
  determined	
  through	
  the	
  Commission	
  on	
  the	
  Continental	
  Shelf,	
  who—if	
  anyone,	
  can	
  claim	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  Canada	
  has	
  embarked	
  on	
  a	
  volley	
  of	
  activity	
  to	
  signify	
  that	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  is	
  Canadian.	
  This	
  includes	
  the	
  issuing	
  of	
  passports	
  to	
  Santa	
  and	
  Mrs	
  Claus	
  in	
  late	
  2012,	
  indicating	
  that	
  as	
  Canadian	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  367	
  (Harper,	
  2007)	
  368	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  2010)	
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citizens	
  and	
  residents,	
  just	
  as	
  the	
  Inuit	
  are	
  Canadian	
  citizens—the	
  North	
  Pole	
  is	
  within	
  Canadian	
  territory.	
  	
  	
  	
  
Conclusions	
  	
  This	
  paper	
  concludes	
  that	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  from	
  the	
  foundations	
  of	
  the	
  Dominion	
  of	
  Canada	
  to	
  the	
  publication	
  of	
  their	
  2010	
  Statement	
  on	
  Canada’s	
  Arctic	
  Foreign	
  Policy	
  has	
  created	
  crisis	
  of	
  legitimacy	
  within	
  Canadian	
  policy	
  over	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  their	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  As	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  this	
  crisis,	
  the	
  government	
  of	
  Canada	
  has	
  attempted	
  several	
  methods	
  for	
  establishing	
  and	
  exercising	
  their	
  sovereignty	
  including	
  claiming	
  the	
  Arctic	
  through	
  imperial	
  transfer,	
  effective	
  occupation,	
  the	
  sectoral	
  principle	
  and	
  most	
  importantly,	
  through	
  their	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  indigenous	
  peoples.	
  	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  these	
  formal	
  methods,	
  they	
  have	
  used	
  informal	
  methods	
  to	
  promote	
  their	
  identity	
  as	
  an	
  Arctic	
  nation	
  through	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  an	
  Arctic	
  identity	
  including	
  the	
  rigours	
  promotion	
  of	
  Canada	
  as	
  an	
  Arctic	
  nation,	
  or	
  a	
  Northern	
  state,	
  with	
  gratuitous	
  use	
  of	
  Inuit	
  symbols	
  in	
  international	
  events	
  and	
  the	
  issuing	
  of	
  the	
  Clauses	
  with	
  passports.	
  	
  	
  The	
  subject	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  has	
  received	
  a	
  significant	
  amount	
  of	
  attention	
  from	
  Canadian	
  policy	
  makers	
  in	
  recent	
  years,	
  and	
  many	
  government	
  officials,	
  including	
  Prime	
  Minister	
  Stephen	
  Harper,	
  continuously	
  express	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  establish	
  and/or	
  reinforce	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Yet,	
  it	
  does	
  not	
  appear	
  that	
  any	
  external	
  challenges	
  to	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  exist—the	
  challenges	
  are	
  only	
  from	
  within,	
  created	
  through	
  a	
  sense	
  of	
  political	
  insecurity	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants.	
  As	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  this	
  crisis	
  of	
  legitimacy,	
  they	
  have	
  promoted	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  the	
  Inuit	
  as	
  the	
  key	
  to	
  their	
  security	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  resulting	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  dual	
  layers	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  within	
  Canada.	
  This	
  identity	
  is	
  needed	
  to	
  give	
  the	
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government	
  legitimacy	
  and	
  popular	
  support	
  for	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  its	
  Arctic	
  policies	
  on	
  both	
  the	
  national	
  and	
  international	
  stage	
  and	
  is	
  being	
  pursued	
  through	
  devolution	
  of	
  government	
  administration	
  to	
  the	
  Inuit	
  people	
  in	
  attempt	
  to	
  prove	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  via	
  the	
  Inuit.	
  	
  There	
  is	
  now	
  the	
  state	
  as	
  the	
  primary	
  sovereign	
  layer,	
  and	
  the	
  indigenous	
  with	
  a	
  tribal	
  layer	
  of	
  sovereign	
  status—a	
  system	
  that	
  in	
  actuality	
  only	
  continues	
  to	
  reinforce	
  the	
  asymmetric	
  imperial	
  relationship	
  that	
  is	
  the	
  cause	
  of	
  this	
  crisis	
  in	
  the	
  first	
  instance.	
  	
  	
  The	
  result	
  of	
  this	
  promotion	
  of	
  the	
  Inuit	
  within	
  the	
  Canadian	
  political	
  hierarchy	
  and	
  the	
  dual	
  layers	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  has	
  had	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  promoting	
  the	
  inclusion	
  of	
  the	
  Inuit	
  within	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations.	
  Thus,	
  the	
  Inuit	
  are	
  also	
  attempting	
  to	
  secure	
  recognition	
  at	
  the	
  international	
  level	
  of	
  their	
  rights	
  as	
  a	
  sovereign	
  people.	
  Although	
  they	
  have	
  been	
  included	
  as	
  permanent	
  participants	
  on	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  this	
  inclusion	
  has	
  not	
  in	
  reality	
  changed	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  hierarchical	
  dominance	
  of	
  states	
  as	
  the	
  primary	
  agents.	
  Despite	
  their	
  Inuit	
  Declaration	
  on	
  Sovereignty,	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  is	
  not	
  able	
  to	
  cope	
  with	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  a	
  people	
  group	
  without	
  the	
  same	
  components	
  held	
  by	
  states	
  that	
  is	
  required	
  for	
  international	
  recognition	
  of	
  external	
  sovereignty.	
  	
  	
  	
  Although	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policy	
  continuously	
  makes	
  reference	
  to	
  establishing	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty,	
  it	
  appears	
  from	
  a	
  legal	
  position,	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  uncertainty	
  of	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty.	
  They	
  have	
  a	
  historic	
  claim	
  reaching	
  back	
  more	
  than	
  a	
  century,	
  have	
  continuously	
  represented	
  the	
  Arctic	
  on	
  official	
  documents	
  and	
  have	
  demonstrated	
  effective	
  occupation	
  as	
  much	
  as	
  possible	
  in	
  a	
  hostile	
  climate.	
  Thus,	
  this	
  crisis	
  of	
  legitimacy	
  regarding	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  terra	
  firma	
  is	
  a	
  somewhat	
  irrational	
  situation,	
  possibly	
  reflecting	
  that	
  Canada	
  is	
  not	
  willing	
  to	
  relinquish	
  any	
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claims	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  or	
  any	
  maritime	
  territory	
  they	
  deem	
  to	
  hold,	
  although	
  claims	
  to	
  this	
  territory	
  have	
  not	
  been	
  made	
  according	
  to	
  rules	
  accepted	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
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Chapter	
  V	
  
	
  
Russian	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  1619-­‐2013	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  Arctic	
  has	
  been	
  a	
  predominant	
  feature	
  of	
  Russian	
  political	
  and	
  economic	
  policy	
  through	
  four	
  phases	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  through	
  three	
  different	
  domestic	
  political	
  constitutions:	
  Imperial	
  Russia,	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  and	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation.	
  	
  Through	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  transitions,	
  the	
  relationship	
  of	
  Russia	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  adapted	
  to	
  the	
  new	
  rules	
  of	
  this	
  system	
  as	
  it	
  pursues	
  its	
  national	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  with	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  domestic	
  transitions	
  adding	
  a	
  new	
  dynamic	
  to	
  the	
  way	
  in	
  which	
  Russia	
  relates	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  state	
  practice.	
  The	
  long-­‐term	
  analysis	
  of	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  demonstrates	
  this	
  policy	
  is	
  the	
  cumulative	
  effect	
  of	
  an	
  inherited	
  identity	
  resulting	
  in	
  state	
  practice	
  that	
  sometimes	
  appears	
  to	
  contradict	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  as	
  Russia	
  pursues	
  its	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  	
  	
  Research	
  Questions	
  	
  
• What	
  is	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  in	
  the	
  different	
  eras	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  what	
  is	
  its	
  character?	
  
• What	
  artefacts	
  exhibit	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy?	
  
• What	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  have	
  the	
  Russian	
  state	
  followed	
  in	
  their	
  Arctic	
  policy?	
  
• What	
  are	
  Russian	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  their	
  Arctic	
  policy?	
  
• How	
  does	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  correlate	
  with	
  change	
  in	
  Russian	
  domestic	
  political	
  structures	
  and	
  how	
  are	
  these	
  changes	
  exhibited	
  in	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy?	
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Methodology	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Although	
  seeing	
  a	
  transition	
  to	
  democracy	
  following	
  the	
  breakdown	
  of	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union,	
  the	
  character	
  and	
  methods	
  of	
  the	
  government	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation	
  are	
  currently	
  in	
  a	
  transitional	
  phase	
  as	
  much	
  of	
  the	
  current	
  leadership	
  received	
  their	
  political	
  training	
  and	
  indoctrination	
  under	
  Communist	
  Russia;	
  the	
  current	
  administration	
  can	
  be	
  accused	
  of	
  attempting	
  to	
  preserve	
  the	
  characteristics	
  of	
  the	
  Soviet	
  State	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  perpetuate	
  their	
  own	
  power.369	
  	
  Thus,	
  this	
  research	
  has	
  faced	
  the	
  following	
  limitations:	
  policy	
  documents	
  have	
  disappeared	
  from	
  government	
  archives	
  during	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  this	
  research,	
  websites	
  produced	
  by	
  the	
  Russian	
  government	
  in	
  English	
  and	
  in	
  Russian	
  versions	
  appear	
  to	
  have	
  different	
  content	
  making	
  it	
  difficult	
  to	
  determine	
  specific	
  policy	
  positions,	
  Russian	
  diplomatic	
  staff	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  Kingdom	
  have	
  refused	
  requests	
  for	
  interviews	
  and	
  finally,	
  a	
  major	
  constraint	
  of	
  this	
  research	
  has	
  been	
  the	
  author’s	
  inability	
  to	
  read	
  Russian	
  and	
  holding	
  limited	
  financial	
  resources	
  to	
  engage	
  translation	
  skills.	
  	
  	
  Thus,	
  to	
  combat	
  the	
  unavailability	
  of	
  the	
  complete	
  set	
  of	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  documents,	
  this	
  research	
  uses	
  the	
  concept	
  of	
  data	
  triangulation	
  as	
  methodology	
  for	
  this	
  chapter.	
  Data	
  triangulation	
  includes	
  collecting	
  data	
  through	
  several	
  sampling	
  strategies	
  from	
  different	
  time	
  periods,	
  different	
  types	
  of	
  sources	
  and	
  different	
  social	
  situations.370	
  This	
  method	
  is	
  used	
  to	
  construct	
  an	
  evolving	
  picture	
  of	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  over	
  four	
  eras	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  in	
  three	
  different	
  forms	
  of	
  Russian	
  government	
  through	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  maps,	
  formal	
  policy	
  statements	
  and	
  the	
  actual	
  engagement	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  state	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
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  (Denzin,	
  1970)	
  
	
   205	
  
	
  
Russian	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  in	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  In	
  1854,	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  was	
  considered	
  worthless	
  as	
  it	
  was	
  “ever	
  frozen.”371	
  At	
  this	
  time,	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  included	
  not	
  only	
  the	
  massive	
  expansive	
  of	
  Siberia,	
  a	
  territorial	
  expanse	
  that	
  today	
  constitutes	
  more	
  than	
  three	
  quarters	
  of	
  Russian	
  territory,	
  but	
  also	
  it	
  included	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  Alaska	
  and	
  the	
  Bering	
  Sea.	
  In	
  the	
  time	
  that	
  frames	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  state	
  within	
  Europe	
  until	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  Russian	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  largely	
  follows	
  the	
  trajectory	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  system	
  during	
  this	
  period,	
  with	
  some	
  exception	
  in	
  their	
  legal	
  treatment	
  of	
  indigenous	
  persons	
  and	
  also	
  in	
  their	
  approach	
  to	
  maritime	
  territory.	
  During	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  Russia	
  expanded	
  their	
  territory	
  into	
  the	
  Arctic	
  applying	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition,	
  developing	
  territorial	
  boundaries	
  through	
  unilateral	
  declarations	
  and	
  bilateral	
  treaties	
  and	
  also	
  establishing	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  their	
  Arctic	
  territories	
  through	
  effective	
  administration	
  by	
  the	
  levying	
  of	
  domestic	
  legislation	
  and	
  incorporating	
  the	
  Arctic	
  into	
  economic	
  development.	
  However,	
  the	
  effects	
  of	
  international	
  politics	
  in	
  this	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  resulted	
  in	
  both	
  the	
  expansion	
  and	
  contraction	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  empire	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  measure	
  of	
  their	
  national	
  interests	
  including	
  threats	
  to	
  sovereignty,	
  security	
  and	
  economic	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  	
  Exploration	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  began	
  in	
  the	
  Middle	
  Ages	
  with	
  the	
  voyages	
  of	
  the	
  Pomors,	
  often	
  considered	
  to	
  be	
  the	
  first	
  Russians	
  to	
  explore	
  the	
  Siberian	
  Seas,	
  by	
  establishing	
  the	
  original	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  beginning	
  at	
  the	
  Kola	
  Peninsula	
  and	
  moving	
  eastward	
  by	
  both	
  land	
  and	
  sea.372	
  This	
  was	
  further	
  developed	
  in	
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  p.	
  245)	
  372	
  (Horensma,	
  1991)	
  
	
   206	
  
the	
  “maritime	
  corridor	
  known	
  as	
  the	
  Great	
  Mangazea	
  Route”373	
  a	
  route	
  which	
  was	
  exceedingly	
  lucrative	
  for	
  the	
  fur	
  trade,	
  the	
  ivory	
  trade	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  other	
  resources	
  harvested	
  through	
  hunting	
  and	
  fishing.	
  Some	
  regional	
  maps	
  depicted	
  the	
  location	
  and	
  types	
  of	
  resources	
  available,	
  (See	
  Figure	
  2).	
  Due	
  the	
  lucrative	
  and	
  abundant	
  economic	
  resources	
  coming	
  from	
  this	
  area,	
  adventurers	
  from	
  all	
  over	
  Europe	
  were	
  attracted	
  to	
  the	
  region	
  and	
  as	
  the	
  Russian	
  monarchs	
  could	
  not	
  prevent	
  poaching	
  or	
  secure	
  payment	
  of	
  taxes	
  with	
  many	
  foreign	
  traders	
  avoiding	
  customs	
  officials,	
  in	
  1619,	
  the	
  Russian	
  authorities	
  “issued	
  a	
  degree	
  forbidding	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  route.”374	
  As	
  a	
  result,	
  the	
  economic	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  was	
  stagnated	
  until	
  the	
  Russian	
  bureaucracy	
  could	
  better	
  administrate	
  over	
  the	
  territory.	
  	
   	
  Having	
  initially	
  focussed	
  the	
  efforts	
  of	
  imperial	
  expansion	
  southward	
  towards	
  the	
  Volga,	
  “Siberia	
  was	
  scarcely	
  known	
  to	
  the	
  Russians	
  before	
  the	
  middle	
  of	
  the	
  sixteenth	
  century.	
  For	
  although	
  an	
  expedition	
  was	
  made…this	
  incursion	
  bore	
  a	
  greater	
  resemblance	
  to	
  the	
  desultory	
  inroads	
  of	
  barbarians,	
  than	
  to	
  any	
  establishment	
  of	
  empire	
  by	
  a	
  civilized	
  nation.”375	
  However,	
  as	
  the	
  wealth	
  of	
  the	
  Sibir	
  region	
  became	
  known	
  through	
  exploration	
  in	
  the	
  late	
  sixteenth	
  century,	
  “‘jealous	
  for	
  the	
  sovereign’s	
  profit’,	
  and	
  not	
  forgetting	
  their	
  own,	
  came	
  soldiers,	
  mercenaries	
  and	
  Cossacks,	
  led	
  by	
  Moscow-­‐appointed	
  administrators...they	
  found	
  ‘new	
  lands’,	
  built	
  forts	
  and	
  imposed	
  fur	
  tribute.”376	
  Russia	
  annexed	
  the	
  Arctic	
  via	
  Siberia	
  into	
  the	
  empire	
  with	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  Siberian	
  Department,	
  responsible	
  for	
  managing	
  the	
  conquest	
  and	
  administration	
  of	
  the	
  region,	
  especially	
  for	
  collecting	
  tax	
  revenues	
  from	
  furs	
  for	
  the	
  state.	
  Russia	
  formally	
  excluded	
  the	
  nearest	
  political	
  power,	
  China,	
  to	
  any	
  claims	
  to	
  Siberia	
  through	
  the	
  Treaty	
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  1984,	
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of	
  Nerchinsk	
  1689,	
  which	
  gave	
  to	
  Russia	
  all	
  territory	
  north	
  of	
  the	
  Amur	
  River;	
  this	
  geographic	
  boundary	
  to	
  this	
  day	
  delineates	
  the	
  border	
  between	
  China	
  and	
  Russia.	
  The	
  political	
  organisation	
  of	
  Siberia	
  as	
  an	
  economic	
  region	
  makes	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  trade	
  different	
  from	
  the	
  trade	
  of	
  other	
  countries	
  as	
  “the	
  Muscovite	
  state	
  participated	
  actively	
  in	
  the	
  exploitation	
  of	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  Siberia.”377	
  It	
  is	
  this	
  economic	
  political	
  arrangement	
  that	
  would	
  inevitably	
  lead	
  to	
  the	
  unprofitability	
  of	
  the	
  extended	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  empire.	
  	
  	
  Under	
  the	
  reign	
  of	
  Czar	
  Peter	
  I	
  in	
  the	
  late	
  seventeenth	
  century,	
  Russian	
  military	
  power	
  returned	
  focus	
  to	
  the	
  sea	
  after	
  the	
  successes	
  on	
  land	
  across	
  the	
  Asian	
  continent,	
  hoping	
  to	
  establish	
  a	
  Russian	
  trading	
  route	
  to	
  the	
  Indies	
  through	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  a	
  route	
  that	
  would	
  bring	
  additional	
  profitability	
  from	
  the	
  payment	
  of	
  tolls	
  from	
  foreign	
  merchant	
  ships.378	
  It	
  was	
  during	
  this	
  period	
  that	
  Vitus	
  Bering,	
  a	
  Dane,	
  was	
  commissioned	
  into	
  the	
  Russian	
  Navy,	
  eventually	
  charged	
  by	
  the	
  Czar	
  to	
  lead	
  expeditions	
  through	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  The	
  Czar	
  instructs	
  Bering	
  to	
  “seek	
  the	
  point	
  where	
  it	
  [Kamchatka]	
  connects	
  with	
  America	
  and	
  go	
  to	
  some	
  settlement	
  under	
  European	
  rule,	
  or	
  if	
  any	
  European	
  vessel	
  is	
  seen,	
  learn	
  of	
  it	
  what	
  the	
  coast	
  visited	
  is	
  called,	
  which	
  should	
  be	
  taken	
  down	
  in	
  writing,	
  an	
  authentic	
  account	
  prepared,	
  placed	
  on	
  the	
  chart	
  and	
  brought	
  back	
  here.”379	
  This	
  signals	
  not	
  only	
  the	
  importance	
  of	
  
European	
  discovery	
  for	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  to	
  apply,	
  but	
  also	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  recording	
  any	
  expeditions	
  and	
  discoveries	
  for	
  Russia	
  should	
  they	
  not	
  be	
  otherwise	
  claimed.	
  	
  	
  Although	
  Bering,	
  who	
  left	
  a	
  strait	
  and	
  the	
  Aleutian	
  island	
  where	
  he	
  died	
  in	
  1741	
  to	
  bear	
  his	
  name	
  still	
  marked	
  on	
  Russian	
  maps,	
  he	
  was	
  not	
  the	
  first	
  to	
  sail	
  for	
  Russia	
  so	
  far	
  east	
  of	
  the	
  political	
  centre.	
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However,	
  he	
  officially	
  demonstrated	
  for	
  the	
  imperial	
  government	
  there	
  was	
  not	
  a	
  visible	
  land	
  bridge	
  to	
  North	
  America,	
  and	
  nor	
  did	
  he	
  find	
  any	
  evidence	
  of	
  European	
  administration	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  as	
  exploration	
  from	
  the	
  other	
  direction	
  had	
  yet	
  to	
  travel	
  this	
  distance.	
  This	
  was	
  recorded	
  on	
  behalf	
  of	
  Bering	
  by	
  another	
  member	
  of	
  the	
  expedition,	
  Gerhard	
  Müller,	
  a	
  German	
  working	
  for	
  the	
  Russian	
  Imperial	
  Academy	
  of	
  Sciences,	
  through	
  the	
  construction	
  of	
  the	
  first	
  complete	
  map	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  Empire	
  to	
  be	
  produced	
  through	
  official	
  sanction.	
  	
  For	
  Russia’s	
  North	
  American	
  territorial	
  claims,	
  what	
  would	
  follow	
  the	
  production	
  of	
  this	
  map	
  includes	
  of	
  other	
  methods	
  of	
  the	
  annexation	
  of	
  territory,	
  including	
  ceremonies	
  of	
  possession,	
  wars,	
  colonisation	
  and	
  economic	
  development	
  throughout	
  the	
  Arctic	
  territories.	
  	
  
To	
  mark	
  their	
  territorial	
  claims	
  to	
  Alaska,	
  the	
  Russians	
  used	
  a	
  variety	
  of	
  methods	
  for	
  their	
  ceremonies	
  of	
  possession	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  to	
  other	
  European	
  parties	
  with	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  new	
  territory	
  that	
  another	
  sovereign	
  already	
  laid	
  claim.	
  These	
  methods	
  including	
  the	
  burying	
  of	
  plates	
  with	
  seals	
  of	
  the	
  imperial	
  government,	
  the	
  erecting	
  of	
  totems	
  depicting	
  symbols	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  state	
  and	
  by	
  giving	
  sculptures	
  of	
  the	
  imperial	
  crest	
  to	
  native	
  chieftains.	
  These	
  methods	
  were	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  establishing	
  territorial	
  claims	
  under	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  and	
  “were	
  designed	
  to	
  be	
  visible	
  warnings	
  to	
  rival	
  nations	
  that	
  the	
  land	
  was	
  under	
  claim.	
  Crosses	
  placed	
  on	
  prominent	
  head	
  lands,	
  highly	
  visible	
  from	
  the	
  water,	
  announced	
  to	
  late-­‐coming	
  seafarers	
  that	
  there	
  was	
  ‘no	
  vacancy.	
  Symbolic	
  gifts	
  given	
  to	
  Native	
  leaders—written	
  proclamations,	
  medallions,	
  and	
  coats-­‐of-­‐arms—	
  also	
  signified	
  that	
  the	
  land	
  was	
  already	
  under	
  im-­‐perial	
  claim.	
  Other	
  markers	
  were	
  silent,	
  buried	
  in	
  the	
  ground	
  at	
  secret	
  locations,	
  to	
  be	
  used	
  as	
  proof	
  of	
  ownership	
  should	
  it	
  be	
  disputed.”380	
  These	
  claims	
  to	
  territory	
  were	
  eventually	
  contested	
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  (Foster	
  &	
  Henrikson,	
  2009,	
  p.	
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by	
  the	
  Spanish,	
  British	
  and	
  American	
  expansion	
  in	
  the	
  late	
  eighteenth	
  and	
  early	
  nineteenth	
  centuries.	
  	
  
In	
  order	
  to	
  combat	
  the	
  deliberate	
  encroachment	
  of	
  other	
  empires	
  from	
  reducing	
  their	
  American	
  territorial	
  holdings,	
  the	
  Russian	
  Imperial	
  government	
  issued	
  what	
  would	
  set	
  the	
  precedent	
  for	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Monroe	
  Doctrine.	
  In	
  1821,	
  a	
  Ukase	
  proclaimed:	
  	
  	
   “The	
  pursuits	
  of	
  commerce,	
  whaling	
  and	
  fishery	
  and	
  of	
  all	
  other	
  industry	
  on	
  all	
  islands,	
  ports	
  and	
  gulfs,	
  including	
  the	
  whole	
  of	
  the	
  northwest	
  coast	
  of	
  America,	
  beginning	
  from	
  Behring’s	
  Straits	
  to	
  the	
  51st	
  degree	
  of	
  the	
  northern	
  latitude,	
  also,	
  from	
  the	
  Aleutian	
  islands	
  to	
  the	
  eastern	
  coast	
  of	
  Siberia,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  along	
  the	
  Kurile	
  islands	
  from	
  Behring’s	
  Straits	
  to	
  the	
  south	
  cape	
  of	
  the	
  island	
  of	
  Urup,	
  viz.	
  to	
  the	
  45°	
  50’	
  northern	
  latitude,	
  are	
  exclusively	
  granted	
  to	
  the	
  Russian	
  subjects.	
  	
  It	
  is,	
  therefore,	
  prohibited	
  to	
  all	
  foreign	
  vessels,	
  not	
  only	
  to	
  land	
  on	
  the	
  coasts	
  and	
  islands,	
  belonging	
  to	
  Russia,	
  as	
  stated	
  above,	
  but	
  also,	
  to	
  approach	
  within	
  less	
  than	
  an	
  hundred	
  Italian	
  miles.	
  The	
  transgressor’s	
  vessel	
  is	
  subject	
  to	
  confiscation	
  along	
  with	
  the	
  whole	
  cargo.”381	
  	
  This	
  had	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  attempting	
  to	
  establish	
  absolute	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  entire	
  breadth	
  of	
  the	
  claims	
  of	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Not	
  only	
  was	
  this	
  proclamation	
  in	
  effect	
  contrary	
  to	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  community	
  in	
  the	
  understanding	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas,	
  but	
  it	
  also	
  establishes	
  a	
  precedent	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  the	
  practice	
  of	
  notifying	
  other	
  states	
  the	
  territory	
  is	
  no	
  longer	
  open	
  for	
  conquest	
  by	
  other	
  interested	
  states.	
  To	
  a	
  certain	
  extent,	
  this	
  proclamation	
  tests	
  the	
  fortitude	
  of	
  the	
  international	
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  1828,	
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community	
  to	
  uphold	
  the	
  existing	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  in	
  preference	
  to	
  their	
  greater	
  national	
  interests.	
  This	
  is	
  a	
  practice	
  that	
  Russia	
  has	
  continued	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  with	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  in	
  1926	
  and	
  the	
  planting	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  tricolour	
  in	
  2007.	
  	
  The	
  territory	
  claimed	
  by	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  in	
  the	
  Ukase	
  of	
  1821	
  included	
  not	
  only	
  the	
  Kurile	
  Islands,382	
  but	
  also	
  territory	
  in	
  North	
  American	
  to	
  as	
  far	
  south	
  as	
  modern	
  day	
  Portland,	
  Oregon.	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  considered	
  what	
  was	
  marked	
  as	
  ‘the	
  river	
  of	
  the	
  West’383	
  as	
  the	
  naturally	
  logical	
  geographic	
  border	
  for	
  separating	
  the	
  Spanish	
  territory	
  of	
  New	
  Albion	
  from	
  Russian	
  America.	
  However,	
  the	
  methods	
  used	
  by	
  Russia	
  to	
  enforce	
  their	
  right	
  by	
  discovery	
  made	
  it	
  difficult	
  to	
  maintain	
  effective	
  occupation	
  over	
  their	
  North	
  American	
  territories,	
  which	
  were	
  beginning	
  to	
  see	
  intense	
  testing	
  by	
  exploration	
  from	
  Spain,	
  Great	
  Britain	
  and	
  also	
  from	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  who,	
  having	
  purchased	
  the	
  Louisiana	
  Territory	
  from	
  Napoleon	
  in	
  1803	
  were	
  keen	
  to	
  establish	
  trade	
  along	
  the	
  major	
  river	
  systems	
  stretching	
  all	
  the	
  way	
  to	
  the	
  Pacific	
  Ocean.	
  	
  	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  pursued	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  Russian	
  American	
  through	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  Russian-­‐American	
  Company	
  in	
  the	
  Ukase	
  of	
  1799,	
  when	
  the	
  company	
  was	
  granted	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  rights	
  within	
  the	
  territory	
  for	
  a	
  period	
  of	
  twenty	
  years.384	
  The	
  company	
  was	
  modelled	
  on	
  the	
  framework	
  of	
  some	
  British	
  economic	
  institutions,	
  including	
  the	
  Hudson’s	
  Bay	
  Company	
  and	
  the	
  East	
  India	
  Trading	
  Company,	
  the	
  former	
  at	
  one	
  point	
  being	
  the	
  largest	
  private	
  landowner	
  in	
  the	
  world,	
  owning	
  more	
  Arctic	
  territory	
  in	
  North	
  America	
  than	
  any	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  	
  It	
  was	
  thought	
  that	
  “an	
  ostensibly	
  commercial	
  company	
  managing	
  territory	
  and	
  populace	
  on	
  behalf	
  of	
  an	
  empire	
  who	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  382	
  Sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  Kurile	
  Islands	
  is	
  currently	
  disputed	
  between	
  Russia	
  and	
  Japan.	
  383	
  Now	
  known	
  as	
  the	
  Columbia	
  River.	
  384	
  Russian	
  America	
  was	
  the	
  only	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  that	
  was	
  treated	
  as	
  a	
  colonial	
  possession,	
  with	
  the	
  Siberian	
  territory	
  formally	
  incorporated	
  into	
  the	
  Russian	
  state	
  by	
  the	
  mid	
  seventeenth	
  century.	
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believe	
  that	
  this	
  arrangement	
  amounted	
  to	
  a	
  cost-­‐effective	
  form	
  of	
  colonialism	
  and	
  provided	
  a	
  convenient	
  scapegoat	
  in	
  case	
  of	
  failure.”385	
  In	
  exchange	
  for	
  the	
  exclusive	
  monopolisation	
  of	
  the	
  economic	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  region,	
  the	
  “government	
  demanded	
  that	
  the	
  company	
  provide	
  social	
  services.”386	
  However,	
  the	
  combination	
  of	
  corruption,	
  reports	
  of	
  near	
  bankruptcy,	
  and	
  the	
  increasing	
  economic	
  pressures	
  from	
  competitors	
  made	
  it	
  impossible	
  for	
  the	
  colonisation	
  project	
  to	
  retain	
  favour	
  with	
  the	
  Imperial	
  Russian	
  government	
  who	
  was	
  dealing	
  with	
  an	
  array	
  of	
  political	
  pressures	
  in	
  the	
  motherland.	
  	
  	
  	
  To	
  alleviate	
  some	
  of	
  these	
  pressures	
  of	
  maintaining	
  effective	
  occupation	
  in	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  colonies,	
  the	
  Imperial	
  Russian	
  government	
  negotiated	
  the	
  Russian-­‐American	
  Treaty	
  of	
  1824	
  and	
  the	
  Anglo-­‐Russian	
  Treaty	
  1825,387	
  and	
  “during	
  the	
  next	
  two	
  years	
  the	
  Russians	
  retreated	
  from	
  their	
  extreme	
  position.”388	
  These	
  two	
  treaties	
  are	
  quite	
  similar	
  in	
  both	
  intent	
  and	
  in	
  content,	
  containing	
  two	
  apparent	
  objectives.	
  The	
  first	
  objective	
  is	
  the	
  interest	
  of	
  Russia	
  to	
  prevent	
  colonisation	
  by	
  other	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  thus	
  both	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Great	
  Britain	
  agreed	
  not	
  to	
  form	
  any	
  establishment	
  in	
  territories	
  claimed	
  by	
  Russia.	
  While	
  this	
  had	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  reducing	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  pressures	
  to	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  from	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Britain,	
  it	
  provided	
  only	
  a	
  temporary	
  lull	
  as	
  the	
  Crimean	
  War	
  would	
  soon	
  deteriorate	
  relations	
  between	
  Great	
  Britain	
  and	
  Russia	
  in	
  Europe	
  initiating	
  new	
  fears	
  over	
  the	
  security	
  of	
  their	
  American	
  territories.	
  The	
  treaty	
  also	
  resulted	
  in	
  a	
  reduction	
  of	
  land	
  claimed	
  in	
  the	
  Ukase	
  of	
  1821,	
  but	
  territory	
  that	
  Russia	
  knew	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  unlikely	
  able	
  to	
  maintain	
  under	
  the	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition.	
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  (Vinkovetsky,	
  2004,	
  p.	
  164)	
  386	
  (Black,	
  2004,	
  p.	
  xiii)	
  387	
  These	
  treaties	
  did	
  not	
  have	
  effect	
  on	
  the	
  dispute	
  between	
  Great	
  Britain	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  in	
  the	
  area	
  known	
  as	
  the	
  “Oregon	
  Territory”	
  which	
  including	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  territory	
  claimed	
  by	
  Russia	
  in	
  the	
  Ukase	
  of	
  1821.	
  388	
  (Pletcher,	
  2001,	
  p.	
  20)	
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  The	
  second	
  objective,	
  however,	
  and	
  arguably	
  the	
  more	
  important	
  arrangement,	
  is	
  the	
  incentive	
  that	
  caused	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Great	
  Britain	
  to	
  agree	
  to	
  limitations	
  on	
  their	
  expansion	
  ambitions.	
  These	
  treaties	
  both	
  had	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  diminishing	
  Russia’s	
  claim	
  of	
  
mare	
  clausum	
  over	
  the	
  North	
  Pacific,	
  attempted	
  in	
  the	
  Ukase	
  of	
  1821,	
  without	
  forcing	
  Russia	
  to	
  rescind	
  their	
  claims	
  with	
  another	
  international	
  declaration.	
  	
  Instead,	
  the	
  Russian	
  attempts	
  to	
  mare	
  
clausum	
  were	
  formally	
  dissolved	
  by	
  treaty	
  arrangement	
  individually	
  with	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Great	
  Britain.	
  Both	
  treaties	
  made	
  arrangements	
  for	
  navigation,	
  fishing,	
  and	
  trade	
  with	
  natives,	
  although	
  explicitly	
  restricting	
  the	
  importation	
  of	
  armaments	
  into	
  the	
  region	
  and	
  the	
  sale	
  of	
  arms	
  to	
  the	
  native	
  populations.	
  The	
  deterioration	
  of	
  this	
  claim	
  to	
  mare	
  clausum	
  at	
  this	
  critical	
  point	
  in	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  prevented	
  mare	
  clausum	
  from	
  becoming	
  and	
  accepted	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  	
  Although	
  the	
  conflict	
  in	
  the	
  Crimean	
  between	
  Russia	
  and	
  Great	
  Britain	
  did	
  not	
  result	
  in	
  any	
  change	
  of	
  borders	
  between	
  these	
  parties	
  in	
  North	
  America,	
  there	
  was	
  certainly	
  realisation	
  for	
  the	
  Imperial	
  Russian	
  government	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  difficult,	
  if	
  not	
  impossible	
  to	
  defend	
  their	
  territory	
  in	
  Alaska.	
  The	
  colonisation	
  and	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  Alaska	
  by	
  the	
  Russian	
  American	
  company	
  was	
  sub	
  par,	
  at	
  best.	
  British	
  politicians	
  noticed	
  this	
  inadequacy	
  in	
  1859,	
  corresponding	
  that	
  the	
  Russians	
  had	
  failed	
  to	
  occupy	
  the	
  territories	
  that	
  they	
  claimed	
  in	
  the	
  1825	
  treaty	
  and	
  that	
  “what	
  Russia	
  has	
  already	
  obtained	
  on	
  this	
  coast	
  [is]	
  by	
  a	
  claim	
  void	
  of	
  any	
  foundation.”389	
  Having	
  settled	
  the	
  matter	
  of	
  the	
  boundary	
  of	
  the	
  Oregon	
  Territory	
  with	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Great	
  Britain	
  had	
  considerable	
  worry	
  about	
  their	
  maritime	
  access	
  to	
  the	
  Pacific	
  Ocean	
  as	
  they	
  were	
  slowly	
  being	
  framed	
  in	
  between	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Russia.	
  Additionally,	
  Russia	
  and	
  Great	
  Britain	
  were	
  at	
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  (British	
  Parliament,	
  1859,	
  p.	
  33)	
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odds	
  in	
  other	
  aspects	
  of	
  international	
  relations	
  such	
  as	
  in	
  the	
  Far	
  East,	
  India,	
  the	
  Middle	
  East	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  Mediterranean;	
  conflict	
  and	
  loss	
  of	
  their	
  indefensible	
  American	
  territories	
  seemed	
  a	
  likely	
  possibility.390	
  	
  The	
  Russian	
  territories	
  in	
  North	
  America	
  had	
  been	
  diminishing	
  with	
  the	
  inability	
  of	
  the	
  Imperial	
  government	
  to	
  adequately	
  maintain	
  effective	
  occupation	
  and	
  administration	
  of	
  the	
  territories.	
  Having	
  sold	
  Fort	
  Ross	
  in	
  California	
  in	
  1842	
  and	
  faced	
  with	
  the	
  likelihood	
  of	
  the	
  British	
  Empire	
  simply	
  eroding	
  their	
  Arctic	
  territories	
  in	
  North	
  America,	
  the	
  Russian	
  government	
  had	
  few	
  options.	
  391	
  “The	
  impossibility	
  of	
  preserving	
  her	
  colonies	
  in	
  the	
  event	
  of	
  a	
  war,	
  the	
  impossibility	
  of	
  protecting	
  them	
  from	
  the	
  consequences	
  of	
  the	
  widely	
  rumoured	
  presence	
  of	
  gold	
  there…and,	
  finally,	
  the	
  transfer	
  of	
  Russian	
  interests	
  onto	
  the	
  Asiatic	
  mainland-­‐-­‐-­‐such	
  were	
  the	
  reasons	
  persuading	
  the	
  tsarist	
  government	
  to	
  sell	
  Alaska.”392	
  Faced	
  with	
  this	
  problem,	
  when	
  U.S.	
  Secretary	
  of	
  State	
  William	
  Seward	
  approached	
  with	
  interest	
  of	
  purchasing	
  Alaska,	
  they	
  were	
  quick	
  to	
  acquiesce,	
  despite	
  some	
  initial	
  problems	
  with	
  ratification	
  for	
  funding	
  by	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Congress.	
  Russia	
  agreed	
  to	
  the	
  
Alaska	
  Purchase	
  Treaty	
  1867	
  with	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  simply	
  to	
  prevent	
  losing	
  it	
  to	
  Great	
  Britain	
  through	
  gradual	
  annexation	
  or	
  through	
  an	
  onslaught	
  of	
  colonising	
  gold	
  prospectors.	
  This	
  treaty	
  ended	
  Russia’s	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  North	
  America.	
  	
  	
  Meanwhile,	
  in	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  territories	
  of	
  Europe	
  and	
  Asia,	
  exploration	
  and	
  development	
  had	
  stagnated	
  due	
  to	
  climatic	
  conditions	
  affecting	
  the	
  Arctic	
  known	
  as	
  the	
  Little	
  Ice	
  Age.	
  “As	
  happened	
  elsewhere	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  Little	
  Ice	
  Age	
  prevented	
  Russian	
  exploration	
  and	
  settlement	
  along	
  the	
  northern	
  Alaskan	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  390	
  (Black,	
  2004)	
  391	
  Russia’s	
  holdings	
  in	
  California	
  were	
  sold	
  to	
  John	
  Sutter.	
  The	
  gold	
  discovery	
  that	
  sparked	
  the	
  California	
  Gold	
  Rush	
  in	
  1849	
  was	
  found	
  at	
  Sutter’s	
  Mill.	
  000	
  392	
  (Bolkhovitinov,	
  1993,	
  p.	
  193)	
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coast…It	
  also	
  prevented	
  foreign	
  ships	
  from	
  sailing	
  along	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route…As	
  long	
  as	
  the	
  ice	
  was	
  a	
  formidable	
  barrier,	
  Russia’s	
  claim	
  to	
  its	
  Arctic	
  mainland	
  and	
  islands	
  was	
  secure.”393	
  The	
  effects	
  of	
  the	
  atmospheric	
  conditions	
  began	
  to	
  decline	
  in	
  the	
  mid	
  to	
  late	
  nineteenth	
  century.	
  So	
  by	
  the	
  time	
  Russia	
  was	
  relieved	
  of	
  its	
  North	
  American	
  possessions,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  climate	
  was	
  improving	
  to	
  the	
  point	
  where	
  Russia	
  could	
  once	
  again	
  concentrate	
  on	
  exploration	
  and	
  development	
  north	
  of	
  60°.	
  	
  After	
  the	
  early	
  bans	
  by	
  Tsarist	
  Russia	
  on	
  using	
  the	
  Kola	
  Seas	
  and	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route,	
  it	
  was	
  reopened	
  by	
  Czar	
  Peter	
  the	
  Great	
  with	
  the	
  Great	
  Northern	
  Expedition,	
  which	
  discovered	
  not	
  only	
  Alaska	
  but	
  also	
  launched	
  a	
  flurry	
  of	
  activity	
  in	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  waters	
  by	
  both	
  Russian	
  and	
  explorers	
  from	
  other	
  European	
  nations.	
  However,	
  this	
  activity	
  rapidly	
  decreased	
  when	
  ships	
  were	
  stopped	
  by	
  or	
  became	
  stuck	
  fast	
  in	
  the	
  ice.	
  After	
  James	
  Cook	
  and	
  his	
  expeditionary	
  members	
  failed	
  to	
  sail	
  through	
  the	
  passage,	
  it	
  was	
  concluded	
  in	
  Western	
  Europe	
  that	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  was	
  impassable;	
  thus	
  “no	
  further	
  attempts	
  were	
  made	
  until	
  the	
  middle	
  of	
  the	
  nineteenth	
  century.”394	
  	
  	
  When	
  interest	
  was	
  reignited	
  in	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route,	
  it	
  was	
  spurred	
  not	
  only	
  by	
  the	
  desire	
  to	
  use	
  the	
  route	
  for	
  commerce,	
  but	
  largely,	
  by	
  the	
  objectives	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  security.	
  Expeditions	
  into	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  regions,	
  over	
  which	
  they	
  had	
  no	
  claim,	
  except	
  through	
  arguments	
  of	
  mare	
  clausum,	
  were	
  being	
  sent	
  to	
  the	
  region	
  by	
  other	
  European	
  states.	
  As	
  a	
  result	
  there	
  was	
  questionable	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  islands	
  such	
  as	
  Svalbard,	
  Novaya	
  Zembla,	
  and	
  Wrangel	
  Islands	
  as	
  they	
  were	
  ‘discovered’	
  multiples	
  times	
  and	
  utilised	
  at	
  varying	
  points	
  by	
  several	
  states.	
  Thus	
  Russia	
  realised	
  that	
  a	
  “way	
  to	
  defend	
  Russian	
  rights	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  393	
  (Grant,	
  2010,	
  p.	
  91)	
  394	
  (Alexandrov	
  &	
  Frolov,	
  2007,	
  p.	
  7)	
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Arctic	
  was	
  to	
  take	
  part	
  more	
  actively	
  in	
  polar	
  exploration.”395	
  To	
  increase	
  their	
  claims	
  by	
  right	
  of	
  the	
  ‘most	
  historical’	
  discovery	
  and	
  sufficient	
  effective	
  occupation,	
  the	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  experienced	
  the	
  “renewed	
  interest	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  government	
  in	
  Arctic	
  Studies,”396	
  which	
  included	
  outfitting	
  ships	
  and	
  expeditions	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  ill-­‐fated	
  Zarya	
  in	
  the	
  Russian	
  Polar	
  Expedition	
  of	
  1900-­‐1902	
  through	
  the	
  Russian	
  Academy	
  of	
  Sciences.	
  	
  Security	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  were	
  introduced	
  in	
  the	
  advent	
  of	
  the	
  Russo-­‐Japanese	
  War	
  in	
  1904	
  when	
  the	
  fleet	
  based	
  in	
  Russia's	
  warm	
  water	
  port,	
  leased	
  in	
  Port	
  Arthur,	
  was	
  attacked	
  without	
  warning.	
  The	
  war	
  taxed	
  the	
  capabilities	
  of	
  the	
  trans-­‐Siberian	
  railway,	
  which	
  had	
  carried	
  goods	
  from	
  the	
  Pacific	
  to	
  Western	
  Russia.	
  The	
  importance	
  of	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  for	
  not	
  only	
  economic	
  benefit	
  became	
  obvious,	
  as	
  the	
  war	
  “showed	
  at	
  a	
  stroke	
  the	
  enormous	
  advantages	
  of	
  the	
  much	
  shorter	
  Arctic	
  Passage”	
  when	
  the	
  rest	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Navy	
  had	
  to	
  sail	
  halfway	
  around	
  the	
  world	
  before	
  it	
  could	
  provide	
  support.	
  397	
  Thus	
  “immediately	
  after	
  the	
  war	
  the	
  government	
  made	
  available	
  funds	
  to	
  explore	
  this	
  passage,”	
  including	
  financing	
  for	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  icebreakers.398	
  	
  Thus,	
  the	
  continuation	
  of	
  the	
  discovery	
  of	
  new	
  islands,	
  the	
  opportunities	
  for	
  scientific	
  discoveries	
  with	
  both	
  economic	
  and	
  security	
  implications	
  and	
  the	
  increasing	
  geostrategic	
  importance	
  of	
  Russian	
  development	
  along	
  the	
  coast	
  including	
  ports	
  at	
  both	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  caused	
  Arctic	
  territory,	
  especially	
  its	
  maritime	
  territory	
  to	
  become	
  of	
  import	
  to	
  the	
  Imperial	
  Russian	
  government.	
  Yet,	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  infrastructural	
  development	
  in	
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  (Horensma,	
  1991,	
  p	
  12)	
  396	
  (Alexandrov	
  &	
  Frolov,	
  2007,	
  p.	
  12)	
  397	
  (Horensma,	
  1991,	
  p.	
  15)	
  398	
  (Horensma,	
  1991,	
  p.	
  15)	
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Siberia	
  and	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  political	
  coordination	
  to	
  develop	
  the	
  infrastructure,	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  would	
  remain	
  relatively	
  quiet	
  for	
  another	
  century.	
  	
  The	
  next	
  phase	
  of	
  interest	
  of	
  shipping	
  in	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  would	
  be	
  generated	
  by	
  a	
  combination	
  of	
  climatic	
  changes,	
  development	
  of	
  new	
  rules	
  of	
  international	
  law,	
  economic	
  interests	
  and	
  improved	
  technological	
  capabilities.	
  	
  
Russia	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  in	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  Russian	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  faced	
  a	
  dramatic	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years.	
  Not	
  only	
  was	
  there	
  a	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  which	
  was	
  traumatised	
  by	
  the	
  conflict	
  and	
  cooperation	
  that	
  came	
  along	
  with	
  the	
  great	
  wars,	
  but	
  there	
  was	
  also	
  a	
  shift	
  within	
  the	
  domestic	
  political	
  structure	
  of	
  Russia.	
  This	
  occurred	
  in	
  the	
  Russian	
  Revolution,	
  which	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  removal	
  of	
  the	
  Tsarist	
  Imperial	
  government	
  that	
  had	
  ruled	
  Russia	
  for	
  centuries	
  and	
  was	
  responsible	
  for	
  past	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  and	
  engagement	
  for	
  Russia.	
  This	
  longstanding	
  political	
  structure	
  was	
  replaced	
  by	
  a	
  new	
  government	
  based	
  on	
  principles	
  of	
  Marxist	
  ideologies	
  (albeit	
  in	
  an	
  altered	
  form),	
  including	
  the	
  removal	
  of	
  the	
  aristocracy	
  and	
  the	
  theoretical	
  equalising	
  of	
  class	
  hierarchies	
  through	
  the	
  redistribution	
  of	
  wealth	
  and	
  property.	
  	
  In	
  theory,	
  the	
  ideologies	
  behind	
  the	
  revolution	
  can	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  progressive,	
  but	
  in	
  practice	
  they	
  were	
  fraught	
  with	
  difficulty	
  and	
  conflict	
  which	
  left	
  Russia	
  in	
  the	
  throes	
  of	
  civil	
  war	
  immediately	
  following	
  the	
  devastation	
  of	
  the	
  first	
  World	
  War.	
  While	
  it	
  is	
  beyond	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  this	
  chapter	
  to	
  evaluate	
  this	
  transformation	
  in	
  depth,	
  it	
  is	
  clear	
  that	
  these	
  transformations	
  changed	
  how	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  incorporated	
  into	
  Russian	
  political	
  consciousness,	
  which	
  has	
  implications	
  for	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  policy.	
  	
  Although	
  it	
  was	
  accepted	
  that	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  territory	
  on	
  ice	
  could	
  not	
  be	
  annexed	
  through	
  discovery,	
  it	
  was	
  believe	
  that	
  within	
  the	
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Arctic	
  regions	
  there	
  still	
  existed	
  additional	
  undiscovered	
  islands	
  and	
  both	
  Canada	
  and	
  United	
  States	
  were	
  sending	
  out	
  regular	
  expeditions	
  to	
  map	
  these	
  territories.	
  This	
  included	
  exploration	
  into	
  maritime	
  areas	
  traditionally	
  considered	
  by	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  to	
  have	
  been	
  enclosed	
  Russian	
  seas.	
  These	
  foreign	
  intrusions	
  caused	
  consternation	
  for	
  the	
  new	
  Soviet	
  government	
  who	
  needed	
  to	
  establish	
  their	
  own	
  policy	
  toward	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  sovereignty,	
  and	
  “after	
  a	
  government	
  protest	
  failed	
  to	
  produce	
  the	
  desired	
  results,	
  the	
  Soviets	
  decided	
  to	
  take	
  action.”399	
  This	
  was	
  done	
  by	
  sending	
  out	
  expeditions	
  of	
  their	
  own,	
  raising	
  the	
  Soviet	
  flag	
  on	
  these	
  territories	
  and	
  arresting	
  foreigners	
  on	
  territory	
  claimed	
  by	
  Russia.	
  However,	
  this	
  only	
  implemented	
  the	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  existing	
  claims,	
  which	
  was	
  not	
  the	
  only	
  threat	
  to	
  Russian	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  The	
  second	
  way	
  in	
  which	
  Russian	
  sovereignty	
  was	
  being	
  challenged	
  was	
  through	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  aviation,	
  by	
  using	
  both	
  zeppelins	
  and	
  airplanes	
  to	
  search	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  for	
  unclaimed	
  islands.	
  Having	
  been	
  ravaged	
  by	
  the	
  first	
  world	
  war,	
  a	
  civil	
  war	
  and	
  a	
  famine,	
  Russia	
  had	
  put	
  few	
  resources	
  into	
  developing	
  aviation	
  technology	
  and	
  thus	
  were	
  years	
  behind	
  in	
  developing	
  technology	
  that	
  would	
  enable	
  them	
  to	
  seek	
  new	
  Arctic	
  territories	
  in	
  the	
  same	
  manner.	
  In	
  order	
  to	
  prevent	
  further	
  intrusions	
  into	
  their	
  Arctic	
  ‘region	
  of	
  interest,’	
  the	
  Soviet	
  government	
  issued	
  the	
  Declaration	
  of	
  1926,	
  which	
  said:	
  	
   “All	
  lands	
  and	
  islands,	
  both	
  discovered	
  and	
  which	
  may	
  be	
  discovered	
  in	
  the	
  future,	
  which	
  do	
  not	
  comprise	
  at	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  publication	
  of	
  the	
  present	
  decree,	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  any	
  foreign	
  state	
  recognized	
  by	
  the	
  government	
  of	
  the	
  USSR,	
  located	
  in	
  the	
  Northern	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  north	
  of	
  the	
  shores	
  of	
  the	
  Union	
  of	
  Soviet	
  Socialist	
  Republics	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
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  (Horensma,	
  1991,	
  p.	
  25)	
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between	
  the	
  meridian	
  32x	
  04'35	
  E...and	
  the	
  meridian	
  168x49'30"	
  W...are	
  proclaimed	
  to	
  be	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  USSR.”400	
  	
  	
  This	
  declaration	
  in	
  effect	
  forms	
  the	
  early	
  policy	
  of	
  Russia	
  towards	
  the	
  maritime	
  Arctic	
  by	
  continuing	
  the	
  sentiments	
  earlier	
  expressed	
  by	
  the	
  Imperial	
  Russian	
  government	
  in	
  the	
  Ukase	
  of	
  1821.	
  As	
  the	
  Russian	
  boundary	
  on	
  the	
  east	
  had	
  been	
  determined	
  in	
  the	
  treaty	
  of	
  1867	
  with	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  World	
  War	
  I	
  had	
  resulted	
  in	
  shifting	
  political	
  boundaries	
  on	
  the	
  western	
  front,	
  the	
  declaration	
  codified	
  in	
  Russian	
  domestic	
  legislation	
  for	
  policy	
  they	
  were	
  already	
  physically	
  enforcing.	
  It	
  has	
  been	
  indicated	
  that	
  for	
  the	
  Soviets	
  “the	
  rules	
  of	
  non-­‐communist	
  international	
  law	
  relative	
  to	
  annexation	
  are	
  not	
  applicable	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic.”401	
  Finally,	
  this	
  declaration	
  establishes	
  the	
  parameters	
  for	
  the	
  international	
  boundaries	
  printed	
  on	
  Russian	
  maps	
  to	
  this	
  day.	
  	
  	
  This	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  sector	
  had	
  the	
  immediate	
  result	
  of	
  eliminating	
  territorial	
  insecurities	
  for	
  the	
  Soviet	
  government,	
  but	
  it	
  also	
  designated	
  to	
  them	
  a	
  new	
  type	
  of	
  responsibility	
  in	
  the	
  realm	
  of	
  effective	
  occupation.	
  The	
  crash	
  of	
  the	
  Airship	
  Italia	
  in	
  1928	
  provided	
  this	
  opportunity	
  when	
  the	
  crew	
  needed	
  to	
  be	
  rescued	
  from	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic.	
  	
  Although	
  Stalin	
  had	
  decided	
  that	
  Russia	
  would	
  not	
  get	
  involved	
  in	
  the	
  rescue,	
  the	
  media	
  had	
  inadvertently	
  committed	
  Russia	
  to	
  the	
  rescue	
  and	
  the	
  government	
  was	
  forced	
  to	
  activate	
  their	
  mothballed	
  icebreakers	
  to	
  prevent	
  loss	
  of	
  face.402	
  Although	
  the	
  rescue	
  attempt	
  was	
  the	
  cumulative	
  effort	
  of	
  what	
  was	
  effectively	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  first	
  internationally	
  coordinated	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  operations	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region,	
  it	
  was	
  the	
  Russian	
  icebreakers	
  that	
  successful	
  rescued	
  the	
  survivors.	
  This	
  rescue	
  utilised	
  the	
  technological	
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  (Taracouzio,	
  1938,	
  p.	
  320)	
  401	
  (Taracouzio,	
  1938,	
  p.	
  338)	
  402	
  (Lenoe,	
  2004,	
  p.	
  222)	
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capability	
  and	
  experience	
  of	
  many	
  states	
  that	
  had	
  been	
  participating	
  in	
  Arctic	
  exploration,	
  but	
  in	
  effect,	
  it	
  also	
  established	
  Russia's	
  technological	
  expertise	
  and	
  prowess	
  for	
  operating	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  The	
  media	
  praise	
  that	
  followed	
  their	
  successful	
  rescue	
  attempt	
  “opened	
  the	
  authorities'	
  eyes	
  to	
  the	
  propaganda	
  possibilities	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.”403	
  	
  	
  With	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Russia	
  into	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  in	
  1922	
  and	
  the	
  eventual	
  transfer	
  of	
  leadership	
  from	
  Lenin	
  to	
  Stalin,	
  the	
  Russian	
  government	
  began	
  to	
  focus	
  more	
  intently	
  on	
  the	
  restructuring	
  of	
  society	
  and	
  economy	
  more	
  appropriate	
  to	
  the	
  new	
  ideology.	
  These	
  new	
  strategies	
  were	
  implemented	
  in	
  the	
  Five	
  Year	
  Plans,	
  which	
  had	
  severe	
  implications	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  Soviet	
  style	
  plans	
  were	
  applied	
  to	
  every	
  facet	
  of	
  society.	
  Although	
  it	
  is	
  beyond	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  this	
  thesis	
  to	
  fully	
  analyse	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  these	
  Five	
  Year	
  Plans,	
  it	
  is	
  important	
  to	
  note	
  that	
  from	
  the	
  first	
  plan,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  greatly	
  affected	
  as	
  it	
  interfered	
  with	
  the	
  traditional	
  lifestyles	
  of	
  indigenous	
  populations.	
  They	
  also	
  changed	
  the	
  landscape	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  causing	
  it	
  to	
  become	
  a	
  base	
  for	
  the	
  Soviet	
  economy	
  by	
  increasing	
  northern	
  populations	
  and	
  development.	
  	
  As	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  communist	
  principle	
  against	
  the	
  ownership	
  of	
  private	
  property,	
  the	
  Soviet	
  government	
  began	
  implementing	
  a	
  nationwide	
  policy	
  of	
  collectivisation,	
  which	
  intended	
  to	
  eliminate	
  the	
  feudal	
  structure	
  of	
  Russian	
  society	
  and	
  replace	
  it	
  with	
  state	
  ownership	
  of	
  property.	
  This	
  policy	
  of	
  collectivisation	
  was	
  also	
  instituted	
  among	
  the	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic,	
  who	
  were	
  assessed	
  as	
  owning	
  too	
  many	
  reindeer	
  per	
  person.	
  Due	
  to	
  this	
  assessment,	
  thousands	
  of	
  reindeer	
  were	
  confiscated,	
  and	
  either	
  killed	
  or	
  redistributed	
  amongst	
  collective	
  farms,404	
  resulting	
  in	
  the	
  starvation	
  of	
  many	
  indigenous	
  peoples.	
  Although	
  the	
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government	
  did	
  eventually	
  make	
  the	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  exempt	
  from	
  many	
  'Soviet	
  duties'	
  such	
  as	
  conscription	
  and	
  payment	
  of	
  taxes	
  as	
  this	
  was	
  outside	
  of	
  their	
  traditional	
  lifestyles,	
  the	
  “state	
  appropriated	
  tribal	
  land	
  and	
  began	
  to	
  cash	
  in	
  on	
  it's	
  vast	
  resources-­‐-­‐including	
  fish,	
  timber,	
  fur	
  and	
  gold-­‐-­‐through	
  industrialization.”405	
  This	
  practice	
  of	
  collectivisation	
  in	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  was	
  ultimately	
  against	
  the	
  best	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  and	
  the	
  environment	
  although	
  it	
  was	
  intended	
  to	
  contribute	
  to	
  the	
  health	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  state	
  through	
  economic	
  development.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Soviet	
  project	
  included	
  the	
  Marxist	
  notion	
  of	
  ‘mastery	
  over	
  nature’	
  and	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  “the	
  ultimate	
  battleground	
  in	
  the	
  Soviets'	
  great	
  ‘struggle	
  against	
  the	
  elements’”,	
  where	
  “triumphs	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  were	
  translated	
  into	
  victories	
  of	
  almost	
  cosmic	
  significance.”406	
  Following	
  the	
  successful	
  rescue	
  of	
  the	
  Italia,	
  even	
  icebreakers	
  became	
  not	
  only	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  Soviet	
  agenda	
  for	
  northern	
  development	
  and	
  the	
  Five	
  Year	
  Plans,	
  but	
  they	
  also	
  became	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  myth	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  the	
  Soviet	
  capabilities	
  to	
  overcome	
  the	
  difficulties	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  through	
  man's	
  (Soviet!)	
  genius	
  and	
  capability.	
  	
  The	
  Stalin-­‐class	
  icebreaker,	
  of	
  which	
  several	
  were	
  built	
  between	
  1932	
  and	
  1939,	
  was	
  glorified	
  in	
  both	
  literal	
  and	
  visual	
  arts,	
  with	
  one	
  poet	
  penning	
  the	
  words:	
  “It	
  is	
  not	
  vernal	
  water	
  overflowing,	
  it	
  is	
  our	
  icebreakers	
  approaching.	
  Not	
  alone	
  is	
  the	
  glorious	
  hero.”407	
  In	
  the	
  visual	
  realm,	
  the	
  Soviet	
  government	
  produced	
  many	
  postage	
  stamps,	
  which	
  were	
  seen	
  by	
  domestic	
  and	
  international	
  audiences	
  with	
  images	
  of	
  icebreakers	
  depicted	
  as	
  supporting	
  scientific	
  research	
  and	
  development	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
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Even	
  though	
  icebreakers	
  were	
  conveniently	
  used	
  to	
  promote	
  the	
  myth	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  they	
  were	
  truly	
  an	
  important	
  component	
  of	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  during	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years,	
  due	
  to	
  their	
  support	
  in	
  keeping	
  the	
  ports	
  of	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  open	
  in	
  winter.	
  The	
  icebreakers	
  were	
  decisive	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route,	
  as	
  without	
  their	
  support,	
  Arctic	
  shipping	
  would	
  have	
  been	
  impossible.408	
  The	
  Soviets	
  invested	
  significant	
  research	
  efforts	
  into	
  developing	
  icebreakers	
  that	
  could	
  not	
  only	
  keep	
  the	
  ports	
  and	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  open,	
  but	
  that	
  could	
  also	
  carry	
  coal	
  and	
  other	
  minerals	
  acquired	
  through	
  mining	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  including	
  coal	
  mined	
  from	
  Svalbard.	
  Arctic	
  development	
  also	
  included	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  'refuelling'	
  ports,	
  which	
  increased	
  the	
  range	
  in	
  which	
  icebreakers	
  could	
  operate.409	
  	
  	
  Equalling	
  in	
  importance	
  to	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  icebreakers	
  was	
  the	
  eventual	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  aviation,	
  and	
  those	
  who	
  flew	
  for	
  Russia	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  were	
  bestowed	
  with	
  the	
  same	
  honours	
  that	
  would	
  later	
  be	
  given	
  to	
  Soviet	
  cosmonauts.	
  With	
  aeroplanes	
  acting	
  as	
  aerial	
  scouts	
  for	
  icebreakers,	
  “without	
  aviation,	
  the	
  whole	
  scheme	
  of	
  industrial	
  development,	
  settlement,	
  geological	
  and	
  geographical	
  exploration,	
  and	
  of	
  navigation	
  along	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  would	
  be	
  unthinkable.”410	
  Aviation	
  contributed	
  to	
  both	
  the	
  economic	
  and	
  security	
  goals	
  and	
  policy	
  of	
  Russia	
  in	
  this	
  period	
  by	
  making	
  it	
  possible	
  for	
  ships	
  to	
  transport	
  minerals	
  and	
  coal	
  mined	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  to	
  the	
  industrial	
  core.	
  They	
  also	
  work	
  to	
  sight	
  additional	
  developmental	
  possibilities	
  from	
  air	
  and	
  gave	
  the	
  Soviet	
  military	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  patrol	
  borders	
  with	
  more	
  efficiency.	
  	
  Economic	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  forced	
  migration	
  began	
  under	
  the	
  administration	
  of	
  the	
  Imperialist	
  Russian	
  government,	
  during	
  which	
  time	
  three	
  different	
  types	
  of	
  'forced'	
  migration	
  were	
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implemented,	
  including	
  immigration	
  as	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  punitive	
  policy.	
  	
  With	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  existing	
  as	
  a	
  vast	
  empty	
  space,	
  this	
  migration	
  was	
  considered	
  necessary	
  to	
  promote	
  economic	
  development,	
  or	
  at	
  the	
  very	
  least	
  to	
  exploit	
  the	
  economic	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
  This	
  policy	
  of	
  forced	
  migration	
  was	
  continued	
  under	
  the	
  Soviet	
  government	
  albeit	
  with	
  some	
  modification,	
  including	
  the	
  transition	
  to	
  Arctic	
  development	
  with	
  Soviet	
  style	
  principles,	
  including	
  changes	
  from	
  peasant	
  communities	
  to	
  communal	
  housing	
  based	
  around	
  collective	
  subsistence	
  farming	
  and	
  promoting	
  youth	
  programs	
  aimed	
  at	
  encouraging	
  leadership	
  amongst	
  the	
  Soviet	
  youth.	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  the	
  utility	
  of	
  the	
  policy	
  of	
  forced	
  migration,	
  based	
  on	
  personal	
  experience	
  of	
  having	
  risen	
  above	
  the	
  hardships	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  labour	
  camps	
  of	
  Imperial	
  Russia	
  prior	
  to	
  the	
  revolution,	
  Stalin	
  perhaps	
  thought	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  testing	
  ground	
  for	
  best	
  character	
  that	
  Russia	
  could	
  produce.	
  	
  	
  The	
  essence	
  of	
  forced	
  migration	
  to	
  promote	
  Northern	
  development	
  and	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  Russian	
  economic	
  base,	
  is	
  however	
  notorious	
  for	
  its	
  cruel	
  and	
  sinister	
  side.	
  “It	
  was	
  inevitable	
  that	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union's	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  territories,	
  beginning	
  as	
  it	
  did	
  with	
  a	
  relatively	
  blank	
  slate	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  would	
  be	
  a	
  reflection	
  of	
  the	
  regime	
  itself.”411	
  Not	
  only	
  was	
  the	
  Arctic	
  used	
  to	
  imprison	
  societal	
  undesirables,	
  in	
  places	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  island	
  of	
  Sakhalin	
  which	
  was	
  used	
  as	
  a	
  penal	
  colony,	
  a	
  destination	
  so	
  bad	
  that	
  occupants	
  hoped	
  to	
  be	
  moved	
  to	
  Siberia,	
  a	
  place	
  dreaded	
  by	
  all	
  other	
  Russians	
  elsewhere.412	
  The	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route,	
  supported	
  by	
  icebreakers	
  and	
  aviation,	
  was	
  used	
  to	
  transport	
  thousands	
  of	
  'migrants'	
  to	
  the	
  work	
  gulags	
  dispersed	
  throughout	
  Siberia-­‐-­‐not	
  only	
  as	
  a	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  criminal	
  justice	
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system,	
  but	
  more	
  critically	
  to	
  provide	
  labour	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  mine	
  the	
  resources	
  that	
  would	
  fuel	
  the	
  Soviet	
  economy.	
  	
  	
  
Russian	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period	
  	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  is	
  in	
  part	
  a	
  continuation	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  policies	
  developed	
  during	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years,	
  and	
  is	
  in	
  part	
  reflective	
  of	
  the	
  new	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  featuring	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  the	
  new	
  rule	
  of	
  ideological	
  discordance	
  that	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  insecurity	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War.	
  Providing	
  continuity	
  between	
  policies	
  of	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  and	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period	
  is	
  the	
  continued	
  leadership	
  of	
  Stalin	
  over	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union.	
  Combined	
  with	
  the	
  new	
  realities	
  of	
  insecurity,	
  suspicion	
  and	
  antagonism	
  of	
  the	
  period,	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  makes	
  a	
  decided	
  transition	
  in	
  the	
  Soviet	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  reflection	
  of	
  the	
  new	
  reality	
  as	
  they	
  moved	
  to	
  pursue	
  their	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  primarily	
  security	
  and	
  economic	
  development,	
  and	
  only	
  engaged	
  with	
  issues	
  of	
  social	
  development	
  and	
  environmental	
  protection	
  when	
  they	
  factored	
  into	
  the	
  grander	
  Soviet	
  strategy.	
  Near	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  period,	
  it	
  is	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  that	
  creates	
  opportunity	
  for	
  future	
  international	
  cooperation	
  in	
  the	
  region.	
  	
  	
  If	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  produced	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  documents	
  during	
  this	
  period,	
  they	
  are	
  no	
  longer	
  available	
  for	
  analysis	
  and	
  so	
  a	
  textual	
  analysis	
  of	
  the	
  policy	
  of	
  this	
  period	
  is	
  impossible.	
  Rather,	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy,	
  using	
  the	
  same	
  national	
  interests	
  identified	
  in	
  their	
  2008	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  document:	
  sovereignty,	
  security,	
  economic	
  development,	
  environmental	
  protection,	
  and	
  international	
  cooperation	
  have	
  been	
  used	
  to	
  guide	
  the	
  analysis	
  of	
  policy	
  in	
  this	
  period.	
  As	
  a	
  result,	
  this	
  section	
  has	
  relied	
  on	
  historical	
  accounts	
  of	
  Soviet	
  foreign	
  policy	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
  official	
  publications	
  of	
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the	
  Soviet	
  government,	
  such	
  as	
  maps,	
  propaganda	
  and	
  postage	
  stamps,	
  evaluation	
  of	
  their	
  engagement	
  with	
  international	
  legal	
  mechanisms,	
  scholarly	
  articles	
  on	
  Soviet	
  policy	
  and	
  newspaper	
  archives	
  to	
  form	
  an	
  analysis	
  of	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  period.	
  	
  	
  Dominating	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  period	
  is	
  the	
  combined	
  focus	
  on	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  security	
  in	
  the	
  region.	
  At	
  the	
  beginning	
  of	
  the	
  period,	
  being	
  without	
  any	
  other	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  to	
  guide	
  the	
  delimitation	
  of	
  their	
  Northern	
  maritime	
  boundaries,	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  continued	
  to	
  use	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  to	
  demarcate	
  their	
  territorial	
  boundaries.	
  Although	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  failed	
  to	
  be	
  accepted	
  as	
  a	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  its	
  continued	
  use	
  in	
  this	
  period	
  is	
  understandable	
  for	
  several	
  reasons:	
  first,	
  given	
  the	
  increase	
  in	
  aviation	
  technologies	
  combined	
  with	
  the	
  increasing	
  attitude	
  of	
  hostility	
  and	
  insecurity,	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  gave	
  the	
  Soviets	
  a	
  clearly	
  designated	
  area	
  for	
  sovereign	
  airspace.	
  Russian	
  policy	
  continues	
  to	
  use	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  to	
  determine	
  their	
  contemporary	
  airspace	
  a	
  designation	
  with	
  proves	
  useful	
  in	
  the	
  determination	
  of	
  responsibility	
  in	
  the	
  event	
  of	
  managing	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  operations.	
  	
  Secondly,	
  as	
  sea	
  ice	
  remained	
  without	
  a	
  legal	
  status	
  but	
  was	
  used	
  in	
  a	
  manner	
  resembling	
  land	
  for	
  scientific	
  research	
  activities,	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  was	
  used	
  to	
  frame	
  the	
  areas	
  of	
  	
  ‘territory’	
  in	
  which	
  Soviet	
  scientists	
  operated.	
  This	
  had	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  demonstrating	
  of	
  the	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  government	
  in	
  the	
  maritime	
  Arctic	
  should	
  their	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  be	
  challenged.	
  The	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  installed	
  dozens	
  of	
  drift	
  stations,	
  many	
  which	
  were	
  permanently	
  manned	
  by	
  scientists	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  study	
  ice	
  and	
  weather	
  conditions,	
  sea	
  currents	
  and	
  geomagnetic	
  observations	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  “ensure	
  the	
  maximum	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
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Route”	
  which	
  included	
  making	
  “	
  sea	
  and	
  air	
  navigation	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  more	
  secure”	
  through	
  “the	
  systematic	
  collection	
  of	
  all	
  the	
  data	
  which	
  are	
  needed	
  to	
  improve	
  ice	
  and	
  weather	
  forecasts.”413	
  For	
  many	
  years,	
  the	
  Soviets	
  not	
  only	
  banned	
  their	
  scientists	
  from	
  collaborating	
  with	
  other	
  international	
  scientists,	
  but	
  also	
  prohibited	
  research	
  from	
  being	
  conducted	
  within	
  their	
  territorial	
  waters	
  and	
  refused	
  to	
  let	
  foreign	
  ships	
  use	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route.414	
  	
  	
  The	
  importance	
  of	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  within	
  Soviet	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  is	
  demonstrated	
  in	
  the	
  effort	
  maintained	
  to	
  make	
  the	
  passage	
  operable.	
  Not	
  only	
  did	
  the	
  Soviet	
  government	
  fund	
  extensive	
  scientific	
  exploration	
  for	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
  but	
  they	
  also	
  invested	
  in	
  the	
  technology	
  necessary	
  to	
  keep	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  open	
  and	
  created	
  a	
  bureaucratic	
  mechanism	
  charged	
  with	
  maintaining	
  the	
  administration	
  functions	
  of	
  the	
  route.	
  This	
  technology	
  included	
  the	
  extensive	
  development	
  of	
  a	
  fleet	
  of	
  icebreakers	
  used	
  to	
  keep	
  the	
  passage	
  open.	
  In	
  1956,	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  Administration	
  managed	
  “15	
  icebreakers,	
  100	
  ocean-­‐going	
  freighters,	
  150	
  aircraft,	
  and	
  35,000	
  employees…	
  operat[ing]	
  entirely	
  in	
  Arctic	
  waters	
  and	
  handl[ing]	
  up	
  to	
  2,000,000	
  tons	
  of	
  freight	
  in	
  a	
  season.”415	
  If	
  the	
  capability	
  of	
  Soviet	
  operating	
  capacity	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  compared	
  with	
  its	
  Arctic	
  neighbours,	
  it	
  is	
  easy	
  to	
  see	
  that	
  Russian	
  considers	
  its	
  Arctic	
  developmental	
  operational	
  capabilities	
  of	
  higher	
  significance.	
  However,	
  this	
  could	
  be	
  in	
  part	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  nature	
  and	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  Soviet	
  economy,	
  which	
  did	
  not	
  require	
  capital	
  profits	
  to	
  be	
  pursued	
  as	
  a	
  policy	
  objective.	
   This	
  focus	
  on	
  the	
  operational	
  capabilities	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  had	
  two	
  rationales:	
  military	
  security	
  and	
  economic	
  development.	
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With	
  the	
  arms	
  race	
  being	
  a	
  predominant	
  feature	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  and	
  two	
  of	
  Russia’s	
  strategic	
  maritime	
  access	
  points,	
  the	
  Baltic	
  Sea	
  and	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  having	
  ice	
  cover	
  in	
  the	
  winter,	
  the	
  fleet	
  of	
  icebreakers	
  maintained	
  by	
  Russia	
  were	
  a	
  tactical	
  component	
  in	
  their	
  naval	
  abilities	
  and	
  home	
  defence	
  strategy.	
  As	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  strategic	
  importance,	
  “the	
  Arctic	
  emerged	
  as	
  an	
  arena	
  of	
  naval	
  superpower	
  competition.”416	
  Although	
  the	
  Soviets	
  did	
  not	
  widely	
  publicise	
  their	
  military	
  capabilities	
  during	
  the	
  height	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War417	
  as	
  technology	
  such	
  as	
  nuclear	
  submarines	
  and	
  intercontinental	
  ballistic	
  missiles	
  became	
  the	
  standard	
  equipment	
  of	
  the	
  superpowers,	
  Arctic	
  operating	
  bases	
  became	
  viable	
  options	
  for	
  Russia—and	
  the	
  source	
  of	
  fear	
  for	
  their	
  rivals.	
  This	
  intensive	
  activity	
  would	
  lead	
  to	
  the	
  Soviets	
  using	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  nuclear	
  dumping	
  site,	
  an	
  issue	
  that	
  would	
  in	
  the	
  future	
  provide	
  an	
  opportunity	
  for	
  cooperation.	
  It	
  was	
  also	
  determined	
  that	
  despite	
  to	
  Test	
  Ban	
  Treaties	
  and	
  Soviet	
  assent	
  to	
  other	
  similar	
  international	
  agreements,	
  this	
  did	
  not	
  in	
  actuality	
  reduce	
  the	
  military	
  threat	
  from	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  against	
  the	
  NATO	
  allies	
  of	
  the	
  West.418	
  	
  Economic	
  development	
  and	
  exploitation	
  of	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  another	
  predominate	
  feature	
  of	
  Soviet	
  policy	
  in	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  period.	
  This	
  economic	
  development,	
  supported	
  by	
  the	
  infrastructure	
  of	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route,	
  targeted	
  hydrocarbons—	
  first	
  with	
  coal	
  and	
  then	
  moving	
  onto	
  gas	
  and	
  oil	
  to	
  fuel	
  the	
  expansion	
  of	
  Soviet	
  industrial	
  development,	
  but	
  also	
  mining	
  other	
  minerals	
  as	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Arctic	
  is	
  “well-­‐endowed	
  with	
  non-­‐renewable	
  resources,	
  such	
  nickel,	
  cobalt,	
  platinum,	
  copper,	
  gold,	
  tin,	
  iron	
  and	
  diamonds.”419	
  To	
  support	
  these	
  mining	
  activities,	
  cities	
  were	
  developed	
  in	
  the	
  Russian	
  far	
  North,	
  providing	
  workers	
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for	
  infrastructural	
  growth	
  and	
  transportation,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  Leningrad-­‐Murmansk	
  railroad,	
  which	
  was	
  built	
  to	
  bring	
  these	
  resources	
  to	
  the	
  populated	
  areas	
  of	
  Russia.	
  This	
  development	
  was	
  of	
  significance	
  as	
  it	
  “accelerated	
  emplacement	
  of	
  infrastructure	
  that	
  is	
  applicable	
  for	
  both	
  military	
  and	
  economic	
  purposes	
  and	
  the	
  drive	
  to	
  promote	
  colonization,	
  industrialization,	
  transportation	
  and	
  communications	
  links	
  and	
  the	
  overall	
  economic	
  modernization”	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.420	
  The	
  totality	
  of	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Communist	
  conceptions	
  of	
  economic	
  structure	
  included	
  not	
  only	
  the	
  exploitation	
  of	
  the	
  natural	
  resources	
  to	
  support	
  the	
  core,	
  but	
  it	
  also	
  included	
  the	
  alteration	
  of	
  the	
  traditional	
  lifestyles	
  and	
  economies	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  indigenous	
  peoples.	
  This	
  policy	
  was	
  initially	
  implemented	
  in	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years,	
  resulting	
  the	
  immediate	
  devastation	
  of	
  populations	
  due	
  to	
  famine	
  and	
  starvation,	
  but	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  period	
  the	
  social	
  effects	
  of	
  this	
  restructuring	
  were	
  more	
  evident	
  as	
  substance	
  abuse	
  and	
  suicide	
  rates	
  increased.	
  Finally,	
  the	
  effects	
  of	
  the	
  Soviet	
  policies	
  on	
  indigenous	
  lands	
  included	
  severe	
  environmental	
  degradation	
  so	
  that	
  even	
  when	
  these	
  relocation	
  and	
  reorganisation	
  policies	
  were	
  relaxed	
  it	
  continued	
  to	
  affect	
  indigenous	
  populations.	
  It	
  remains	
  that	
  	
  “all	
  facets	
  of	
  aboriginal	
  life	
  have	
  been	
  influenced	
  by	
  environmental	
  degradation,	
  [and]	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  traditional	
  activities—reindeer	
  herding,	
  hunting,	
  trapping,	
  gathering	
  and	
  fishing	
  which	
  have	
  been	
  most	
  affected”;	
  this	
  environmental	
  degradation	
  also	
  “attacks	
  the	
  very	
  essence	
  of	
  aboriginal	
  societies.”421	
  Although	
  domestic	
  Soviet	
  environmental	
  policy	
  was	
  in	
  effect	
  to	
  have	
  no	
  policy	
  at	
  all	
  aside	
  from	
  the	
  exploitation	
  of	
  resources	
  until	
  near	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
  it	
  is	
  environmental	
  policies	
  that	
  provided	
  opportunity	
  for	
  international	
  cooperation	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
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realm	
  of	
  military	
  insecurities.	
  This	
  included	
  international	
  agreements	
  on	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  where	
  Russia	
  holds	
  suspended	
  territorial	
  claims,	
  but	
  also	
  in	
  the	
  1973	
  Agreement	
  on	
  the	
  
Conservation	
  of	
  Polar	
  Bears.	
  Incidentally,	
  despite	
  this	
  late	
  awakening	
  to	
  ecological	
  consciousness	
  and	
  the	
  awareness	
  of	
  the	
  exhaustibility	
  of	
  natural	
  resources,	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  Soviets	
  who	
  initiated	
  the	
  advancement	
  of	
  international	
  cooperation	
  on	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  environmental	
  concerns	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  In	
  what	
  can	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  the	
  first	
  step	
  towards	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  also	
  the	
  first	
  officially	
  delivered	
  position	
  on	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy,	
  the	
  Murmansk	
  Speech	
  delivered	
  by	
  Gorbachev	
  proposed	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  “let	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  be	
  a	
  pole	
  of	
  peace.”422	
  Identified	
  within	
  this	
  speech	
  are	
  the	
  elements	
  that	
  would	
  become	
  the	
  foundations	
  of	
  contemporary	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy:	
  international	
  cooperation,	
  security,	
  scientific	
  research,	
  the	
  environment,	
  Northern	
  development	
  and	
  indigenous	
  populations.	
  Yet	
  even	
  during	
  the	
  final	
  days	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
  this	
  turn	
  to	
  cooperation	
  came	
  with	
  caution	
  that	
  “promoters	
  of	
  environmental	
  regimes	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  should	
  be	
  aware	
  of	
  this	
  Soviet	
  desire	
  to	
  limit	
  the	
  players	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  to	
  those	
  with	
  direct	
  interests	
  and	
  activities	
  there,	
  keeping	
  control	
  in	
  the	
  hand	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  eight.”423	
  Although	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  would	
  soon	
  disintegrate,	
  resulting	
  in	
  a	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  the	
  speech	
  at	
  Murmansk	
  signalled	
  to	
  the	
  other	
  Arctic	
  states	
  that	
  future	
  of	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  was	
  inclined	
  toward	
  international	
  cooperation	
  addressing	
  the	
  issues	
  arising	
  within	
  the	
  region.	
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Russia	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  in	
  the	
  Post	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period	
  	
   Following	
  the	
  breakdown	
  of	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  and	
  the	
  transition	
  to	
  becoming	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation,	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  has	
  not	
  only	
  been	
  required	
  to	
  adapt	
  to	
  the	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  character	
  of	
  the	
  domestic	
  political	
  structure	
  of	
  Russia,	
  but	
  it	
  has	
  also	
  needed	
  to	
  adjust	
  to	
  the	
  transition	
  in	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  The	
  loss	
  of	
  global	
  predominance	
  that	
  Russia	
  experienced	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  shift	
  from	
  the	
  bi-­‐polarity	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  caused	
  a	
  crisis	
  in	
  Russian	
  identity	
  as	
  the	
  country	
  sought	
  to	
  develop	
  a	
  new	
  identity	
  that	
  befitted	
  their	
  new	
  position	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  while	
  still	
  maintaining	
  the	
  pride	
  and	
  dignity	
  of	
  centuries	
  of	
  Russian	
  civilization.	
  While	
  waiting	
  for	
  this	
  new	
  identity	
  to	
  stabilise,	
  the	
  posturing	
  that	
  has	
  taken	
  place	
  within	
  state	
  practice	
  of	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policy	
  gives	
  uncertainty	
  to	
  an	
  international	
  audience,	
  even	
  though	
  their	
  official	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  document	
  swears	
  obeisance	
  to	
  international	
  law.	
  In	
  an	
  earlier	
  era,	
  Churchill	
  evaluated	
  that	
  Russia	
  “is	
  a	
  riddle	
  wrapped	
  in	
  a	
  mystery	
  inside	
  an	
  enigma”424	
  and	
  having	
  faced	
  another	
  series	
  of	
  transitions,	
  today,	
  the	
  character	
  of	
  Russia	
  is	
  even	
  more	
  opaque.	
  	
  	
  The	
  key	
  to	
  understanding	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  is	
  in	
  the	
  identification	
  of	
  national	
  interests,	
  including	
  those	
  delivered	
  in	
  the	
  2008	
  Foundations	
  of	
  State	
  Policy	
  of	
  Russian	
  Federation	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  
for	
  the	
  period	
  to	
  2020	
  and	
  Beyond	
  and	
  how	
  they	
  might	
  be	
  achieved	
  through	
  the	
  Russian	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  The	
  document	
  thoroughly	
  outlines	
  Russia’s	
  national	
  interests,	
  issues	
  and	
  objectives	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  its	
  use	
  as	
  a	
  resource	
  base,	
  focusing	
  heavily	
  on	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  including	
  “the	
  creation	
  and	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  infrastructure	
  and	
  communications	
  management	
  system	
  of	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  to	
  solve	
  the	
  problems	
  of	
  Eurasian	
  transit,”	
  but	
  also	
  identifies	
  a	
  desire	
  to	
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conserve	
  the	
  Arctic	
  ecosystems	
  and	
  to	
  maintain	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  zone	
  of	
  peaceful	
  cooperation	
  while	
  also	
  to	
  built	
  a	
  military	
  “capable	
  of	
  ensuring	
  military	
  security	
  under	
  various	
  military-­‐political	
  scenarios.”425	
  These	
  policy	
  elements	
  give	
  rationalisation	
  to	
  Russian	
  state	
  practice	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  including	
  involvement	
  in	
  international	
  agreements	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Search	
  and	
  Rescue	
  Treaty	
  2011	
  and	
  the	
  forthcoming	
  Polar	
  Code,	
  but	
  also	
  to	
  military	
  activity	
  and	
  preparation	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  which	
  so	
  often	
  causes	
  consternation	
  amongst	
  observers	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations.	
  	
  	
  Fulfilling	
  Gorbachev’s	
  invitation	
  to	
  launch	
  international	
  cooperation	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  transforming	
  it	
  into	
  a	
  zone	
  of	
  peace,	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation	
  has	
  been	
  an	
  active	
  participant	
  in	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  Arctic	
  governance.	
  This	
  includes	
  acceding	
  to	
  both	
  informal	
  and	
  formal	
  agreements	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  from	
  the	
  1991	
  Arctic	
  Environmental	
  Protection	
  Strategy	
  and	
  the	
  resulting	
  Ottawa	
  Declaration	
  1996,	
  establishing	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council.	
  They	
  were	
  also	
  participants	
  in	
  the	
  Ilulissat	
  Declaration	
  2008	
  where	
  they	
  committed	
  to	
  abide	
  by	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law,	
  but	
  also	
  to	
  find	
  solutions	
  to	
  regional	
  issues	
  outside	
  of	
  formal	
  Arctic	
  Treaty,	
  restating	
  a	
  Russian	
  position	
  that	
  the	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  remain	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Pursuing	
  this	
  position,	
  Russia	
  also	
  ratified	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Search	
  and	
  Rescue	
  Treaty	
  
2011,	
  creating	
  the	
  opportunity	
  for	
  military	
  cooperation	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  their	
  fulfilment	
  of	
  the	
  obligations	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  under	
  international	
  law.	
  Finally,	
  they	
  peacefully	
  ended	
  a	
  forty	
  year	
  dispute	
  over	
  a	
  maritime	
  boundary	
  in	
  a	
  bilateral	
  treaty	
  with	
  Norway.	
  The	
  reason	
  for	
  this	
  international	
  cooperation	
  is	
  not	
  only	
  to	
  address	
  Arctic	
  environmental	
  issues	
  which	
  Russia	
  cannot	
  manage	
  alone,	
  but	
  also	
  to	
  also	
  keep	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  as	
  international	
  interest	
  in	
  Arctic	
  resources	
  accelerates.	
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A	
  critical	
  element	
  of	
  Russian	
  compliance	
  with	
  international	
  law	
  is	
  their	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  legal	
  framework,	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  
Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982,	
  which	
  establishes	
  the	
  procedure	
  to	
  establish	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  maritime	
  territory	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  The	
  Convention	
  entered	
  into	
  force	
  for	
  Russia	
  in	
  1997	
  and	
  Russia	
  made	
  an	
  initial	
  submission	
  on	
  the	
  outer	
  limits	
  on	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  in	
  2001	
  to	
  the	
  Commission	
  on	
  the	
  Continental	
  Shelf.	
  The	
  maps	
  included	
  in	
  this	
  submission	
  depict	
  the	
  maritime	
  borders	
  of	
  Russia	
  as	
  including	
  the	
  entire	
  length	
  of	
  the	
  median	
  line	
  between	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Russia	
  and	
  nearly	
  all	
  territory	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  on	
  their	
  western	
  boundary.426	
  This	
  submission	
  was	
  evaluated	
  as	
  deficient	
  in	
  scientific	
  evidence,	
  especially	
  in	
  light	
  of	
  the	
  territorial	
  dispute	
  with	
  Norway,	
  which	
  has	
  since	
  been	
  resolved.	
  Russia	
  resubmitted	
  a	
  partially	
  revised	
  claim	
  in	
  early	
  2013	
  on	
  the	
  limits	
  in	
  the	
  Okhotsk	
  Sea,	
  but	
  did	
  not	
  resubmit	
  revised	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  Lomonosov	
  Ridge.	
  However,	
  given	
  the	
  longstanding	
  claims	
  by	
  Russia	
  on	
  territory	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  which	
  has	
  a	
  historic	
  role	
  in	
  Russian	
  identity,	
  and	
  in	
  reflection	
  of	
  the	
  contents	
  of	
  the	
  2001	
  submission,	
  it	
  is	
  expected	
  that	
  the	
  claim	
  to	
  this	
  territory	
  will	
  remain	
  as	
  the	
  current	
  policy	
  document	
  states	
  the	
  “boundaries	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Zone	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation	
  may	
  be	
  specified	
  in	
  accordance	
  with	
  the	
  Normative	
  Legal	
  Acts	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation.”427	
  As	
  evident	
  of	
  state	
  practice	
  demonstrating	
  policy,	
  Russian	
  posturing	
  in	
  the	
  flag	
  planting	
  exercise	
  on	
  the	
  seabed	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  in	
  2007	
  also	
  denotes	
  intent	
  to	
  maintain	
  current	
  boundary	
  delimitations.	
  	
  Since	
  the	
  early	
  days	
  of	
  Imperial	
  Russia,	
  the	
  Russians	
  have	
  considered	
  the	
  Arctic	
  area	
  north	
  of	
  their	
  terra	
  firma	
  as	
  Russian	
  territory.	
  In	
  each	
  phase	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  they	
  have	
  implemented	
  some	
  form	
  of	
  control	
  over	
  the	
  maritime	
  region—	
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from	
  the	
  banning	
  of	
  fur	
  trapping	
  in	
  the	
  early	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery	
  as	
  trappers	
  were	
  avoiding	
  Russian	
  customs	
  and	
  taxes	
  to	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  Administration	
  that	
  determines	
  who	
  is	
  allowed	
  passage	
  through	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route.	
  Considering	
  this	
  long	
  term	
  control	
  over	
  the	
  maritime	
  Arctic	
  for	
  Russian	
  national	
  interests,	
  it	
  is	
  expected	
  that	
  in	
  the	
  Post-­‐Cold	
  War	
  Period,	
  despite	
  the	
  changes	
  in	
  rules	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  that	
  Russia	
  maintains	
  the	
  desire	
  to	
  control	
  the	
  economic	
  benefits	
  of	
  the	
  region,	
  to	
  keep	
  economic	
  flows	
  heading	
  towards	
  Russian	
  coffers.	
  However,	
  the	
  adoption	
  of	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  as	
  a	
  major	
  shipping	
  lane	
  from	
  China	
  to	
  Europe	
  is	
  likely	
  to	
  encourage	
  economic	
  development	
  for	
  Russia	
  and	
  is	
  thus	
  in	
  the	
  national	
  interest.	
  The	
  increase	
  of	
  traffic	
  in	
  this	
  sensitive	
  region	
  also	
  increases	
  possibility	
  of	
  industrial	
  accidents	
  and	
  environmental	
  damage.	
  	
  	
  As	
  the	
  effects	
  of	
  any	
  accidents	
  would	
  harm	
  Russian	
  maritime	
  industries,	
  as	
  was	
  demonstrated	
  in	
  the	
  1989	
  Exxon	
  Valdez	
  accident	
  in	
  Alaska	
  where	
  twenty-­‐five	
  years	
  following	
  the	
  region	
  still	
  suffers	
  the	
  effects	
  of	
  this	
  disaster,	
  Russia	
  is	
  keen	
  to	
  avoid	
  accidents.	
  To	
  mitigate	
  this	
  probability,	
  Russia	
  is	
  cooperating	
  with	
  other	
  Arctic	
  nations	
  and	
  the	
  International	
  Maritime	
  Organisation	
  to	
  develop	
  a	
  mandatory	
  international	
  code,	
  the	
  Polar	
  Code	
  to	
  regulate	
  shipping	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.	
  Given	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas,	
  it	
  is	
  unlikely	
  the	
  Northern	
  Sea	
  Route	
  Administration	
  can	
  maintain	
  legitimate	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  beyond	
  the	
  contiguous	
  zone	
  and	
  the	
  Polar	
  Code	
  will	
  provide	
  Russia	
  with	
  the	
  international	
  authorisation	
  to	
  control	
  maritime	
  traffic	
  in	
  they	
  consider	
  to	
  be	
  their	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  code	
  was	
  being	
  drafted	
  in	
  early	
  2014.	
  	
  	
  The	
  condition	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  environment	
  has	
  been	
  given	
  a	
  platform	
  in	
  Russian	
  policy	
  since	
  Gorbachev’s	
  Murmansk	
  Speech,	
  and	
  is	
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being	
  addressed	
  through	
  several	
  different	
  strategies.	
  The	
  first	
  is	
  through	
  international	
  cooperation	
  mechanisms.	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  environmental	
  strategies	
  associated	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  Russia	
  is	
  cooperating	
  with	
  the	
  Environmental	
  Protection	
  Agency	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  several	
  other	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Military	
  Environment	
  Program.	
  This	
  aim	
  of	
  this	
  program	
  is	
  to	
  assist	
  Russia	
  in	
  the	
  decommissioning	
  of	
  Cold	
  War	
  era	
  nuclear	
  arms	
  and	
  also	
  to	
  begin	
  clean	
  up	
  of	
  hazardous	
  wastes,	
  which	
  were	
  dumped	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War.428	
  While	
  there	
  is	
  little	
  that	
  can	
  be	
  done	
  at	
  present	
  to	
  stop	
  the	
  melting	
  of	
  tundra	
  in	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  climate	
  change	
  and	
  global	
  warming,	
  Russia	
  appears	
  to	
  be	
  engaging	
  in	
  international	
  cooperation	
  with	
  issues	
  that	
  it	
  can	
  address.	
  	
  	
  Cooperation	
  by	
  Russia	
  in	
  international	
  agreements,	
  and	
  specifically	
  to	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  
1982,	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  through	
  this	
  mechanism	
  is	
  merely	
  a	
  method	
  to	
  attract	
  international	
  investment	
  in	
  hydrocarbon	
  industries.	
  Russia’s	
  adherence	
  to	
  this	
  legal	
  mechanism	
  gives	
  foreign	
  investors	
  a	
  sense	
  of	
  legal	
  security	
  in	
  the	
  designation	
  of	
  property	
  rights	
  for	
  the	
  territory	
  where	
  these	
  resources	
  are	
  located.	
  However,	
  the	
  2008	
  Foundations	
  of	
  State	
  
Policy	
  of	
  Russian	
  Federation	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  for	
  the	
  period	
  to	
  2020	
  and	
  
Beyond	
  clearly	
  indicates	
  that	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation	
  considers	
  its	
  boundaries	
  to	
  have	
  been	
  determined	
  in	
  the	
  1926	
  Soviet	
  declaration	
  on	
  the	
  sector	
  principle.	
  In	
  the	
  event	
  that	
  the	
  Russian	
  claims	
  the	
  Commission	
  on	
  the	
  Continental	
  Shelf	
  are	
  denied,	
  it	
  is	
  unlikely	
  that	
  Russia	
  will	
  change	
  the	
  territorial	
  borders	
  on	
  maps.	
  	
  	
  Russia	
  has	
  drawn	
  its	
  international	
  boundaries	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  in	
  the	
  pie	
  shaped	
  wedge	
  of	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  since	
  1926.	
  These	
  lines	
  consistently	
  appeared	
  on	
  military	
  maps,	
  postage	
  stamps	
  and	
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propaganda	
  posters	
  throughout	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  period,	
  often	
  with	
  a	
  Soviet	
  flag	
  displayed	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole.	
  Russia	
  also	
  considers	
  its	
  airspace	
  to	
  fall	
  within	
  this	
  territory;	
  airspace	
  in	
  which	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  both	
  warn	
  each	
  other	
  to	
  ‘stay	
  out’,	
  making	
  protest	
  when	
  they	
  feel	
  their	
  airspace	
  is	
  violated.	
  Given	
  the	
  layers	
  of	
  territory	
  which	
  Russia	
  has	
  long	
  embraced	
  as	
  part	
  of	
  their	
  cultural	
  and	
  political	
  heritage,	
  it	
  is	
  unlikely	
  that	
  they	
  will	
  be	
  willing	
  to	
  redraw	
  the	
  lines	
  on	
  their	
  maps	
  any	
  time	
  soon.	
  	
  	
  
Conclusions	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  It	
  is	
  often	
  said	
  that	
  the	
  best	
  predictor	
  of	
  future	
  behaviour	
  is	
  past	
  behaviour,	
  yet	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation	
  is	
  in	
  effect	
  a	
  fledgling	
  state.	
  While	
  it	
  is	
  an	
  heir	
  to	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union,	
  inheriting	
  the	
  Soviet	
  seat	
  on	
  the	
  Security	
  Council,	
  nuclear	
  status	
  and	
  other	
  treaty	
  obligations,429	
  the	
  actions	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation	
  cannot	
  be	
  simply	
  viewed	
  as	
  a	
  continuation	
  of	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union’s	
  behavioural	
  tendencies:	
  it	
  must	
  be	
  analysed	
  of	
  its	
  own	
  merit.	
  Given	
  the	
  relatively	
  short	
  history	
  of	
  a	
  state	
  with	
  so	
  much	
  international	
  status	
  there	
  has	
  been	
  little	
  time	
  for	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation	
  to	
  make	
  its	
  mark.	
  Yet,	
  fortunately	
  it	
  has	
  provided	
  several	
  fascinating	
  events	
  for	
  analysis,	
  including	
  the	
  planting	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  tricolour	
  on	
  the	
  seabed	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole.430	
  	
  While	
  it	
  is	
  impossible	
  to	
  precisely	
  predict	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  it	
  seems	
  likely	
  that	
  the	
  Russian	
  position	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  new	
  phenomenon,	
  a	
  turning	
  over	
  of	
  the	
  behaviour	
  leaf—especially	
  given	
  that	
  its	
  government	
  is	
  partially	
  formed	
  of	
  remnants	
  from	
  the	
  Soviet	
  regime	
  and	
  many	
  of	
  it’s	
  political	
  leaders	
  were	
  trained	
  in	
  Soviet	
  ideology.	
  It	
  appears	
  wholly	
  possible	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  its	
  historical	
  borders	
  are	
  indelibly	
  planted	
  into	
  the	
  Russian	
  identity.	
  While	
  current	
  professions	
  prescribe	
  adherence	
  to	
  settlement	
  frameworks	
  of	
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  2014	
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  Crimea	
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  international	
  protest	
  and	
  sanctions.	
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international	
  law,	
  the	
  analysis	
  of	
  these	
  events	
  determine	
  that	
  the	
  international	
  cooperation	
  on	
  issues	
  of	
  the	
  environment	
  and	
  resource	
  development	
  is	
  temporary	
  smokescreen	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Front	
  and	
  the	
  absolute	
  motivation	
  for	
  these	
  policies	
  is	
  the	
  Russian	
  national	
  interest.	
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   Part	
  Three:	
  Governance	
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Chapter	
  VI	
  
	
  
Arctic	
  Governance:	
  Transformation,	
  Rules	
  and	
  
Doctrine	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Territorial	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  occurred	
  in	
  several	
  different	
  phases	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  recent	
  turn	
  to	
  governance	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  is	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  transformation	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  changes	
  in	
  the	
  rules	
  which	
  coordinate	
  the	
  behaviour	
  between	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  realm.	
  In	
  its	
  simplest	
  form,	
  governance	
  is	
  defined	
  as	
  ‘the	
  act	
  of	
  governing’.	
  However	
  with	
  state	
  sovereignty	
  formally	
  constrained	
  by	
  borders,	
  and	
  given	
  the	
  anarchic	
  condition	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  this	
  creates	
  a	
  vacuum	
  of	
  jurisdictional	
  control	
  in	
  the	
  territory	
  outside	
  of	
  state	
  borders.	
  As	
  global	
  issues	
  outside	
  of	
  their	
  borders	
  increasingly	
  affect	
  states,	
  the	
  domestic	
  space	
  where	
  they	
  pursue	
  ‘the	
  good’	
  in	
  policy	
  decisions	
  for	
  their	
  citizens	
  becomes	
  an	
  insufficient	
  realm	
  to	
  pursue	
  their	
  national	
  interests,	
  thus	
  they	
  are	
  compelled	
  to	
  seek	
  solutions	
  outside	
  of	
  their	
  sovereign	
  borders	
  in	
  a	
  place	
  where	
  they	
  are	
  without	
  authority.	
  As	
  the	
  relative	
  size	
  of	
  the	
  globe	
  has	
  diminished	
  and	
  states	
  have	
  become	
  increasingly	
  interconnected,	
  some	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  international	
  relations,	
  such	
  as	
  war	
  or	
  international	
  law,	
  have	
  singly	
  become	
  insufficient	
  to	
  achieve	
  the	
  goals	
  of	
  states.	
  Consequently,	
  within	
  the	
  anarchic	
  environment	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  a	
  new	
  mechanism—governance-­‐-­‐	
  has	
  been	
  developed	
  by	
  states	
  help	
  achieve	
  the	
  national	
  interests	
  that	
  sometimes	
  extend	
  beyond	
  the	
  jurisdictional	
  limits	
  of	
  their	
  sovereign	
  borders	
  resulting	
  in	
  the	
  transformation	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
  Governance	
  is	
  thus	
  a	
  method	
  for	
  creating	
  jurisdiction	
  through	
  multilateral	
  consent	
  in	
  areas	
  outside	
  of	
  sovereign	
  territorial	
  boundaries.	
  	
  This	
  creation	
  of	
  governance	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  weakness	
  of	
  the	
  sovereign	
  state	
  system	
  has	
  also	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
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testing	
  of	
  a	
  new	
  ‘indigenous	
  rule’	
  and	
  has	
  had	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  creating	
  of	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Doctrine.	
  	
  	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  has	
  developed	
  in	
  the	
  post	
  Cold	
  War	
  phase	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  a	
  system	
  which	
  features	
  a	
  plethora	
  of	
  layered	
  rules-­‐-­‐	
  both	
  tacit	
  and	
  codified,	
  that	
  guide	
  the	
  expected	
  behaviour	
  between	
  states	
  as	
  they	
  engage	
  in	
  international	
  relationships.	
  Many	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  currently	
  in	
  force	
  were	
  developed	
  in	
  a	
  transition	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  following	
  the	
  Great	
  World	
  Wars	
  of	
  the	
  twentieth	
  century,	
  which	
  resulted	
  in	
  a	
  shift	
  away	
  from	
  classical	
  imperialism	
  and	
  toward	
  a	
  form	
  of	
  imperialism	
  that,	
  although	
  more	
  subtle,	
  continued	
  to	
  repeat	
  patterns	
  of	
  domination,	
  including	
  asymmetric	
  power	
  and	
  economic	
  relationships.	
  The	
  early	
  generations	
  of	
  governance	
  sought	
  merely	
  to	
  prevent	
  war	
  in	
  Europe,	
  but	
  over	
  the	
  last	
  century,	
  it	
  has	
  become	
  more	
  sophisticated	
  and	
  is	
  capable	
  of	
  being	
  proactive-­‐-­‐rather	
  than	
  merely	
  reactive-­‐-­‐	
  to	
  international	
  issues.	
  As	
  a	
  new	
  generation	
  mechanism,	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  is	
  unlike	
  other	
  regional	
  governance	
  regimes	
  previously	
  established	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  spectrum,	
  notably	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  System,	
  as	
  it	
  seeks	
  not	
  only	
  to	
  eliminate	
  conflict	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  but	
  it	
  also	
  address	
  issues	
  in	
  advance	
  of	
  their	
  reality	
  (such	
  as	
  using	
  Arctic	
  Search	
  and	
  Rescue	
  to	
  mitigate	
  a	
  human	
  and	
  environmental	
  disaster)	
  while	
  pursuing	
  and	
  protecting	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  region.	
  	
  	
  Arctic	
  governance,	
  formally	
  established	
  through	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  is	
  also	
  unusual	
  in	
  that	
  not	
  all	
  states	
  are	
  treated	
  equal	
  within	
  the	
  hierarchy	
  of	
  participation	
  and	
  it	
  elevates	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  to	
  a	
  higher	
  status	
  than	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states.	
  Yet	
  despite	
  this	
  elevation,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  have	
  in	
  actuality	
  reinforced	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  structural	
  hierarchy	
  that	
  posits	
  states	
  as	
  the	
  dominant	
  agents	
  within	
  international	
  relations.	
  Although	
  this	
  inclusion	
  of	
  indigenous	
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groups	
  within	
  the	
  decision-­‐making	
  processes	
  of	
  regional	
  governance	
  has	
  been	
  lauded	
  as	
  a	
  great	
  step	
  forward	
  for	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  restoring	
  indigenous	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  lands	
  and	
  resources	
  once	
  apprehended	
  by	
  the	
  powers	
  of	
  classical	
  imperialism,	
  this	
  chapter	
  will	
  argue	
  that	
  the	
  inclusion	
  of	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  within	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  restoration	
  of	
  indigenous	
  status	
  and	
  is	
  merely	
  a	
  method	
  of	
  imperialism	
  whereby	
  states	
  can	
  portray	
  legitimate	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  Arctic	
  but	
  that	
  this	
  inclusion	
  does	
  not	
  pose	
  a	
  challenge	
  to	
  the	
  hierarchy	
  of	
  agents	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  	
  This	
  chapter	
  investigates	
  the	
  transformations	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  relating	
  to	
  Arctic	
  governance,	
  the	
  rationale	
  for	
  its	
  development,	
  the	
  positions	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants	
  within	
  this	
  system	
  and	
  within	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  and	
  finally,	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Doctrine	
  through	
  the	
  following	
  questions:	
  	
  
• What	
  transformations	
  have	
  occurred	
  to	
  result	
  in	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  Arctic	
  governance?	
  
• Why	
  is	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  being	
  pursued	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  States?	
  
• Does	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  alter	
  the	
  hierarchy	
  of	
  the	
  central	
  actors	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system?	
  	
  
• Is	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  an	
  Arctic	
  doctrine?	
  	
  Governance	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic431	
  has	
  been	
  addressed	
  by	
  Olav	
  Stokke,	
  Evan	
  T.	
  Bloom,	
  Timo	
  Koivurova,	
  Karin	
  Keskitalo	
  and	
  Oran	
  Young,	
  among	
  others.	
  These	
  scholars	
  have	
  traced	
  its	
  development	
  from	
  an	
  embryonic	
  condition,	
  beginning	
  with	
  Gorbachev’s	
  Murmansk	
  
Speech	
  in	
  1987,	
  the	
  catalyst	
  for	
  ending	
  Cold	
  War	
  politics	
  in	
  the	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  431	
  Although	
  this	
  paper	
  focuses	
  on	
  transformations	
  within	
  circumpolar	
  governance	
  at	
  state	
  level,	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  can	
  also	
  include	
  organisations	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  Barents	
  Euro-­‐Arctic	
  Region,	
  Council	
  of	
  the	
  Baltic	
  Sea	
  States,	
  Inuit	
  Circumpolar	
  Council,	
  and	
  the	
  Saami	
  Council,	
  etc.	
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Arctic	
  by	
  calling	
  for	
  cooperation	
  amongst	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  on	
  Northern	
  issues.	
  This	
  was	
  followed	
  by	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Environmental	
  Protection	
  Strategy	
  1997,	
  by	
  invitation	
  from	
  the	
  Finnish	
  government	
  as	
  response	
  to	
  Gorbachev’s	
  call.	
  	
  These	
  actions	
  provided	
  the	
  foundational	
  structure	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  which	
  emerged	
  as	
  a	
  more	
  formalised	
  structure	
  following	
  the	
  Ottawa	
  Declaration	
  in	
  1996	
  to	
  “provide	
  a	
  means	
  for	
  promoting	
  cooperation,	
  coordination	
  and	
  interaction	
  among	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  with	
  the	
  involvement	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  indigenous	
  communities	
  and	
  other	
  Arctic	
  inhabitants	
  on	
  common	
  Arctic	
  issues….”432	
  	
  	
  Since	
  this	
  event,	
  governance	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  steadily	
  developed	
  into	
  a	
  cohesive	
  structure	
  for	
  managing	
  the	
  emerging	
  issues	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  has	
  been	
  solidified	
  with	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  standing	
  Secretariat	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  in	
  2012,	
  introduced	
  with	
  the	
  intent	
  “to	
  strengthen	
  the	
  capacity	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  to	
  respond	
  to	
  the	
  challenges	
  and	
  opportunities	
  facing	
  the	
  Arctic,”433	
  giving	
  the	
  structures	
  of	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  greater	
  formality	
  and	
  consistency.	
  The	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  is	
  the	
  overarching	
  structure	
  of	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  as	
  it	
  includes	
  the	
  five	
  littoral	
  states	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Russia,	
  Canada,	
  Norway	
  and	
  Denmark,	
  plus	
  the	
  other	
  states	
  with	
  Arctic	
  territory:	
  Iceland,	
  Sweden	
  and	
  Finland—making	
  it	
  truly	
  circumpolar	
  in	
  nature.	
  Thus,	
  in	
  the	
  space	
  of	
  less	
  than	
  thirty	
  years,	
  governance	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  has	
  blossomed	
  from	
  the	
  hostility	
  and	
  insecurity	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  to	
  mature	
  into	
  a	
  structure	
  where	
  members	
  can	
  collaborate	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  issues	
  specific	
  to	
  the	
  region,	
  including	
  environmental	
  change,	
  changes	
  to	
  the	
  human	
  dimensions-­‐-­‐including	
  the	
  effects	
  on	
  traditional	
  indigenous	
  lifestyles	
  and	
  the	
  results	
  of	
  increasing	
  commercial	
  development.	
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  (Arctic	
  Council,	
  1996,	
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The	
  Discourse	
  of	
  Governance	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  In	
  its	
  most	
  basic	
  of	
  definitions,	
  governance	
  can	
  be	
  defined	
  as	
  the	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  policy,	
  affairs	
  and	
  actions	
  of	
  a	
  state	
  or	
  organisation.434	
  The	
  term	
  is	
  often	
  used	
  to	
  describe	
  the	
  “characteristics	
  that	
  are	
  generally	
  associated	
  with	
  a	
  system	
  of	
  national	
  administration”435	
  but	
  it	
  can	
  also	
  be	
  tied	
  to	
  global	
  administration,	
  described	
  by	
  the	
  World	
  Health	
  Organization	
  as	
  “an	
  international	
  process	
  of	
  consensus-­‐forming	
  which	
  generates	
  guidelines	
  and	
  agreements	
  that	
  affect	
  national	
  governments	
  and	
  international	
  corporations.”436	
  The	
  World	
  Bank	
  has	
  identified	
  several	
  specific	
  aspects	
  of	
  governance,	
  including	
  “i)	
  [a]	
  form	
  of	
  political	
  regime;	
  (ii)	
  the	
  process	
  by	
  which	
  authority	
  is	
  exercised…;	
  and	
  iii)	
  the	
  capacity	
  of	
  governments	
  to	
  design,	
  formulate	
  and	
  implement	
  policies....”437	
  The	
  Institute	
  of	
  Governance,	
  Ottawa	
  defines	
  governance	
  as	
  “the	
  institutions,	
  processes	
  and	
  conventions	
  in	
  a	
  society	
  which	
  determine	
  how	
  power	
  is	
  exercised,	
  how	
  important	
  decisions	
  affecting	
  society	
  are	
  made	
  and	
  how	
  various	
  interests	
  are	
  accorded	
  a	
  place	
  in	
  such	
  decisions.”438	
  International	
  governance	
  can	
  be	
  “confined	
  to	
  those	
  processes	
  which	
  are	
  intended	
  to	
  create	
  a	
  more	
  supranational	
  structure	
  for	
  dealing	
  with	
  the	
  collective	
  problems	
  of	
  the	
  ‘global	
  neighbourhood’.”439	
  As	
  this	
  chapter	
  is	
  concerned	
  with	
  governance	
  within	
  international	
  relations	
  and,	
  specifically	
  the	
  governance	
  of	
  a	
  region	
  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	
  a	
  community	
  of	
  states	
  and	
  as	
  such	
  uses	
  a	
  narrow	
  conception	
  of	
  the	
  term,	
  to	
  include	
  the	
  formation	
  of	
  the	
  supranational	
  administrative	
  mechanisms	
  and	
  the	
  exercise	
  of	
  power	
  to	
  manage	
  the	
  affairs	
  and	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  neighbourhood	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.	
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  (Oxford	
  Dictionaries,	
  2013)	
  435	
  (Weiss,	
  2000,	
  p.	
  795)	
  436	
  (World	
  Health	
  Organization,	
  2013)	
  437	
  (World	
  Bank,	
  1994,	
  p.	
  xix)	
  438	
  (Weiss,	
  2000,	
  p.	
  797)	
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  (Brus,	
  2002,	
  p.	
  4)	
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The	
  world	
  over	
  is	
  intrigued	
  by	
  the	
  almost	
  daily	
  developments	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  Scarcely	
  a	
  day	
  passes	
  without	
  mention	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  media,	
  often	
  paired	
  with	
  the	
  keywords	
  of	
  oil,	
  territorial	
  claims	
  or	
  resources.	
  One	
  day	
  the	
  Russians	
  are	
  planting	
  flags	
  and	
  on	
  another,	
  the	
  Danish	
  military	
  is	
  safeguarding	
  prospecting	
  oil	
  companies	
  from	
  environmental	
  protest	
  groups.	
  	
  At	
  first	
  glance,	
  the	
  region	
  appears	
  to	
  be	
  haunted	
  with	
  the	
  ghosts	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  with	
  disputed	
  claims	
  to	
  territorial	
  boundaries,	
  the	
  training	
  of	
  special	
  military	
  forces	
  and	
  statements	
  by	
  political	
  figures	
  claiming	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  their	
  slice	
  of	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  pie	
  pregnant	
  with	
  its	
  bounty.	
  Realist	
  games	
  of	
  power	
  politics	
  are	
  undoubtedly	
  a	
  feature	
  of	
  Arctic	
  activity	
  and	
  if	
  only	
  these	
  events	
  are	
  considered,	
  the	
  predicted	
  future	
  of	
  the	
  Artic	
  is	
  bleak	
  indeed.	
  However,	
  these	
  examples	
  and	
  others	
  like	
  them	
  do	
  not	
  adequately	
  depict	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  development	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  these	
  power	
  theories	
  focus	
  on	
  the	
  conflicting	
  exertion	
  of	
  wills	
  and	
  interest	
  of	
  states	
  which	
  rarely	
  results	
  in	
  “the	
  crude	
  maximisation	
  of	
  power	
  as	
  the	
  basic	
  goal	
  of	
  national	
  interests.”440	
  	
  The	
  material	
  factors	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  give	
  force	
  to	
  the	
  drivers	
  of	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  but	
  alongside	
  the	
  obvious	
  pursuit	
  of	
  national	
  interests	
  of	
  security	
  and	
  survival	
  are	
  the	
  distinct	
  signs	
  of	
  cooperation.	
  The	
  Arctic	
  states	
  have	
  banded	
  together	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  emerging	
  issues	
  that	
  economic	
  development	
  and	
  climate	
  change	
  bring	
  to	
  the	
  region,	
  causing	
  the	
  national	
  interests	
  of	
  security	
  and	
  survival	
  to	
  become	
  cooperative	
  activities	
  if	
  the	
  possibility	
  of	
  environmental	
  destruction	
  and	
  economic	
  loss	
  is	
  to	
  be	
  avoided.	
  Thus,	
  the	
  Nuuk	
  Declaration	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  the	
  Ilulissat	
  Declaration	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  States	
  and	
  the	
  International	
  Maritime	
  Organisation’s	
  Polar	
  Code	
  which	
  affirm	
  protection	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  environment	
  as	
  priority,	
  along	
  with	
  a	
  commitment	
  to	
  existing	
  structures	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  as	
  prescriptive	
  order	
  for	
  the	
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  (Frankel,	
  1970,	
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behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  realm,	
  lay	
  positive	
  steps	
  to	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  a	
  peaceful,	
  secure	
  and	
  productive	
  Arctic,	
  an	
  example	
  of	
  the	
  uniqueness	
  of	
  liberal	
  democracies	
  “in	
  their	
  ability	
  and	
  willingness	
  to	
  establish	
  peaceful	
  relations	
  among	
  themselves.”441	
  The	
  developing	
  governance	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  provided	
  multiple	
  opportunities	
  for	
  cooperation	
  and	
  many	
  actors,	
  including	
  NGOs	
  and	
  indigenous	
  peoples	
  are	
  promoting	
  this	
  progression.	
  Yet	
  power	
  and	
  authority	
  in	
  governance	
  structures	
  still	
  remain	
  with	
  the	
  state	
  and	
  so	
  the	
  liberal	
  paradigm	
  focusing	
  on	
  the	
  roles	
  of	
  institutions	
  and	
  the	
  equality	
  of	
  agents	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  also	
  remains	
  inadequate	
  to	
  describe	
  Arctic	
  governance.	
  	
  Governance	
  institutions,	
  or	
  the	
  lack	
  thereof,	
  reflect	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  a	
  particular	
  era.	
  Ultimately,	
  “international	
  cooperation	
  is	
  not	
  formulated,	
  and	
  certainly	
  not	
  implemented,	
  in	
  a	
  vacuum”	
  but	
  rather	
  governance	
  is	
  introduced	
  into	
  “a	
  ‘regulatory’	
  space	
  already	
  occupied	
  by	
  a	
  set	
  of	
  problem	
  definitions	
  and	
  policy	
  strategies.”442	
  The	
  result	
  is	
  a	
  continuous	
  layering	
  of	
  institutions,	
  regimes	
  and	
  other	
  normative	
  expectations,	
  which	
  together	
  construct	
  an	
  international	
  system	
  understood	
  through	
  “shared	
  knowledge,	
  material	
  resources,	
  and	
  practices.”443	
  For	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  ‘regulatory’	
  space	
  was	
  absorbed	
  into	
  sovereign	
  control	
  in	
  an	
  era	
  of	
  classical	
  imperialism;	
  today,	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  is	
  being	
  built	
  upon	
  this	
  layering	
  of	
  rules	
  with	
  a	
  foundation	
  in	
  imperialistic	
  practices.	
  The	
  layers	
  of	
  rules	
  do	
  not	
  eliminate	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  imperialism	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  rather	
  they	
  have	
  the	
  cumulative	
  effect	
  of	
  enforcing	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  states	
  as	
  the	
  rule-­‐makers,	
  thus	
  establishing	
  the	
  standards	
  for	
  normative	
  behaviour	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
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The	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  which	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  is	
  constructed	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  tangible	
  structure.	
  Rather,	
  it	
  is	
  a	
  product	
  of	
  shared	
  understandings	
  between	
  agents	
  who	
  accept	
  that	
  the	
  structure	
  does	
  exist.	
  Like	
  all	
  systems,	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  is	
  ordered	
  by	
  certain	
  rules,	
  principles	
  and	
  procedures,	
  but	
  it	
  is	
  a	
  “social	
  structure	
  that	
  exists	
  only	
  in	
  process.”444	
  As	
  a	
  product	
  of	
  social	
  and	
  political	
  development,	
  this	
  system	
  is	
  subject	
  to	
  change	
  as	
  new	
  forces	
  act	
  upon	
  it	
  and	
  as	
  new	
  rules	
  are	
  introduced	
  to	
  the	
  system.	
  The	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  region	
  in	
  need	
  of	
  political	
  organisation	
  has	
  been	
  accepted	
  by	
  states	
  with	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region,	
  who	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  are	
  cooperating	
  to	
  protect	
  and	
  expand	
  on	
  these	
  interests.	
  So	
  while	
  the	
  needs	
  of	
  the	
  indigenous	
  citizens	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  might	
  be	
  included	
  in	
  these	
  interests,	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  yet	
  in	
  their	
  interest	
  to	
  elevate	
  indigenous	
  agents	
  to	
  the	
  hierarchical	
  level	
  of	
  states	
  as	
  this	
  could	
  provide	
  competition	
  to	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  	
  Governance	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  appeared	
  in	
  a	
  recent	
  phase	
  of	
  Arctic	
  imperialism	
  and	
  is	
  a	
  method	
  for	
  combatting	
  the	
  anarchy	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  To	
  borrow	
  from	
  Wendt,	
  anarchy	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  what	
  states	
  make	
  of	
  it.	
  Governance	
  seeks	
  not	
  only	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  wills	
  and	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  as	
  they	
  follow	
  patterns	
  of	
  expected	
  behaviour	
  in	
  international	
  relations,	
  but	
  by	
  banding	
  together,	
  states	
  have	
  created	
  a	
  technique	
  whereby	
  competition	
  from	
  states	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  can	
  be	
  controlled	
  or	
  even	
  eliminated.	
  This	
  use	
  of	
  governance	
  to	
  isolate	
  the	
  Arctic	
  meanwhile	
  uses	
  methods	
  of	
  imperialism	
  to	
  achieve	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  discourse	
  and	
  the	
  material	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
  	
  	
  This	
  phase	
  of	
  Arctic	
  imperialism	
  follows	
  an	
  earlier	
  phase	
  of	
  imperialism	
  when	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  militarised	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  and	
  the	
  previous	
  stage	
  of	
  expansive	
  imperialism	
  in	
  which	
  the	
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territory	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  carved	
  up	
  between	
  the	
  now	
  littoral	
  states.	
  Throughout	
  these	
  phases,	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  was	
  undergoing	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  gradual	
  transformation	
  of	
  its	
  own,	
  with	
  new	
  rules	
  being	
  introduced	
  to	
  manage	
  the	
  interactions	
  between	
  states	
  in	
  their	
  international	
  relationships.	
  The	
  Arctic	
  is	
  without	
  a	
  comprehensive	
  system	
  of	
  political	
  organisation	
  and	
  the	
  governance	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  is	
  a	
  system	
  that	
  has	
  been	
  pieced	
  together,	
  addressing	
  the	
  needs	
  of	
  the	
  powers	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  in	
  specific	
  eras	
  and	
  closely	
  mirrors	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system—making	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  a	
  subset	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  
Rationale	
  for	
  the	
  Creation	
  of	
  Arctic	
  Governance	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  There	
  have	
  been	
  calls	
  for	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Treaty,	
  similar	
  to	
  the	
  regime	
  created	
  by	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  System	
  1959,	
  claiming	
  the	
  region	
  would	
  face	
  meltdown	
  if	
  cooperation	
  did	
  not	
  materialise.445	
  Although	
  Art.	
  234	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  
on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  makes	
  provision	
  for	
  special	
  legal	
  arrangements	
  to	
  be	
  made	
  for	
  areas	
  with	
  ice	
  covered	
  waters,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  littoral	
  states	
  have	
  continuously	
  stressed	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  can	
  be	
  managed	
  through	
  existing	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  international	
  law.	
  However,	
  the	
  caveat	
  to	
  these	
  declarations	
  is	
  that	
  existing	
  international	
  law	
  cannot	
  account	
  for	
  the	
  special	
  issues	
  created	
  by	
  the	
  climatic	
  hostility	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region,	
  and	
  thus	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  need	
  to	
  create	
  additional	
  mechanisms	
  for	
  managing	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Hence,	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  governance	
  for	
  the	
  region,	
  including	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  and	
  other	
  instruments	
  of	
  Polar	
  Law	
  such	
  as	
  those	
  managing	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  and	
  the	
  operation	
  of	
  vessels	
  in	
  ice-­‐covered	
  waters.	
  	
  International	
  governance	
  is	
  a	
  mechanism	
  providing	
  a	
  means	
  to	
  manage	
  the	
  conditions	
  created	
  by	
  two	
  shared	
  understandings	
  in	
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the	
  international	
  system.	
  Firstly,	
  international	
  governance	
  addresses	
  the	
  problem	
  of	
  anarchy,	
  which	
  itself	
  results	
  in	
  two	
  deficiencies	
  in	
  international	
  relations.	
  The	
  first	
  deficiency	
  is	
  that	
  under	
  anarchy,	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  an	
  overarching	
  global	
  authority	
  to	
  order	
  the	
  behaviour	
  between	
  states.	
  The	
  second	
  deficiency	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  is	
  comprised	
  of	
  several	
  hundred	
  discrete	
  political	
  units,	
  each	
  with	
  control	
  over	
  a	
  finite	
  territorial	
  space.	
  As	
  the	
  spaces	
  beyond	
  the	
  sovereign	
  borders	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  are	
  terra	
  
nullius	
  and	
  lack	
  the	
  ordering	
  power	
  of	
  political	
  authority,	
  they	
  remain	
  a	
  no	
  man’s	
  land,	
  with	
  all	
  the	
  insecurity	
  and	
  competition	
  that	
  arises	
  from	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  political	
  order.	
  Thus,	
  international	
  governance	
  provides	
  a	
  mechanism	
  whereby	
  states	
  can	
  overcome	
  the	
  anarchy	
  in	
  the	
  spaces	
  of	
  terra	
  nullius	
  to	
  act	
  with	
  authority	
  in	
  these	
  extraterritorial	
  spaces.	
  	
  The	
  development	
  of	
  international	
  governance	
  arose	
  out	
  of	
  the	
  need	
  for	
  states	
  to	
  counteract	
  the	
  condition	
  of	
  anarchy	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  The	
  international	
  system	
  can	
  be	
  likened	
  to	
  a	
  sort	
  of	
  figurative	
  pre-­‐social	
  state	
  of	
  nature,	
  with	
  states	
  acting	
  as	
  individual	
  units	
  that	
  must	
  ensure	
  their	
  own	
  survival	
  against	
  competition	
  from	
  other	
  political	
  units,	
  as	
  each	
  unit	
  wrestles	
  with	
  the	
  dilemma	
  of	
  scarcity	
  and	
  the	
  fear	
  of	
  insecurity.	
  As	
  states	
  realised	
  their	
  survival	
  is	
  best	
  vested	
  in	
  cooperation—or	
  through	
  some	
  form	
  of	
  a	
  social	
  contact,	
  such	
  as	
  those	
  arising	
  from	
  governance	
  and	
  international	
  law,	
  mechanisms	
  for	
  ordering	
  the	
  normative	
  behaviour	
  between	
  states	
  are	
  created.	
  Thus,	
  governance	
  emerged	
  as	
  a	
  counter-­‐balance	
  to	
  international	
  anarchy	
  where	
  existing	
  international	
  law	
  mechanisms	
  fail	
  to	
  fully	
  address	
  the	
  interests	
  of	
  states,	
  although	
  it	
  does	
  not	
  provide	
  an	
  absolute	
  remedy.	
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Without	
  state	
  cooperation	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  realm,	
  the	
  life	
  of	
  states	
  could	
  indeed	
  be	
  “nasty,	
  brutish	
  and	
  short,”446	
  given	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  anarchy	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  In	
  earlier	
  stages	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  international	
  relations	
  was	
  driven	
  by	
  absolute	
  and	
  unrestricted	
  competition,	
  resulting	
  in	
  the	
  bloody	
  rise	
  and	
  fall	
  of	
  many	
  empires	
  and	
  the	
  consolidation	
  of	
  other	
  polities	
  into	
  increasingly	
  larger	
  political	
  units—a	
  situation	
  which	
  the	
  
Peace	
  of	
  Westphalia	
  is	
  often	
  considered	
  to	
  have	
  diminished,	
  revisionist	
  accounts	
  aside.	
  	
  While	
  it	
  is	
  sometimes	
  supposed	
  that	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  governance	
  systems	
  has	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  decline	
  of	
  the	
  power	
  of	
  states,	
  resulting	
  in	
  a	
  diminishing	
  of	
  state	
  sovereignty,	
  it	
  has	
  in	
  actuality	
  increased	
  the	
  potential	
  quality	
  of	
  states.447	
  The	
  formation	
  of	
  international	
  governance	
  has	
  not	
  diminished	
  state	
  sovereignty	
  for	
  those	
  states	
  traditionally	
  operating	
  within	
  the	
  Westphalian	
  system	
  and	
  has	
  allowed	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  to	
  evolve	
  away	
  from	
  the	
  Hobbesian	
  conception	
  of	
  a	
  fearful	
  state	
  of	
  nature.	
  	
  	
  The	
  development	
  of	
  governance	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  realm	
  has	
  had	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  creating	
  a	
  situation	
  whereby	
  states	
  can	
  coordinate	
  the	
  mutual	
  pursuit	
  of	
  interests	
  through	
  cooperation	
  in	
  areas	
  extraterritorial	
  to	
  their	
  sovereign	
  borders.	
  In	
  sacrificing	
  unlimited	
  restraint	
  of	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  by	
  consenting	
  to	
  instruments	
  of	
  international	
  governance,	
  the	
  threat	
  of	
  insecurity	
  been	
  reduced	
  for	
  the	
  many	
  as	
  cooperation	
  is	
  the	
  best	
  method	
  of	
  ensuring	
  the	
  chance	
  to	
  prosper	
  in	
  a	
  sort	
  of	
  collective	
  security.	
  	
  While	
  the	
  condition	
  of	
  anarchy	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  competition	
  that	
  initially	
  emerges	
  from	
  this	
  state	
  of	
  insecurity	
  at	
  first	
  provides	
  a	
  Hobbesian	
  atmosphere	
  to	
  international	
  relations,	
  what	
  thus	
  follows	
  is	
  a	
  Lockean	
  conception	
  of	
  the	
  social	
  contract	
  which	
  is	
  initiated	
  as	
  a	
  way	
  to	
  ensure	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  “life,	
  liberty	
  and	
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property.”448	
  Although	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  is	
  not	
  governance	
  in	
  the	
  same	
  ilk	
  of	
  governing	
  occurring	
  within	
  the	
  domestic	
  sphere,	
  its	
  creation	
  has	
  given	
  states	
  a	
  means	
  whereby	
  they	
  can	
  cooperatively	
  control	
  Arctic	
  issues	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  realm.	
  	
  	
  When	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  ended,	
  the	
  structures	
  organising	
  the	
  behaviour	
  between	
  the	
  states	
  littoral	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  also	
  disappeared,	
  creating	
  a	
  vacuum	
  in	
  the	
  normative	
  expectations	
  as	
  the	
  previous	
  militarization-­‐security	
  order	
  was	
  no	
  longer	
  required.	
  This	
  sudden	
  transformation	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  created	
  opportunity	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  form	
  new	
  understandings	
  for	
  the	
  region.	
  From	
  this	
  has	
  resulted	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  governance	
  and	
  political	
  cooperation	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  opposed	
  to	
  the	
  former	
  shared	
  understandings	
  of	
  conflict	
  and	
  insecurity.	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  the	
  breakdown	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  as	
  the	
  normative	
  rule,	
  the	
  realisation	
  of	
  environmental	
  change	
  and	
  of	
  the	
  wealth	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  provided	
  the	
  impetus	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  advance	
  levels	
  of	
  cooperation	
  to	
  ensure	
  territorial	
  integrity,	
  environmental	
  protection	
  and	
  sustainable	
  development	
  within	
  the	
  region.	
  	
  	
  
Identifying	
  Transformation	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Governance	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  had	
  the	
  opportunity	
  to	
  develop	
  due	
  transformations	
  in	
  several	
  dimensions.	
  There	
  are	
  the	
  physical	
  transformations	
  occurring	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  at	
  a	
  rate	
  faster	
  than	
  man	
  has	
  seen	
  before,	
  usually	
  communicated	
  in	
  biannual	
  publication	
  of	
  the	
  minimum	
  and	
  maximum	
  ice	
  extents,449	
  with	
  references	
  to	
  the	
  changes	
  in	
  volume	
  of	
  multi-­‐year	
  ice	
  and	
  melting	
  of	
  the	
  permafrost.	
  These	
  transformations	
  have	
  been	
  repeatedly	
  identified	
  in	
  political	
  speeches	
  and	
  reports	
  from	
  government,	
  intergovernmental	
  and	
  non-­‐governmental	
  organisations	
  and	
  have	
  been	
  enumerated	
  in	
  the	
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  (Locke,	
  1988)	
  449	
  See	
  National	
  Snow	
  and	
  Ice	
  Data	
  Center.	
  at	
  http://nsidc.org/cryosphere/sotc/sea_ice.html	
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academic	
  literature	
  on	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  For	
  example,	
  the	
  2012	
  Arctic	
  Report	
  Card	
  by	
  the	
  National	
  Oceanic	
  and	
  Atmospheric	
  Administration	
  of	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Federal	
  Government	
  indicates	
  that	
  “large	
  changes	
  in	
  multiple	
  indicators	
  are	
  affecting	
  climate	
  and	
  ecosystems,	
  and,	
  combined,	
  these	
  changes	
  provide	
  strong	
  evidence	
  of	
  the	
  momentum	
  that	
  has	
  developed	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  environmental	
  system	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  impacts	
  of	
  a	
  persistent	
  warming	
  trend	
  that	
  began	
  over	
  30	
  years	
  ago…Thus,	
  we	
  arrive	
  at	
  the	
  conclusion	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  very	
  likely	
  that	
  major	
  changes	
  will	
  continue	
  to	
  occur	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  years	
  to	
  come….”450	
  It	
  is	
  the	
  initial	
  identification	
  of	
  these	
  changes	
  and	
  their	
  implications	
  that	
  caused	
  Gorbachev	
  to	
  call	
  for	
  change	
  in	
  the	
  foreign	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  towards	
  the	
  region,	
  realising	
  that	
  the	
  model	
  of	
  military	
  pre-­‐eminence	
  was	
  an	
  unsustainable	
  pattern	
  for	
  future	
  security	
  issues	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
  	
  The	
  result	
  of	
  identifying	
  these	
  changes	
  is	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  governance	
  structures	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  implications	
  of	
  these	
  environmental	
  and	
  developmental	
  changes.	
  Cooperation	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  was	
  initiated	
  by	
  the	
  prompting	
  of	
  Gorbachev	
  in	
  his	
  Murmansk	
  Speech	
  1987,	
  identifying	
  the	
  climatic	
  changes	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  encouraging	
  cooperation	
  for	
  resource	
  development.	
  There	
  is	
  unfortunately,	
  very	
  little	
  prospect	
  of	
  preventing	
  these	
  changes	
  from	
  continuing,	
  and	
  likely	
  it	
  is	
  even	
  impossible	
  to	
  prevent	
  them	
  from	
  accelerating.	
  	
  	
  To	
  address	
  both	
  the	
  dilemmas	
  and	
  opportunities	
  that	
  these	
  changes	
  bring	
  to	
  the	
  region,	
  a	
  second	
  form	
  of	
  transformation	
  has	
  also	
  been	
  occurring	
  since	
  the	
  late	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period,	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  governance	
  structures	
  for	
  the	
  region—from	
  a	
  situation	
  with	
  no	
  discernable	
  governance	
  to	
  a	
  maturing	
  structure	
  capable	
  of	
  addressing	
  the	
  changing	
  needs	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
  In	
  fact,	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  governance	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  developing	
  at	
  such	
  a	
  brisk	
  pace	
  that	
  by	
  the	
  time	
  academic	
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  (National	
  Oceanic	
  and	
  Atmospheric	
  Administration,	
  2013)	
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materials	
  are	
  published	
  on	
  the	
  topic	
  new	
  advances	
  in	
  the	
  politics	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  have	
  rendered	
  them	
  obsolete.	
  Oran	
  Young	
  has	
  previously	
  identified	
  these	
  two	
  types	
  of	
  transformation	
  saying,	
  “Taken	
  together,	
  these	
  and	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  related	
  developments	
  are	
  dramatic	
  enough	
  to	
  justify	
  the	
  proposition	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  experiencing	
  what	
  systems	
  analysts	
  think	
  of	
  as	
  a	
  state	
  change.”451	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  is	
  thus	
  an	
  attempt	
  by	
  states	
  to	
  respond	
  to	
  significant	
  state	
  change	
  within	
  the	
  region.	
  	
  Yet,	
  not	
  discussed	
  by	
  others	
  in	
  their	
  discussions	
  of	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  is	
  that	
  this	
  state	
  of	
  change	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  the	
  potential	
  to	
  create	
  tension	
  throughout	
  the	
  fabric	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  The	
  third	
  transformation	
  identified	
  within	
  this	
  paper	
  is	
  a	
  change	
  that	
  has	
  created	
  the	
  opportunity	
  for	
  the	
  structures	
  of	
  governance	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  to	
  act	
  as	
  a	
  catalyst	
  for	
  a	
  transformation	
  on	
  a	
  grander	
  scale.	
  The	
  element	
  with	
  the	
  potential	
  to	
  introduce	
  this	
  third	
  transformation	
  was	
  identified	
  by	
  Young	
  who	
  said:	
  “The	
  Council	
  has	
  accepted	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  indigenous	
  peoples’	
  organizations	
  as	
  Permanent	
  Participants	
  in	
  its	
  activities,	
  a	
  notable	
  precedent	
  with	
  implications	
  extending	
  far	
  beyond	
  the	
  Arctic.”452	
  Despite	
  the	
  identification	
  of	
  indigenous	
  inclusion	
  in	
  the	
  governance	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  potential	
  de	
  facto	
  implications	
  for	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  are	
  not	
  identified	
  or	
  discussed	
  by	
  Young.	
  This	
  third	
  form	
  of	
  transformation	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  seen	
  as	
  a	
  change	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  that	
  would	
  allow	
  for	
  the	
  indigenous	
  peoples	
  to	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  equivalent	
  agents	
  of	
  power	
  not	
  only	
  within	
  Arctic	
  governance,	
  but	
  also	
  within	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  a	
  situation	
  that	
  within	
  the	
  current	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  is	
  far	
  from	
  reality.	
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  (Young,	
  2009,	
  p.	
  424)	
  452	
  (Young,	
  2009,	
  p.	
  428)	
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The	
  introduction	
  of	
  this	
  element	
  of	
  change	
  into	
  the	
  realm	
  of	
  international	
  relations	
  gives	
  opportunity	
  for	
  it	
  to	
  achieve	
  reality	
  and	
  the	
  next	
  section	
  will	
  discuss	
  the	
  method	
  by	
  which	
  a	
  trajectory	
  of	
  transformation	
  is	
  introduced	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  how	
  this	
  third	
  transformation	
  has	
  been	
  introduced	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.	
  However,	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  this	
  chapter	
  that	
  although	
  advances	
  have	
  been	
  made	
  away	
  from	
  an	
  international	
  system	
  ruled	
  by	
  imperial	
  practices	
  of	
  territorial	
  land	
  grabs	
  and	
  disenfranchisement	
  of	
  the	
  indigenous	
  people	
  from	
  their	
  traditional	
  homelands,	
  states	
  are	
  still	
  the	
  primary	
  agents	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  gratuitous	
  inclusion	
  of	
  indigenous	
  populations	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  participants	
  to	
  governance	
  processes	
  does	
  not	
  effectively	
  indicate	
  a	
  transformation	
  in	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  to	
  include	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  as	
  equal	
  actors.	
  Imperial	
  practices	
  have	
  not	
  disappeared	
  from	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  but	
  have	
  merely	
  changed	
  form.	
  	
  	
  
Governance	
  +	
  Indigenous	
  Participation	
  =	
  An	
  Indigenous	
  Rule?	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Transformation	
  in	
  a	
  system	
  occurs	
  because	
  of	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  a	
  new	
  rule,	
  or	
  a	
  new	
  shared	
  understanding,	
  which	
  influences	
  the	
  normative	
  behaviour	
  of	
  the	
  agents	
  operating	
  within	
  that	
  system,	
  and	
  it	
  has	
  already	
  been	
  identified	
  that	
  several	
  rule	
  changes	
  have	
  been	
  made	
  to	
  result	
  in	
  transformation	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.	
  Rules	
  are	
  established	
  to	
  “shape	
  normative	
  and	
  ideological	
  frameworks	
  that	
  constitute	
  stable	
  patterns	
  of	
  interaction,”453	
  and	
  Kratochwil	
  has	
  identified	
  that	
  “rules	
  and	
  norms	
  mold	
  decisions	
  via	
  the	
  reasoning	
  process	
  (deliberation).”454	
  Rules	
  provide	
  stability	
  and	
  help	
  to	
  form	
  expectations	
  in	
  regard	
  to	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  reducing	
  potential	
  for	
  insecurity	
  and	
  providing	
  a	
  way	
  to	
  manage	
  competition.	
  As	
  the	
  dominant	
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  (Burch,	
  2000,	
  p.	
  187)	
  454	
  (Kratochwil,	
  1989,	
  p.	
  43)	
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agents	
  of	
  political	
  organisation	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  for	
  centuries,	
  states	
  have	
  created	
  rules	
  that	
  have	
  positioned	
  themselves	
  advantageously.	
  Some	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  that	
  have	
  made	
  states	
  the	
  dominant	
  agents	
  of	
  international	
  relations	
  include	
  those	
  giving	
  states	
  a	
  monopoly	
  on	
  war,	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  territory,	
  and	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  their	
  citizens,	
  amongst	
  others.	
  These	
  rules	
  have	
  been	
  tacit,	
  demonstrated	
  in	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states,	
  and	
  sometimes	
  explicit,	
  such	
  as	
  in	
  the	
  instances	
  of	
  ceremonies	
  of	
  possession,	
  which	
  made	
  imperial	
  power	
  the	
  new	
  overlords	
  of	
  distant	
  lands	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  codified	
  international	
  law.	
  Yet,	
  within	
  the	
  circles	
  of	
  Arctic	
  social	
  scientists,	
  it	
  is	
  a	
  common	
  belief	
  that	
  the	
  inclusion	
  of	
  indigenous	
  participants	
  within	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  has	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  a	
  new	
  rule	
  that	
  will	
  change	
  the	
  hierarchy	
  of	
  agents	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  One	
  can	
  observe	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  within	
  the	
  remit	
  of	
  just	
  any	
  political	
  agent	
  to	
  create	
  similar	
  rules	
  and	
  norms	
  for	
  themselves	
  through	
  mere	
  declaration,	
  desire	
  or	
  similar	
  behaviour-­‐there	
  is	
  a	
  clear	
  and	
  distinct	
  pecking	
  order	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  with	
  states	
  at	
  the	
  apex	
  descending	
  to	
  the	
  individual	
  person	
  at	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  social	
  hierarchy	
  of	
  political	
  organisation.	
  States	
  have	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  create	
  rules	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Individuals,	
  and	
  even	
  groups	
  of	
  individuals	
  do	
  not	
  have	
  this	
  ability.	
  In	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  an	
  attempt	
  was	
  made	
  by	
  an	
  agent	
  to	
  introduce	
  change	
  within	
  the	
  system	
  through	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  a	
  new	
  rule.	
  This	
  occurred	
  in	
  2009,	
  when	
  the	
  Inuit	
  Circumpolar	
  Council	
  issued	
  A	
  
Circumpolar	
  Inuit	
  Declaration	
  on	
  Sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  which	
  included	
  the	
  following	
  statement:	
  	
   “The	
  conduct	
  of	
  international	
  relations	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  the	
  resolution	
  of	
  international	
  disputes	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  are	
  not	
  the	
  sole	
  preserve	
  of	
  Arctic	
  states	
  or	
  other	
  states;	
  they	
  are	
  also	
  within	
  the	
  purview	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic’s	
  indigenous	
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peoples.	
  The	
  development	
  of	
  international	
  institutions	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  such	
  as	
  multi-­‐level	
  governance	
  systems	
  and	
  indigenous	
  peoples’	
  organizations,	
  must	
  transcend	
  Arctic	
  states’	
  agendas	
  on	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  sovereign	
  rights	
  and	
  the	
  traditional	
  monopoly	
  claimed	
  by	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  area	
  of	
  foreign	
  affairs.”455	
  	
  The	
  declaration	
  identifies	
  that	
  the	
  Inuit	
  have	
  been	
  living	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  “from	
  time	
  immemorial”456	
  and	
  that	
  although	
  they	
  have	
  ultimately	
  become	
  the	
  citizens	
  of	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  they	
  are	
  in	
  fact	
  an	
  indigenous	
  people	
  with	
  sovereign	
  rights	
  accorded	
  them	
  in	
  international	
  law	
  through	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Declaration	
  on	
  the	
  
Rights	
  of	
  Indigenous	
  People	
  2007,	
  including:	
  	
   “the	
  right	
  to	
  self-­‐determination,	
  to	
  freely	
  determine	
  our	
  political	
  status	
  and	
  to	
  freely	
  pursue	
  our	
  economic,	
  social	
  and	
  cultural,	
  including	
  linguistic,	
  development	
  (Art.	
  3);	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  internal	
  autonomy	
  or	
  self-­‐government	
  (Art.	
  4);	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  recognition,	
  observance	
  and	
  enforcement	
  of	
  treaties,	
  agreements	
  and	
  other	
  constructive	
  arrangements	
  concluded	
  with	
  states	
  (Art.	
  37);	
  …the	
  right	
  to	
  participate	
  in	
  decision-­‐making	
  in	
  matters	
  which	
  would	
  affect	
  our	
  rights	
  and	
  to	
  maintain	
  and	
  develop	
  our	
  own	
  indigenous	
  decision-­‐making	
  institutions	
  (Art.	
  18);	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  own,	
  use,	
  develop	
  and	
  control	
  our	
  lands,	
  territories	
  and	
  resources	
  and	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  ensure	
  that	
  no	
  project	
  affecting	
  our	
  lands,	
  territories	
  or	
  resources	
  will	
  proceed	
  without	
  our	
  free	
  and	
  informed	
  consent	
  (Art.	
  25-­‐32)….”457	
  	
  Yet,	
  despite	
  these	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  by	
  the	
  indigenous	
  community	
  (especially	
  those	
  claims	
  relating	
  to	
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  (Inuit	
  Circumpolar	
  Council,	
  2009,	
  4.2)	
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  Council,	
  2009,	
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territory,	
  resources	
  and	
  participation	
  within	
  treaty	
  agreements),	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic-­‐-­‐both	
  terrestrial	
  and	
  maritime-­‐-­‐	
  has	
  been	
  divided	
  between	
  the	
  states	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  through	
  a	
  lengthy	
  history	
  of	
  imperial	
  practices,	
  including	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  structured	
  around	
  the	
  Westphalian	
  notion	
  of	
  the	
  primacy	
  of	
  states	
  as	
  the	
  dominant	
  agents	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  has	
  been	
  determined	
  at	
  the	
  international	
  level	
  through	
  treaty	
  based	
  territorial	
  delimitations,	
  and	
  by	
  both	
  tacit	
  and	
  explicit	
  shared	
  understandings.	
  Historically,	
  as	
  peripheral	
  agents,	
  indigenous	
  people	
  have	
  not	
  been	
  included	
  in	
  the	
  treaty	
  negotiations,	
  or	
  development	
  decisions	
  over	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  the	
  land	
  they	
  inhabited.	
  And	
  despite	
  rules,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  right	
  of	
  indigenous	
  persons	
  to	
  self	
  determination,	
  being	
  introduced	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty-­‐-­‐past	
  and	
  future-­‐-­‐	
  is	
  within	
  the	
  hands	
  of	
  states	
  as	
  the	
  dominant	
  agents	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  
Asymmetric	
  Relationship	
  Between	
  States	
  and	
  Indigenous	
  
Groups	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Traditional	
  conceptualisations	
  of	
  international	
  governance	
  do	
  not	
  consider	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  non-­‐state	
  groups,	
  such	
  as	
  indigenous	
  persons:	
  states	
  are	
  the	
  most	
  important	
  actors	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  However,	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  there	
  has	
  been	
  some	
  differentiation	
  in	
  the	
  normal	
  approach	
  of	
  states	
  to	
  governance	
  in	
  that	
  ‘symbolic’	
  nods	
  to	
  their	
  importance	
  have	
  been	
  made	
  in	
  governance	
  documents.	
  This	
  has	
  been	
  in	
  part	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  promotion	
  of	
  indigenous	
  participation	
  within	
  the	
  devolution	
  of	
  domestic	
  governance	
  in	
  Canada,	
  coupled	
  with	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  into	
  politicised	
  organisations	
  and	
  the	
  acknowledgement	
  of	
  indigenous	
  rights	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  
	
   255	
  
realm.458	
  Yet,	
  these	
  changes	
  are	
  not	
  sufficient	
  to	
  change	
  the	
  hierarchical	
  position	
  of	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  While	
  most	
  change	
  occurs	
  so	
  gradually	
  it	
  is	
  barely	
  discernable	
  to	
  those	
  evaluating	
  only	
  episodic	
  events	
  as	
  opposed	
  to	
  the	
  longue	
  
durée,459	
  by	
  taking	
  a	
  cross	
  section460	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  a	
  given	
  period	
  of	
  history,	
  it	
  should	
  be	
  possible	
  to	
  observe	
  the	
  international	
  relations	
  occurring	
  within	
  a	
  different	
  set	
  of	
  rules	
  and	
  principles	
  ordering	
  the	
  affairs	
  and	
  conduct	
  between	
  states.	
  In	
  the	
  first	
  cross-­‐sectional	
  observation	
  of	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  during	
  the	
  corresponding	
  first	
  phase	
  of	
  Arctic	
  imperialism,	
  governance	
  arguably	
  did	
  not	
  exist.	
  This	
  is	
  because	
  the	
  agents	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  were	
  operating	
  under	
  the	
  modus	
  operandi	
  of	
  
carpe	
  diem—or	
  more	
  precisely	
  ‘carpe	
  terra	
  nullius’—seize	
  any	
  available	
  territory	
  and	
  resources	
  not	
  effectively	
  administrated	
  by	
  another	
  sovereign	
  state.	
  Emphasis	
  is	
  placed	
  here	
  on	
  the	
  requirement	
  for	
  land	
  to	
  be	
  under	
  the	
  control	
  of	
  a	
  legitimate	
  state	
  -­‐-­‐mere	
  occupation	
  by	
  a	
  people	
  group	
  did	
  not	
  qualify.	
  According	
  to	
  European	
  rationalisation,	
  vacant	
  land	
  was	
  available	
  for	
  territorial	
  claim.	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  single	
  exception	
  to	
  this	
  principle	
  of	
  vacancy	
  is	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  utility	
  and	
  that	
  some	
  land	
  could	
  be	
  deemed	
  as	
  effectively	
  administered	
  by	
  a	
  commercial	
  entity	
  via	
  the	
  authority	
  of	
  a	
  state,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  charters	
  held	
  by	
  the	
  Hudson	
  Bay	
  Company	
  or	
  the	
  Russian	
  American	
  Company.	
  If	
  a	
  land	
  was	
  appropriately	
  utilised	
  or	
  administrated,	
  it	
  was	
  no	
  longer	
  vacant.	
  This	
  was	
  demonstrated	
  as	
  the	
  Hudson	
  Bay	
  Company	
  was	
  considered	
  as	
  legitimate	
  owner	
  of	
  the	
  territory	
  designated	
  on	
  its	
  maps	
  due	
  to	
  administration—and	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  458	
  The	
  United	
  Nations	
  Declaration	
  on	
  the	
  Rights	
  of	
  Indigenous	
  People	
  includes	
  rights	
  to	
  self-­‐determination,	
  autonomy	
  and	
  self-­‐government,	
  (United	
  Nations,	
  2007).	
  459	
  (Brandel,	
  2012)	
  460	
  A	
  cross	
  section	
  is	
  “A	
  surface	
  or	
  shape	
  exposed	
  by	
  making	
  a	
  straight	
  cut	
  through	
  something,	
  especially	
  at	
  right	
  angles	
  to	
  an	
  axis”,	
  (Oxford	
  University	
  Press,	
  2014).	
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was	
  even	
  returned	
  due	
  to	
  this	
  realisation	
  by	
  the	
  Treaty	
  of	
  Utrecht	
  after	
  France	
  attempted	
  acquisition	
  of	
  the	
  territory.	
  In	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  American	
  Company,	
  the	
  company	
  operated	
  under	
  the	
  remit	
  of	
  the	
  Tsar	
  to	
  operate	
  in	
  the	
  interest	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  empire.	
  Yet	
  these	
  examples	
  still	
  fall	
  out	
  of	
  the	
  category	
  of	
  ‘governance’	
  proper	
  as	
  used	
  by	
  this	
  chapter,	
  as	
  it	
  constitutes	
  governing	
  inside,	
  rather	
  than	
  outside	
  of	
  territorial	
  boundaries.	
  	
  These	
  rules	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  provided	
  the	
  justification	
  for	
  the	
  annexation	
  of	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  into	
  the	
  sovereign	
  domains	
  of	
  the	
  circumpolar	
  states.	
  And	
  although	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  now	
  incorporates	
  enlightened	
  principles	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  rights	
  to	
  self-­‐determination,	
  or	
  the	
  innocence	
  of	
  non-­‐combatants	
  in	
  wartime,	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  indigenous	
  representatives	
  into	
  the	
  governance	
  mechanisms	
  as	
  participants	
  does	
  not	
  elevate	
  them	
  to	
  the	
  same	
  status	
  of	
  the	
  state.	
  The	
  state	
  remains	
  the	
  primary	
  agent	
  of	
  analysis	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  is	
  not	
  yet	
  ready	
  for	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  ‘indigenous	
  groups	
  are	
  equal	
  with	
  states’,	
  as	
  it	
  would	
  upset	
  the	
  relative	
  hierarchy	
  and	
  order	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  realm.	
  Thus,	
  it	
  can	
  be	
  determined	
  that	
  the	
  inclusion	
  of	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  into	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  does	
  not	
  yet	
  constitute	
  a	
  new	
  rule.	
  	
  	
  
Arctic	
  Governance	
  as	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Doctrine	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  In	
  the	
  contemporary	
  discourse	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  have	
  continuously	
  confirmed	
  it	
  is	
  their	
  position	
  that	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Treaty,	
  similar	
  to	
  the	
  treaty	
  system	
  developed	
  for	
  the	
  Antarctic,	
  is	
  unnecessary	
  for	
  the	
  region.	
  This	
  position	
  is	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  2008	
  Ilulissat	
  Declaration	
  of	
  the	
  five	
  littoral	
  states,	
  in	
  United	
  States	
  policy	
  documents	
  from	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period	
  and	
  an	
  Arctic	
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Treaty,	
  drafted	
  in	
  1991,	
  that	
  was	
  never	
  adopted.461	
  The	
  idea	
  for	
  the	
  Polar	
  States	
  to	
  convene	
  a	
  conference	
  to	
  collaborate	
  on	
  legal	
  issues	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  was	
  initially	
  suggested	
  during	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years,	
  realising	
  that	
  the	
  organisation	
  of	
  a	
  conference	
  to	
  establish	
  “a	
  definite	
  Arctic	
  Doctrine”462	
  would	
  require	
  the	
  invitation	
  of	
  non-­‐polar	
  states	
  as	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  had	
  become	
  more	
  formalised.463	
  In	
  between	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  and	
  now,	
  law	
  applying	
  to	
  maritime	
  sovereignty,	
  applicable	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  has	
  changed	
  so	
  that	
  states	
  are	
  now	
  able	
  to	
  claim	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  via	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  rather	
  than	
  by	
  the	
  sector	
  principle,	
  eliminating	
  the	
  need	
  for	
  a	
  conference	
  on	
  these	
  issues.	
  However,	
  new	
  issues	
  and	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  have	
  since	
  developed	
  and	
  to	
  form	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Treaty,	
  establishing	
  rules	
  contrary	
  to	
  those	
  already	
  existing	
  in	
  international	
  law—such	
  as	
  establishing	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  mare	
  clausum-­‐-­‐	
  would	
  require	
  the	
  consent	
  of	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states.	
  Thus,	
  through	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  and	
  patterns	
  of	
  accepted	
  practice	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Doctrine	
  is	
  being	
  formed	
  which	
  guarantees	
  only	
  the	
  involvement	
  of	
  Arctic	
  states	
  in	
  regional	
  cooperation,	
  excluding	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states	
  from	
  the	
  decision-­‐making	
  process.	
  	
  There	
  are	
  significant	
  differences	
  in	
  the	
  comparative	
  situating	
  of	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  and	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  System	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  sphere,	
  mostly	
  relating	
  to	
  the	
  geographic	
  differences	
  between	
  the	
  two	
  Polar	
  Regions	
  that	
  have	
  led	
  to	
  different	
  circumstances	
  in	
  their	
  sovereign	
  development.	
  This	
  has	
  correspondingly	
  resulted	
  in	
  different	
  individual	
  treaty	
  arrangements	
  being	
  developed	
  in	
  the	
  regions,	
  correlating	
  to	
  the	
  interests	
  and	
  duties	
  that	
  accompany	
  sovereign	
  rights	
  of	
  the	
  involved	
  states.	
  Although	
  they	
  are	
  similar	
  in	
  their	
  climatic	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  461	
  Arctic	
  scholar	
  Donat	
  Pharand	
  produced	
  a	
  draft	
  Arctic	
  Treaty	
  in	
  1991.	
  462	
  (Taracouzio,	
  1938,	
  p.	
  366)	
  463	
  This	
  recommendation	
  was	
  made	
  by	
  Soviet	
  scholar	
  Lakhtin	
  in	
  discussion	
  on	
  the	
  legal	
  viability	
  of	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  claimed	
  by	
  Russia	
  and	
  Canada,	
  but	
  not	
  by	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  see	
  (Taracouzio,	
  1938).	
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conditions,	
  like	
  their	
  geographic	
  situating,	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  region	
  has	
  resulted	
  in	
  nearly	
  opposite	
  legal	
  arrangements.	
  Although	
  both	
  regions	
  have	
  legislation	
  protecting	
  exclusively	
  polar	
  species	
  and	
  encouraging	
  environmental	
  protection,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  being	
  developed	
  for	
  economic	
  advantages,	
  while	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  is	
  currently	
  protected	
  from	
  similar	
  exploitation.	
  	
  	
  
	
  Figure	
  1:	
  Arctic	
  Governance	
  Agreements	
  vs.	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  System	
  	
  Although	
  both	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  Antarctic	
  were	
  approached	
  through	
  the	
  opportunities	
  of	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  they	
  have	
  developed	
  in	
  very	
  different	
  ways,	
  especially	
  in	
  the	
  area	
  of	
  formal	
  sovereignty.	
  The	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  1959,	
  Art.	
  4	
  makes	
  provision	
  for	
  the	
  suspension	
  of	
  territorial	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  by	
  states	
  that	
  have	
  engaged	
  with	
  the	
  Antarctic.	
  This	
  was	
  agreed	
  in	
  a	
  time	
  when	
  states	
  had	
  failed	
  to	
  fully	
  administrate	
  the	
  region,	
  with	
  the	
  exception	
  of	
  rotating	
  populations	
  of	
  scientists,	
  and	
  in	
  many	
  respects	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  treaty	
  gave	
  states	
  a	
  hiatus	
  that	
  allowed	
  them	
  to	
  continue	
  casual	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  region,	
  at	
  a	
  significantly	
  lesser	
  cost	
  than	
  absolute	
  empire.	
  However,	
  as	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  an	
  ocean	
  surrounded	
  by	
  land,	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  surrounding	
  land	
  had	
  been	
  established	
  long	
  before	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  the	
  ‘common	
  heritage	
  of	
  mankind’	
  emerged	
  as	
  a	
  principle	
  of	
  international	
  law.	
  Additionally,	
  the	
  territory	
  available	
  for	
  sovereign	
  claims	
  in	
  the	
  sea	
  has	
  continued	
  to	
  expand	
  in	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  in	
  the	
  latter	
  half	
  of	
  the	
  twentieth	
  century.	
  It	
  can	
  be	
  seen	
  in	
  state	
  practice	
  and	
  policy	
  in	
  the	
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Arctic,	
  that	
  state	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  the	
  rights	
  that	
  accompany	
  sovereignty	
  are	
  the	
  number	
  one	
  priority	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  	
  	
  It	
  is	
  the	
  resources	
  that	
  lie	
  in	
  these	
  extended	
  territorial	
  areas,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zone	
  and	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf,	
  that	
  impel	
  states	
  to	
  pursue	
  maritime	
  sovereign	
  claims	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  While	
  access	
  to	
  (and	
  exploitation	
  of)	
  resources	
  for	
  national	
  interests	
  is	
  likely	
  to	
  always	
  be	
  a	
  policy	
  priority	
  for	
  states,	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  these	
  resources	
  are	
  able	
  to	
  be	
  isolated	
  for	
  exploitation	
  by	
  individual	
  states	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  provisions	
  of	
  the	
  law	
  the	
  sea.	
  This	
  is	
  not	
  the	
  case	
  in	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  where	
  no	
  sovereignty	
  has	
  been	
  established	
  over	
  land	
  and	
  thus	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  resources	
  in	
  the	
  sea	
  is	
  undesignated.	
  With	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  System	
  restricting	
  or	
  prohibiting	
  resource	
  exploitation,	
  it	
  eliminated	
  competition	
  for	
  these	
  resources	
  from	
  other	
  states.	
  With	
  sovereignty	
  already	
  determined	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  it	
  is	
  impossible	
  to	
  remove	
  these	
  resources	
  from	
  competition	
  in	
  the	
  same	
  manner;	
  thus,	
  the	
  best	
  option	
  for	
  states	
  is	
  to	
  sequester	
  the	
  resources	
  from	
  themselves,	
  eliminating	
  competition	
  and	
  protecting	
  national	
  interests	
  by	
  improving	
  resource	
  security.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  was	
  formed	
  through	
  a	
  conference	
  of	
  polar	
  and	
  non-­‐polar	
  states,	
  establishing	
  legitimacy	
  in	
  international	
  law	
  even	
  though	
  it	
  veers	
  from	
  other	
  traditional	
  legal	
  arrangements,	
  such	
  as	
  laws	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition,	
  suspending	
  sovereign	
  rights	
  of	
  the	
  occupying	
  states,	
  an	
  arrangement	
  which	
  could	
  not	
  have	
  been	
  made	
  without	
  multilateral	
  consent.	
  With	
  the	
  Arctic	
  having	
  developed	
  with	
  territorial	
  sovereignty	
  determined	
  by	
  the	
  littoral	
  state	
  and	
  thus	
  permanent	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  resources	
  simultaneously	
  secured,	
  the	
  developments	
  in	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  to	
  extend	
  maritime	
  sovereignty	
  into	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  has	
  given	
  the	
  littoral	
  states	
  access	
  to	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean.	
  This	
  makes	
  it	
  unlikely,	
  if	
  not	
  impossible,	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  would	
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ever	
  agree	
  to	
  establish	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  as	
  the	
  common	
  heritage	
  of	
  mankind.	
  Nor	
  would	
  it	
  strategically	
  be	
  in	
  the	
  interest	
  of	
  a	
  singular	
  Arctic	
  state	
  to	
  wave	
  rights	
  to	
  access	
  to	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  The	
  resulting	
  effect	
  of	
  choosing	
  not	
  to	
  establish	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Treaty	
  is	
  to	
  purposefully	
  exclude	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states	
  from	
  making	
  decisions	
  affecting	
  resource	
  development	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  thus	
  governance	
  has	
  been	
  developed	
  which	
  is	
  specifically	
  exclusionary,	
  permitting	
  membership	
  only	
  to	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  	
  The	
  use	
  of	
  international	
  shipping	
  lanes	
  is	
  one	
  activity	
  from	
  which	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  cannot	
  exclude	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states,	
  and	
  nor	
  would	
  they	
  desire	
  to	
  pursue	
  this	
  exclusion	
  as	
  the	
  Arctic	
  shipping	
  routes	
  are	
  the	
  longest	
  sought	
  after	
  economic	
  resource	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  regions!	
  However,	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  polar	
  routes	
  as	
  climate	
  change	
  encourages	
  ice	
  melt	
  brings	
  with	
  it	
  a	
  new	
  set	
  of	
  problems	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  potential	
  accidents,	
  chemical	
  spills	
  and	
  environmental	
  damage.	
  Without	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Treaty,	
  it	
  is	
  impossible	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  establish	
  legitimate	
  regulations	
  for	
  shipping	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  To	
  circumvent	
  this	
  weakness	
  of	
  existing	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  mechanisms,	
  regulations	
  for	
  polar	
  shipping	
  are	
  being	
  pursued	
  in	
  the	
  forthcoming	
  Polar	
  Code,	
  sponsored	
  by	
  the	
  International	
  Maritime	
  Organisation,	
  a	
  specialised	
  branch	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations,	
  gaining	
  legitimation	
  through	
  the	
  backing	
  of	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  community	
  of	
  states.	
  The	
  Polar	
  Code	
  will	
  provide	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  with	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  enforce	
  safe	
  shipping	
  practices	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  without	
  having	
  to	
  concede	
  exclusionary	
  practices	
  in	
  other	
  matters	
  to	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  and	
  other	
  elements	
  of	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  together	
  form	
  an	
  umbrella	
  mechanism	
  through	
  which	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  can	
  cooperate	
  on	
  overlapping	
  issue	
  areas	
  affecting	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  cooperation	
  between	
  Arctic	
  states	
  began	
  through	
  environmental	
  protection	
  strategies,	
  but	
  has	
  advanced	
  to	
  address	
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Arctic	
  specific	
  issue	
  areas	
  as	
  suggested	
  in	
  Article	
  234	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  
Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982.	
  An	
  example	
  of	
  this	
  cooperation	
  is	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Search	
  and	
  
Rescue	
  Agreement	
  2011,	
  collaborated	
  through	
  the	
  forum	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  but	
  not	
  produced	
  officially	
  under	
  the	
  council.	
  It	
  is	
  likely	
  that	
  the	
  future	
  will	
  bring	
  with	
  it	
  additional	
  Arctic	
  specific	
  legislation	
  that	
  addresses	
  overlapping	
  issue	
  areas,	
  developed	
  through	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  which	
  simultaneously	
  strengthens	
  existing	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  international	
  law.	
  	
  	
  While	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  have	
  stated	
  that	
  they	
  do	
  not	
  intend	
  to	
  develop	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Treaty	
  and	
  that	
  they	
  will	
  abide	
  by	
  existing	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  and	
  have	
  not	
  expressly	
  produced	
  a	
  statement	
  known	
  as	
  an	
  Arctic	
  doctrine,	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  should	
  be	
  seen	
  as	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Doctrine	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  There	
  are	
  explicit	
  policies	
  and	
  preferences	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  repeatedly	
  reinforced	
  in	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  including:	
  state	
  sovereignty	
  as	
  a	
  primary	
  focus,	
  exploitation	
  for	
  national	
  interests,	
  exclusionary	
  practices	
  that	
  isolate	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  and	
  the	
  encouragement	
  of	
  cooperation	
  for	
  overlapping	
  issue	
  areas.	
  Taken	
  together,	
  these	
  preferences	
  should	
  be	
  considered	
  to	
  form	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Doctrine,	
  as	
  they	
  constitute	
  the	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  	
  	
  
Conclusions	
  	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  has	
  developed	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  occurrence	
  of	
  two	
  types	
  of	
  transformation,	
  one	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  the	
  other	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  itself	
  as	
  it	
  is	
  affected	
  by	
  climate	
  change	
  and	
  the	
  technological	
  capabilities	
  of	
  modern	
  man.	
  The	
  need	
  for	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  governance	
  is	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  constraints	
  that	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  states	
  places	
  on	
  their	
  ability	
  to	
  legislate	
  outside	
  of	
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their	
  territorial	
  borders.	
  	
  Thus	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  has	
  been	
  developed	
  to	
  create	
  a	
  mechanism	
  for	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  extend	
  their	
  influence	
  over	
  issues	
  affecting	
  their	
  national	
  interests	
  outside	
  of	
  their	
  borders.	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  international	
  system	
  has	
  undergone	
  a	
  rapid	
  transformation	
  in	
  the	
  last	
  century	
  from	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery,	
  where	
  a	
  few	
  states	
  participated	
  in	
  gross	
  annexation	
  of	
  ‘underutilised’	
  territory,	
  to	
  a	
  system	
  of	
  many	
  states	
  acceding	
  to	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  community	
  to	
  ensure	
  their	
  security	
  and	
  prosperity.	
  Within	
  this	
  system	
  is	
  a	
  hierarchy	
  of	
  social	
  order,	
  and	
  states	
  are	
  the	
  primary	
  unit	
  within	
  this	
  system	
  as	
  they	
  are	
  the	
  political	
  units	
  that	
  wage	
  war,	
  respond	
  to	
  international	
  incidents	
  and	
  most	
  importantly,	
  have	
  the	
  sole	
  authority	
  to	
  ratify	
  international	
  treaties.	
  Within	
  Arctic	
  governance,	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  as	
  permanent	
  participants	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  introduced	
  the	
  possibility	
  of	
  a	
  rule	
  change	
  within	
  the	
  social	
  hierarchy.	
  It	
  appears	
  that	
  although	
  there	
  have	
  been	
  claims	
  by	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  to	
  political	
  and	
  territorial	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  at	
  present	
  this	
  inclusion	
  of	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  rule	
  change,	
  but	
  is	
  merely	
  a	
  phase	
  of	
  political	
  enlightenment,	
  with	
  states	
  ignoring	
  these	
  sovereignty	
  claims,	
  attempting	
  to	
  include	
  people	
  who	
  were	
  earlier	
  relieved	
  of	
  their	
  territories	
  by	
  imperial	
  states.	
  	
  	
  Finally,	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  has	
  created	
  an	
  environment	
  for	
  international	
  cooperation	
  where	
  issues	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  can	
  be	
  addressed	
  and	
  where	
  solutions	
  for	
  these	
  issues	
  can	
  be	
  developed.	
  This	
  turn	
  towards	
  cooperation	
  is	
  possible	
  only	
  because	
  of	
  the	
  transformation	
  away	
  from	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  when	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  were	
  hostile	
  and	
  the	
  Arctic	
  was	
  seen	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  war.	
  The	
  development	
  of	
  governance	
  has	
  made	
  it	
  possible	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  avoid	
  creating	
  an	
  Arctic	
  treaty	
  in	
  which	
  Non-­‐Arctic	
  States	
  would	
  need	
  to	
  be	
  involved.	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  has	
  thus	
  become	
  an	
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Arctic	
  doctrine	
  through	
  which	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  are	
  pursuing	
  sovereign	
  interests,	
  including	
  resources	
  exploitation	
  and	
  excluding	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states	
  from	
  making	
  decisions	
  on	
  Arctic	
  issues.	
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Chapter	
  VII	
  
	
  
A	
  Political	
  Assessment	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Search	
  and	
  
Rescue	
  Agreement:	
  Text,	
  Framing	
  and	
  Logics	
  	
  (This	
  content	
  of	
  this	
  chapter	
  was	
  published	
  in	
  The	
  Yearbook	
  of	
  Polar	
  Law	
  V,	
  Koninkliike	
  Brill	
  NV,	
  Leiden,	
  2013.)	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Testament	
  to	
  the	
  advancement	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  as	
  a	
  regional	
  intergovernmental	
  organisation,	
  in	
  May	
  2011,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  agreed	
  upon	
  its	
  first	
  multilateral	
  legally	
  binding	
  instrument,	
  
the	
  Agreement	
  on	
  Cooperation	
  on	
  Aeronautical	
  and	
  Maritime	
  
Search	
  and	
  Rescue	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  2011	
  (SAR	
  Agreement).464	
  The	
  signing	
  of	
  the	
  agreement	
  occurred	
  at	
  the	
  same	
  Ministerial	
  Council	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  provided	
  for	
  a	
  permanent	
  secretariat,	
  two	
  events	
  advancing	
  its	
  relative	
  importance	
  as	
  a	
  central	
  organisation	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  and	
  is	
  seen	
  as	
  “a	
  positive	
  step	
  toward	
  building	
  partnerships	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.”465	
  Although	
  it	
  is	
  a	
  legally	
  binding	
  agreement,	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  can	
  itself	
  be	
  determined	
  to	
  be	
  an	
  instrument	
  of	
  not	
  just	
  hard	
  law,	
  but	
  also	
  as	
  “primarily	
  a	
  political	
  document,”466	
  aiding	
  state	
  cooperation	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  not	
  dissimilar	
  to	
  the	
  usefulness	
  the	
  
Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  provided	
  for	
  international	
  relations	
  in	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  climate	
  of	
  1959.	
  As	
  there	
  are	
  points	
  on	
  politics,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  capability,	
  with	
  significant	
  mileage	
  to	
  be	
  considered	
  relevant	
  to	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement,	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  intent	
  of	
  this	
  article	
  to	
  assess	
  the	
  political	
  elements	
  and	
  implications	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement.	
  	
  	
  There	
  is	
  some	
  difficulty	
  in	
  analysing	
  a	
  legal	
  text	
  for	
  the	
  political	
  elements	
  and	
  the	
  resulting	
  implications	
  without	
  reviewing	
  the	
  communications	
  exchanged	
  between	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  writing	
  of	
  the	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  464	
  The	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  is	
  the	
  first	
  instrument	
  agreed	
  under	
  the	
  auspices	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council.	
  Other	
  multi-­‐lateral	
  treaties	
  involving	
  the	
  Arctic	
  include:	
  the	
  North	
  Pacific	
  Fur	
  
Seal	
  Convention	
  1911,	
  the	
  Svalbard	
  Treaty	
  1920	
  and	
  the	
  International	
  Agreement	
  on	
  the	
  
Conservation	
  of	
  Polar	
  Bears	
  1973	
  predate	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council.	
  	
  465	
  	
  (U.S	
  Department	
  of	
  State,	
  2011)	
  	
  	
  466	
  (Exner-­‐Pirot,	
  2012)	
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text	
  of	
  the	
  agreement.	
  In	
  the	
  Tromsø	
  Declaration	
  2011,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  approved	
  the	
  “establishment	
  of	
  a	
  task	
  force	
  to	
  develop	
  and	
  complete	
  negotiation…of	
  an	
  international	
  instrument	
  on	
  cooperation	
  on	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  operations	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.”467	
  The	
  treaty	
  negotiation	
  process	
  usually	
  involves	
  the	
  representative	
  of	
  states	
  presenting	
  their	
  interests	
  to	
  a	
  task	
  force	
  and	
  for	
  a	
  document	
  to	
  be	
  forged	
  from	
  the	
  merging	
  of	
  these	
  interests.	
  However,	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement,	
  no	
  negotiation	
  documents	
  exist.468	
  Thus,	
  although	
  it	
  is	
  impossible	
  to	
  determine	
  issues	
  of	
  politics	
  from	
  the	
  missing	
  negotiation	
  texts,	
  several	
  issues	
  have	
  been	
  identified	
  throughout	
  this	
  analysis	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  relations	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  
Agreement.	
  	
  The	
  advent	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  gives	
  way	
  to	
  the	
  first	
  point	
  of	
  political	
  significance	
  and	
  this	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  agreement	
  was	
  signed	
  at	
  the	
  same	
  Ministerial	
  meeting	
  that	
  also	
  established	
  the	
  permanent	
  secretariat	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council.	
  Without	
  the	
  permanent	
  secretariat,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  had	
  been	
  considered	
  largely	
  as	
  a	
  forum	
  for	
  dialogue	
  on	
  Arctic	
  matters	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  littoral	
  states,	
  states	
  with	
  territory	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Circle	
  and	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  with	
  social	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  The	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  permanent	
  secretariat	
  signals	
  the	
  intention	
  of	
  the	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  to	
  extend	
  the	
  intergovernmental	
  organisation	
  from	
  a	
  mere	
  forum	
  for	
  conversation	
  to	
  a	
  proactive	
  regulating	
  and	
  decision-­‐making	
  body.469	
  This	
  strengthened	
  operational	
  intent	
  will	
  aid	
  to	
  optimise	
  cooperation	
  between	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  members	
  and	
  its	
  permanent	
  observers	
  as	
  the	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  increases	
  from	
  outside	
  states	
  and	
  commercial	
  operatives,	
  allowing	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  members	
  to	
  act	
  as	
  a	
  unified	
  body	
  to	
  the	
  exclusion/inclusion	
  of	
  Arctic	
  outsiders.	
  The	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  is	
  the	
  first	
  example	
  of	
  this	
  increased	
  operational	
  capacity,	
  and	
  has	
  been	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  467	
  (Arctic	
  Council,	
  2009)	
  468	
  (Balton,	
  2012)	
  	
  469	
  The	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  is	
  also	
  preparing	
  a	
  treaty	
  for	
  preventing	
  oil	
  pollution	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  and	
  is	
  discussing	
  legislation	
  on	
  polar	
  over	
  flight.	
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described	
  by	
  Russian	
  Ambassador	
  Vasiliev	
  as	
  “a	
  landmark	
  of	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  cooperation”	
  while	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Ambassador	
  Balton	
  determined	
  that	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  conclusion	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  is	
  “becoming	
  a	
  stronger	
  body.”470	
  	
  When	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  announced	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement,	
  some	
  media	
  coverage	
  generated	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  press	
  heralded	
  the	
  agreement	
  as	
  an	
  important	
  step	
  to	
  international	
  cooperation	
  in	
  the	
  region.471	
  Yet	
  despite	
  the	
  positive	
  coverage,	
  on	
  the	
  implementation	
  and	
  ratification	
  of	
  the	
  agreement	
  there	
  are	
  at	
  least	
  two	
  technical	
  issues	
  to	
  be	
  considered.	
  These	
  include	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  term	
  ‘agreement’	
  and	
  the	
  article	
  providing	
  for	
  ratification	
  within	
  the	
  official	
  text.	
  There	
  appears	
  to	
  be	
  differentiation	
  between	
  legal	
  theory	
  and	
  actual	
  practice	
  as	
  to	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  the	
  agreement	
  within	
  international	
  law,	
  with	
  resulting	
  implications	
  for	
  legal	
  responsibility	
  in	
  the	
  event	
  of	
  an	
  actual	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  (SAR)	
  incident.	
  	
  Not	
  to	
  disregard	
  the	
  political	
  import	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement,	
  it	
  should	
  be	
  noted	
  that	
  legally	
  it	
  is	
  an	
  ‘agreement’,	
  with	
  resulting	
  political	
  and	
  legal	
  implications	
  for	
  this	
  choice	
  of	
  instrument.	
  Within	
  international	
  law	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  difference	
  between	
  a	
  ‘treaty’	
  and	
  an	
  ‘agreement’	
  as	
  the	
  international	
  agreement	
  has	
  been	
  made	
  between	
  states	
  of	
  an	
  intergovernmental	
  organisation.472	
  	
  However	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  word	
  ‘agreement’	
  has	
  circumvented	
  the	
  need	
  for	
  ratification	
  of	
  the	
  instrument	
  by	
  some	
  domestic	
  parliamentary	
  bodies	
  as	
  “in	
  many	
  counties,	
  the	
  constitution	
  requires	
  that	
  international	
  agreements	
  in	
  a	
  form	
  considered	
  under	
  the	
  internal	
  law	
  or	
  usage	
  of	
  the	
  State	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  ‘treaty’	
  must	
  be	
  endorsed	
  by	
  the	
  legislature	
  or	
  have	
  their	
  ratification	
  authorized	
  by	
  it,	
  ...whereas	
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  (Arctic	
  Council,	
  2011	
  c)	
  471	
  For	
  example,	
  see	
  (Meyers,	
  2011)	
  and	
  (Klapper,	
  2011).	
  472	
  (United	
  Nations,	
  2006)	
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other	
  forms	
  of	
  international	
  agreement	
  are	
  not	
  subject	
  to	
  this	
  requirement.”473	
  	
  	
  Somewhat	
  complicating	
  procedure	
  for	
  implementation	
  of	
  the	
  agreement,	
  there	
  are	
  differences	
  among	
  the	
  Arctic	
  States	
  as	
  to	
  whether	
  an	
  agreement	
  requires	
  the	
  same	
  ratification	
  mechanisms	
  a	
  treaty.	
  For	
  example,	
  United	
  States	
  code	
  mandates	
  that	
  agreements	
  enter	
  into	
  force	
  when	
  the	
  Secretary	
  of	
  State	
  applies	
  their	
  signature,474	
  while	
  in	
  Canada	
  agreements	
  are	
  considered	
  as	
  treaties	
  and	
  enter	
  into	
  force	
  when	
  formally	
  announced	
  by	
  the	
  Minister	
  of	
  Foreign	
  Affairs.475	
  By	
  negotiating	
  an	
  agreement,	
  it	
  allowed	
  for	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  to	
  immediately	
  authorise	
  the	
  agreement	
  upon	
  signature	
  by	
  Secretary	
  Clinton,	
  in	
  part	
  based	
  upon	
  authority	
  of	
  earlier	
  agreement	
  and	
  ratification	
  to	
  the	
  treaties	
  included	
  within	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement.476	
  The	
  negotiation	
  of	
  an	
  ‘agreement’	
  rather	
  than	
  a	
  ‘treaty’	
  thus	
  avoided	
  some	
  pitfalls	
  of	
  internal	
  political	
  scenes	
  in	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  eight	
  Arctic	
  states	
  and	
  eliminated	
  some	
  delay	
  to	
  the	
  implementation	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement,	
  such	
  as	
  has	
  been	
  seen	
  with	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  failing	
  to	
  ratify	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  
the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  causing	
  potential	
  difficulties	
  for	
  delineating	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  claims.	
  	
  	
  While	
  this	
  semantic	
  differentiation	
  between	
  ‘treaty’	
  and	
  ‘agreement’	
  appears	
  to	
  enable	
  the	
  circumvention	
  of	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  pitfalls	
  of	
  internal	
  politics,	
  not	
  all	
  domestic	
  ratification	
  procedures	
  have	
  been	
  completely	
  bypassed,	
  with	
  Art	
  19.2	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  
Agreement	
  making	
  provision	
  for	
  ratification,	
  as	
  is	
  required	
  by	
  international	
  treaty	
  law,	
  and	
  allowing	
  for	
  the	
  provisional	
  time	
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  (Watts,	
  1999,	
  p.	
  625)	
  474	
  (Hoffman	
  &	
  Rumsey,	
  2012)	
  475	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  2011)	
  	
  476	
  (Hoffman	
  &	
  Rumsey,	
  2012,	
  p.	
  86)	
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lapse	
  before	
  entry	
  into	
  force.477	
  The	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  designates	
  Canada	
  as	
  the	
  legal	
  depository	
  for	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement,	
  making	
  it	
  responsible	
  for	
  maintaining	
  register	
  of	
  ratification,	
  however	
  the	
  team	
  at	
  the	
  Treaty	
  Law	
  Division	
  for	
  the	
  Government	
  of	
  Canada	
  have	
  declined	
  to	
  make	
  information	
  on	
  what	
  countries	
  have	
  completed	
  ratification	
  publically	
  available,	
  only	
  saying	
  “At	
  this	
  point,	
  all	
  the	
  Parties	
  have	
  not	
  yet	
  completed	
  their	
  internal	
  procedures	
  for	
  ratification.	
  Once	
  all	
  the	
  Parties	
  would	
  have	
  completed	
  their	
  procedures,	
  the	
  Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  in	
  his	
  capacity	
  as	
  depositary,	
  will	
  notify	
  the	
  Parties	
  that	
  the	
  Agreement	
  will	
  enter	
  into	
  force	
  after	
  30	
  days.”478	
  However,	
  despite	
  this	
  statement	
  by	
  the	
  depository,	
  it	
  has	
  been	
  claimed	
  by	
  Björn	
  Arp	
  that	
  by	
  October	
  2011	
  both	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Russia	
  have	
  ratified	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement,	
  although	
  evidence	
  to	
  prove	
  this	
  is	
  not	
  available.479	
  Thus	
  officially,	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  has	
  not	
  entered	
  into	
  force	
  and	
  until	
  it	
  has,	
  the	
  agreement	
  is	
  only	
  provisionally	
  applied.	
  	
  	
  When	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  was	
  formed	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  Ottawa	
  
Declaration	
  in	
  1996,	
  it	
  was	
  to	
  encourage	
  the	
  engagement	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  on	
  issues	
  of	
  sustainable	
  development	
  and	
  environmental	
  protection	
  and	
  specifically	
  excluded	
  matters	
  of	
  military	
  security.480	
  Given	
  that	
  a	
  main	
  focus	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  had	
  included	
  the	
  security	
  of	
  the	
  northern	
  borders	
  and	
  the	
  possibility	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  could	
  be	
  used	
  as	
  both	
  a	
  theatre	
  of	
  war	
  and	
  the	
  route	
  of	
  attack,481	
  the	
  exclusion	
  of	
  military	
  elements	
  removed	
  difficult	
  points	
  of	
  political	
  tension,	
  and	
  allowed	
  for	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  the	
  Council.	
  In	
  a	
  significant	
  development	
  of	
  political	
  relations,	
  the	
  SAR	
  
Agreement	
  is	
  step	
  away	
  from	
  the	
  policy	
  of	
  ‘no	
  military’	
  or	
  ‘no	
  security’,	
  without	
  specifically	
  changing	
  the	
  charter	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
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  (Arctic	
  Council,	
  2011	
  b)	
  478	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  2012).	
  479	
  (Arp,	
  2011,	
  p.	
  1110)	
  	
  480	
  (Arctic	
  Council,	
  1996)	
  	
  481	
  (Jalonen,	
  1988,	
  p.	
  1)	
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Council.	
  This	
  is	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  designates	
  specific	
  government	
  operatives	
  to	
  be	
  responsible	
  for	
  the	
  coordination	
  and	
  execution	
  of	
  any	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  operations	
  in	
  the	
  delineated	
  areas.	
  For	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  those	
  operatives	
  are	
  part	
  of	
  national	
  defence	
  departments,	
  i.e.,	
  the	
  Coast	
  Guard	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Minister	
  of	
  National	
  Defense	
  and	
  the	
  Russian	
  Ministry	
  of	
  Civil	
  Defense	
  are	
  the	
  designated	
  operatives	
  for	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  operations	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  their	
  respective	
  sectors.	
  So	
  under	
  the	
  remit	
  of	
  search	
  and	
  rescue,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  States	
  have	
  agreed	
  to	
  undergo	
  what	
  will	
  essentially	
  be	
  joint	
  military	
  operations	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.	
  	
  	
  There	
  is	
  good	
  reason	
  for	
  this	
  designation	
  as	
  these	
  are	
  the	
  only	
  entities	
  with	
  the	
  practical	
  ability	
  to	
  perform	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  in	
  this	
  region,	
  yet	
  the	
  willingness	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  make	
  an	
  agreement	
  that	
  will	
  require	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  military	
  capability	
  is	
  signal	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  are	
  willing	
  to	
  begin	
  proxy	
  military	
  cooperation	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.	
  Exner-­‐Pirot	
  determines	
  that	
  “the	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  agreement	
  can	
  thus	
  provide	
  a	
  platform	
  by	
  which	
  states	
  can	
  pursue	
  what’s	
  termed	
  defence	
  diplomacy	
  –	
  the	
  peacetime	
  cooperative	
  use	
  of	
  armed	
  forces	
  and	
  related	
  infrastructure	
  as	
  a	
  tool	
  of	
  security	
  and	
  foreign	
  policy.”482	
  Following	
  the	
  military	
  stand-­‐off	
  of	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
  the	
  SAR	
  
Agreement	
  seems	
  to	
  be	
  an	
  ‘about	
  face’	
  to	
  security	
  issues	
  of	
  the	
  polar	
  north,	
  and	
  can	
  be	
  deemed	
  as	
  a	
  signal	
  to	
  Arctic	
  outsiders	
  on	
  the	
  strength	
  of	
  the	
  cooperation	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states.	
  	
  	
  The	
  inclusion	
  of	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  military	
  through	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  can	
  also	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  a	
  way	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  address	
  security	
  concerns	
  for	
  the	
  region.	
  Historically,	
  international	
  SAR	
  agreements	
  and	
  operations	
  have	
  sometimes	
  been	
  used	
  by	
  governments	
  as	
  a	
  guise	
  for	
  addressing	
  security	
  and	
  defence	
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  (Exner-­‐Pirot,	
  2012,	
  p.	
  195)	
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concerns	
  through	
  international	
  agreements	
  as	
  it	
  is	
  easier	
  to	
  gain	
  consensus	
  on	
  SAR	
  than	
  on	
  security/defence	
  issues	
  which	
  require	
  absolute	
  inclusion	
  of	
  military.483	
  An	
  example	
  of	
  this	
  was	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  pushing	
  maritime	
  security	
  concerns	
  over	
  terrorism	
  in	
  the	
  post-­‐9/11	
  paranoia	
  through	
  with	
  SAR	
  mechanisms	
  with	
  the	
  International	
  Maritime	
  Organisation	
  (IMO).484	
  Through	
  this,	
  Long-­‐Range	
  Identification	
  Tracking	
  (LRIT)	
  regulations,	
  requiring	
  all	
  ships	
  to	
  report	
  positions	
  and	
  other	
  significant	
  data	
  to	
  a	
  centralised	
  database	
  was	
  established	
  through	
  the	
  guise	
  of	
  being	
  able	
  to	
  provide	
  for	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  capability	
  in	
  accordance	
  with	
  the	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Safety	
  of	
  Life	
  at	
  Sea	
  (SOLAS).	
  Thus	
  it	
  appears,	
  with	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement,	
  the	
  tradition	
  of	
  addressing	
  security	
  concerns	
  through	
  SAR	
  coordination	
  continues.	
  	
  	
  The	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  also	
  seems	
  to	
  have	
  political	
  implications	
  with	
  regard	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  as	
  SAR	
  has	
  sometimes	
  been	
  used	
  by	
  states	
  as	
  a	
  sovereignty	
  ploy	
  for	
  enhancing	
  territorial	
  claims.	
  This	
  was	
  demonstrated	
  in	
  the	
  Aegean	
  Crisis	
  when	
  after	
  decades	
  of	
  territorial	
  disputes,	
  Turkey	
  undertook	
  a	
  SAR	
  operation	
  within	
  disputed	
  waters	
  claimed	
  under	
  Greek	
  sovereignty.	
  Not	
  only	
  was	
  this	
  an	
  opportunity	
  for	
  the	
  Turkish	
  military	
  to	
  test	
  military	
  equipment	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  practice	
  operations	
  and	
  capabilities,	
  it	
  was	
  also	
  a	
  chance	
  for	
  Turkey	
  to	
  undermine	
  Greek	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  functional	
  zone	
  of	
  territorial	
  waters,	
  claimed	
  by	
  Greece	
  where	
  the	
  state	
  failed	
  to	
  exercise	
  its	
  territorial	
  sovereignty.485	
  It	
  may	
  be	
  seen	
  that	
  the	
  conducting	
  of	
  SAR	
  operations	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  can	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  territory	
  as	
  the	
  states	
  wait	
  for	
  their	
  claims	
  with	
  the	
  Commission	
  on	
  the	
  Continental	
  Shelf	
  for	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  to	
  be	
  processed.	
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  (Leslie,	
  2012)	
  484	
  (Leslie,	
  2012)	
  	
  485	
  (Travisanut,	
  2010,	
  p.	
  533	
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In	
  an	
  additional	
  point	
  on	
  undetermined	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  it	
  is	
  interesting	
  to	
  note	
  that	
  the	
  SAR	
  areas	
  designated	
  under	
  the	
  
SAR	
  Agreement	
  largely	
  follow	
  existing	
  bilateral	
  treaty	
  lines,	
  and	
  also	
  reinforce	
  the	
  sectoral	
  sovereignty	
  claims	
  of	
  Canada	
  in	
  1925486	
  and	
  by	
  Russia487	
  in	
  1926,488	
  (see	
  Figure	
  1).	
  While	
  it	
  was	
  eventually	
  realised	
  that	
  the	
  ice	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  covered	
  an	
  ocean	
  and	
  not	
  terra	
  
firma,	
  in	
  the	
  decades	
  that	
  followed,	
  international	
  law	
  developed	
  to	
  allow	
  for	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  under	
  the	
  high	
  seas	
  to	
  be	
  claimed	
  as	
  territory	
  for	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  economic	
  exploitation	
  through	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea.	
  As	
  mentioned,	
  these	
  claims	
  are	
  currently	
  pending	
  due	
  process	
  through	
  international	
  legal	
  mechanisms.	
  There	
  still	
  also	
  remain	
  some	
  maritime	
  territorial	
  disputes,	
  notably	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Passage	
  (NWP)	
  and	
  the	
  Beaufort	
  Sea,	
  where	
  the	
  
SAR	
  Agreement	
  line	
  follows	
  the	
  territorial	
  claims	
  of	
  Canada.	
  While	
  sovereignty	
  can	
  sometimes	
  be	
  determined	
  through	
  historic	
  use	
  and	
  effective	
  administration	
  of	
  a	
  government,	
  which	
  can	
  be	
  provided	
  through	
  SAR	
  operations	
  delivery,	
  the	
  legal	
  problematic	
  of	
  this	
  delimitation	
  has	
  been	
  circumvented	
  in	
  Art	
  3.2	
  which	
  states:	
  “The	
  delimitation	
  of	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  regions	
  is	
  not	
  related	
  to	
  and	
  shall	
  not	
  prejudice	
  the	
  delimitation	
  of	
  any	
  boundary	
  between	
  States	
  or	
  their	
  sovereignty,	
  sovereign	
  rights	
  or	
  jurisdiction.”489	
  Thus,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  have	
  specifically	
  excluded	
  the	
  potential	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  to	
  determine	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  claims	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  though	
  it	
  remains	
  to	
  be	
  seen	
  if	
  the	
  exercise	
  of	
  SAR	
  operations	
  can	
  contribute	
  to	
  these	
  territorial	
  claims.	
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  (Canadian	
  Geographic,	
  2012)	
  	
  487	
  In	
  1926	
  Russia	
  was	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union.	
  488	
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  Figure	
  1:	
  Arctic	
  Search	
  and	
  Rescue	
  Delimitation	
  Map490	
  The	
  advent	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  also	
  represents	
  a	
  shift	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  from	
  focusing	
  on	
  soft	
  law	
  to	
  hard	
  law.	
  	
  While	
  there	
  are	
  other	
  instruments	
  of	
  hard	
  law	
  that	
  apply	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  these	
  pre-­‐date	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  which	
  previously	
  operated	
  through	
  working	
  groups	
  and	
  action	
  plans	
  addressing	
  conservation	
  and	
  monitoring.	
  Additionally,	
  the	
  diplomatic	
  face	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  has	
  largely	
  relied	
  on	
  multilateral	
  policy	
  declarations,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  Ilulissat	
  Declaration	
  where	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  committed	
  to	
  adhering	
  to	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  to	
  deal	
  with	
  Arctic	
  matters.	
  The	
  development	
  of	
  a	
  single	
  instrument	
  to	
  strengthen	
  SAR	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  when	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  simply	
  adapts	
  and	
  reinforces	
  existing	
  international	
  law491	
  to	
  fit	
  the	
  unique	
  condition	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
  S-­‐M	
  Kao	
  et	
  al	
  point	
  out	
  that	
  “[This]	
  proves	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  States	
  are	
  willing	
  at	
  least	
  on	
  an	
  issue-­‐by-­‐	
  issue	
  basis	
  to	
  accept	
  a	
  legally-­‐binding	
  instrument,	
  rather	
  than	
  stick	
  to	
  non	
  legally-­‐binding	
  Declarations	
  as	
  they	
  have	
  in	
  the	
  past,	
  to	
  address	
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new	
  challenges	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.”492	
  It	
  also	
  serves	
  to	
  endorse	
  the	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  States	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  need	
  for	
  an	
  ‘Arctic	
  Treaty	
  System’	
  as	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  is	
  able	
  to	
  modify	
  existing	
  hard	
  law	
  mechanisms	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  needs	
  of	
  the	
  region,	
  using	
  the	
  expertise	
  of	
  the	
  working	
  groups	
  to	
  provide	
  recommendations.	
  However,	
  in	
  time,	
  it	
  may	
  be	
  seen	
  that	
  a	
  collection	
  of	
  a	
  body	
  of	
  hard	
  law	
  could	
  be	
  incorporated	
  into	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Treaty	
  System,	
  just	
  as	
  
UNCLOS	
  began	
  as	
  four	
  discrete	
  conventions.	
  	
  The	
  transition	
  to	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  hard	
  law	
  instruments	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  also	
  gives	
  insight	
  into	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  indigenous	
  peoples	
  within	
  the	
  group.	
  Although	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  has	
  the	
  unique	
  feature	
  of	
  including	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  as	
  permanent	
  participants	
  giving	
  them	
  status	
  above	
  the	
  sovereign	
  states	
  with	
  mere	
  observer	
  status,	
  it	
  is	
  evident	
  that	
  the	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  do	
  not	
  hold	
  the	
  same	
  status	
  within	
  the	
  Council	
  as	
  Arctic	
  states	
  themselves	
  hold.	
  Although,	
  it	
  is	
  claimed	
  “the	
  organizations	
  participate	
  in	
  the	
  same	
  manner	
  as	
  states	
  in	
  most	
  other	
  respects,”493	
  this	
  shift	
  to	
  hard	
  law	
  provides	
  ample	
  demonstration	
  of	
  the	
  inability	
  of	
  the	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  to	
  operate	
  on	
  par	
  with	
  sovereign	
  states	
  in	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  ways.	
  	
  An	
  obvious	
  signal	
  of	
  this	
  inequality	
  is	
  that	
  the	
  parties	
  to	
  the	
  SAR	
  
Agreement	
  include	
  only	
  sovereign	
  states	
  and	
  exclude	
  any	
  mention	
  of	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  as	
  party	
  to	
  the	
  treaty.	
  In	
  fact,	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  mention	
  at	
  all	
  of	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  within	
  the	
  text	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement.	
  This	
  is	
  a	
  reoccurrence	
  of	
  their	
  exclusion	
  from	
  the	
  state-­‐level	
  Ilulissat	
  Declaration,	
  except	
  for	
  their	
  mention	
  in	
  the	
  text	
  indicating	
  that	
  the	
  prevention	
  of	
  harm	
  to	
  indigenous	
  communities	
  required	
  the	
  stewardship	
  of	
  Arctic	
  states.494	
  Oran	
  Young	
  says	
  “Indigenous	
  peoples	
  organizations	
  have	
  acquired	
  a	
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  p.	
  382	
  )	
  
	
   274	
  
high	
  profile	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  but	
  it	
  is	
  notable	
  that	
  they	
  were	
  largely	
  ignored	
  in	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  crafting	
  the	
  May	
  2008	
  Ilulissat	
  Declaration.”495	
  It	
  was	
  their	
  exclusion	
  from	
  the	
  Ilulissat	
  
Declaration	
  that	
  cause	
  some	
  anger	
  among	
  indigenous	
  groups,	
  resulting	
  in	
  the	
  release	
  of	
  A	
  Circumpolar	
  Inuit	
  Declaration	
  
on	
  Sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  which	
  cited	
  the	
  “the	
  right	
  to	
  recognition,	
  observance	
  and	
  enforcement	
  of	
  treaties,	
  agreements	
  and	
  other	
  constructive	
  arrangements	
  concluded	
  with	
  states.”496	
  It	
  appears	
  that	
  these	
  declarations	
  have	
  not	
  been	
  sufficient	
  to	
  exact	
  equality	
  between	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  and	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  as	
  they	
  were	
  still	
  excluded	
  from	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement,	
  with	
  no	
  evidence	
  that	
  there	
  were	
  even	
  included	
  as	
  participants.	
  	
  Another	
  way	
  in	
  which	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  cannot	
  operate	
  equal	
  to	
  states	
  is	
  in	
  the	
  delivery	
  of	
  SAR	
  missions	
  in	
  the	
  even	
  of	
  an	
  incident.	
  The	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  designates	
  the	
  competent	
  authorities	
  and	
  responsible	
  agencies	
  for	
  each	
  party	
  to	
  the	
  treaty	
  and	
  also	
  makes	
  allowance	
  in	
  Art	
  18	
  to	
  “seek	
  cooperation	
  with	
  States	
  not	
  party	
  to	
  this	
  Agreement	
  that	
  may	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  contribute	
  to	
  the	
  conduct	
  of	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  operations.”497	
  Indigenous	
  representatives	
  have	
  claimed	
  that	
  they	
  “must	
  be	
  fully	
  involved	
  in	
  the	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  agreement	
  because	
  they	
  will	
  likely	
  be	
  the	
  first	
  ones	
  on	
  the	
  scene	
  of	
  a	
  major	
  disaster.”498	
  However,	
  indigenous	
  community	
  groups	
  have	
  not	
  been	
  named	
  as	
  responsible	
  for	
  the	
  delivery	
  of	
  SAR	
  operations	
  showing	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  still	
  states	
  held	
  responsible	
  for	
  this	
  duty	
  to	
  protect	
  under	
  both	
  SOLAS	
  and	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement.	
  It	
  may	
  be	
  possible	
  that	
  individual	
  states	
  will	
  utilise	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  to	
  carry	
  out	
  practical	
  elements	
  of	
  domestic	
  SAR,	
  as	
  is	
  seen	
  within	
  the	
  United	
  Kingdom	
  and	
  the	
  cooperation	
  between	
  the	
  Coast	
  Guard	
  and	
  community	
  based	
  volunteer	
  Royal	
  National	
  Lifeboat	
  Institution,	
  but	
  under	
  international	
  law	
  the	
  duty	
  remains	
  with	
  the	
  state	
  and	
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  171)	
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not	
  the	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  to	
  provide	
  SAR	
  capability	
  thus	
  giving	
  rational	
  cause	
  for	
  their	
  exclusion.	
  	
  The	
  harsh	
  reality	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  climate	
  also	
  provides	
  a	
  dimension	
  of	
  difficulty	
  to	
  the	
  delivery	
  of	
  SAR	
  operations	
  that	
  will	
  affect	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  and	
  states	
  alike,	
  both	
  facing	
  natural	
  and	
  technical	
  obstacles	
  of	
  operating	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  reality	
  is	
  a	
  major	
  reason	
  for	
  the	
  need	
  for	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement,	
  as	
  SOLAS	
  already	
  provides	
  an	
  earlier	
  global	
  SAR	
  mandate.	
  The	
  SAR	
  
Agreement	
  facilitates	
  the	
  mechanisms	
  for	
  operational	
  cooperation	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  event	
  of	
  an	
  incident	
  with	
  Art	
  9.2	
  providing	
  for	
  the	
  exchange	
  of	
  information	
  and	
  Art	
  9.3	
  providing	
  for	
  cooperation	
  including	
  “sharing	
  information	
  systems,	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  procedures,	
  techniques,	
  equipment,	
  and	
  facilities,”499	
  which	
  will	
  help	
  to	
  address	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  difficulties	
  of	
  Arctic	
  SAR	
  requirements.	
  	
  This	
  cooperation	
  also	
  provides	
  for	
  an	
  opportunity	
  whereby	
  states	
  can	
  conduct	
  joint	
  military	
  operations	
  in	
  the	
  name	
  of	
  SAR	
  rather	
  than	
  for	
  defence	
  and	
  security.	
  The	
  Arctic	
  has	
  a	
  hostile	
  climate	
  that	
  requires	
  specialised	
  equipment	
  capable	
  of	
  withstanding	
  the	
  elements,	
  and	
  the	
  collaboration	
  under	
  SAR	
  provides	
  opportunity	
  for	
  testing	
  of	
  operational	
  capability	
  without	
  causing	
  political	
  tensions.	
  This	
  includes	
  equipment	
  such	
  as	
  “remote	
  surveillance	
  and	
  detection	
  technologies	
  (i.e.	
  satellite	
  communications,	
  GPS	
  availability,	
  weather	
  stations)...[which]	
  are	
  limited	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  due	
  to	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  coverage	
  and	
  the	
  availability	
  of	
  real-­‐time	
  weather	
  information.”500	
  The	
  opportunity	
  to	
  test	
  and	
  improve	
  these	
  systems	
  will	
  help	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  serious	
  issues	
  of	
  SAR	
  capability	
  gaps	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region.	
  Some	
  of	
  these	
  capability	
  gaps	
  have	
  been	
  seen	
  historically	
  in	
  earlier	
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Arctic	
  disasters.	
  A	
  century	
  ago,	
  with	
  an	
  absence	
  of	
  much	
  of	
  the	
  technology	
  available	
  today,	
  the	
  passengers	
  of	
  the	
  Titanic	
  were	
  disadvantaged	
  because	
  of	
  the	
  scarcity	
  of	
  help	
  available	
  in	
  the	
  area	
  of	
  its	
  demise.	
  In	
  1912,	
  danger	
  from	
  icebergs	
  was	
  detected	
  from	
  a	
  personnel	
  watchman,	
  a	
  rudimentary	
  technique.	
  Now,	
  there	
  are	
  daily	
  reports	
  available	
  from	
  the	
  International	
  Ice	
  Patrol	
  on	
  the	
  whereabouts	
  and	
  population	
  density	
  of	
  icebergs,	
  though	
  vessels	
  should	
  still	
  exercise	
  caution	
  when	
  operating	
  in	
  polar	
  waters.	
  Yet,	
  this	
  still	
  does	
  not	
  address	
  the	
  scarcity	
  of	
  help	
  available	
  when	
  disaster	
  strikes.	
  Despite	
  advances	
  in	
  equipment	
  and	
  technology,	
  decades	
  later	
  in	
  1959,	
  the	
  Hans	
  Hedtoft	
  also	
  struck	
  an	
  iceberg,	
  resulting	
  in	
  no	
  surviving	
  passengers,	
  as	
  there	
  were	
  no	
  ships	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  available	
  to	
  report	
  to	
  the	
  disaster	
  and	
  all	
  aircraft	
  were	
  grounded	
  due	
  to	
  inclement	
  weather.	
  With	
  increasing	
  traffic	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  the	
  likelihood	
  of	
  accidents,	
  both	
  ordinary	
  and	
  from	
  icebergs,	
  increases	
  and	
  the	
  cooperation	
  provided	
  through	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  provides	
  a	
  means	
  by	
  which	
  to	
  diminish	
  capability	
  gaps	
  through	
  joint	
  practice	
  exercises	
  and	
  increased	
  communication	
  and	
  technical	
  cooperation.	
  A	
  U.S.	
  Department	
  of	
  Defense	
  report	
  to	
  Congress	
  claimed	
  that	
  challenges	
  to	
  Arctic	
  operations	
  included:	
  “shortfalls	
  in	
  ice	
  and	
  weather	
  reporting	
  and	
  forecasting;	
  limitations	
  in	
  command,	
  control,	
  communications,	
  computers,	
  intelligence,	
  surveillance,	
  and	
  reconnaissance…due	
  to	
  lack	
  of	
  assets	
  and	
  harsh	
  environmental	
  conditions;	
  limited	
  inventory	
  of	
  ice-­‐capable	
  vessels;	
  and	
  limited	
  shore-­‐based	
  infrastructure.”501	
  This	
  lack	
  of	
  capability	
  to	
  operate	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  by	
  the	
  world’s	
  greatest	
  military	
  shows	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  hardware	
  shortfall	
  and	
  that	
  as	
  Arctic	
  traffic	
  increases,	
  it	
  may	
  prove	
  difficult	
  for	
  SAR	
  authorities	
  to	
  even	
  have	
  the	
  equipment	
  available	
  to	
  provide	
  for	
  search	
  and	
  rescue.	
  	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  hardware	
  shortfalls,	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  experience	
  in	
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providing	
  for	
  SAR	
  operations	
  in	
  the	
  extreme	
  conditions	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Through	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  this	
  lack	
  of	
  expertise	
  is	
  being	
  addressed	
  through	
  joint	
  practice	
  operations,	
  such	
  as	
  SAREX	
  2012.	
  The	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  highlights	
  that	
  “It	
  is	
  notable	
  that	
  all	
  the	
  ships,	
  airplanes	
  etc.	
  were	
  regional	
  units	
  normally	
  operating	
  in	
  the	
  High	
  North	
  nationally	
  and	
  in	
  that	
  context	
  the	
  exercise	
  was	
  conducted	
  in	
  a	
  very	
  realistic	
  environment,”502	
  which	
  is	
  important	
  to	
  prove	
  the	
  integrity	
  of	
  the	
  exercise	
  as	
  there	
  are	
  rarely	
  advance	
  notifications	
  of	
  a	
  disaster.	
  Despite	
  the	
  relative	
  success	
  of	
  the	
  exercise	
  to	
  the	
  faux	
  disaster,	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  unlikely	
  that	
  it	
  would	
  be	
  impossible	
  for	
  SAR	
  teams	
  to	
  arrive	
  a	
  disaster	
  in	
  time	
  to	
  save	
  lives,	
  with	
  the	
  U.S.	
  military	
  noting	
  in	
  reference	
  to	
  the	
  six	
  day	
  response	
  by	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Coast	
  Guard	
  to	
  a	
  ship	
  running	
  aground,	
  “It’d	
  probably	
  take	
  us	
  six	
  weeks	
  to	
  get	
  adequate	
  resources	
  up	
  for	
  a	
  similar	
  thing	
  in	
  our	
  waters”.503	
  Thus,	
  the	
  cooperation	
  provided	
  by	
  the	
  SAR	
  
Agreement	
  helps	
  to	
  alleviate	
  this	
  shortcoming.	
  With	
  ice	
  retreat	
  increasing	
  the	
  accessibility	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  making	
  increased	
  marine	
  traffic	
  possible,	
  coupled	
  with	
  the	
  increase	
  of	
  tourist	
  cruise	
  vessels	
  and	
  other	
  commercial	
  activity	
  in	
  the	
  high	
  north	
  the	
  potential	
  for	
  mass	
  rescue	
  operations	
  also	
  increases.	
  A	
  mass	
  rescue	
  operation	
  is	
  defined	
  by	
  the	
  International	
  Maritime	
  Organization	
  as	
  “the	
  need	
  for	
  immediate	
  response	
  to	
  large	
  numbers	
  of	
  persons	
  in	
  distress,	
  such	
  that	
  the	
  capabilities	
  normally	
  available	
  to	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  authorities	
  are	
  inadequate.”504	
  Obviously	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  cannot	
  do	
  anything	
  to	
  alleviate	
  the	
  distances	
  that	
  much	
  be	
  covered	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  but	
  it	
  does	
  help	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  potential	
  that	
  a	
  single	
  state	
  may	
  not	
  have	
  sufficient	
  capability	
  to	
  provide	
  for	
  an	
  entire	
  mass	
  SAR	
  operation.	
  The	
  Automated	
  Mutual	
  Assistance	
  Vessel	
  Rescue	
  System	
  (Amver),	
  a	
  voluntary	
  reporting	
  system	
  is	
  also	
  available	
  to	
  help	
  in	
  the	
  event	
  of	
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  Council,	
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any	
  rescue	
  operation,	
  creating	
  “a	
  force	
  multiplier,	
  offering	
  a	
  unique	
  ability	
  to	
  ensure	
  a	
  blanket	
  of	
  safety	
  across	
  the	
  far	
  reaches	
  of	
  our	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  system.	
  It	
  doesn’t	
  matter	
  where	
  in	
  the	
  world	
  you	
  are—we	
  can	
  likely	
  find	
  a	
  ship	
  to	
  save	
  you.”505	
  However	
  as	
  can	
  be	
  seen	
  from	
  the	
  Amver	
  density	
  plot	
  for	
  ship	
  traffic	
  in	
  September	
  2012	
  (See	
  Figure	
  2),	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  distinct	
  lack	
  of	
  traffic	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  making	
  this	
  an	
  unreliable	
  source	
  of	
  SAR	
  help.	
  	
  
	
  Figure	
  2:	
  Amver	
  Density	
  Plot	
  September	
  2012506	
  International	
  law	
  already	
  dictates	
  the	
  requirement	
  for	
  coastal	
  states	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  provide	
  emergency	
  maritime	
  assistance	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  an	
  accident,	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  capability	
  by	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  provide	
  for	
  SAR	
  in	
  a	
  territory	
  in	
  which	
  they	
  are	
  attempting	
  to	
  claim,	
  establish	
  or	
  extend	
  sovereignty	
  delivers	
  a	
  problematic	
  and	
  potential	
  for	
  significant	
  political	
  liability.	
  Although	
  the	
  disputed	
  areas	
  for	
  overlapping	
  claims	
  are	
  minimal,	
  an	
  accident	
  in	
  which	
  a	
  state	
  was	
  unable	
  to	
  assist	
  could	
  either	
  give	
  reason	
  for	
  another	
  state	
  to	
  emphasis	
  their	
  ability	
  to	
  provide	
  required	
  assistance	
  and	
  thus	
  effective	
  administration.	
  A	
  failed	
  response	
  could	
  provide	
  reason	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  to	
  remain	
  outside	
  the	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  states	
  and	
  within	
  the	
  realm	
  of	
  the	
  common	
  heritage	
  of	
  mankind.	
  The	
  establishment	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  demonstrates	
  the	
  intent	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  fulfil	
  their	
  obligations	
  to	
  SAR	
  under	
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  (Strong,	
  2011,	
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international	
  law.	
  The	
  creation	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  also	
  has	
  potential	
  implications	
  for	
  those	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states	
  with	
  Arctic	
  interests	
  as	
  it	
  seems	
  to	
  solidify	
  the	
  cooperation	
  of	
  Arctic	
  states	
  as	
  unified	
  group	
  and	
  reinforces	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  identities	
  as	
  ‘Arctic	
  states’.	
  Thus	
  far,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  has	
  largely	
  remained	
  a	
  closed	
  forum	
  with	
  membership	
  available	
  only	
  to	
  states	
  with	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  There	
  is	
  a	
  small	
  deviation	
  to	
  these	
  league	
  restrictions	
  as	
  a	
  few	
  other	
  states	
  have	
  been	
  granted	
  ‘observer’	
  status	
  and	
  to	
  qualify	
  as	
  an	
  observer,	
  states	
  must	
  “recognize	
  Arctic	
  States'	
  sovereignty,	
  sovereign	
  rights	
  and	
  jurisdiction	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic”	
  and	
  to	
  “have	
  demonstrated	
  their	
  Arctic	
  interests	
  and	
  expertise	
  relevant	
  to	
  the	
  work	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council.”507	
  This	
  seems	
  to	
  heavily	
  restrict	
  those	
  who	
  can	
  potentially	
  impact	
  the	
  diplomatic	
  manoeuvring	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations.	
  It	
  is	
  interesting	
  to	
  note	
  that	
  all	
  states	
  already	
  admitted	
  as	
  observers	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  are	
  also	
  NATO	
  members.	
  	
  Currently,	
  six	
  other	
  states	
  have	
  applications	
  pending	
  for	
  observer	
  status;	
  all	
  except	
  one	
  are	
  NATO	
  members.	
  	
  	
  Through	
  pronouncements	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  Ilulissat	
  Declaration,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  have	
  continuously	
  declared	
  their	
  loyalty	
  to	
  existing	
  international	
  law.	
  They	
  have	
  also	
  said	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  need	
  to	
  create	
  an	
  ‘Arctic	
  Treaty’	
  similar	
  to	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  System	
  when	
  there	
  is	
  already	
  an	
  extensive	
  body	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  suitable	
  to	
  delimiting	
  and	
  managing	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  and	
  its	
  peripheral	
  regions	
  as,	
  “although	
  international	
  law	
  is	
  universal	
  its	
  interpretation	
  and	
  application	
  may	
  not,	
  in	
  practice,	
  be	
  easy	
  particularly	
  where	
  the	
  Polar	
  Regions	
  are	
  concerned	
  as	
  numerous	
  specific	
  pre-­‐conditions	
  exist	
  which	
  may	
  influence	
  the	
  result.”508	
  The	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  in	
  fact	
  demonstrates	
  that	
  international	
  law	
  is	
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  Council,	
  2011	
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  (Loukacheva,	
  2010,	
  p.	
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not	
  sufficiently	
  comprehensive	
  to	
  address	
  all	
  the	
  exigencies	
  that	
  the	
  opening	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  produces.	
  	
  In	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  a	
  region,	
  most	
  legal	
  processes	
  are	
  retrospective.	
  They	
  are	
  built	
  around	
  existing	
  populations,	
  traditions,	
  etc.	
  and	
  the	
  international	
  law	
  has	
  been	
  developed	
  to	
  act	
  as	
  guidelines	
  for	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states	
  in	
  settling	
  disputes	
  on	
  territory,	
  resources	
  and	
  war,	
  among	
  other	
  things.	
  However,	
  due	
  to	
  its	
  hostile	
  climate	
  and	
  distant	
  location,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  the	
  last	
  region	
  on	
  the	
  globe	
  to	
  remain	
  untouched	
  by	
  these	
  developmental	
  processes.	
  However,	
  due	
  to	
  climate	
  change,	
  technological	
  advances	
  and	
  commercial	
  interest	
  the	
  Arctic	
  can	
  no	
  longer	
  escape	
  the	
  advances	
  of	
  development	
  and	
  a	
  legal	
  framework	
  for	
  addressing	
  the	
  coming	
  changes	
  should	
  be	
  considered.	
  	
  The	
  SAR	
  Agreement	
  attempts	
  to	
  address	
  these	
  issues	
  of	
  development	
  as	
  a	
  proactive,	
  rather	
  than	
  a	
  reactive	
  measure,	
  building	
  upon	
  existing	
  bodies	
  of	
  international	
  law,	
  and	
  borrowing	
  from	
  codes	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  to	
  develop	
  policy	
  unique	
  to	
  the	
  exigencies	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
  In	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  polar	
  law	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  it	
  may	
  be	
  that	
  future	
  legally	
  binding	
  agreements	
  will	
  continue	
  to	
  adapt	
  existing	
  frameworks,	
  so	
  that	
  they	
  address	
  the	
  needs	
  and	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  regions,	
  possibly	
  continuing	
  exclusion	
  of	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states.	
  	
  
Conclusions	
  	
  With	
  SAR	
  being	
  defined	
  as	
  “search[ing]	
  for,	
  and	
  provision	
  of	
  aid	
  to,	
  persons,	
  ships	
  or	
  other	
  craft	
  which	
  are,	
  or	
  are	
  feared	
  to	
  be,	
  in	
  distress	
  or	
  imminent	
  danger,”509	
  SAR	
  always	
  has	
  a	
  priority	
  on	
  the	
  salvation	
  of	
  lives,	
  and	
  is	
  something	
  that	
  lies	
  outside	
  the	
  mandated	
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scope	
  of	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  operations.	
  It	
  is	
  clear	
  that	
  the	
  emphasis	
  in	
  establishing	
  yet	
  another	
  instrument	
  of	
  law	
  for	
  the	
  provision	
  of	
  SAR	
  demonstrates	
  the	
  determination	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  provide	
  for	
  such	
  salvation	
  when	
  needed	
  through	
  coordinated	
  efforts.	
  However,	
  while	
  life	
  is	
  priority	
  in	
  SAR	
  and	
  property	
  of	
  second	
  import,	
  it	
  is	
  also	
  relevant	
  that	
  the	
  capability	
  to	
  provide	
  for	
  the	
  assistance	
  in	
  case	
  of	
  distress	
  might	
  also	
  provide	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  prevent	
  the	
  occurrence	
  of	
  a	
  major	
  incident	
  or	
  disaster	
  from	
  with	
  environmental	
  consequences	
  from.	
  In	
  providing	
  such	
  assistance,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  could	
  thus	
  be	
  fulfilling	
  its	
  mandate	
  in	
  the	
  Ottawa	
  Declaration	
  to	
  provide	
  for	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  the	
  environment.	
  During	
  the	
  last	
  twenty	
  years,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  has	
  developed	
  into	
  a	
  key	
  region	
  in	
  international	
  relations	
  in	
  a	
  transition	
  strikingly	
  different	
  to	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
  a	
  period	
  noted	
  for	
  suspicion	
  and	
  hostility.	
  With	
  this	
  transition,	
  it	
  is	
  clear	
  that	
  that	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  through	
  the	
  umbrella	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  as	
  the	
  forum	
  for	
  discussion,	
  negotiation	
  and	
  cooperation	
  have	
  arrived	
  at	
  some	
  consensus	
  for	
  developing	
  and	
  protecting	
  their	
  mutual	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region,	
  mostly	
  through	
  diplomatic	
  exchanges	
  but	
  also	
  now	
  through	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  instruments	
  of	
  hard	
  law,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement.	
  In	
  the	
  text	
  of	
  the	
  SAR	
  
Agreement,	
  it	
  is	
  possible	
  to	
  see	
  several	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  including	
  the	
  safety	
  of	
  life	
  at	
  sea,	
  the	
  safety	
  of	
  the	
  environment,	
  the	
  boundaries	
  (thus	
  limitations)	
  of	
  responsibility	
  and	
  ultimately,	
  sovereignty.	
  	
  While	
  there	
  is	
  clearly	
  avoidance	
  of	
  the	
  settling	
  of	
  maritime	
  disputes	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  through	
  the	
  SAR	
  Agreement,	
  the	
  agreement	
  goes	
  a	
  long	
  way	
  in	
  advancing	
  the	
  cooperation	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  through	
  the	
  safe	
  political	
  issue	
  of	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  and	
  may	
  signal	
  the	
  trend	
  for	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations,	
  or	
  at	
  the	
  very	
  least,	
  provide	
  for	
  a	
  new	
  addition	
  to	
  discussion	
  the	
  body	
  of	
  polar	
  law.	
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Chapter	
  VIII	
  
	
  
A	
  Pending	
  Governance	
  Issue:	
  The	
  Legal	
  Status	
  
of	
  Ice	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  In	
  2002,	
  The	
  Atlantic	
  covered	
  a	
  story	
  on	
  an	
  ‘Iceberg	
  War’	
  that	
  had	
  occurred	
  off	
  the	
  coast	
  of	
  Newfoundland,	
  Canada.	
  The	
  narrative	
  of	
  the	
  story	
  goes	
  something	
  like	
  this:	
  While	
  a	
  group	
  of	
  tourists	
  were	
  admiring	
  the	
  natural	
  beauty	
  of	
  an	
  Arctic	
  iceberg	
  in	
  its	
  stunning	
  surroundings,	
  “a	
  barge	
  equipped	
  with	
  a	
  crane	
  loomed	
  from	
  around	
  the	
  headlands,	
  tethered	
  itself	
  to	
  the	
  iceberg,	
  and	
  started	
  noisily	
  and	
  methodically	
  chipping	
  away	
  at	
  it	
  with	
  a	
  device	
  designed	
  for	
  dredging	
  rock.”510	
  The	
  tourists	
  and	
  the	
  tour	
  operators	
  were	
  aghast,	
  as	
  “people	
  were	
  stealing	
  the	
  iceberg	
  right	
  in	
  front	
  of	
  our	
  eyes.”511	
  While	
  no	
  one	
  enjoys	
  having	
  a	
  beauty	
  spot	
  or	
  their	
  holiday	
  spoilt	
  by	
  development,	
  this	
  situation	
  and	
  others	
  like	
  it	
  raise	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  questions	
  regarding	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  within	
  the	
  Polar	
  Regions.	
  Most	
  of	
  these	
  questions	
  eventually	
  return	
  to	
  one	
  dominant	
  query	
  that	
  has	
  continually	
  evaded	
  resolution	
  in	
  international	
  law	
  for	
  over	
  a	
  century:	
  To	
  whom	
  does	
  the	
  freshwater	
  within	
  iceberg	
  belong,	
  and	
  thus	
  who	
  has	
  a	
  right	
  to	
  its	
  use	
  and	
  procurement?	
  	
  	
  Within	
  international	
  relations,	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  applies	
  to	
  areas	
  within	
  clearly	
  defined	
  and	
  delineated	
  borders.512	
  The	
  condition	
  of	
  the	
  sovereignty513	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  only	
  their	
  territorial	
  boundaries	
  creates	
  a	
  situation	
  whereby	
  space	
  outside	
  of	
  states	
  is	
  subject	
  the	
  condition	
  of	
  anarchy,	
  which	
  also	
  characterises	
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  (Curtis,	
  2002)	
  511	
  (Curtis,	
  2002)	
  512	
  This	
  thesis	
  does	
  not	
  have	
  the	
  scope	
  or	
  capacity	
  to	
  permit	
  a	
  discussion	
  on	
  the	
  debates	
  regarding	
  the	
  erosion	
  of	
  sovereignty.	
  513	
  Sovereignty	
  is	
  defined	
  as	
  “the	
  supreme	
  power	
  to	
  make	
  and	
  unmake	
  the	
  law,”	
  (Bodin,	
  1967,	
  p.	
  44).	
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the	
  entirety	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  Terrestrial	
  political	
  borders	
  of	
  states	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  have	
  expanded	
  until	
  all	
  terra	
  firma	
  is	
  subject	
  to	
  sovereign	
  control.	
  Within	
  the	
  maritime,	
  determined	
  through	
  state	
  practice	
  following	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  historical	
  debates514	
  on	
  whether	
  the	
  sea	
  could	
  be	
  ‘owned’,	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  became	
  a	
  norm,	
  and	
  a	
  state	
  could	
  claim	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  as	
  much	
  sea	
  as	
  they	
  could	
  defend	
  by	
  cannon	
  thus	
  establishing	
  the	
  customary	
  three	
  mile	
  limits	
  for	
  territorial	
  waters.	
  But	
  as	
  technology	
  improved,	
  states	
  became	
  increasingly	
  interested	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  over	
  the	
  resources	
  within	
  the	
  seas,	
  even	
  though	
  maintenance	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  was	
  preferred	
  for	
  purposes	
  of	
  commerce	
  and	
  security.	
  	
  	
  Responding	
  to	
  this	
  national	
  interest	
  and	
  as	
  a	
  remedy	
  to	
  the	
  anarchy	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  was	
  adapted	
  to	
  allow	
  states	
  to	
  establish	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  maritime	
  areas,	
  but	
  only	
  for	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  resource	
  extraction.	
  	
  Through	
  the	
  Conventions	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea,	
  states	
  were	
  designated	
  control	
  over	
  the	
  resources	
  in	
  the	
  sea	
  column	
  up	
  to	
  200nm	
  and	
  over	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  up	
  to	
  350	
  nm,	
  and	
  the	
  high	
  seas	
  beyond	
  these	
  limits	
  are	
  defined	
  within	
  international	
  law	
  as	
  ‘global	
  commons’.515	
  	
  	
  There	
  are	
  many	
  types	
  of	
  resources	
  in	
  the	
  oceans,	
  some	
  living	
  and	
  some	
  mineral.	
  To	
  address	
  that	
  living	
  resources	
  do	
  not	
  understand	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  political	
  boundaries,	
  and	
  that	
  many	
  of	
  these	
  resources	
  are	
  migratory	
  or	
  fugacious,	
  legal	
  frameworks	
  have	
  been	
  developed	
  for	
  managing	
  issues	
  of	
  overfishing.516	
  In	
  the	
  extraction	
  of	
  mineral	
  resources,	
  which	
  are	
  largely	
  stationary,	
  no	
  such	
  frameworks	
  have	
  been	
  established.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  514	
  For	
  example,	
  see	
  Hugo	
  Grotius’	
  Mare	
  Liberum	
  and	
  John	
  Seldon’s	
  Mare	
  Clausum.	
  515	
  Antarctic	
  is	
  also	
  defined	
  as	
  a	
  global	
  common,	
  (United	
  Nations	
  Environmental	
  Program,	
  2014)	
  516	
  For	
  example,	
  the	
  Convention	
  on	
  Fishing	
  and	
  Conservation	
  of	
  Living	
  Resources	
  of	
  the	
  
High	
  Seas	
  1958.	
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In	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  icebergs,	
  although	
  they	
  are	
  technically	
  mineral517,	
  they	
  are	
  a	
  fugacious	
  resources	
  and	
  frameworks	
  for	
  regulating	
  their	
  use	
  have	
  not	
  been	
  established.	
  This	
  chapter	
  argues	
  that	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  within	
  international	
  law	
  is	
  indeterminate,	
  but	
  existing	
  legal	
  models	
  within	
  international	
  law	
  can	
  be	
  drawn	
  from	
  to	
  establish	
  precedence	
  on	
  how	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  could	
  be	
  determined.	
  	
  As	
  governance	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  being	
  developed	
  for	
  the	
  express	
  purpose	
  of	
  managing	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  this	
  is	
  potentially	
  an	
  issue	
  of	
  governance	
  for	
  the	
  states	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  or	
  those	
  states	
  party	
  to	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  System,	
  to	
  address	
  placing	
  icebergs	
  within	
  the	
  global	
  commons.	
  By	
  establishing	
  a	
  regulatory	
  system	
  for	
  icebergs,	
  states	
  would	
  provide	
  for	
  themselves	
  clear	
  expectations	
  regarding	
  resources	
  rights	
  for	
  icebergs,	
  preventing	
  future	
  conflict	
  of	
  this	
  valuable	
  resource	
  and	
  will	
  provide	
  an	
  additional	
  facet	
  of	
  environmental	
  protection	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  environment	
  thus	
  fulfilling	
  the	
  mandate	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council.	
  	
  	
  
Background	
  to	
  the	
  Problem	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  United	
  Nations	
  claims	
  that	
  water	
  scarcity	
  already	
  affects	
  every	
  continent	
  and	
  is	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  main	
  problems	
  that	
  will	
  affect	
  society	
  in	
  the	
  next	
  century.518	
  Despite	
  frequent	
  reports	
  from	
  media	
  and	
  the	
  scientific	
  community	
  of	
  global	
  warming	
  and	
  evidence	
  of	
  retreating	
  glaciers	
  and	
  ice	
  shelves,	
  both	
  inside	
  and	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  Polar	
  Regions,	
  a	
  large	
  percentage	
  of	
  the	
  global	
  fresh	
  water	
  supply	
  is	
  stored	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  ice.	
  	
  Water	
  being	
  essential,	
  not	
  only	
  to	
  life,	
  but	
  also	
  to	
  economic	
  development,	
  “the	
  fact	
  that	
  more	
  than	
  three-­‐fourths	
  of	
  all	
  the	
  world’s	
  fresh	
  water	
  is	
  locked	
  up	
  in	
  ice	
  formations,	
  principally	
  those	
  in	
  the	
  polar	
  regions,	
  assumes	
  ever-­‐increasing	
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  To	
  be	
  classified	
  as	
  a	
  mineral,	
  a	
  substance	
  must	
  be:	
  naturally	
  occurring,	
  	
  inorganic,	
  solid,	
  have	
  a	
  limited	
  range	
  of	
  chemical	
  compositions	
  and	
  have	
  an	
  ordered	
  atomic	
  structure,	
  (King,	
  2013).	
  518	
  (United	
  Nations,	
  2012)	
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importance.”519	
  The	
  amount	
  of	
  freshwater	
  contained	
  in	
  icebergs	
  is	
  difficult	
  to	
  conceptually	
  explain,	
  not	
  unlike	
  examples	
  of	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  stars	
  in	
  the	
  sky,	
  but	
  scientific	
  measurements	
  do	
  exist.	
  Estimates	
  of	
  the	
  amount	
  of	
  the	
  world’s	
  fresh	
  water	
  contained	
  in	
  ice	
  form	
  (such	
  as	
  glaciers,	
  ice	
  sheets	
  and	
  icebergs)	
  have	
  ranged	
  from	
  75%	
  in	
  the	
  early	
  1970s520	
  to	
  68%	
  in	
  recent	
  years521	
  although	
  the	
  World	
  Glacier	
  Monitoring	
  Service	
  continues	
  to	
  use	
  the	
  75%	
  figure	
  as	
  an	
  estimate.522	
  Some	
  recent	
  research	
  indicates	
  that	
  the	
  amount	
  of	
  freshwater	
  entering	
  the	
  ocean	
  from	
  ice	
  melt	
  equals	
  that	
  of	
  the	
  total	
  global	
  consumption	
  for	
  each	
  year,523	
  and	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  enough	
  water	
  in	
  icebergs	
  to	
  fulfil	
  the	
  consumption	
  of	
  5	
  billion	
  persons,524	
  with	
  consumption	
  including	
  not	
  only	
  water	
  directly	
  consumed	
  but	
  also	
  water	
  used	
  for	
  sanitation	
  and	
  agriculture.	
  These	
  figures	
  help	
  to	
  give	
  some	
  idea	
  of	
  the	
  quantity	
  of	
  freshwater	
  available	
  in	
  ice	
  form,	
  and	
  why	
  future	
  water	
  security	
  issues	
  might	
  demand	
  that	
  water	
  from	
  icebergs	
  be	
  utilised.	
  	
  	
  Not	
  only	
  a	
  source	
  of	
  freshwater,	
  ice	
  has	
  previously	
  been	
  utilised	
  as	
  a	
  complex	
  industrial	
  product.	
  	
  As	
  early	
  as	
  the	
  1850s,	
  business	
  known	
  as	
  the	
  ‘Ice	
  Trade’	
  for	
  which	
  even	
  trade	
  journals	
  existed,	
  glacier	
  ice	
  was	
  being	
  harvested	
  from	
  Alaska	
  and	
  shipped	
  to	
  California525	
  and	
  as	
  far	
  south	
  as	
  Central	
  America.	
  However,	
  the	
  demand	
  for	
  this	
  product	
  declined	
  with	
  the	
  advent	
  of	
  modern	
  refrigeration	
  methods526	
  and	
  the	
  commercialisation	
  of	
  natural	
  ice	
  disappeared.	
  	
  The	
  notions	
  of	
  harvesting	
  the	
  freshwater	
  in	
  icebergs,	
  predominately	
  from	
  the	
  Antarctic,	
  saw	
  revivals	
  in	
  the	
  1950s	
  and	
  1970s	
  as	
  the	
  problems	
  of	
  waters	
  scarcity	
  in	
  arid	
  areas	
  of	
  the	
  world	
  received	
  the	
  attention	
  of	
  international	
  developers.	
  During	
  this	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  519	
  (Joyner,	
  1991,	
  p.	
  213)	
  520	
  (Schultz,	
  1974,	
  p.	
  74)	
  521	
  (Gleick,	
  2009,	
  p.	
  6)	
  522	
  	
  See	
  	
  (World	
  Glacier	
  Monitoring	
  Service,	
  2007)	
  523	
  “The	
  amount	
  of	
  iceberg	
  water	
  that	
  annually	
  dissolves	
  into	
  the	
  sea	
  is	
  3	
  trillion	
  m3,	
  close	
  to	
  the	
  world’s	
  annual	
  consumption	
  of	
  fresh	
  water	
  (3.3	
  m3),”	
  (Spandonide,	
  2009,	
  pg	
  549).	
  524	
  (McCormick,	
  1988)	
  525	
  (Keithan,	
  1967,	
  p.	
  174)	
  526	
  (Joseph	
  &	
  Hopkins,	
  2002,	
  p.	
  153)	
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period	
  several	
  researchers	
  developed	
  models	
  for	
  calculating	
  the	
  costs	
  and	
  benefits	
  of	
  harvesting	
  and	
  transporting	
  icebergs	
  for	
  water	
  and	
  for	
  potential	
  use	
  as	
  an	
  energy	
  resource;527	
  however,	
  the	
  transfer	
  of	
  icebergs	
  to	
  water	
  deficient	
  regions	
  has	
  yet	
  to	
  be	
  implemented,	
  in	
  part	
  due	
  to	
  economic	
  inefficiencies	
  and	
  in	
  part	
  due	
  to	
  logistical	
  difficulties.528	
  	
  Some	
  of	
  these	
  early	
  proposals	
  to	
  harvest	
  icebergs	
  for	
  potable	
  water	
  centred	
  on	
  discussions	
  of	
  water	
  scarcity	
  as	
  the	
  water	
  contained	
  within	
  icebergs	
  was	
  sometimes	
  thought	
  of	
  as	
  a	
  universal	
  good	
  with	
  access	
  to	
  clean	
  drinking	
  water	
  having	
  been	
  declared	
  a	
  human	
  right.529	
  However,	
  in	
  a	
  return	
  to	
  early	
  periods	
  of	
  ice	
  harvesting	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  recent	
  usage	
  of	
  iceberg	
  resources	
  largely	
  appears	
  to	
  centre	
  on	
  economic	
  incentives.	
  	
  This	
  difference	
  would	
  seem	
  to	
  change	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  debate	
  on	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  icebergs	
  in	
  international	
  law	
  from	
  a	
  common	
  good	
  to	
  a	
  private	
  good	
  when	
  acquisition	
  and	
  consumption	
  is	
  for	
  profit	
  rather	
  than	
  for	
  the	
  benefit	
  of	
  mankind.	
  	
  Current	
  uses	
  for	
  icebergs	
  include	
  cosmetics	
  for	
  the	
  Asian	
  market,	
  water	
  for	
  the	
  European	
  market,	
  tourism	
  both	
  from	
  land	
  and	
  sea	
  in	
  the	
  North	
  Atlantic,	
  and	
  vodka	
  and	
  beer	
  produced	
  in	
  Canada.530	
  	
  	
  
Historical	
  Debates	
  on	
  the	
  Legal	
  Status	
  of	
  Ice	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  status	
  of	
  polar	
  ice	
  in	
  international	
  law	
  has	
  been	
  topical	
  for	
  legal	
  scholars	
  since	
  Peary	
  set	
  foot	
  on	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  in	
  1909,	
  and	
  is	
  interesting	
  for	
  at	
  least	
  two	
  reasons.	
  The	
  first	
  is	
  that	
  ice	
  as	
  a	
  substance	
  is	
  of	
  a	
  potentially	
  temporary	
  nature	
  and	
  that	
  by	
  changing	
  its	
  physical	
  properties—by	
  melting—it	
  is	
  no	
  longer	
  ice	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  527	
  See	
  (Schultz,	
  1974),	
  (Smakhtin,	
  et	
  al.,	
  2001),	
  (Spandonide,	
  2009).	
  528	
  (National	
  Oceanic	
  and	
  Atmospheric	
  Administration,	
  2012)	
  529	
  (UN	
  News	
  Centre,	
  2010)	
  530	
  	
  For	
  further	
  information	
  see:	
  Ossetra	
  Global	
  at	
  http://www.ossetra-­‐global.com,	
  Glace	
  Iceberg	
  Water	
  at	
  http://www.icebergcanada.com,	
  Tourism	
  Campaign	
  for	
  Newfoundland	
  &	
  Labrador	
  at	
  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RpShYvI84JI	
  and	
  Iceberg	
  Vodka	
  at	
  http://www.iceberg.ca.	
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but	
  water,	
  and	
  therefore	
  loses	
  its	
  special	
  status	
  as	
  ice.	
  For	
  international	
  law,	
  this	
  ability	
  of	
  ice	
  to	
  change	
  physical	
  properties	
  makes	
  it	
  difficult	
  to	
  handle	
  ice	
  under	
  the	
  same	
  categories	
  as	
  other	
  resources	
  such	
  as	
  minerals	
  or	
  living	
  resources	
  and	
  it	
  has	
  also	
  caused	
  it	
  to	
  be	
  omitted	
  from	
  legal	
  discussions	
  of	
  water.	
  The	
  second	
  point	
  is	
  that	
  ice	
  has	
  eluded	
  codification,	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  varied	
  types	
  of	
  ice	
  and	
  thus	
  their	
  varied	
  use	
  within	
  the	
  polar	
  areas,	
  but	
  more	
  importantly	
  because	
  in	
  earlier	
  eras	
  the	
  necessity	
  to	
  pursue	
  codification	
  failed	
  to	
  climax	
  due	
  to	
  lack	
  of	
  scarcity	
  and	
  conflict.	
  Ice	
  has	
  also	
  avoided	
  a	
  legal	
  status	
  through	
  customary	
  law	
  due	
  to	
  lack	
  of	
  consistent	
  state	
  practice.	
  	
  At	
  the	
  turn	
  of	
  the	
  twentieth	
  century,	
  knowledge	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  especially	
  its	
  geography,	
  was	
  in	
  a	
  very	
  rudimentary	
  state.	
  It	
  was	
  still	
  believed	
  that	
  located	
  underneath	
  the	
  ice	
  of	
  the	
  Mar	
  Glaciale	
  was	
  more	
  land	
  to	
  be	
  claimed	
  by	
  the	
  states	
  through	
  parties	
  of	
  flag-­‐carrying	
  polar	
  explorers,	
  a	
  misconception	
  perpetuated	
  by	
  the	
  characteristics	
  of	
  geographical	
  formations,	
  now	
  known	
  to	
  be	
  glacial	
  deposits.	
  It	
  is	
  now	
  assumed	
  those	
  apparent	
  geographical	
  characteristics	
  originated	
  in	
  ice	
  calved	
  from	
  terra	
  firma	
  and	
  when	
  the	
  ice	
  melted	
  in	
  the	
  Atlantic,	
  the	
  rocks	
  sank	
  to	
  the	
  bottom	
  of	
  the	
  sea.	
  Dominating	
  the	
  period	
  was	
  a	
  near	
  hysteria	
  for	
  Arctic	
  exploration	
  for	
  purposes	
  of	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  through	
  discovery	
  and	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  new	
  lands;	
  this	
  ‘evidence’	
  of	
  additional	
  lands	
  fuelled	
  the	
  search	
  for	
  territory.531	
  	
  However,	
  this	
  quest	
  for	
  land	
  was	
  not	
  a	
  without	
  constraint	
  and	
  respect	
  for	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  areas	
  known	
  to	
  be	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  
Mar	
  Glaciale.	
  	
  	
  When	
  Admiral	
  Peary	
  acquired	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  and	
  in	
  his	
  eagerness	
  to	
  claim	
  a	
  territorial	
  prize	
  for	
  the	
  beloved	
  motherland,	
  a	
  telegram	
  was	
  dispatched	
  to	
  the	
  Associated	
  Press	
  and	
  to	
  the	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  531	
  As	
  late	
  as	
  the	
  1930s,	
  states	
  were	
  looking	
  for	
  new	
  islands	
  using	
  aerial	
  surveillance.	
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United	
  States,	
  William	
  Taft,	
  saying	
  “The	
  stars	
  and	
  stripes	
  are	
  nailed	
  to	
  the	
  north	
  pole.”532	
  By	
  placing	
  the	
  flag	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  Peary	
  was	
  indicating	
  rights	
  of	
  sovereign	
  possession.	
  However,	
  President	
  Taft	
  replied	
  with	
  a	
  ‘Thanks,	
  but	
  no	
  thanks’,	
  dismissing	
  potential	
  U.S.	
  territorial	
  possession	
  of	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  as	
  this	
  was	
  contradictory	
  to	
  accepted	
  norms	
  of	
  customary	
  international	
  law,	
  respecting	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas.	
  It	
  was	
  accepted	
  that	
  that	
  “title	
  by	
  discovery	
  applies	
  to	
  land,	
  not	
  to	
  water	
  …as	
  it	
  is	
  universally	
  held	
  that	
  the	
  open	
  seas,	
  beyond	
  the	
  limit	
  of	
  territorial	
  waters,	
  are	
  insusceptible	
  of	
  appropriation.”533	
  As	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  is	
  positioned	
  well	
  within	
  the	
  limits	
  of	
  the	
  high	
  seas	
  it	
  was	
  not	
  available	
  for	
  appropriation	
  by	
  any	
  state	
  and	
  Taft’s	
  precedent	
  established	
  that	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  on	
  the	
  surface	
  of	
  the	
  Mar	
  Glaciale	
  would	
  remain	
  outside	
  the	
  territorial	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  any	
  state.	
  	
  	
  Even	
  though	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  rejected	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  icy	
  surfaces	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole,	
  the	
  discussion	
  of	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  was	
  not	
  yet	
  over,	
  nor	
  was	
  this	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  territorial	
  claims	
  at	
  the	
  North	
  Pole.	
  	
  In	
  1925	
  Canada,	
  followed	
  by	
  Russia	
  in	
  1926,	
  extended	
  their	
  sovereign	
  territory	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole—though	
  neither	
  country	
  claimed	
  possession	
  of	
  the	
  pole	
  itself,	
  but	
  only	
  claimed	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  the	
  territory	
  from	
  their	
  landmass	
  continuing	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  North	
  Pole	
  and	
  established	
  their	
  ‘regions	
  of	
  attraction’	
  through	
  the	
  sector	
  principle.534	
  Each	
  state	
  claimed	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  all	
  lands	
  discovered	
  or	
  undiscovered	
  within	
  the	
  areas	
  of	
  these	
  pie	
  shaped	
  wedges,535	
  using	
  ideas	
  of	
  the	
  sector	
  principle	
  and	
  regions	
  of	
  attraction	
  to	
  establish	
  spheres	
  of	
  influence.	
  This	
  signalled	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  era	
  of	
  exploration	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  for	
  purposes	
  of	
  territorial	
  acquisition	
  and	
  heralded	
  the	
  beginning	
  of	
  a	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  532	
  (Peary,	
  1910,	
  p.	
  195)	
  533	
  (Scott,	
  1909,	
  p.	
  938)	
  534	
  The	
  sector	
  principle	
  is	
  also	
  used	
  in	
  the	
  Antarctic.	
  535	
  (Rolston,	
  1988)	
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new	
  era	
  in	
  Arctic	
  exploration—an	
  era	
  of	
  scientific	
  exploration	
  introducing	
  a	
  new	
  use	
  for	
  polar	
  ice.	
  	
  When	
  scientists	
  began	
  to	
  use	
  islands	
  of	
  ice	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  for	
  semi-­‐permanent	
  habitation536,	
  an	
  additional	
  scholarly	
  element	
  on	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  was	
  introduced:	
  should	
  ice,	
  used	
  as	
  land,	
  be	
  treated	
  as	
  land	
  under	
  international	
  law?	
  The	
  ice	
  islands,	
  used	
  predominantly	
  by	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union,	
  were	
  of	
  questionable	
  jurisdictional	
  status	
  for	
  several	
  reasons.	
  	
  Under	
  international	
  law,	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  a	
  territory	
  could	
  be	
  claimed	
  if	
  a	
  state	
  were	
  to	
  maintain	
  effective	
  occupation	
  of	
  the	
  territory.	
  But	
  ice	
  islands,	
  not	
  unlike	
  the	
  sea	
  ice	
  over	
  the	
  rest	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  are	
  in	
  a	
  constant	
  state	
  of	
  movement.	
  The	
  rotational	
  movement	
  of	
  the	
  ice	
  islands	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  effects	
  of	
  the	
  Beaufort	
  Gyre	
  caused	
  some	
  difficulty	
  in	
  determining	
  their	
  status	
  because,	
  although	
  some	
  ice	
  can	
  be	
  utilised	
  as	
  if	
  it	
  were	
  land,	
  their	
  movement	
  prevents	
  permanent	
  habitation	
  at	
  fixed	
  coordinates	
  and	
  “any	
  habitation	
  fixed	
  upon	
  it	
  would	
  be	
  continually	
  moving.	
  And	
  such	
  possible	
  occupation	
  would	
  be	
  too	
  precarious	
  and	
  shifting	
  to	
  and	
  fro	
  to	
  give	
  any	
  one	
  a	
  good	
  title.”537	
  So	
  ice	
  islands	
  formed	
  of	
  multi-­‐year	
  sea	
  ice	
  would	
  not	
  be	
  seen	
  as	
  terra	
  firma	
  by	
  virtue	
  of	
  discovery	
  or	
  claimed	
  sovereignty,	
  yet	
  further	
  questions	
  remained.	
  	
  But	
  what	
  of	
  ice	
  islands	
  originating	
  from	
  land?	
  If	
  state	
  sovereignty	
  could	
  be	
  realised	
  over	
  an	
  ice	
  island	
  birthed	
  from	
  terra	
  firma,	
  when	
  did	
  that	
  sovereignty	
  begin?	
  Did	
  sovereignty	
  begin	
  when	
  the	
  ice	
  formed	
  over	
  land,	
  and	
  remain	
  when	
  the	
  ice	
  island	
  calved	
  from	
  a	
  land	
  formation,	
  or	
  did	
  it	
  begin	
  when	
  the	
  island	
  became	
  occupied?	
  The	
  sovereign	
  status	
  of	
  a	
  moving	
  ice	
  island	
  becomes	
  problematic	
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  “Soviet	
  scientists	
  have	
  been	
  stationed	
  on	
  ice	
  islands	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  since	
  1937,	
  50	
  to	
  which	
  theatrical	
  groups	
  are	
  sent	
  for	
  entertainment.	
  	
  T-­‐3,	
  Fletcher's	
  Ice	
  Island,	
  having	
  a	
  circumference	
  of	
  31	
  miles	
  and	
  a	
  breadth	
  of	
  five	
  miles,	
  discovered	
  in	
  1952,	
  was	
  occupied	
  for	
  some	
  time	
  by	
  U.S.	
  scientists	
  and	
  is	
  still	
  drifting.	
  Peary	
  camped	
  on	
  such	
  an	
  island	
  in	
  1909	
  and	
  it	
  was	
  still	
  drifting	
  45	
  years	
  later,”	
  (Auburn,	
  1970,	
  p.	
  242).	
  537	
  (Balch,	
  1919,	
  p.	
  266)	
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when	
  the	
  island	
  floats	
  into	
  the	
  sector	
  of	
  another	
  state.	
  Does	
  sovereignty	
  remain	
  with	
  the	
  occupant,	
  or	
  does	
  it	
  transfer	
  to	
  the	
  state	
  into	
  whose	
  territory	
  the	
  island	
  is	
  floating?	
  	
  One	
  view	
  determined	
  that	
  “ice	
  islands	
  should	
  be	
  considered	
  property	
  of	
  the	
  State	
  away	
  from	
  which	
  they	
  calved...	
  [and]	
  Permitting	
  an	
  ice	
  island	
  to	
  drift	
  beyond	
  its	
  maritime	
  jurisdiction	
  without	
  occupation	
  clearly	
  would	
  signify	
  forfeiture	
  of	
  exclusive	
  sovereign	
  rights	
  to	
  it.”538	
  The	
  prevailing	
  idea	
  proffered	
  was	
  that	
  ice	
  islands	
  should	
  legally	
  be	
  assimilated	
  to	
  ships.	
  	
  However,	
  this	
  posed	
  additional	
  problems	
  because	
  if	
  ice	
  islands	
  were	
  to	
  be	
  legally	
  classified	
  as	
  ships	
  they	
  must	
  be	
  registered	
  with	
  a	
  flag	
  state	
  and	
  maintain	
  insurance—and	
  of	
  course,	
  ice	
  islands	
  do	
  not	
  have	
  navigational	
  abilities,	
  which	
  as	
  an	
  “essential	
  criterion	
  of	
  a	
  floating	
  apparatus	
  qualifying	
  as	
  a	
  ship,”539	
  and	
  this	
  technicality	
  made	
  it	
  difficult	
  to	
  gain	
  state	
  consensus	
  on	
  this	
  approach.	
  	
  The	
  issue	
  of	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  islands,	
  either	
  with	
  determination	
  as	
  sovereign	
  territory	
  or	
  with	
  designation	
  as	
  ships	
  under	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas,	
  was	
  the	
  cause	
  of	
  considerable	
  concern	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War.	
  This	
  was	
  especially	
  true	
  for	
  the	
  Canadians	
  who	
  were	
  worried	
  by	
  “the	
  presence	
  of	
  Soviet	
  scientists	
  on	
  ice-­‐islands	
  drifting	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  ‘sector’	
  and	
  territorial	
  waters.”540	
  With	
  their	
  semi-­‐permanent	
  nature,	
  ice	
  islands	
  could	
  be	
  used	
  as	
  assault	
  platforms	
  for	
  stationing	
  troops	
  and	
  weapons,	
  creating	
  security	
  concerns.	
  Thus,	
  the	
  decision	
  to	
  make	
  a	
  determination	
  on	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  islands	
  was	
  neglected,	
  in	
  part	
  to	
  avoid	
  granting	
  of	
  legal	
  rights	
  to	
  those	
  utilising	
  the	
  ice	
  islands.	
  	
  	
  The	
  lack	
  of	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  islands	
  in	
  international	
  law	
  developed	
  an	
  additional	
  jurisdictional	
  issue	
  owing	
  to	
  the	
  presence	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  538	
  (Joyner,	
  1991,	
  p.	
  238)	
  539	
  (Pharand,	
  1973,	
  p.	
  197)	
  540	
  (Auburn,	
  1970,	
  pp.	
  241-­‐42)	
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of	
  semi-­‐permanent	
  populations	
  of	
  scientists	
  habituating	
  on	
  these	
  moving	
  islands	
  without	
  sovereign	
  status.	
  	
  In	
  1972,	
  a	
  murder	
  was	
  committed	
  on	
  an	
  island	
  occupied	
  by	
  a	
  member	
  of	
  a	
  science	
  crew	
  from	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  while	
  the	
  ice	
  island	
  was	
  floating	
  in	
  the	
  Canadian	
  sector.	
  Due	
  to	
  the	
  uncertain	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  the	
  ice	
  island,	
  there	
  was	
  the	
  question	
  over	
  which	
  state	
  held	
  legal	
  authority	
  to	
  prosecute	
  for	
  the	
  homicide	
  case.	
  	
  Known	
  as	
  the	
  Escamilla	
  Case	
  on	
  ice	
  island	
  T-­‐3,	
  Canada	
  chose	
  not	
  “to	
  exercise	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  the	
  incident,	
  even	
  if	
  it	
  was	
  convinced	
  that	
  it	
  had	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  do	
  so.”541	
  It	
  instead	
  deferred	
  to	
  allow	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  to	
  treat	
  the	
  ice	
  island	
  as	
  a	
  ship	
  and	
  gave	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  the	
  prerogative	
  to	
  prosecute	
  the	
  accused	
  individual.	
  Meanwhile,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  maintained	
  that	
  the	
  ice	
  island	
  was	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  high	
  seas	
  and	
  claimed	
  jurisdiction	
  on	
  the	
  basis	
  that	
  the	
  incident	
  occurred	
  between	
  U.S.	
  citizens.542	
  Here	
  is	
  an	
  example	
  of	
  both	
  principles	
  (sector	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  designation	
  as	
  ships)	
  being	
  applied	
  by	
  different	
  states,	
  according	
  to	
  their	
  determined	
  interests,	
  which	
  shows	
  the	
  difficulty	
  in	
  reaching	
  international	
  agreement	
  on	
  the	
  classification	
  of	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  islands.	
  	
  	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  the	
  demonstrated	
  difference	
  in	
  state	
  practice	
  regarding	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  islands,	
  continental	
  ice543	
  has	
  also	
  generated	
  discussion	
  among	
  legal	
  scholars.	
  	
  Continental	
  ice544	
  has	
  originated	
  from	
  a	
  continental	
  landmass,	
  especially	
  Antarctica,	
  and	
  frequently	
  a	
  large	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  shelf	
  remains	
  lodged	
  on	
  the	
  continent	
  but	
  at	
  times	
  it	
  can	
  also	
  be	
  found	
  floating	
  in	
  the	
  sea	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  tabular	
  islands	
  or	
  icebergs	
  when	
  it	
  has	
  calved	
  from	
  its	
  point	
  of	
  origin.	
  	
  The	
  academic	
  discussion	
  on	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  shelf	
  ice	
  in	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  which	
  has	
  produced	
  a	
  general	
  consensus	
  that	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  541	
  (Pharand,	
  1971,	
  p.	
  84)	
  542	
  (Auburn	
  F.	
  ,	
  1973,	
  p.	
  554)	
  543	
  “Ice	
  can	
  generally	
  be	
  divided	
  into	
  two	
  main	
  categories:	
  continental	
  and	
  sea	
  ice.	
  Continental	
  ice	
  has	
  three	
  types:	
  ice	
  sheets,	
  glacial	
  ice	
  and	
  ice	
  shelves,”	
  (Rothwell,	
  1996,	
  p.	
  26).	
  544	
  Also	
  called	
  ‘shelf	
  ice’.	
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“icebergs	
  may	
  be	
  privately	
  owned	
  in	
  the	
  academic	
  sense,”545	
  based	
  on	
  arguments	
  dating	
  back	
  to	
  Grotius	
  that	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  water	
  column	
  can	
  be	
  privately	
  owned.	
  Although	
  it	
  is	
  found	
  in	
  both	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  Antarctic	
  Polar	
  Regions,	
  it	
  has	
  not	
  been	
  included	
  within	
  any	
  specific	
  legal	
  regime,	
  however,	
  “the	
  continued	
  specific	
  reference	
  to	
  ice	
  shelves	
  under	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  provisions	
  in	
  fact	
  indicates	
  that	
  the	
  Treaty	
  parties	
  believe	
  that	
  ice	
  falls	
  into	
  a	
  special	
  category,	
  worthy	
  of	
  separate	
  consideration.”546	
  This	
  separate	
  condition	
  is	
  generally	
  accepted	
  as	
  “ice	
  formations	
  that	
  are	
  more	
  or	
  less	
  immovable	
  should	
  enjoy	
  a	
  legal	
  status	
  equivalent	
  to	
  polar	
  territory”547	
  as	
  “there	
  is	
  not	
  much	
  difficulty	
  in	
  classifying	
  sheet	
  ice	
  or	
  glacial	
  ice	
  as	
  equivalent	
  to	
  terra	
  firma.”548	
  The	
  only	
  consensus	
  that	
  has	
  been	
  reached	
  is	
  that	
  ice	
  islands	
  do	
  not	
  qualify	
  for	
  their	
  own	
  territorial	
  waters	
  as	
  permitted	
  for	
  land	
  islands.	
  Yet,	
  even	
  this	
  agreement	
  has	
  not	
  led	
  to	
  clear	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  shelf	
  ice	
  under	
  international	
  law,	
  as	
  there	
  continues	
  to	
  be	
  division	
  between	
  legal	
  opinion,	
  state	
  practice	
  and	
  in	
  differences	
  in	
  jurisdictional	
  frameworks.	
  	
  This	
  final	
  difficulty	
  lies	
  in	
  the	
  different	
  legal	
  regimes	
  operating	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  Antarctic	
  regions.	
  	
  In	
  the	
  Antarctic,	
  operating	
  under	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  System	
  1959,	
  sovereign	
  claims	
  to	
  territory	
  have	
  been	
  suspended	
  and	
  so	
  even	
  though	
  continental	
  ice	
  is	
  generally	
  agreed	
  to	
  hold	
  sovereignty	
  parallel	
  with	
  land,	
  states	
  are	
  not	
  permitted	
  to	
  claim	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  ice	
  originating	
  from	
  Antarctica.	
  The	
  situation	
  is	
  very	
  different	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  not	
  only	
  because	
  it	
  is	
  an	
  ocean	
  surrounded	
  by	
  land,	
  but	
  also	
  because	
  it	
  is	
  surrounded	
  by	
  sovereign	
  states.	
  	
  For	
  example,	
  “since	
  1979,	
  Greenland	
  has	
  enjoyed	
  home	
  rule	
  from	
  Denmark....	
  as	
  a	
  result,	
  the	
  sovereign	
  status	
  of	
  the	
  ice	
  sheet	
  covering	
  Greenland	
  is	
  not	
  in	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  545	
  (Lundquist,	
  1977,	
  p.	
  23)	
  546	
  (Rothwell,	
  1996,	
  p.	
  268)	
  547	
  (Lakhtine,	
  1930,	
  p.	
  712)	
  548	
  (Rothwell,	
  1996,	
  p.	
  262)	
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question.	
  Sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  ice	
  sheet	
  follows	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  subglacial	
  terra	
  firma.	
  The	
  critical	
  quality	
  present	
  in	
  Greenland—and	
  absent	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Antarctica—is	
  clear	
  and	
  indisputable	
  title	
  to	
  sovereign	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  the	
  territory.”549	
  	
  This	
  indicates	
  that	
  ice	
  originating	
  from	
  a	
  landmass	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  could	
  retain	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  origination.	
  	
  	
  
Existing	
  Legal	
  Frameworks	
  as	
  Models	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  historical	
  scholarly	
  discussion	
  and	
  state	
  practice	
  on	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  has	
  disintegrated	
  any	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  sea	
  ice,	
  but	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  continues	
  to	
  provide	
  a	
  different	
  dilemma	
  against	
  the	
  backdrop	
  of	
  water	
  scarcity.	
  The	
  management	
  of	
  freshwater	
  sources	
  and	
  water	
  scarcity	
  are	
  enormous	
  challenges	
  facing	
  the	
  globe	
  in	
  the	
  twenty-­‐first	
  century	
  and	
  some	
  principles	
  for	
  approaching	
  the	
  issue	
  have	
  been	
  developed,	
  including	
  those	
  in	
  the	
  UN’s	
  Millennium	
  Development	
  Goals.550	
  While	
  there	
  are	
  bilateral	
  agreements	
  governing	
  water	
  resources,	
  an	
  agreement	
  on	
  an	
  international	
  legal	
  framework	
  for	
  managing	
  transboundary	
  water	
  resources	
  has	
  eluded	
  international	
  consensus.551	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  other	
  freshwater	
  issues,	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  remains	
  untouched	
  by	
  legal	
  regimes	
  and	
  at	
  present,	
  “International	
  law	
  concerning	
  ice	
  remains	
  incomplete	
  and	
  unclear	
  [and]	
  no	
  international	
  legal	
  regime	
  is	
  yet	
  in	
  place	
  which	
  comprehensively	
  sets	
  out	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  in	
  its	
  various	
  forms	
  or	
  specifically	
  assigns	
  jurisdictional	
  competence	
  over	
  its	
  use.”552	
  However,	
  existing	
  legal	
  models	
  in	
  both	
  domestic	
  and	
  international	
  law	
  can	
  be	
  drawn	
  from	
  to	
  establish	
  precedence	
  on	
  how	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  could	
  be	
  determined	
  during	
  four	
  conditions	
  freshwater	
  iceberg	
  could	
  hold	
  during	
  its	
  lifecycle.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  549	
  (Joyner,	
  1991,	
  p.	
  222)	
  550	
  (United	
  Nations,	
  2000)	
  551	
  In	
  2012,	
  The	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  Non-­‐Navigational	
  Uses	
  of	
  International	
  Watercourses	
  1997	
  had	
  insufficient	
  signatories	
  to	
  enter	
  into	
  effect	
  as	
  international	
  law.	
  552	
  (Joyner,	
  1991,	
  p.	
  214)	
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  This	
  absence	
  of	
  a	
  legal	
  status	
  for	
  ice	
  extends	
  even	
  to	
  the	
  most	
  principal	
  regime	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  governing	
  the	
  maritime	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982,	
  which	
  makes	
  only	
  provision	
  for	
  the	
  environmental	
  protection	
  of	
  ice-­‐covered	
  waters	
  through	
  national	
  legislation.	
  The	
  only	
  mention	
  that	
  ice	
  specifically	
  receives	
  in	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  
Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  is	
  in	
  Article	
  234,	
  which	
  states:	
  “Coastal	
  States	
  have	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  adopt	
  and	
  enforce	
  non-­‐discriminatory	
  laws	
  and	
  regulations	
  for	
  the	
  prevention,	
  reduction	
  and	
  control	
  of	
  marine	
  pollution	
  from	
  vessels	
  in	
  ice-­‐covered	
  areas	
  within	
  the	
  limits	
  of	
  the	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zone....”553	
  This	
  article,	
  while	
  potentially	
  reducing	
  the	
  possibility	
  of	
  environmental	
  disasters	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  does	
  not	
  provide	
  any	
  guidance	
  on	
  the	
  designation	
  of	
  a	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice,	
  and	
  in	
  fact	
  this	
  proviso	
  could	
  be	
  determined	
  to	
  only	
  apply	
  to	
  sea	
  ice,	
  the	
  type	
  of	
  ice	
  that	
  forms	
  a	
  continuous	
  ‘crust’	
  over	
  parts	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  marine	
  environment	
  which	
  creates	
  ‘ice-­‐covered	
  waters’	
  and	
  not	
  to	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  originating	
  from	
  land.	
  Applying	
  to	
  global	
  ocean	
  bodies,	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  
1982	
  makes	
  no	
  provision	
  for	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  inside	
  or	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  rendering	
  this	
  framework	
  insufficient	
  as	
  a	
  standard	
  for	
  freshwater	
  ice.	
  	
  	
  Although	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  is	
  silent	
  on	
  the	
  treatment	
  of	
  ice,	
  there	
  are	
  several	
  other	
  legal	
  regimes	
  with	
  potential	
  to	
  provide	
  guidance	
  on	
  establishing	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  in	
  the	
  Polar	
  Regions.	
  These	
  include	
  the	
  Argentine	
  
Ley	
  de	
  Protección	
  de	
  Glaciares	
  2010,	
  the	
  U.S.-­‐Mexico	
  Rio	
  Grande	
  
Treaty	
  1906,	
  the	
  North	
  Pacific	
  Fur	
  Seal	
  Convention	
  1911	
  and	
  finally,	
  the	
  work	
  of	
  the	
  International	
  Law	
  Association	
  culminating	
  in	
  the	
  
Berlin	
  Rules	
  applied	
  in	
  the	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  Non-­‐
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  553	
  (United	
  Nations,	
  1982)	
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Navigational	
  Uses	
  of	
  International	
  Watercourses	
  1997.554	
  Like	
  the	
  
United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982,	
  none	
  of	
  these	
  legal	
  frameworks	
  provide	
  an	
  absolute	
  remedy	
  for	
  the	
  issue	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  complexities	
  of	
  the	
  properties	
  and	
  location	
  of	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  in	
  the	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zones	
  of	
  sovereign	
  states	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  high	
  seas	
  of	
  the	
  oceans.	
  	
  However,	
  cumulatively	
  these	
  instruments	
  provide	
  guidelines	
  for	
  a	
  remedy	
  for	
  settling	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  near	
  and	
  within	
  the	
  Polar	
  Regions	
  with	
  potential	
  application	
  for	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  they	
  address	
  many	
  of	
  the	
  issues	
  surrounding	
  freshwater	
  ice,	
  including	
  its	
  value	
  as	
  water	
  resource,	
  the	
  fugacious	
  nature	
  of	
  icebergs	
  and	
  deliver	
  principles	
  on	
  the	
  equitable	
  appropriation	
  of	
  freshwater.	
  	
  	
  The	
  first	
  condition	
  in	
  the	
  lifecycle	
  of	
  an	
  iceberg	
  begins	
  at	
  the	
  point	
  of	
  origin,	
  in	
  a	
  glacier	
  or	
  continental	
  shelf	
  on	
  terra	
  firma	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  on	
  sovereign	
  territory.	
  If	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  ice	
  resources,	
  such	
  as	
  shelf	
  ice	
  were	
  applicable	
  in	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  in	
  absence	
  of	
  the	
  
Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  System,	
  then	
  the	
  principles	
  that	
  provide	
  that	
  status	
  would	
  also	
  apply	
  to	
  similar	
  ice	
  features	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  would	
  mean	
  that	
  a	
  state,	
  such	
  as	
  Denmark,	
  could	
  utilise	
  any	
  and	
  all	
  the	
  multiple	
  freshwater	
  resources	
  of	
  Greenland	
  while	
  they	
  are	
  within	
  their	
  territorial	
  boundaries	
  because	
  “the	
  natural	
  wealth	
  and	
  resources	
  located	
  within	
  the	
  territorial	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  a	
  sovereign	
  state	
  belong	
  to	
  the	
  community,	
  i.e.	
  the	
  people	
  themselves.”555	
  The	
  State	
  of	
  Argentina	
  has	
  recently	
  exercised	
  this	
  concept	
  over	
  glaciers	
  within	
  its	
  territory.	
  In	
  the	
  Ley	
  de	
  Protección	
  de	
  Glaciares	
  2010,	
  the	
  Argentine	
  government	
  has	
  mandated	
  that	
  glaciers	
  are	
  public	
  property	
  in	
  order	
  “to	
  preserve	
  as	
  strategic	
  reserves	
  of	
  water	
  resources	
  and	
  water	
  providers	
  charging	
  watersheds.”556	
  Due	
  to	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  554	
  In	
  a	
  paper	
  on	
  Swiss	
  glaciers,	
  Michael	
  Bütler	
  claims	
  that	
  the	
  Kyoto	
  Protocol	
  protects	
  glaciers	
  even	
  though	
  glaciers	
  are	
  not	
  specifically	
  mentioned	
  in	
  the	
  treaty,	
  (Bütler,	
  2007).	
  555	
  (Hossain	
  &	
  Chowdhury,	
  1984,	
  p.	
  1)	
  556	
  (Ley	
  de	
  Protección	
  de	
  Glaciares,	
  2010)	
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the	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  System,	
  a	
  regime	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  and	
  the	
  
Ley	
  de	
  Protección	
  de	
  Glaciares,	
  a	
  piece	
  of	
  domestic	
  law,	
  it	
  appears	
  that	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  in	
  a	
  glacier	
  or	
  periglacial	
  environment	
  would	
  qualify	
  as	
  a	
  resource	
  eligible	
  for	
  permanent	
  sovereignty.557	
  	
  	
  	
  This	
  is	
  pertinent,	
  as	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  permanent	
  sovereignty	
  does	
  not	
  make	
  exceptions	
  for	
  specific	
  types	
  of	
  resource	
  and	
  rate	
  at	
  which	
  a	
  state	
  is	
  allowed	
  to	
  use	
  the	
  resource,	
  and	
  permits	
  the	
  state	
  to	
  requisition	
  resources	
  in	
  the	
  national	
  interests.	
  	
  From	
  the	
  passing	
  of	
  the	
  legislation	
  declaring	
  glacial	
  ice	
  a	
  public	
  resource	
  in	
  Argentina,	
  and	
  the	
  arrest	
  of	
  a	
  man	
  for	
  stealing	
  glacial	
  ice	
  in	
  Chile,558	
  it	
  is	
  clear	
  that	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  is	
  considered	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  sovereign	
  resource	
  within	
  geopolitical	
  boundaries.	
  Applying	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  permanent	
  sovereignty,	
  any	
  ice	
  originating	
  on	
  sovereign	
  territory	
  would	
  establish	
  permanent	
  ownership	
  by	
  that	
  state	
  until	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  lifecycle	
  of	
  the	
  iceberg,	
  regardless	
  of	
  its	
  location.	
  For	
  ice	
  resources	
  located	
  within	
  a	
  single	
  state	
  this	
  designation	
  is	
  unproblematic.	
  However,	
  glaciers	
  are	
  flowing	
  and	
  frozen	
  rivers	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  this	
  leads	
  to	
  icebergs	
  crossing	
  geopolitical	
  boundaries.	
  	
  	
  This	
  leads	
  to	
  the	
  second	
  condition	
  in	
  the	
  lifecycle	
  of	
  an	
  iceberg—the	
  point	
  at	
  which	
  it	
  leaves	
  land	
  and	
  joins	
  with	
  the	
  sea	
  and	
  introduces	
  another	
  problem	
  with	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice.	
  Ice	
  is	
  a	
  natural	
  resource	
  and	
  thus	
  permanent	
  sovereignty	
  applies,	
  however,	
  it	
  is	
  also	
  a	
  fugacious	
  resource	
  belonging	
  to	
  a	
  watershed.	
  Within	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  is	
  a	
  second	
  concept,	
  the	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zone,	
  which	
  provides	
  some	
  answer	
  as	
  to	
  who	
  can	
  exploit	
  the	
  frozen	
  resources	
  before	
  they	
  enter	
  the	
  high	
  seas559	
  and	
  from	
  where	
  those	
  resources	
  can	
  be	
  exploited.	
  Application	
  of	
  this	
  legal	
  principle	
  is	
  the	
  method	
  that	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  557	
  See	
  (United	
  Nations,	
  1962)	
  558	
  (British	
  Broadcasting	
  Corporation,	
  2012)	
  559	
  (Geon	
  1997,	
  p.	
  278)	
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states	
  are	
  currently	
  using	
  to	
  apply	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  iceberg	
  resources.	
  Article	
  56	
  establishes	
  “sovereign	
  rights	
  for	
  the	
  purpose	
  of	
  exploring	
  and	
  exploiting,	
  conserving	
  and	
  managing	
  the	
  natural	
  resources,	
  whether	
  living	
  or	
  non-­‐living.”560	
  With	
  regards	
  to	
  the	
  exploitation	
  of	
  freshwater	
  ice,	
  it	
  would	
  also	
  seem	
  that	
  Article	
  56	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  grants	
  full	
  rights	
  of	
  exploitation	
  of	
  the	
  resource	
  within	
  the	
  limits	
  of	
  a	
  state’s	
  territorial	
  waters.	
  While	
  providing	
  a	
  temporary	
  method	
  for	
  determining	
  a	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice,	
  this	
  article	
  fails	
  to	
  address	
  first,	
  the	
  potential	
  ownership	
  of	
  glacial	
  ice	
  from	
  its	
  location	
  of	
  origin,	
  the	
  fugacious	
  and	
  transboundary	
  nature	
  of	
  icebergs	
  and	
  also	
  fails	
  to	
  address	
  issues	
  around	
  the	
  sustainability	
  and	
  equitable	
  sharing	
  of	
  water	
  resources.	
  	
  The	
  third	
  condition	
  of	
  an	
  iceberg	
  relates	
  to	
  its	
  fugacious	
  or	
  transboundary	
  nature.	
  Over	
  the	
  last	
  century,	
  international	
  law	
  has	
  developed	
  an	
  alternative	
  approach	
  to	
  fugacious	
  resources,	
  such	
  as	
  oil,	
  water	
  and	
  fish,	
  beyond	
  the	
  notions	
  of	
  permanent	
  sovereignty.	
  The	
  sovereign	
  right	
  of	
  a	
  state	
  to	
  use	
  its	
  natural	
  resources	
  within	
  its	
  own	
  territory	
  is	
  not	
  in	
  dispute,	
  albeit	
  with	
  caveats,	
  including	
  transboundary	
  resources	
  and	
  fugacious561	
  resources	
  (such	
  as	
  oil,	
  water	
  and	
  sometimes	
  animals)	
  where	
  often	
  the	
  ‘rule	
  of	
  capture’562	
  has	
  been	
  applied.563	
  This	
  is	
  evident	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  regarding	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  water	
  in	
  the	
  Rio	
  Grande	
  between	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  and	
  Mexico	
  in	
  the	
  early	
  twentieth	
  century.	
  Here,	
  US	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  Justice	
  Harmon	
  applied	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  sovereign	
  immunity	
  or	
  the	
  absolute	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  every	
  nation	
  within	
  its	
  own	
  territory—and	
  thus	
  the	
  absolute	
  right	
  to	
  dispose	
  of	
  the	
  water	
  as	
  it	
  will.564	
  	
  This	
  dispute	
  culminated	
  in	
  the	
  Rio	
  Grande	
  Treaty	
  1906,	
  with	
  the	
  US	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  560	
  (United	
  Nations,	
  1982)	
  561	
  Defined	
  as	
  “Apt	
  to	
  flee	
  away”,	
  (Oxford	
  English	
  Dictionary,	
  2012).	
  562	
  The	
  ‘rule	
  of	
  capture’	
  “provides	
  that	
  ownership	
  is	
  granted	
  to	
  any	
  party	
  who	
  ‘captures’	
  the	
  natural	
  resources	
  by	
  bringing	
  it	
  within	
  its	
  dominion	
  and	
  control”	
  (McLaughlin,	
  2009,	
  p.	
  210).	
  563	
  (McLaughlin,	
  2009,	
  p.	
  210)	
  564	
  (Korwa	
  &	
  Check,	
  2011,	
  p.	
  190)	
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conceding	
  that	
  although	
  it	
  was	
  the	
  upper	
  riparian,	
  Mexico	
  could	
  claim	
  prior	
  appropriation	
  of	
  the	
  water	
  resource—as	
  Mexico	
  it	
  was	
  first	
  to	
  use	
  the	
  resource	
  due	
  to	
  their	
  farmers	
  having	
  used	
  the	
  Rio	
  Grande	
  long	
  before	
  U.S.	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  had	
  reached	
  the	
  region.	
  The	
  U.S.	
  was	
  required	
  to	
  use	
  water	
  with	
  consideration	
  to	
  those	
  downstream	
  depending	
  on	
  this	
  water	
  for	
  their	
  livelihood.	
  	
  	
  In	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  difficulty	
  of	
  legislating	
  for	
  fugacious	
  resources	
  for	
  arguments	
  of	
  economic	
  sustainability	
  and	
  environmental	
  protection	
  already	
  has	
  some	
  history,	
  although	
  the	
  application	
  to	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  is	
  a	
  new	
  extension	
  of	
  the	
  problem.	
  The	
  complexity	
  of	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  fugacious	
  resources	
  first	
  surfaced	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  over	
  the	
  issue	
  of	
  the	
  migratory	
  fur	
  seals	
  introducing	
  the	
  idea	
  of	
  environmental	
  stewardship	
  into	
  international	
  law,	
  following	
  the	
  
Alaska	
  Treaty	
  1867	
  when	
  entrepreneurial	
  individuals	
  from	
  various	
  states	
  took	
  advantage	
  of	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  effective	
  administration	
  and	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  in	
  Alaska,	
  and	
  engaged	
  in	
  extensive	
  hunting	
  and	
  killing	
  of	
  fur	
  seals,	
  which	
  had	
  breeding	
  grounds	
  located	
  in	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  Archipelago.	
  	
  When	
  Washington	
  learned	
  of	
  impact	
  on	
  the	
  fur	
  seal	
  population	
  and	
  on	
  the	
  economic	
  revenues	
  of	
  the	
  Alaska	
  Commercial	
  Company,	
  they	
  moved	
  to	
  prevent	
  indiscriminate	
  destruction	
  of	
  the	
  species	
  with	
  an	
  1870	
  Act565	
  prohibiting	
  the	
  activity	
  by	
  unauthorised	
  individuals.	
  While	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  never	
  tried	
  to	
  prevent	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  navigation	
  or	
  the	
  right	
  of	
  other	
  nations	
  to	
  fish	
  upon	
  the	
  high	
  seas,	
  but	
  had	
  only	
  attempted	
  to	
  protect	
  the	
  fur	
  seal	
  from	
  extinction,	
  an	
  international	
  arbitration	
  court	
  found	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  principles	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas.	
  Thus,	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  lost	
  their	
  moral	
  appeal	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  community	
  in	
  their	
  fur	
  seal	
  stewardship	
  claims	
  with	
  Canada	
  winning	
  the	
  arbitration	
  on	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  economic	
  injustice	
  caused	
  when	
  the	
  U.S.	
  confiscated	
  the	
  equipment	
  of	
  their	
  citizens.	
  However,	
  within	
  a	
  few	
  years	
  the	
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  (Sanger,	
  1869,	
  p.	
  241)	
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maritime	
  nations	
  around	
  the	
  north	
  Pacific	
  entered	
  into	
  the	
  North	
  
Pacific	
  Fur	
  Seal	
  Convention	
  1911,	
  creating	
  a	
  regulatory	
  regime	
  for	
  fur	
  seals,	
  including	
  hunting	
  moratoriums	
  to	
  allow	
  the	
  population	
  to	
  regenerate.	
  	
  While	
  ‘stealing	
  from	
  glaciers’	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  not	
  yet	
  a	
  significant	
  problem,	
  this	
  parallel	
  issue	
  reflects	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  protect	
  glacial	
  ice	
  from	
  those	
  who	
  would	
  practice	
  ruthless	
  business	
  practices,	
  resulting	
  in	
  the	
  degradation	
  of	
  the	
  resource.	
  The	
  fur	
  seal	
  issue	
  demonstrates	
  two	
  different	
  difficulties	
  in	
  the	
  management	
  of	
  fugacious	
  resources	
  that	
  could	
  be	
  applied	
  to	
  freshwater	
  ice.	
  These	
  include	
  the	
  difficulty	
  of	
  managing	
  a	
  fugacious	
  resource	
  from	
  unsustainable	
  predatory	
  practices	
  and	
  the	
  difficulty	
  of	
  protecting	
  these	
  resources	
  from	
  degradation,	
  even	
  if	
  under	
  the	
  guise	
  of	
  the	
  ‘protection	
  of	
  the	
  common	
  heritage	
  of	
  mankind’,	
  while	
  simultaneously	
  abiding	
  by	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law.	
  In	
  this	
  case	
  of	
  protecting	
  fur	
  seals,	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  was	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  under	
  consideration	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  freshwater	
  ice,	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  provision	
  of	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zones	
  under	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982,	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  permanent	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  natural	
  resources	
  and	
  notions	
  of	
  equitable	
  sharing	
  for	
  fugacious	
  resources.	
  	
  In	
  addition,	
  a	
  potential	
  framework	
  for	
  the	
  protection	
  and	
  management	
  of	
  freshwater	
  sea	
  ice	
  would	
  be	
  developed	
  in	
  an	
  entirely	
  different	
  political	
  and	
  legal	
  climate.	
  This	
  includes	
  the	
  notions	
  of	
  rights	
  of	
  exploitation	
  found	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  
the	
  Sea	
  1982,	
  which	
  did	
  not	
  exist	
  in	
  the	
  early	
  twentieth	
  century	
  and	
  also	
  ideas	
  of	
  equitable	
  distribution,	
  environmental	
  sustainability	
  and	
  economic	
  efficiency.	
  	
  	
  Freshwater	
  ice	
  has	
  been	
  discussed	
  as	
  the	
  property	
  of	
  a	
  state	
  within	
  its	
  territory,	
  and	
  it	
  has	
  also	
  been	
  discussed	
  as	
  a	
  resource	
  available	
  for	
  exploitation	
  within	
  the	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zone,	
  but	
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there	
  is	
  one	
  more	
  angle	
  to	
  consider.	
  It	
  is	
  entirely	
  possible	
  that	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  deserves	
  not	
  only	
  status	
  as	
  a	
  natural	
  resource,	
  but	
  that	
  it	
  also	
  must	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  a	
  fugacious	
  water	
  resource,	
  with	
  all	
  the	
  characteristics	
  of	
  a	
  transboundary	
  water	
  resource,	
  including	
  a	
  watershed.	
  The	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  
of	
  Non-­‐Navigational	
  Uses	
  of	
  International	
  Watercourses	
  1997	
  defines	
  a	
  watershed	
  as	
  “a	
  system	
  of	
  surface	
  waters	
  and	
  ground	
  waters	
  constituting	
  by	
  virtue	
  of	
  their	
  physical	
  relationship	
  a	
  unitary	
  whole	
  and	
  normally	
  flowing	
  into	
  a	
  common	
  terminus.”566	
  Ordinarily,	
  the	
  terminus	
  of	
  the	
  watershed	
  would	
  be	
  located	
  at	
  the	
  point	
  where	
  both	
  the	
  surface	
  and	
  ground	
  waters	
  flow	
  into	
  sea.	
  This	
  is	
  because	
  at	
  this	
  intersection	
  of	
  fluids,	
  freshwater	
  and	
  oceanic,	
  it	
  becomes	
  impossible	
  for	
  man	
  to	
  physically	
  separate	
  freshwater	
  from	
  seawater	
  and	
  thus	
  the	
  ocean	
  becomes	
  the	
  natural	
  boundary	
  for	
  the	
  watershed.	
  	
  However,	
  this	
  is	
  not	
  the	
  case	
  with	
  ice	
  from	
  ice	
  shelves	
  or	
  glaciers,	
  which	
  even	
  when	
  in	
  the	
  ocean,	
  retains	
  its	
  freshwater	
  form.	
  Unlike	
  water,	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  does	
  not	
  lose	
  separate	
  identity	
  from	
  oceanic	
  water	
  at	
  the	
  moment	
  that	
  the	
  ice	
  of	
  the	
  glacial	
  watershed	
  enters	
  the	
  sea,	
  but	
  retains	
  it	
  until	
  the	
  point	
  where	
  the	
  sea	
  reaches	
  sufficient	
  temperature	
  to	
  melt	
  it.	
  This	
  creates	
  another	
  problem	
  for	
  determining	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice:	
  if	
  ice	
  is	
  part	
  of	
  a	
  watershed,	
  does	
  this	
  watershed	
  terminate	
  at	
  the	
  point	
  where	
  it	
  flows	
  into	
  the	
  ocean,	
  or	
  does	
  it	
  terminate	
  at	
  the	
  point	
  where	
  the	
  ice	
  melts?	
  And	
  does	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  the	
  natural	
  freshwater	
  ice,	
  as	
  designated	
  by	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  permanent	
  sovereignty,	
  continue	
  until	
  the	
  edge	
  of	
  the	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zone	
  or	
  international	
  border,	
  or	
  until	
  the	
  finality	
  of	
  the	
  watershed	
  is	
  reached—providing	
  that	
  the	
  definition	
  of	
  the	
  terminus	
  of	
  the	
  watershed	
  is	
  considered	
  as	
  the	
  melting	
  point	
  of	
  glacial	
  ice?	
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  (Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  Non-­‐Navigational	
  Uses	
  of	
  International	
  Watercourses,	
  1997)	
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  At	
  this	
  point,	
  additional	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law,	
  which	
  have	
  developed	
  over	
  the	
  last	
  century,	
  must	
  be	
  considered,	
  including	
  notions	
  of	
  prior	
  use,	
  equitable	
  appropriation	
  and	
  responsibility	
  for	
  injury	
  across	
  frontiers.	
  In	
  the	
  case	
  which	
  eventually	
  led	
  to	
  the	
  Rio	
  
Grande	
  Treaty	
  1906,	
  even	
  though	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  did	
  enjoy	
  sovereign	
  and	
  exclusive	
  right	
  to	
  the	
  resources	
  within	
  its	
  territorial	
  boundaries,	
  it	
  also	
  had	
  the	
  duty	
  under	
  international	
  law	
  to	
  “prohibit	
  riparian	
  states	
  from	
  causing	
  harm	
  to	
  other	
  states,	
  and	
  call	
  for	
  cooperation	
  and	
  peaceful	
  resolution	
  of	
  disputes.”567	
  Applying	
  this	
  to	
  freshwater	
  ice,	
  because	
  Canadian	
  industries	
  have	
  been	
  established	
  utilising	
  ice	
  resources	
  that	
  may	
  have	
  originated	
  from	
  Greenland,	
  it	
  would	
  be	
  against	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  for	
  Denmark	
  to	
  cause	
  injury	
  to	
  those	
  industries	
  from	
  Danish	
  overuse	
  of	
  freshwater	
  ice,	
  even	
  though	
  it	
  originated	
  from	
  within	
  their	
  sovereign	
  territory.	
  The	
  same	
  would	
  hold	
  true	
  for	
  any	
  other	
  non-­‐Polar	
  State	
  also	
  utilising	
  polar	
  ice	
  for	
  economic	
  gain.	
  But	
  as	
  “we	
  can	
  see	
  how	
  rising	
  demand	
  and	
  real	
  or	
  threatened	
  water	
  scarcity	
  are	
  shaping	
  ideas	
  of	
  equitable	
  appropriation	
  and	
  leading	
  to	
  new	
  arrangements	
  for	
  sharing,”	
  568	
  we	
  turn	
  to	
  apply	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  efficiency	
  in	
  international	
  law	
  to	
  the	
  sharing	
  of	
  this	
  transboundary	
  water	
  resource	
  beyond	
  the	
  notions	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  both	
  territory	
  and	
  resources.	
  	
  In	
  international	
  law,	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  efficiency	
  is	
  “a	
  norm	
  that	
  offers	
  an	
  optimal	
  allocation	
  of	
  global	
  or	
  transnational	
  resources	
  among	
  states.”569	
  It	
  likely	
  the	
  efficiency	
  principle	
  should	
  apply	
  to	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  even	
  with	
  the	
  constraint	
  of	
  customary	
  law	
  that	
  “state	
  sovereignty	
  –	
  as	
  it	
  is	
  understood	
  today	
  –	
  entails	
  the	
  authority	
  of	
  states	
  to	
  use	
  resources	
  under	
  their	
  sole	
  ownership	
  at	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  567	
  (Salman,	
  2007)	
  568	
  (Schachtner,	
  1977,	
  p.	
  37)	
  569	
  (Benvenisti,	
  2002,	
  p.	
  204)	
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their	
  discretion,	
  even	
  inefficiently.”570	
  This	
  prompts	
  the	
  question:	
  If	
  there	
  is	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  ice,	
  then	
  does	
  the	
  state	
  ever	
  lose	
  it	
  when	
  the	
  resource	
  crosses	
  a	
  boundary	
  and	
  does	
  it	
  then	
  become	
  the	
  sovereign	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  next	
  state?	
  Ordinarily,	
  a	
  state	
  can	
  utilise	
  or	
  waste	
  a	
  resource	
  as	
  desired,	
  but	
  the	
  problem	
  in	
  this	
  instance	
  is	
  that	
  glacial	
  ice,	
  representing	
  a	
  scare	
  resource,	
  will	
  eventually	
  melt	
  into	
  the	
  ocean.	
  571	
  Therefore,	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  utilisation	
  will	
  eventually	
  mean	
  total	
  loss	
  of	
  the	
  resource	
  to	
  the	
  state	
  of	
  origination	
  and	
  also	
  to	
  any	
  other	
  states	
  that	
  could	
  utilise	
  the	
  water	
  resource	
  further	
  ‘downstream’,	
  likely	
  representing	
  a	
  complete	
  opportunity	
  loss	
  for	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  this	
  resource	
  to	
  mankind.572	
  	
  	
  The	
  final	
  condition	
  of	
  the	
  lifecycle	
  of	
  an	
  iceberg	
  involves	
  the	
  potential	
  condition	
  as	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  global	
  commons.	
  The	
  idea	
  of	
  designating	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  as	
  the	
  ‘common	
  heritage	
  of	
  mankind’	
  as	
  a	
  remedy	
  for	
  the	
  inefficient	
  maximisation	
  of	
  the	
  resource	
  by	
  states	
  who	
  could	
  claim	
  a	
  priori	
  rights	
  introduces	
  a	
  final	
  idea	
  to	
  consider	
  regarding	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice.	
  This	
  is	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  res	
  communis,	
  which	
  is	
  applicable	
  because	
  many	
  other	
  resources	
  in	
  the	
  ocean,	
  especially	
  those	
  in	
  the	
  high	
  seas	
  are	
  considered	
  as	
  a	
  collective	
  good.	
  So	
  perhaps	
  ice,	
  under	
  conditions	
  of	
  water	
  scarcity,	
  should	
  also	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  a	
  collective	
  good?573	
  There	
  are	
  some	
  implementation	
  difficulties	
  with	
  this	
  concept,	
  as	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  debates	
  on	
  the	
  possibilities	
  of	
  transporting	
  polar	
  ice	
  to	
  drought	
  stricken	
  areas	
  of	
  Africa.574	
  Due	
  to	
  the	
  finite	
  quantity	
  of	
  ice	
  available	
  in	
  the	
  sea	
  at	
  any	
  given	
  time,	
  it	
  is	
  clear	
  that	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  570	
  (Benvenisti,	
  2002,	
  p.	
  204)	
  571	
  	
  Polar	
  scientists	
  are	
  currently	
  monitoring	
  the	
  problem	
  of	
  the	
  freshening	
  of	
  the	
  oceans	
  due	
  to	
  permafrost	
  and	
  glacier	
  melt.	
  This	
  freshening	
  likely	
  has	
  extreme	
  implications	
  for	
  weather	
  patterns	
  and	
  climate	
  across	
  Europe	
  and	
  North	
  America.	
  	
  A	
  large	
  part	
  of	
  this	
  freshening	
  is	
  from	
  melting	
  permafrost	
  in	
  Russia,	
  which	
  is	
  largely	
  uncontrollable.	
  However,	
  there	
  is	
  potential	
  to	
  diminish	
  contributions	
  to	
  this	
  freshening	
  by	
  harvesting	
  glacial	
  ice.	
  572	
  It	
  is	
  possible	
  that	
  the	
  freshwater	
  lost	
  from	
  glacier	
  melt	
  will	
  return	
  to	
  earth	
  in	
  the	
  rain	
  cycle?	
  573	
  “A	
  collective	
  good	
  is	
  non-­‐appropriable	
  and	
  freely	
  accessible	
  to	
  all,”	
  (Schachtner,	
  1977,	
  p.	
  38).	
  574	
  See	
  (Vladimir	
  Smakhtin,	
  2001),	
  (Spandonide,	
  2009),	
  (Czarra,	
  2002),	
  etc.	
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consumption	
  by	
  some	
  will	
  undoubtedly	
  result	
  in	
  less	
  opportunity	
  for	
  others.	
  As	
  many	
  icebergs	
  will	
  be	
  located	
  inside	
  of	
  the	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zone,	
  there	
  is	
  clearly	
  some	
  jurisdictional	
  difficulty	
  with	
  designating	
  all	
  ice	
  as	
  res	
  communis,	
  especially	
  given	
  that	
  this	
  could	
  cause	
  economic	
  injury	
  to	
  those	
  in	
  prior	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  resource.	
  	
  	
  This	
  discussion	
  presents	
  the	
  continuing	
  problems	
  in	
  concluding	
  a	
  legal	
  status	
  for	
  ice,	
  which	
  for	
  this	
  generation	
  are	
  different	
  to	
  those	
  faced	
  in	
  earlier	
  discussions	
  of	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice.	
  Four	
  legal	
  conditions	
  possible	
  during	
  the	
  lifecycle	
  have	
  been	
  identified	
  including:	
  consideration	
  as	
  permanent	
  resources,	
  as	
  being	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  the	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zone,	
  a	
  condition	
  fugacious	
  or	
  as	
  a	
  transboundary	
  resource	
  and	
  finally,	
  as	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  global	
  commons.	
  	
  However,	
  there	
  are	
  existing	
  legal	
  models	
  such	
  as	
  those	
  on	
  glacial	
  ice	
  in	
  delimited	
  political	
  boundaries,	
  on	
  fugacious	
  resources,	
  principles	
  of	
  transboundary	
  water	
  providing	
  example	
  on	
  how	
  a	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  could	
  be	
  determined.	
  Although	
  it	
  appears	
  that	
  Article	
  56	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  
Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  provides	
  there	
  dominant	
  organisation	
  for	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  ice,	
  the	
  section	
  has	
  shown	
  that	
  this	
  condition	
  could	
  become	
  problematic	
  as	
  the	
  commercial	
  value	
  of	
  icebergs	
  increase	
  or	
  become	
  the	
  source	
  of	
  conflict	
  in	
  an	
  era	
  of	
  water	
  scarcity.	
  	
  
Overlapping	
  Legal	
  Codes	
  of	
  Iceberg	
  Harvesting	
  Regions	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Within	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  there	
  are	
  several	
  overlapping	
  legal	
  codes,	
  both	
  national	
  and	
  international,	
  that	
  are	
  in	
  effect	
  in	
  marine	
  waters	
  containing	
  icebergs	
  thus	
  complicating	
  the	
  arrival	
  at	
  a	
  solution	
  to	
  the	
  potential	
  conditions	
  of	
  icebergs	
  without	
  a	
  distinct	
  management	
  framework	
  created	
  specifically	
  for	
  icebergs.	
  The	
  advancing	
  problem	
  of	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  a	
  legal	
  regime	
  for	
  the	
  harvesting	
  of	
  icebergs	
  is	
  illustrated	
  through	
  the	
  example	
  of	
  the	
  Davis	
  Strait	
  (See	
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Figure	
  1),	
  a	
  region	
  where	
  nearly	
  10,000	
  icebergs	
  are	
  calved	
  each	
  year.575	
  It	
  is	
  here	
  that	
  icebergs	
  begin	
  as	
  a	
  glacial	
  water	
  resource	
  of	
  either	
  Canada	
  or	
  Greenland	
  and	
  then	
  finally	
  exit	
  into	
  the	
  North	
  Atlantic	
  (See	
  Figure	
  2),	
  some	
  eventually	
  escaping	
  into	
  the	
  high	
  seas.	
  The	
  regimes	
  depicted	
  here	
  are	
  the	
  International	
  Iceberg	
  Patrol	
  and	
  the	
  Polar	
  Code,	
  both	
  international	
  mechanisms	
  and	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Waters	
  Pollution	
  Prevention	
  Act	
  1972,	
  a	
  piece	
  of	
  domestic	
  legislation.576	
  While	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  is	
  positive	
  in	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  their	
  individual	
  aims	
  and	
  can	
  provide	
  ample	
  guidance	
  for	
  polar	
  safety	
  and	
  environmental	
  standards,	
  none	
  has	
  jurisdictional	
  authority	
  to	
  cover	
  all	
  northern	
  hemisphere	
  marine	
  areas	
  containing	
  icebergs,	
  including	
  the	
  subarctic	
  areas	
  between	
  Russia	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  States.	
  In	
  addition,	
  it	
  must	
  be	
  remembered	
  that	
  the	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zones	
  of	
  Greenland	
  (Denmark)	
  and	
  Iceland	
  extend	
  for	
  200nm	
  beyond	
  the	
  landmass,	
  but	
  are	
  not	
  depicted	
  in	
  this	
  illustration.	
  	
  	
  
	
  	
  Figure	
  1:	
  Overlapping	
  Legal	
  Codes	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Maritime	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  575	
  (A.	
  Mosbech,	
  2000)	
  576	
  The	
  boat	
  icon	
  on	
  the	
  Figure	
  1	
  is	
  located	
  at	
  the	
  geographic	
  coordinates	
  for	
  the	
  sinking	
  of	
  Titanic	
  on	
  15	
  April	
  1912.	
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  Figure	
  2:	
  International	
  Ice	
  Patrol:	
  General	
  Drift	
  Pattern	
  of	
  Icebergs577	
  	
  The	
  International	
  Ice	
  Patrol	
  (IIP)	
  was	
  established	
  in	
  response	
  to	
  the	
  Titanic	
  tragedy	
  by	
  the	
  International	
  Convention	
  for	
  Safety	
  of	
  
Life	
  at	
  Sea	
  (SOLAS)	
  in	
  1914,	
  giving	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  responsibility	
  for	
  the	
  “study	
  and	
  observation	
  of	
  ice	
  conditions,	
  and	
  ice	
  patrol.”578	
  Its	
  primary	
  function	
  is	
  to	
  report	
  the	
  location	
  and	
  number	
  of	
  icebergs	
  present	
  in	
  the	
  North	
  Atlantic	
  on	
  any	
  given	
  day	
  and	
  also	
  monitors	
  the	
  directional	
  flow	
  of	
  the	
  larger	
  icebergs	
  originating	
  in	
  the	
  far	
  north	
  through	
  satellite	
  tracking	
  and	
  from	
  ship	
  reports	
  on	
  sightings.	
  While	
  the	
  IIP	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  legal	
  mechanism,	
  it	
  demonstrates	
  not	
  only	
  the	
  ability	
  and	
  potential	
  for	
  the	
  international	
  community	
  of	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  cooperate	
  regarding	
  the	
  management	
  of	
  icebergs,	
  but	
  it	
  also	
  provides	
  already	
  existing	
  machinery	
  to	
  monitor	
  the	
  quantity	
  and	
  location	
  of	
  icebergs	
  (See	
  Figure	
  3)	
  that	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  577	
  (A.	
  Mosbech,	
  2000,	
  pp.	
  8-­‐44)	
  578	
  (International	
  Maritime	
  Organization,	
  1914)	
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are	
  available	
  for	
  harvesting.	
  An	
  additional	
  benefit	
  could	
  also	
  be	
  that	
  iceberg	
  harvesting	
  could	
  reduce	
  the	
  threat	
  of	
  icebergs	
  to	
  passing	
  container	
  and	
  passenger	
  vessels.	
  	
  	
  
	
  Figure	
  3:	
  Iceberg	
  Frequency	
  and	
  Locations	
  on	
  15	
  April	
  2012579	
  	
  The	
  Polar	
  Code	
  is	
  a	
  recent	
  mechanism	
  developed	
  through	
  the	
  International	
  Maritime	
  Organization	
  for	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  the	
  maritime	
  environment	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean.	
  It	
  intended	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  shortfalls	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  
Sea	
  1982	
  and	
  the	
  International	
  Convention	
  for	
  the	
  Protection	
  of	
  Pollution	
  from	
  Ships,580	
  which	
  exists	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  extreme	
  conditions	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  As	
  witnessed	
  by	
  Arctic	
  explorers	
  in	
  the	
  nineteenth	
  century,	
  sea	
  ice	
  provides	
  a	
  formidable	
  hazard	
  for	
  polar	
  seafaring,	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  579	
  (International	
  Ice	
  Patrol,	
  2012)	
  580	
  Aims	
  of	
  MARPOL	
  include	
  “preventing	
  and	
  minimizing	
  pollution	
  from	
  ships,”	
  (International	
  Maritime	
  Organization,	
  2011).	
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with	
  many	
  ships	
  becoming	
  stuck	
  fast	
  in	
  the	
  ice	
  and	
  eventually	
  crushed	
  by	
  its	
  forces581,	
  marooning	
  crew	
  on	
  the	
  ice	
  and	
  sending	
  the	
  ship’s	
  cargo	
  to	
  the	
  bottom	
  of	
  the	
  ocean.	
  	
  Some	
  of	
  these	
  dangers	
  have	
  been	
  mitigated	
  as	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  addressed	
  the	
  problems	
  of	
  coordinating	
  for	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  missions	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  with	
  the	
  Agreement	
  on	
  Cooperation	
  on	
  Aeronautical	
  and	
  Maritime	
  
Search	
  and	
  Rescue	
  2011.	
  However,	
  of	
  equal	
  concern	
  are	
  the	
  environmental	
  effects	
  of	
  the	
  spillage	
  of	
  ship	
  cargo,	
  often	
  including	
  fossil	
  fuel	
  extracts,	
  nuclear	
  materials	
  and	
  other	
  hazardous	
  chemicals,	
  which	
  could	
  wreak	
  havoc	
  on	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  ecosystem.	
  As	
  demonstrated	
  by	
  the	
  Exxon	
  Valdez	
  1989	
  and	
  the	
  
Deepwater	
  Horizon	
  2010	
  disasters,	
  ocean	
  oil	
  spills	
  are	
  difficult	
  to	
  clean	
  up	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  this	
  would	
  be	
  compounded	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  presence	
  of	
  sea	
  ice.	
  	
  	
  Additionally,	
  sea	
  ice	
  is	
  a	
  hazard	
  to	
  vessels	
  attempting	
  to	
  traverse	
  through	
  the	
  polar	
  and	
  subarctic	
  seas,	
  as	
  observed	
  by	
  the	
  loss	
  of	
  the	
  many	
  ships	
  including	
  the	
  Titanic	
  in	
  1912	
  and	
  the	
  MS	
  Explorer	
  in	
  2007,	
  and	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  avoid	
  becoming	
  trapped	
  in	
  the	
  ice	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  ships	
  are	
  escorted	
  by	
  ice	
  breakers.	
  The	
  hazards	
  to	
  shipping	
  found	
  in	
  the	
  polar	
  environments	
  creates	
  a	
  gap	
  which	
  is	
  not	
  addressed	
  by	
  the	
  legal	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  International	
  Convention	
  
for	
  the	
  Safety	
  of	
  Life	
  at	
  Sea	
  1974	
  or	
  International	
  Convention	
  for	
  the	
  
Prevention	
  of	
  Pollution	
  From	
  Ships	
  1973,	
  as	
  greater	
  precautions	
  are	
  needed	
  to	
  ensure	
  physical	
  safety	
  of	
  the	
  vessels	
  and	
  passengers	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  sub-­‐Arctic	
  environments.	
  The	
  Polar	
  Code	
  addresses	
  this	
  need	
  by	
  requiring	
  additional	
  structural,	
  safety	
  equipment	
  and	
  even	
  training	
  for	
  vessels	
  and	
  crews	
  entering	
  the	
  polar	
  seas,	
  however,	
  as	
  Figure	
  1	
  illustrates,	
  the	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  the	
  Polar	
  Code	
  does	
  not	
  extend	
  into	
  the	
  subarctic	
  marine	
  areas	
  in	
  which	
  iceberg	
  harvesting	
  occurs.	
  A	
  management	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  581	
  	
  The	
  problem	
  of	
  ships	
  being	
  crushed	
  by	
  ice	
  led	
  to	
  the	
  design	
  of	
  the	
  Fram,	
  a	
  ship	
  designed	
  to	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  float	
  on	
  the	
  Beaufort	
  Gyre.	
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regime	
  for	
  the	
  harvesting	
  of	
  icebergs	
  could	
  address	
  this	
  gap	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  prevent	
  potential	
  environmental	
  hazards	
  due	
  to	
  increased	
  traffic	
  of	
  vessels	
  sailing	
  in	
  iceberg	
  infested	
  waters.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Waters	
  Pollution	
  Prevention	
  Act	
  1972	
  played	
  an	
  instrumental	
  role	
  in	
  influencing	
  the	
  insertion	
  of	
  Article	
  234	
  into	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982,	
  providing	
  retroactive	
  justification	
  through	
  international	
  law	
  for	
  Canada’s	
  restrictive	
  controls	
  over	
  the	
  Northwest	
  Passage,	
  an	
  international	
  strait	
  that	
  Canada	
  deems	
  as	
  internal	
  waters.	
  	
  The	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Waters	
  Pollution	
  Prevention	
  Act	
  1972	
  provides	
  that	
  “no	
  person	
  or	
  ship	
  shall	
  deposit	
  or	
  permit	
  the	
  deposit	
  of	
  waste	
  of	
  any	
  type	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  waters”582	
  and	
  like	
  International	
  Convention	
  
for	
  the	
  Prevention	
  of	
  Pollution	
  From	
  Ships	
  1973	
  provides	
  environmental	
  protection	
  for	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  ocean	
  areas	
  from	
  where	
  icebergs	
  are	
  harvested.	
  However,	
  the	
  jurisdiction	
  extent	
  of	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Waters	
  Pollution	
  Prevention	
  Act	
  1972	
  only	
  reaches	
  to	
  the	
  borders	
  of	
  the	
  Canadian	
  exclusive	
  economic	
  zone	
  and	
  thus	
  is	
  insufficient	
  to	
  protect	
  all	
  the	
  marine	
  areas	
  where	
  icebergs	
  linger.	
  	
  	
  
Regulatory	
  Framework	
  for	
  Freshwater	
  Ice:	
  A	
  Legal	
  Duty?	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Although	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  has	
  been	
  neglected	
  by	
  the	
  policy	
  makers	
  of	
  individual	
  states,	
  it	
  is	
  important	
  for	
  scholars	
  to	
  proffer	
  a	
  discursive	
  framework	
  for	
  a	
  legal	
  regime	
  for	
  the	
  management	
  of	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  as	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  only	
  a	
  potential	
  source	
  of	
  freshwater,	
  but	
  is	
  increasingly	
  being	
  used	
  as	
  a	
  commodity.	
  A	
  legal	
  regime	
  could	
  provide	
  guidelines	
  for	
  finally	
  determining	
  what	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  thus	
  what	
  rights,	
  if	
  any,	
  can	
  be	
  held	
  over	
  ice	
  in	
  both	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  Antarctic	
  regions,	
  preventing	
  potential	
  conflict	
  between	
  States	
  and	
  industries	
  utilising	
  icebergs	
  for	
  economic	
  gain.	
  A	
  legal	
  regime	
  also	
  could	
  provide	
  for	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  ice	
  sheets	
  and	
  glacial	
  features	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  582	
  (Government	
  of	
  Canada,	
  1970)	
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protruding	
  into	
  the	
  ocean,	
  and	
  could	
  provide	
  for	
  the	
  prevention	
  of	
  pollution	
  of	
  the	
  environment	
  in	
  which	
  these	
  features	
  exist.	
  This	
  could	
  be	
  achieved	
  through	
  a	
  regulatory	
  framework,	
  that	
  through	
  licensing	
  determines	
  who	
  has	
  access	
  to	
  the	
  areas	
  in	
  which	
  icebergs	
  exist,	
  what	
  type	
  of	
  equipment	
  is	
  allowed	
  into	
  these	
  areas583	
  and	
  finally,	
  how	
  much	
  ice	
  one	
  is	
  permitted	
  to	
  harvest.	
  	
  	
  As	
  outlined,	
  many	
  of	
  the	
  early	
  debates	
  on	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  revolved	
  around	
  the	
  notion	
  of	
  establishing	
  sovereignty,	
  or	
  sovereign	
  ownership	
  over	
  the	
  ice.	
  However,	
  it	
  can	
  be	
  clearly	
  seen	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  apparent	
  desire	
  by	
  states	
  to	
  establish	
  such	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  ice	
  used	
  for	
  habitation,	
  nor	
  at	
  present	
  does	
  there	
  appear	
  to	
  be	
  an	
  impetus	
  for	
  establishing	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  ice	
  as	
  a	
  natural	
  resource.	
  However,	
  as	
  ice	
  is	
  a	
  potentially	
  much	
  needed	
  source	
  of	
  freshwater,	
  and	
  with	
  its	
  increasing	
  use	
  as	
  a	
  commodity,	
  there	
  are	
  compelling	
  reasons	
  to	
  establish	
  some	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  freshwater	
  icebergs,	
  beyond	
  the	
  provisions	
  of	
  the	
  exploitation	
  rights	
  found	
  in	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  sea	
  as	
  this	
  does	
  not	
  address	
  earlier	
  identified	
  provisions	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  such	
  as	
  permanent	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  water	
  resources,	
  notions	
  of	
  transboundary	
  water	
  law	
  and	
  finally,	
  the	
  problems	
  created	
  through	
  economic	
  inefficiencies	
  of	
  exploitation	
  assumed	
  without	
  a	
  legal	
  framework	
  for	
  allocation.	
  	
  	
  Without	
  regulation,	
  ice,	
  as	
  with	
  other	
  fugacious	
  resources,	
  could	
  be	
  affected	
  by	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  economic	
  inefficiencies	
  as	
  “no-­‐one	
  owns	
  the	
  resource,	
  there	
  is	
  nothing	
  to	
  stop	
  anyone	
  from	
  capturing	
  the	
  benefits	
  of	
  a	
  resources,	
  which	
  leads	
  to	
  an	
  unproductive	
  race	
  to	
  capture	
  as	
  much	
  of	
  the	
  resources	
  as	
  possible...eventually	
  a	
  point	
  will	
  be	
  reached	
  when	
  resource	
  exploitation	
  is	
  saturated	
  and	
  no	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  583	
  This	
  is	
  an	
  area	
  currently	
  being	
  developed	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean	
  through	
  the	
  IMO	
  and	
  the	
  Polar	
  Code.	
  However,	
  many	
  icebergs	
  and	
  ice	
  shelf	
  features	
  exist	
  in	
  areas	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  such	
  as	
  in	
  the	
  Davis	
  and	
  Bering	
  Straits.	
  The	
  Polar	
  Code	
  also	
  does	
  not	
  apply	
  to	
  ships	
  entering	
  the	
  Southern	
  Ocean.	
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rent	
  is	
  gained,”584	
  as	
  was	
  seen	
  with	
  the	
  competition	
  over	
  Fur	
  Seals	
  in	
  the	
  early	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  twentieth	
  century.	
  Applying	
  the	
  problems	
  of	
  inefficiency	
  to	
  the	
  capture	
  of	
  freshwater	
  icebergs,	
  if	
  icebergs	
  continue	
  to	
  remain	
  an	
  unregulated	
  resource,	
  as	
  their	
  benefits	
  and	
  scarcity	
  are	
  realised	
  the	
  competition	
  for	
  harvesting	
  these	
  resources	
  will	
  intensify,	
  likely	
  causing	
  degradation	
  to	
  the	
  environment,	
  despite	
  attempts	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  to	
  prevent	
  the	
  harming	
  of	
  the	
  ocean	
  environments.585	
  	
  	
  The	
  use	
  of	
  icebergs	
  as	
  an	
  economic	
  resource	
  in	
  itself	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  problem.	
  The	
  problem	
  lies	
  in	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  often	
  ice	
  that	
  is	
  incorporated	
  into	
  one	
  nation’s	
  economic	
  activity	
  originated	
  from	
  another	
  state’s	
  territory,	
  and	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  clear	
  indication	
  from	
  international	
  law	
  if	
  there	
  are	
  rights	
  to	
  do	
  so.	
  	
  As	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  originates	
  from	
  terra	
  firma	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  resource	
  of	
  a	
  state,	
  which	
  thus	
  holds	
  both	
  sovereign	
  rights	
  and	
  property	
  rights	
  over	
  the	
  resource.	
  The	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  ice	
  originating	
  from	
  land	
  has	
  been	
  assumed	
  to	
  belong	
  to	
  the	
  territory	
  of	
  origin	
  by	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  System	
  
1959.586	
  The	
  trouble	
  with	
  this	
  ‘probably’	
  status	
  in	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  
Treaty	
  System	
  1959	
  is	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  sufficient	
  title	
  to	
  territory	
  for	
  any	
  state	
  to	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  make	
  a	
  claim	
  to	
  exclusive	
  rights	
  over	
  a	
  resource.	
  In	
  an	
  examination	
  of	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  in	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  before	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  
the	
  Sea	
  1982	
  and	
  the	
  addition	
  Conventions	
  of	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  
System,	
  Lundquist	
  held	
  that,	
  in	
  all	
  likelihood,	
  principles	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  dictated	
  that	
  shelf	
  ice	
  held	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  glacia	
  
firma,	
  the	
  same	
  sovereign	
  status	
  as	
  terra	
  firma	
  and	
  that	
  “international	
  law	
  points	
  toward	
  open	
  access	
  for	
  reasonable	
  iceberg	
  harvesting	
  for	
  all	
  nations	
  on	
  the	
  high	
  seas.”587	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  584	
  (Barnes,	
  2009,	
  pp.	
  2-­‐3)	
  585	
  Such	
  as	
  with	
  the	
  International	
  Convention	
  for	
  the	
  Prevention	
  of	
  Pollution	
  from	
  Ships	
  
1973/1978.	
  586	
  (Rothwell,	
  1996,	
  p.	
  258)	
  587	
  (Lundquist,	
  1977,	
  p.	
  29)	
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In	
  addition	
  to	
  the	
  sovereign	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  likely	
  granted	
  in	
  the	
  
Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  System	
  1959,	
  which	
  sets	
  some	
  precedent	
  for	
  determining	
  the	
  treatment	
  of	
  all	
  freshwater	
  ice,	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  has	
  established	
  principles	
  of	
  permanent	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  resources	
  in	
  a	
  resolution	
  by	
  the	
  General	
  Assembly	
  in	
  1952,	
  saying	
  that	
  “The	
  right	
  of	
  peoples	
  to	
  use	
  and	
  exploit	
  their	
  natural	
  wealth	
  and	
  resources	
  is	
  inherent	
  within	
  their	
  sovereignty.”588	
  As	
  a	
  natural	
  resource,	
  freshwater	
  ice,	
  no	
  matter	
  its	
  form	
  (glaciers,	
  ice	
  shelves,	
  icebergs,	
  etc.),	
  would	
  thus	
  be	
  the	
  resource	
  of	
  a	
  state	
  with	
  that	
  state	
  retaining	
  rights	
  to	
  permanent	
  sovereignty.	
  	
  So,	
  should	
  territorial	
  claims	
  ever	
  be	
  an	
  option	
  in	
  the	
  Antarctic,	
  the	
  freshwater	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  ice	
  shelves	
  would	
  belong	
  to	
  the	
  claimant	
  states.	
  	
  	
  A	
  key	
  issue	
  in	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  a	
  framework	
  for	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  is	
  that	
  this	
  ice	
  is	
  harvested	
  from	
  the	
  ocean	
  and	
  used	
  by	
  coastal	
  communities,	
  providing	
  revenues	
  to	
  groups	
  who	
  hold	
  no	
  recourse	
  for	
  the	
  protection	
  of	
  an	
  industry	
  based	
  solely	
  around	
  freshwater	
  icebergs.	
  While	
  ice	
  has	
  been	
  harvested	
  as	
  a	
  commodity	
  for	
  over	
  a	
  century,	
  harvesting	
  from	
  icebergs	
  and	
  iceberg	
  tourism	
  are	
  relatively	
  young	
  industries	
  providing	
  substantial	
  economic	
  revenues	
  to	
  isolated	
  economies.589	
  The	
  lack	
  of	
  a	
  regime	
  to	
  date	
  can	
  be	
  attributed	
  to	
  two	
  factors:	
  state	
  avoidance	
  in	
  pursuing	
  a	
  regime	
  on	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  islands	
  and	
  ice	
  shelves	
  for	
  fear	
  of	
  losing	
  potential	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  resource,	
  and	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  “absence	
  of	
  resource	
  users	
  who	
  are	
  already	
  owners	
  or	
  holders	
  of	
  conventional	
  rights	
  under	
  common	
  law	
  which	
  has	
  translated	
  into	
  an	
  absence	
  of	
  the	
  chief	
  means	
  by	
  which	
  uses	
  of	
  other	
  resources	
  have	
  exercised	
  demand	
  for	
  modifications	
  of	
  their	
  rights.”590	
  Because	
  there	
  has	
  been	
  no	
  overall	
  designation	
  on	
  the	
  legal	
  status	
  of	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  it	
  is	
  difficult	
  for	
  those	
  who	
  use	
  it	
  to	
  pursue	
  a	
  regime	
  which	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  588	
  (United	
  Nations,	
  1952)	
  589	
  In	
  2004,	
  Iceberg	
  tourism	
  was	
  considered	
  a	
  substantial	
  part	
  of	
  Newfoundland’s	
  $620	
  million	
  dollar	
  industry	
  (Hudson,	
  2004,	
  p.	
  161)	
  and	
  was	
  considered	
  “one	
  of	
  the	
  few	
  new	
  growth	
  industries	
  in	
  Newfoundland,”	
  (Cartier	
  &	
  Lew,	
  2005,	
  p.	
  16).	
  590	
  (Scott,	
  2008,	
  p.	
  57)	
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establishes	
  rights	
  over	
  the	
  resource,	
  which,	
  for	
  example,	
  makes	
  it	
  impossible	
  for	
  the	
  iceberg	
  tourists	
  to	
  make	
  a	
  legal	
  complaint	
  regarding	
  the	
  destruction	
  of	
  their	
  iceberg	
  by	
  an	
  iceberg	
  harvester.	
  	
  	
  A	
  licensing	
  system	
  for	
  harvesting	
  icebergs	
  in	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  was	
  suggested	
  as	
  a	
  possible	
  solution	
  during	
  the	
  1970s	
  to	
  rectify	
  the	
  problems	
  of	
  these	
  economic	
  inefficiencies,	
  but	
  at	
  the	
  time	
  there	
  was	
  not	
  an	
  available	
  regulatory	
  body	
  to	
  manage	
  the	
  system.591	
  However,	
  this	
  obstacle	
  has	
  been	
  overcome	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic	
  with	
  the	
  advent	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  and	
  its	
  development	
  in	
  2011	
  to	
  include	
  a	
  permanent	
  secretariat.	
  For	
  the	
  Antarctic,	
  legal	
  addenda	
  have	
  been	
  created	
  for	
  the	
  region	
  prohibiting	
  the	
  exploitation	
  of	
  living	
  resources	
  and	
  for	
  mineral/hydrocarbon	
  resources	
  and	
  provided	
  for	
  environmental	
  protection.592	
  However,	
  these	
  additions	
  still	
  do	
  not	
  provide	
  guidance	
  on	
  the	
  exploitation	
  of	
  ice,	
  which	
  is	
  neither	
  living	
  nor	
  mineral	
  resource.	
  	
  	
  While	
  to	
  date,	
  there	
  appears	
  to	
  have	
  been	
  little	
  impetus	
  for	
  states	
  to	
  make	
  explicit	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  ice,	
  this	
  does	
  not	
  mean	
  that	
  this	
  non-­‐status	
  for	
  ice	
  should	
  continue	
  indefinitely	
  especially	
  as	
  it	
  appears	
  that	
  under	
  international	
  law	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  legal	
  duty	
  to	
  provide	
  regulation	
  for	
  water	
  resources	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  prevent	
  conflict	
  and	
  to	
  provide	
  environmental	
  protection.	
  The	
  legal	
  duty	
  is	
  a	
  two-­‐step	
  process	
  beginning	
  at	
  domestic	
  level;	
  “Individual	
  states,	
  as	
  a	
  first	
  measure,	
  are	
  expected	
  to	
  adopt	
  adequate	
  legislative	
  and	
  administrative	
  provisions	
  to	
  regulate	
  and	
  control	
  frontier	
  water	
  pollution	
  within	
  their	
  jurisdiction.”593	
  In	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  some	
  of	
  these	
  environmental	
  legislative	
  protections	
  are	
  already	
  in	
  place,	
  but	
  this	
  has	
  led	
  to	
  overlapping	
  legal	
  protection	
  systems.	
  The	
  second	
  step	
  of	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  fulfilling	
  legal	
  duty	
  to	
  cooperate	
  in	
  development	
  of	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  591	
  See	
  (Lundquist,	
  1977,	
  pp.	
  32-­‐3)	
  592	
  Convention	
  for	
  the	
  Conservation	
  of	
  Antarctic	
  Marine	
  Living	
  Resources	
  (1980),	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Regulation	
  of	
  Antarctic	
  Mineral	
  Resources	
  (1988)	
  (not	
  in	
  force),	
  and	
  the	
  Protocol	
  on	
  Environmental	
  Protection	
  to	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  (1991).	
  593	
  (Caponera,	
  1987,	
  p.8)	
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“long-­‐term,	
  systematic	
  planning	
  of	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  shared	
  water	
  resources,”594	
  something	
  that	
  to	
  date	
  is	
  absent	
  in	
  reference	
  to	
  glacial	
  icebergs	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  The	
  creation	
  of	
  a	
  regulatory	
  framework	
  for	
  the	
  harvesting	
  of	
  ice	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  providing	
  the	
  settlement	
  of	
  its	
  legal	
  status	
  would	
  ideally	
  come	
  under	
  the	
  auspices	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  whose	
  aim	
  as	
  an	
  intergovernmental	
  organisation	
  is	
  to	
  “promote	
  cooperation,	
  coordination	
  and	
  interaction	
  among	
  the	
  Arctic	
  States.”595	
  	
  A	
  mandate	
  for	
  any	
  regulatory	
  framework	
  would	
  necessarily	
  need	
  to	
  have	
  establishment	
  in	
  a	
  realm	
  with	
  supra-­‐jurisdiction	
  beyond	
  the	
  realm	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  as	
  no	
  state	
  individually	
  has	
  the	
  authority	
  to	
  legislate	
  for	
  the	
  resources	
  found	
  in	
  the	
  high	
  seas.596	
  	
  As	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  is	
  the	
  primary	
  forum	
  for	
  intergovernmental	
  activity	
  between	
  Polar	
  states	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  logical	
  administrative	
  location	
  for	
  an	
  iceberg	
  harvesting	
  regulatory	
  system	
  and	
  for	
  incorporating	
  the	
  overlapping	
  environmental	
  codes	
  found	
  in	
  the	
  domestic	
  and	
  international	
  Arctic	
  areas	
  into	
  a	
  comprehensive	
  regulatory	
  regimes	
  that	
  both	
  adheres	
  to	
  the	
  codes	
  individually	
  and	
  also	
  addresses	
  the	
  existing	
  deficiencies	
  of	
  harvesting	
  ice	
  without	
  a	
  regulatory	
  system.	
  	
  	
  
Conclusions	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Ice,	
  in	
  both	
  its	
  freshwater	
  and	
  saltwater	
  forms,	
  holds	
  an	
  uncertain	
  legal	
  status	
  under	
  international	
  law	
  for	
  historical	
  political	
  and	
  legal	
  reasons,	
  but	
  it	
  may	
  be	
  the	
  time	
  has	
  come	
  to	
  remedy	
  this	
  status.	
  It	
  is	
  clear	
  that	
  the	
  economic	
  value	
  of	
  ice	
  increasing	
  due	
  to	
  its	
  life-­‐giving	
  properties	
  in	
  a	
  world	
  with	
  growing	
  freshwater	
  needs;	
  ice	
  is	
  also	
  increasing	
  in	
  interest	
  as	
  an	
  economic	
  commodity.	
  Although	
  ice	
  has	
  no	
  real	
  legal	
  status,	
  despite	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  594	
  Ibid,	
  	
  p.7	
  595	
  (Arctic	
  Council,	
  2011	
  a)	
  596	
  (Fisheries	
  and	
  Oceans	
  Canada,	
  2010)	
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indication	
  in	
  the	
  Antarctic	
  Treaty	
  System	
  1959	
  that	
  it	
  should	
  have	
  a	
  legal	
  status,	
  ice	
  in	
  the	
  oceans	
  could	
  be	
  treated	
  as	
  a	
  fugacious	
  resource	
  within	
  the	
  confines	
  of	
  the	
  Exclusive	
  Economic	
  Zone	
  provided	
  under	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  
Sea—although	
  because	
  of	
  the	
  preciousness	
  of	
  freshwater,	
  it	
  should	
  not	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  a	
  sovereign	
  resource	
  but	
  should	
  instead	
  be	
  considered	
  as	
  a	
  transboundary	
  water	
  resource.	
  Thus,	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  need	
  to	
  provide	
  a	
  regulatory	
  system	
  for	
  the	
  harvesting	
  of	
  ice	
  to	
  prevent	
  conflict	
  between	
  those	
  who	
  would	
  process	
  the	
  ice	
  into	
  commercial	
  products	
  and	
  those	
  who	
  enjoy	
  admiring	
  its	
  beauty	
  as	
  an	
  experience.	
  	
  	
  Additionally,	
  the	
  sources	
  of	
  icebergs-­‐-­‐	
  glaciers	
  and	
  ice	
  shelves,	
  need	
  to	
  be	
  protected	
  from	
  those	
  who	
  would	
  engage	
  in	
  predatory	
  practices	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  acquire	
  this	
  resource	
  and	
  there	
  is	
  also	
  a	
  need	
  to	
  prevent	
  the	
  degradation	
  of	
  the	
  environment	
  from	
  pollution	
  and	
  industrial	
  accidents	
  caused	
  by	
  shipping	
  traffic	
  in	
  the	
  area.	
  It	
  has	
  been	
  demonstrated	
  that	
  there	
  are	
  mechanisms	
  in	
  both	
  international	
  and	
  domestic	
  law	
  that	
  aim	
  to	
  provide	
  for	
  some	
  of	
  these	
  problems,	
  but	
  none	
  of	
  them	
  are	
  sufficient	
  to	
  protect	
  the	
  entire	
  extent	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  from	
  which	
  icebergs	
  are	
  harvested	
  or	
  to	
  account	
  for	
  the	
  hazards	
  of	
  operating	
  in	
  the	
  subarctic	
  environment.	
  Therefore,	
  this	
  paper	
  proposes	
  that	
  a	
  regulatory	
  system	
  be	
  established	
  through	
  the	
  authority	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  to	
  establish	
  licensing	
  for	
  iceberg	
  harvesting,	
  including	
  designation	
  of	
  the	
  fields	
  from	
  which	
  it	
  can	
  be	
  harvested	
  and	
  to	
  extend	
  the	
  guidelines	
  of	
  the	
  Polar	
  Code	
  by	
  specifying	
  the	
  types	
  of	
  equipment	
  that	
  must	
  be	
  used	
  when	
  operating	
  in	
  the	
  subarctic	
  environment	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  protect	
  the	
  valuable	
  resource	
  of	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  and	
  to	
  protect	
  integrity	
  of	
  its	
  surroundings.	
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Conclusions	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  aim	
  of	
  this	
  thesis	
  has	
  been	
  to	
  develop	
  a	
  meta-­‐narrative	
  of	
  the	
  longue	
  durée	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  provide	
  a	
  better	
  understanding	
  of	
  how	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  is	
  situated	
  within	
  the	
  domestic	
  structures	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  and	
  within	
  the	
  framework	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  In	
  developing	
  this	
  narrative,	
  this	
  thesis	
  has	
  argued	
  that	
  in	
  the	
  process	
  of	
  establishing	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty,	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  have	
  always	
  acted	
  in	
  accordance	
  with	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  given	
  eras,	
  but	
  that	
  these	
  rules	
  have	
  changed	
  over	
  time.	
  Arguing	
  that	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  changes	
  through	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  rules	
  to	
  the	
  system	
  by	
  states	
  acting	
  as	
  the	
  primary	
  agents	
  within	
  this	
  system	
  it	
  posits	
  that	
  the	
  rules	
  currently	
  situating	
  the	
  Arctic	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  are	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  imperial	
  practices	
  as	
  states	
  have	
  continued	
  to	
  reinforce	
  an	
  asymmetric	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  people	
  and	
  with	
  the	
  territory.	
  It	
  also	
  argued	
  that	
  the	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  is	
  reactive	
  to	
  these	
  changes	
  within	
  the	
  system	
  but	
  that	
  the	
  pursuit	
  specific	
  national	
  interests	
  can	
  be	
  identified	
  in	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  periods.	
  Finally,	
  it	
  argued	
  that	
  governance	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  a	
  method	
  whereby	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  project	
  control	
  over	
  the	
  Arctic	
  outside	
  their	
  sovereign	
  territorial	
  borders	
  with	
  the	
  intent	
  to	
  the	
  exclude	
  of	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states,	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  pursue	
  their	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  
	
  
Chapter	
  1:	
  The	
  Case	
  of	
  the	
  Melting	
  Arctic:	
  Sovereignty,	
  Imperialism	
  
and	
  the	
  International	
  System	
  introduced	
  the	
  conceptual	
  framework	
  by	
  describing	
  the	
  character	
  and	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  in	
  which	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  is	
  being	
  established.	
  It	
  argued	
  that	
  sovereignty	
  is	
  a	
  socially	
  constructed	
  rule	
  that	
  designates	
  state	
  	
  ‘ownership’	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  providing	
  them	
  with	
  security	
  to	
  exploit	
  the	
  resources	
  of	
  the	
  region.	
  States	
  are	
  currently	
  in	
  the	
  process	
  of	
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establishing	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  maritime	
  territories	
  within	
  the	
  current	
  construction	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  with	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  the	
  terra	
  firma	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  having	
  been	
  established	
  under	
  a	
  previous	
  construction	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  The	
  international	
  system,	
  which	
  is	
  socially	
  constructed	
  on	
  a	
  conceptual	
  foundation	
  of	
  the	
  sovereignty	
  of	
  states,	
  has	
  been	
  created	
  through	
  the	
  layering	
  of	
  rules	
  and	
  codes,	
  which	
  in	
  the	
  condition	
  of	
  anarchy	
  guides	
  the	
  behaviour	
  of	
  states.	
  These	
  rules	
  give	
  security	
  and	
  when	
  broken	
  are	
  the	
  cause	
  of	
  insecurity	
  between	
  states.	
  When	
  new	
  rules	
  are	
  added	
  to	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  it	
  causes	
  the	
  system	
  to	
  change	
  shape,	
  with	
  some	
  rules	
  adding	
  turning	
  points	
  in	
  the	
  overall	
  character	
  of	
  the	
  system.	
  During	
  the	
  years	
  of	
  state	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  four	
  eras	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  can	
  be	
  identified	
  in	
  which	
  states	
  have	
  applied	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  system	
  to	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  an	
  imperialist	
  relationship.	
  	
  	
  
Chapter	
  2:	
  A	
  Genealogy	
  of	
  the	
  Rules	
  and	
  Codes	
  of	
  Arctic	
  Sovereignty	
  presented	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  legitimised	
  through	
  state	
  practice,	
  advancing	
  state	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  four	
  different	
  eras.	
  This	
  chapter	
  argued	
  that	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  that	
  frame	
  the	
  Arctic	
  were	
  introduced	
  due	
  to	
  national	
  interests	
  of	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  for	
  security	
  through	
  resource	
  exploitation	
  as	
  states	
  engaged	
  with	
  new	
  territory	
  opportunities	
  beginning	
  in	
  the	
  Age	
  of	
  Discovery.	
  The	
  lineage	
  of	
  these	
  socially	
  constructed	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  reveals	
  the	
  evolving	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  absorption	
  of	
  Arctic	
  territory	
  (both	
  terrestrial	
  and	
  maritime).	
  This	
  lineage	
  also	
  demonstrates	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  through	
  imperial	
  expansion	
  as	
  the	
  territory	
  has	
  been	
  divided	
  between	
  the	
  littoral	
  states.	
  As	
  new	
  interests	
  are	
  identified,	
  states	
  will	
  introduce	
  new	
  rules	
  and	
  codes	
  to	
  acquire	
  international	
  legitimisation	
  permitting	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  their	
  policy	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  realm.	
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Chapter	
  3:	
  United	
  States	
  Arctic	
  Policy	
  1867-­‐2013	
  analysed	
  the	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  from	
  the	
  Alaskan	
  
Purchase	
  Treaty	
  in	
  1867	
  to	
  the	
  publication	
  of	
  the	
  National	
  Strategy	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Region	
  2013.	
  It	
  argued	
  that	
  U.S.	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  continuously	
  aligns	
  itself	
  with	
  the	
  broader	
  grand	
  strategy	
  of	
  U.S.	
  national	
  interests,	
  exemplified	
  in	
  their	
  dedication	
  to	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  maintain	
  their	
  ability	
  to	
  pursue	
  their	
  maritime	
  security	
  strategy.	
  Although	
  U.S.	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  generally	
  reflects	
  their	
  adherence	
  to	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  as	
  a	
  dominant	
  state,	
  they	
  are	
  willing	
  to	
  test	
  the	
  strength	
  of	
  these	
  rules,	
  for	
  example	
  in	
  the	
  attempt	
  to	
  implement	
  protectionist	
  legislation	
  towards	
  fugacious	
  fur	
  seals	
  outside	
  of	
  their	
  territorial	
  boundaries,	
  and	
  are	
  willing	
  to	
  introduce	
  new	
  rules	
  to	
  the	
  system	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  pursue	
  their	
  national	
  interests,	
  as	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  Truman	
  Proclamation	
  of	
  1945.	
  Finally,	
  U.S.	
  practice	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  acts	
  as	
  a	
  stabiliser	
  in	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations	
  against	
  the	
  backdrop	
  of	
  the	
  more	
  exhibitionist	
  policies	
  of	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia,	
  as	
  seen	
  both	
  in	
  their	
  refusal	
  to	
  claim	
  sea	
  ice	
  as	
  sovereign	
  territory	
  and	
  in	
  their	
  application	
  of	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  the	
  continental	
  shelf	
  in	
  spite	
  of	
  their	
  non-­‐ratification	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  
1982.	
  	
  	
  
Chapter	
  4:	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  Foreign	
  Policy	
  1867-­‐2013	
  analysed	
  the	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policy	
  of	
  Canada	
  from	
  the	
  1870	
  Transfer	
  of	
  the	
  
Northwest	
  Territories	
  and	
  Rupert’s	
  Land	
  from	
  Great	
  Britain	
  to	
  the	
  2010	
  Statement	
  on	
  Canada’s	
  Arctic	
  Foreign	
  Policy	
  and	
  subsequent	
  diplomatic	
  statements.	
  The	
  chapter	
  argued	
  that	
  Canadian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  reflects	
  an	
  uncertainty	
  in	
  their	
  possession	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty,	
  which	
  was	
  acquired	
  through	
  transfer	
  from	
  Great	
  Britain,	
  as	
  it	
  was	
  uncertain	
  of	
  its	
  own	
  sovereign	
  position	
  over	
  these	
  territories.	
  To	
  secure	
  this	
  sovereignty,	
  Canada	
  has	
  claimed	
  that	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants	
  have	
  been	
  Canadians	
  since	
  time	
  immemorial,	
  when	
  the	
  relationship	
  of	
  the	
  central	
  government	
  with	
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the	
  Canadian	
  Inuit	
  continuously	
  exhibits	
  the	
  asymmetry	
  of	
  their	
  imperial	
  relationship.	
  As	
  Canada	
  has	
  only	
  been	
  responsible	
  for	
  its	
  foreign	
  policy	
  since	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  Interwar	
  Years	
  it	
  has	
  exhibited	
  an	
  immaturity	
  in	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policy,	
  relying	
  on	
  its	
  southern	
  neighbour	
  for	
  Arctic	
  security	
  during	
  the	
  Cold	
  War	
  Period.	
  In	
  its	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  it	
  attempts	
  to	
  promote	
  their	
  domestic	
  ‘indigenous	
  rule’	
  at	
  the	
  international	
  level	
  and	
  in	
  their	
  representation	
  of	
  borders	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  which	
  have	
  remained	
  contrary	
  to	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  for	
  almost	
  a	
  century.	
  Finally,	
  it	
  argued	
  that	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  secure	
  international	
  recognition,	
  Canada	
  is	
  rebranding	
  its	
  identity	
  as	
  a	
  ‘northern	
  country’	
  by	
  informally	
  changing	
  its	
  national	
  motto,	
  making	
  the	
  Inuit	
  Inuksuk	
  the	
  symbol	
  of	
  the	
  2010	
  Vancouver	
  Olympics,	
  presenting	
  a	
  nationalist	
  narrative	
  of	
  Canada	
  originating	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  at	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Museum	
  of	
  Civilization,	
  amongst	
  others.	
  	
  	
  
Chapter	
  5:	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  Foreign	
  Policy	
  1619-­‐2013	
  analysed	
  the	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policy	
  of	
  Imperial	
  Russia,	
  the	
  Soviet	
  Union	
  and	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation	
  beginning	
  with	
  the	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  into	
  Siberia	
  through	
  to	
  the	
  2008	
  publication	
  of	
  the	
  Principles	
  of	
  State	
  Policy	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  up	
  to	
  2020	
  and	
  Beyond	
  and	
  subsequent	
  diplomatic	
  activity.	
  The	
  chapter	
  argued	
  that	
  although	
  Russia	
  has	
  not	
  formally	
  contradicted	
  the	
  principle	
  of	
  the	
  freedom	
  of	
  the	
  seas,	
  in	
  practice,	
  its	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  has	
  always	
  treated	
  the	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  maritime	
  as	
  a	
  mare	
  clausum,	
  an	
  approach	
  that	
  will	
  be	
  difficult	
  to	
  relinquish	
  as	
  the	
  sea	
  routes	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  become	
  more	
  accessible.	
  The	
  opening	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  provides	
  impetus	
  for	
  Russia	
  to	
  cooperate	
  with	
  the	
  other	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  forming	
  an	
  Arctic	
  cartel	
  and	
  thus	
  still	
  maintaining	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  within	
  the	
  counties	
  of	
  the	
  Far	
  North.	
  It	
  also	
  holds	
  that	
  Russia’s	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  has	
  always	
  been	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  premise	
  that	
  Russian	
  domestic	
  legislation	
  maintains	
  priority	
  over	
  international	
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rules,	
  causing	
  insecurity	
  within	
  Russian	
  international	
  relations.	
  Finally,	
  it	
  argued	
  that	
  every	
  transition	
  in	
  the	
  Russian	
  domestic	
  political	
  structure	
  has	
  forced	
  Russia	
  to	
  redefine	
  its	
  relationship	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic	
  in	
  tandem	
  with	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  but	
  there	
  are	
  inherited	
  Russian	
  identities	
  that	
  have	
  remained	
  constant.	
  Contemporary	
  Russian	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  represents	
  the	
  cumulative	
  effect	
  of	
  this	
  inherited	
  identity	
  and	
  the	
  myth	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  with	
  the	
  development	
  and	
  economic	
  goals	
  of	
  the	
  Russian	
  Federation.	
  	
  
	
  
Chapter	
  6:	
  Arctic	
  Governance:	
  Transformations,	
  Rules	
  and	
  Doctrine	
  introduced	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  governance	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  as	
  a	
  method	
  by	
  which	
  states	
  pursue	
  their	
  national	
  interests	
  outside	
  the	
  realms	
  of	
  sovereign	
  territories.	
  It	
  argued	
  that	
  transformation	
  in	
  both	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  has	
  resulted	
  in	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  governance,	
  and	
  that	
  states	
  are	
  using	
  governance	
  to	
  project	
  their	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  and	
  to	
  promote	
  their	
  Arctic	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  international	
  realm.	
  Although	
  indigenous	
  groups	
  have	
  been	
  included	
  in	
  the	
  governance	
  hierarchy,	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  new	
  rule	
  added	
  to	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  that	
  reduces	
  the	
  primacy	
  of	
  states	
  as	
  the	
  dominant	
  agents	
  of	
  power.	
  Finally,	
  it	
  argued	
  that	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  a	
  governance	
  mechanism	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  rather	
  than	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Treaty	
  constitutes	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  an	
  Arctic	
  Doctrine,	
  whereby	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  States	
  are	
  eliminated	
  from	
  the	
  decision	
  making	
  process	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  in	
  effect	
  creating	
  an	
  Arctic	
  cartel.	
  	
  
Chapter	
  7:	
  A	
  Political	
  Assessment	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Search	
  and	
  Rescue	
  
Agreement:	
  Text,	
  Framing	
  and	
  Logics	
  analysed	
  the	
  politics	
  of	
  the	
  
Agreement	
  on	
  Cooperation	
  on	
  Aeronautical	
  and	
  Maritime	
  Search	
  
and	
  Rescue	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  2011,	
  signed	
  by	
  the	
  eight	
  states	
  with	
  membership	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council.	
  It	
  argued	
  that	
  as	
  search	
  and	
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rescue	
  obligations	
  have	
  already	
  been	
  addressed	
  through	
  other	
  international	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  hard	
  law,	
  this	
  SAR	
  agreement	
  facilitates	
  a	
  means	
  whereby	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  are	
  able	
  to	
  project	
  their	
  security	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  region	
  through	
  cooperative	
  joint	
  military	
  manoeuvres	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  while	
  still	
  maintaining	
  the	
  image	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  as	
  a	
  zone	
  of	
  peace.	
  As	
  the	
  first	
  instrument	
  of	
  hard	
  law	
  negotiated	
  through	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  the	
  agreement	
  serves	
  as	
  solidification	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Doctrine	
  through	
  the	
  continued	
  exclusion	
  of	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states.	
  Additionally,	
  although	
  some	
  Arctic	
  states	
  use	
  indigenous	
  people	
  to	
  assist	
  with	
  search	
  and	
  rescue	
  capabilities,	
  their	
  exclusion	
  as	
  signatories	
  to	
  the	
  agreement	
  represents	
  the	
  continued	
  asymmetric	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  signals	
  the	
  continuance	
  of	
  the	
  imperial	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  and	
  the	
  indigenous	
  inhabitants.	
  	
  	
  
Chapter	
  8:	
  A	
  Pending	
  Governance	
  Issue:	
  The	
  Legal	
  Status	
  of	
  Ice	
  postulated	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  regulatory	
  gap	
  within	
  polar	
  law	
  on	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  ice	
  within	
  international	
  law.	
  	
  It	
  argued	
  that	
  because	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  can	
  be	
  scientifically	
  classified	
  as	
  a	
  mineral,	
  that	
  it	
  qualifies	
  for	
  claims	
  to	
  sovereignty	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  permanent	
  sovereignty	
  over	
  resources.	
  However,	
  because	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  originates	
  in	
  glaciers	
  and	
  ultimately	
  converts	
  into	
  water	
  losing	
  its	
  status	
  as	
  a	
  mineral,	
  the	
  fugacious	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  resource	
  causes	
  some	
  difficulty	
  in	
  its	
  treatment	
  under	
  existing	
  water	
  legislation.	
  After	
  a	
  discussion	
  of	
  the	
  gaps	
  in	
  the	
  legal	
  regimes	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  the	
  chapter	
  argued	
  that	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  a	
  mechanism	
  for	
  the	
  regulation	
  of	
  ice	
  harvesting.	
  Freshwater	
  ice	
  is	
  growing	
  in	
  importance	
  as	
  a	
  commercial	
  commodity,	
  but	
  as	
  water	
  scarcity	
  becomes	
  a	
  global	
  issue,	
  it	
  falls	
  within	
  the	
  remit	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  to	
  create	
  a	
  legal	
  status	
  for	
  freshwater	
  ice	
  to	
  preserve	
  the	
  resource	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  potentially	
  preventing	
  environmental	
  damage	
  to	
  the	
  fragile	
  Arctic	
  ecosystem.	
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  To	
  complete	
  this	
  research,	
  this	
  thesis	
  employed	
  process-­‐tracing,	
  beginning	
  with	
  contemporary	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  to	
  which	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  are	
  proclaiming	
  adherence,	
  including	
  the	
  
United	
  Nations	
  Convention	
  on	
  the	
  Law	
  of	
  the	
  Sea	
  1982,	
  to	
  develop	
  a	
  lineage	
  of	
  international	
  law	
  that	
  creates	
  the	
  legal	
  framework	
  for	
  the	
  establishment	
  of	
  terrestrial	
  and	
  maritime	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  This	
  method	
  served	
  to	
  identify	
  transitions	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  that	
  frames	
  these	
  rules,	
  dividing	
  them	
  into	
  four	
  discrete	
  eras	
  as	
  state	
  practice	
  with	
  territorial	
  expansion	
  and	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  changed	
  tack	
  with	
  these	
  evolving	
  rules	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  achieve	
  their	
  national	
  interests.	
  To	
  analyse	
  the	
  Arctic	
  policy	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Canada	
  and	
  Russia	
  in	
  comparative	
  analysis,	
  this	
  research	
  engaged	
  with	
  empirical	
  data	
  including:	
  treaties,	
  policy	
  statements	
  and	
  legislative	
  materials—such	
  as	
  congressional	
  records	
  and	
  policy	
  documents—as	
  well	
  as	
  other	
  official	
  documents	
  such	
  as	
  maps,	
  postage	
  stamps	
  and	
  national	
  museum	
  exhibitions	
  and	
  archives.	
  It	
  also	
  used	
  information	
  from	
  other	
  government	
  agencies,	
  newspaper	
  archives	
  and	
  historical	
  accounts,	
  when	
  available.	
  To	
  analyse	
  how	
  Arctic	
  governance	
  is	
  situated	
  within	
  international	
  relations,	
  this	
  research	
  relied	
  on	
  not	
  only	
  the	
  materials	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  policy	
  sections	
  of	
  this	
  thesis,	
  but	
  used	
  official	
  documents	
  from	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  treaties	
  and	
  other	
  diplomatic	
  statements	
  relating	
  to	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations.	
  	
  	
  While	
  it	
  is	
  unlikely	
  that	
  this	
  research	
  has	
  used	
  empirical	
  data	
  never	
  before	
  seen,	
  the	
  way	
  in	
  which	
  it	
  is	
  collated	
  and	
  synthesised	
  in	
  this	
  thesis	
  presents	
  an	
  empirical	
  and	
  theoretical	
  angle	
  on	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  different	
  to	
  other	
  materials	
  produced	
  on	
  the	
  topic.	
  Throughout,	
  it	
  has	
  raised	
  questions	
  concerning	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system	
  and	
  the	
  way	
  in	
  which	
  states	
  engage	
  with	
  this	
  system	
  as	
  they	
  pursue	
  their	
  national	
  interests	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  region	
  through	
  domestic	
  policy	
  and	
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governance.	
  And	
  while	
  it	
  might	
  not	
  provide	
  a	
  complete	
  solution	
  to	
  future	
  issues,	
  challenges	
  and	
  conflicts	
  facing	
  policy-­‐makers	
  engaging	
  in	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations,	
  it	
  does	
  provide	
  a	
  framework	
  for	
  analysing	
  the	
  Arctic	
  different	
  to	
  the	
  mainstream	
  
realpolitik	
  or	
  liberal	
  institutionalist	
  approaches.	
  	
  	
  Throughout	
  this	
  research,	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  the	
  researcher	
  on	
  the	
  topic	
  has	
  also	
  evolved.	
  Beginning	
  with	
  an	
  approach	
  similar	
  to	
  other	
  Realist	
  conceptions	
  of	
  Arctic	
  international	
  relations,	
  this	
  project	
  began	
  from	
  the	
  premise	
  that	
  states	
  act	
  only	
  in	
  their	
  national	
  interests	
  and	
  would	
  pursue	
  their	
  interests	
  of	
  territorial	
  sovereignty	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  contrary	
  to	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  As	
  empirical	
  sources	
  were	
  collated	
  and	
  analysed	
  within	
  the	
  Constructivist	
  research	
  framework,	
  this	
  position	
  was	
  tested	
  and	
  what	
  has	
  been	
  discovered	
  instead,	
  is	
  that	
  states	
  are	
  not	
  prone	
  to	
  absolute	
  disregard	
  for	
  the	
  rules	
  because	
  it	
  is	
  states	
  that	
  have	
  socially	
  constructed	
  these	
  rules	
  and	
  that	
  these	
  rules	
  are	
  in	
  themselves	
  a	
  form	
  of	
  security,	
  causing	
  insecurity	
  when	
  ignored	
  in	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  state	
  policy.	
  Thus	
  for	
  the	
  Arctic,	
  its	
  surrounding	
  states	
  are	
  compelled	
  to	
  follow	
  these	
  rules,	
  but	
  when	
  their	
  interests	
  are	
  restricted	
  by	
  existing	
  rules,	
  they	
  introduce	
  new	
  rules	
  to	
  the	
  system	
  which	
  furthers	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  their	
  policy.	
  The	
  rules	
  are	
  created	
  by	
  states	
  in	
  their	
  interests	
  and	
  thus	
  rather	
  than	
  ignore	
  the	
  rules	
  in	
  the	
  pursuit	
  of	
  their	
  national	
  interests,	
  they	
  create	
  opportunities	
  to	
  extend	
  the	
  rules	
  through	
  international	
  consensus.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Furthermore,	
  during	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  this	
  research	
  that	
  developed	
  a	
  meta-­‐narrative	
  of	
  the	
  longue	
  durée	
  of	
  Arctic	
  policy,	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  the	
  approach	
  of	
  this	
  thesis	
  is	
  that	
  it	
  might	
  benefit	
  decision-­‐making	
  within	
  foreign	
  policy	
  by	
  those	
  who	
  are	
  willing	
  to	
  employ	
  this	
  research	
  strategy.	
  It	
  appears	
  that	
  often,	
  foreign	
  policy	
  decisions	
  are	
  based	
  on	
  information	
  and	
  interests	
  in	
  a	
  given	
  episodic	
  event,	
  in	
  some	
  cases	
  leading	
  to	
  military	
  engagement	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  realign	
  the	
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situation	
  with	
  a	
  state’s	
  national	
  interests.	
  Although	
  drawing	
  heavily	
  on	
  contemporary	
  examples	
  from	
  U.S.	
  foreign	
  policy,	
  these	
  include	
  the	
  Cuban	
  Missile	
  Crisis	
  (analysed	
  by	
  Graham	
  Allison),	
  the	
  Iraq	
  War,	
  and	
  Operation	
  Enduring	
  Freedom,	
  amongst	
  many	
  others.	
  In	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  examples,	
  should	
  policy	
  makers	
  have	
  taken	
  the	
  opportunity	
  to	
  turn	
  an	
  episodic	
  analysis	
  into	
  a	
  meta-­‐narrative	
  of	
  the	
  longue	
  durée,	
  they	
  would	
  have	
  discovered	
  more	
  nuances	
  of	
  interests	
  and	
  identity	
  inlaid	
  with	
  the	
  forces	
  of	
  empire	
  in	
  ages	
  past.	
  	
  	
  Policy	
  makers	
  would	
  have	
  discovered	
  that	
  countries,	
  such	
  as	
  Iraq	
  and	
  Afghanistan,	
  now	
  legally	
  classified	
  as	
  states	
  within	
  the	
  international	
  system,	
  gained	
  their	
  condition	
  of	
  statehood	
  by	
  designation	
  upon	
  the	
  disintegration	
  of	
  empire,	
  and	
  responsibility	
  for	
  institutions	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  that	
  Europe	
  has	
  taken	
  centuries	
  develop	
  were	
  suddenly	
  thrust	
  upon	
  these	
  political	
  units.	
  Many	
  of	
  these	
  states	
  tenuously	
  cling	
  to	
  the	
  façade	
  of	
  statehood,	
  which	
  sometimes	
  crumbles	
  when	
  challenged	
  by	
  domestic	
  forces	
  or	
  outside	
  infringements	
  (such	
  as	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  Somalia).	
  Empires	
  drew	
  territorial	
  boundaries	
  in	
  convenient	
  lines	
  on	
  imperial	
  maps	
  and	
  issued	
  new	
  ‘states’	
  with	
  contiguous	
  territory	
  that	
  should	
  never	
  have	
  rationally	
  been	
  joined	
  into	
  a	
  single	
  political	
  unit.	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  weak	
  institutions	
  of	
  domestic	
  government,	
  the	
  drawing	
  of	
  these	
  dubious	
  territorial	
  boundaries	
  amalgamating	
  ethnic	
  and	
  religious	
  factions	
  has	
  ultimately	
  resulted	
  in	
  civil	
  conflict	
  within	
  these	
  states.	
  	
  As	
  these	
  factions	
  are	
  ignited	
  by	
  passions-­‐-­‐or	
  the	
  chains	
  of	
  society	
  that	
  Rousseau	
  deplored-­‐-­‐it	
  is	
  exceedingly	
  difficult	
  for	
  the	
  project	
  of	
  democracy	
  to	
  succeed	
  in	
  these	
  states.	
  Given	
  more	
  nuanced	
  knowledge	
  of	
  these	
  situations,	
  perhaps	
  states	
  would	
  have	
  either	
  reconsidered	
  engagement	
  or	
  used	
  different	
  methods	
  to	
  achieve	
  their	
  policy	
  objectives.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  the	
  limitations	
  identified	
  during	
  the	
  introduction,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  inability	
  to	
  access	
  materials	
  written	
  in	
  different	
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languages	
  and	
  some	
  difficulty	
  in	
  accessing	
  archival	
  materials	
  due	
  to	
  funding	
  or	
  restricted	
  permissions,	
  the	
  concluding	
  of	
  this	
  research	
  has	
  revealed	
  further	
  theoretical	
  and	
  empirical	
  limitations.	
  This	
  research	
  has	
  focused	
  on	
  the	
  application	
  of	
  the	
  rule	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  through	
  a	
  Constructivist	
  research	
  framework	
  and	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  foreign	
  policy	
  as	
  states	
  engage	
  with	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  However,	
  this	
  approach	
  is	
  conceptually	
  limited	
  in	
  that	
  it	
  classifies	
  ‘interests’	
  generally,	
  and	
  does	
  not	
  place	
  priority	
  on	
  one	
  interest	
  over	
  another,	
  except	
  through	
  the	
  patterns	
  of	
  state	
  practice.	
  When	
  empirical	
  samples	
  revealing	
  patterns	
  of	
  state	
  practice	
  are	
  accumulated,	
  they	
  appear	
  to	
  focus	
  on	
  the	
  national	
  interest	
  of	
  security	
  through	
  territorial	
  integrity,	
  buffer	
  zones	
  and	
  international	
  cooperation.	
  Yet,	
  although	
  these	
  security	
  motives	
  for	
  the	
  acquisition	
  of	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  are	
  important	
  for	
  the	
  early	
  stages	
  of	
  empire,	
  in	
  an	
  era	
  of	
  advanced	
  military	
  hardware,	
  they	
  are	
  not	
  completely	
  rational	
  for	
  the	
  change	
  of	
  rules	
  that	
  have	
  allowed	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states	
  to	
  acquire	
  maritime	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  	
  The	
  reason	
  for	
  the	
  introduction	
  of	
  the	
  rule	
  changes	
  that	
  allows	
  this	
  absorption	
  of	
  territory	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  is	
  to	
  permit	
  states	
  to	
  pursue	
  security	
  through	
  resource	
  sovereignty.	
  During	
  the	
  development	
  over	
  the	
  longue	
  durée,	
  the	
  theme	
  of	
  economic	
  benefits	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  continuously	
  reappears	
  throughout	
  the	
  entirety	
  of	
  state	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  In	
  fact,	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  economic	
  benefits	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  sea	
  routes	
  during	
  the	
  early	
  stage	
  of	
  capitalism	
  that	
  is	
  the	
  initial	
  impulse	
  drawing	
  empires	
  to	
  the	
  region.	
  Thus,	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  this	
  researcher,	
  that	
  this	
  subject	
  matter,	
  while	
  still	
  employing	
  the	
  methodology	
  of	
  the	
  creation	
  of	
  a	
  meta-­‐narrative	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty,	
  would	
  be	
  advanced	
  if	
  analysed	
  through	
  the	
  lens	
  of	
  classical	
  Marxism,	
  including	
  the	
  collation	
  of	
  empirical	
  data	
  that	
  focuses	
  on	
  the	
  economic	
  earnings	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  gained	
  through	
  exploitation	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  The	
  use	
  of	
  classical	
  Marxism	
  would	
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allow	
  for	
  a	
  continuation	
  of	
  the	
  theme	
  of	
  asymmetry	
  between	
  the	
  core	
  of	
  imperial	
  governments	
  and	
  the	
  fringes	
  of	
  Arctic	
  territory,	
  including	
  the	
  alienated	
  relationship	
  with	
  indigenous	
  people,	
  but	
  more	
  importantly,	
  it	
  would	
  allow	
  for	
  a	
  focus	
  on	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  the	
  Artic	
  as	
  an	
  economic	
  base	
  for	
  the	
  empires	
  absorbing	
  the	
  Arctic	
  to	
  fulfil	
  their	
  national	
  interest	
  of	
  economic	
  security	
  as	
  they	
  engage	
  with	
  the	
  capitalist	
  structure	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Finally,	
  there	
  are	
  implications	
  that	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  this	
  research	
  has	
  for	
  the	
  future	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  First,	
  this	
  research	
  could	
  be	
  expanded	
  beyond	
  the	
  limited	
  scope	
  of	
  the	
  project	
  to	
  apply	
  this	
  strategy	
  to	
  case	
  studies	
  of	
  the	
  littoral	
  Arctic	
  states	
  not	
  explicitly	
  included	
  as	
  case	
  studies	
  in	
  this	
  thesis.	
  Secondly,	
  this	
  research	
  could	
  be	
  expanded	
  to	
  include	
  all	
  the	
  states	
  with	
  membership	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council,	
  analysing	
  their	
  Arctic	
  policies	
  and	
  their	
  pursuit	
  of	
  governance	
  against	
  the	
  background	
  of	
  their	
  engagement	
  with	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  international	
  system.	
  The	
  expansion	
  of	
  this	
  scope	
  would	
  ideally	
  not	
  only	
  reproduce	
  the	
  findings	
  of	
  this	
  thesis,	
  but	
  it	
  would	
  also	
  result	
  in	
  the	
  completion	
  of	
  a	
  complete	
  account	
  of	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  sovereignty	
  around	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Ocean,	
  providing	
  policy	
  makers	
  both	
  within	
  Arctic	
  and	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states	
  with	
  a	
  complete	
  picture	
  of	
  international	
  relations	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  expanding	
  adding	
  to	
  episodic	
  analysis	
  (in	
  relation	
  to	
  the	
  already	
  developed	
  longue	
  durée)	
  of	
  governance	
  and	
  treaty	
  mechanisms	
  as	
  they	
  continue	
  to	
  increase	
  in	
  quantity.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Additionally,	
  this	
  research	
  strategy	
  could	
  be	
  applied	
  to	
  data	
  sets	
  outside	
  of	
  the	
  Arctic	
  states,	
  including	
  considering	
  questions	
  on	
  how	
  the	
  development	
  of	
  Arctic	
  sovereignty	
  and	
  governance	
  mechanisms	
  affect	
  non-­‐Arctic	
  states	
  with	
  interests	
  in	
  Arctic	
  resources	
  and	
  shipping.	
  Secondly,	
  a	
  comparative	
  analysis	
  between	
  the	
  Arctic	
  and	
  the	
  Mediterranean,	
  both	
  enclosed	
  seas,	
  could	
  be	
  made	
  questioning	
  the	
  economic	
  and	
  infrastructural	
  implications	
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for	
  the	
  Mediterranean	
  as	
  trade	
  is	
  drawn	
  away	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  opening	
  of	
  sea	
  routes	
  in	
  the	
  Arctic.	
  Thirdly,	
  the	
  implications	
  of	
  an	
  independent	
  Scotland	
  for	
  the	
  status	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  Kingdom	
  within	
  the	
  Arctic	
  Council	
  could	
  be	
  assessed.	
  And	
  finally,	
  as	
  discussed	
  earlier,	
  this	
  research	
  strategy	
  could	
  be	
  applied	
  to	
  other	
  situations	
  of	
  interest	
  in	
  foreign	
  policy	
  to	
  policy	
  makers,	
  both	
  past	
  and	
  future.	
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